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Abstract 
 
 
The thesis is a socio-legal account of Italian penality between 1970 and 2000. It analyses the 
Italian experience as a critical case study with which to test David Garland, Alessandro De 
Giorgi and Nicola Lacey’s theories of punishment in contemporary Western polities. It argues 
that Italian penality is not sufficiently explained by reference to Garland or De Giorgi’s meta-
theories of ‘late modern’ and ‘post-Fordist’ punishment. Lacey’s institutional analysis 
provides a better framework, if modified to allow for the centrality of political dynamics in 
Italy.  
  
The thesis argues that Italian penality is a ‘volatile penal equilibrium’, whose ‘differential 
punitiveness’ is marked by oscillations between repression and leniency. The thesis provides 
an institutional analysis of Italian punishment, investigating in turn the Italian political 
economy, political culture and state-citizen relations, judicial contributions to penal trends, 
and the punishment of non-EU migrants. The thesis argues that Italian penality can be 
systematised by reference to political dynamics, in particular political conflict and political 
dualisms. Political conflict can broadly be defined as conflict between political interests, 
ranging from parties through to broader political groups such as families; dualisms are 
tensions produced by opposing institutional dynamics. The thesis analyses these conflicts and 
dualisms in terms of penal pressures, either in favour of penal exclusion or moderation. Italy’s 
institutional structure incorporates political conflict, and fosters structural tensions. The result 
is that Italy’s volatile political equilibrium is conveyed through its institutions to the penal 
realm, producing a volatile penal equilibrium. 
 
Ultimately, the Italian case study demonstrates that contemporary theories of penality should 
explicitly incorporate political dynamics and their institutional anchorage. Italian penality can 
be analysed in terms of the nature of the state and its institutions and inclusion and exclusion 
from political belonging. Contemporary theories would profit from incorporating this 
analysis. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
How are we to explain contemporary Italian penality? Though Italy is, by rights, a 
‘contemporary Western democracy’ its penality appears to differ from that described in 
authoritative accounts of contemporary punishment. Similarly Italy’s economy, politics and 
culture cannot be easily superimposed upon the economy, politics and culture analysed in 
these accounts. What then is the accounts’ explanatory capacity for Italy? And what are the 
primary determinants of punishment in Italy? This thesis provides my answers to these 
questions. It is an account of Italian penality between 1970 and 2000 and uses Italy as a so-
called ‘critical case study’1, insofar as my analysis of punishment in Italy serves to critique 
existing theories of contemporary Western penality. In particular, my thesis takes its cue from 
the analyses of David Garland in The Culture of Control; Alessandro De Giorgi in Re-
Thinking the Political Economy of Punishment; and Nicola Lacey in The Prisoners’ 
Dilemma
2
. All three theorists are concerned with explaining contemporary developments in 
Western punishment.  
Garland and De Giorgi aim to explain how and why Western nations are (arguably) 
traversing a period of ‘increasing punitiveness’: a quantitative and qualitative intensification 
of formal punishment. This increasing punitiveness is purportedly manifest in rising 
incarceration rates: experienced as of the early 1970s by the United States and, to a lesser 
degree, the United Kingdom
3
. Both authors tether these penal changes to broader contextual 
transformations. In David Garland’s account, punishment is what he calls a ‘social 
institution’4. This means that, although it appears to be ‘an apparatus for dealing with 
criminals’, punishment in fact embodies ‘a whole web of social relations and cultural 
meanings’5. Punishment can then be ‘read’ to discern such meanings. This is, in a sense, what 
Garland does in The Culture of Control
6
, which explains contemporary penality by reference 
to ‘late modernity’: a series of social, political, economic and cultural shifts that have 
conditioned how crime is interpreted and dealt with in contemporary societies. Alessandro De 
Giorgi, who gives a political economic account of punishment, links contemporary penality to 
transformations in modes of production. His account is one of penality in ‘post-Fordism’, 
with its progressive contraction of large scale industrial labour; an emphasis on deregulation; 
and the expulsion of large sectors of the work force from full-time, secure employment.  
                                                     
1
 See: Hancké (2009, pp. 68-71) 
2
 De Giorgi (2006b); Garland (2001); Lacey (2008c) 
3
 Garland (2001, p. 14) 
4
 Garland (1990, p. 187) 
5
 Ibid. 
6
 Garland (2001) 
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Insofar as both Garland and De Giorgi use explanatory categories – late modernity 
and post-Fordism – that transcend specific contexts, it can be assumed that their theories 
purport to apply across Western nations
7
. By contrast to both Garland and De Giorgi, Nicola 
Lacey addresses the issue of divergence in punishment across Western nations. Her starting 
observation is that increasing punitiveness, as manifest in increasing imprisonment, is a 
reality only for certain western nations: notably the United States and, in Europe, the United 
Kingdom. Differences should be drawn even between these two nations
8
, but where the UK is 
then compared to nations such as Germany, we also witness a striking contrast. Germany has 
displayed penal stability across the decades
9
, and Lacey uses this fact as an illustration of the 
broader point that contemporary penality is articulated differently across different nations
10
. 
Moreover, she argues that this difference can be explained by reference to different ‘varieties 
of capitalism’11. In particular, she contrasts so-called liberal market economies (LMEs) and 
co-ordinated market economies (CMEs) and their institutional structures. To summarise, 
Lacey’s argument is that different institutional structures create different penal incentives. In 
liberal-market economies exclusion from economy and body politic through incarceration has 
relatively low costs. By contrast the organisation of co-ordinated market economies makes it 
more ‘sensible’ to reintegrate deviants. Where, as in CMEs, reintegration is the more 
advantageous option, we may then find lower, more stable, rates of imprisonment. Lacey 
hypothesises that in nations that display greater penal leniency, the institutional structure has 
intercepted the ‘global level’ changes associated with ‘late modernity’ and/or ‘post-Fordism’, 
to yield different penal outcomes. In this sense the ‘punitiveness’ of Garland and De Giorgi’s 
account is more situated than their explanatory categories would lead us to believe.  
 
Where does Italy fit within this scenario? Italy is a ‘contemporary Western European nation’; 
this means that it too is presumed to have transitioned into ‘late modernity’ or into ‘post-
Fordism’. As a Western European nation it is also a suitable subject for Lacey’s analysis of 
penal divergence. Though Italy is neither an LME nor a CME (Chapter 3) it too presents an 
institutional structure that will have ‘intercepted’ changes in the global political economy, and 
in the socio-political structure. This means that Italy can provide an illustration of how 
national institutions affect penality, whether it is to produce punitiveness or leniency.  
                                                     
7
 Ibid., p. 75 
8
 The USA’s prison rates (1970 -2006) are so high that they stand alone compared to other 
Western nations: see Lacey’s figures for world imprisonment rates with and without the USA 
(2008, pp. 139,140) 
9
 Lacey (2008, p. 199) 
10
 Lacey (2008, pp. 55-113) 
11
 Lacey builds on Peter Hall and David Soskice’s models (2001) 
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In fact, as I will explain in the coming pages, Italy presents features that cast doubt on 
all three theoretical accounts – Garland, De Giorgi and Lacey (accounts that are, in any case, 
not free from controversy
12
).  First and foremost, Italian penality neither displays the 
increasing incarceration rates presumed in The Culture of Control and in Re-Thinking the 
Political Economy of Punishment; nor does it display the stable penal rates of Lacey’s 
alternative comparators: co-ordinated market economies. As I will show in Chapter 2, Italian 
prison rates oscillated between 1970 and 2000: though incarceration increased overall, it did 
so unevenly, in a series of peaks and troughs. In this sense Italian penality is neither 
univocally punitive, nor univocally lenient. Rather, it is beset by what I will call a leniency-
punitiveness dualism.  
The theories advanced by Garland, De Giorgi and Lacey cannot account for this 
dualism, although in principle (as a Western European nation) Italy should fall within their 
analytical remit. My thesis starts from this basic observation, to provide a set of interpretive 
hypotheses that explain the specific Italian experience. It does so by drawing on literature on 
Italian criminal justice and political culture, as well as on some statistical material. In so 
doing, it qualifies the three theories from which my work began. My thesis is a ‘mid-level’ 
theoretical account: this means that it is situated below macroscopic theories of contemporary 
penality; but above more particular, empirical studies of punishment in Italy. The thesis 
develops a range of hypotheses; but it is not possible to fully prove some of my arguments 
with available empirical data (see below). However, in the coming pages I do identify the 
additional empirical research that would allow my claims to be tested, spelling out the nature 
of the approach required when conducting future research. 
 
In this introduction I will first formulate the research question answered in my thesis. The 
succeeding section details the scopes and limits of the thesis and is followed by an 
explanation of the boundaries of my work. Firstly, I account for my choice of theories. 
Secondly, I account for the national context that I have chosen to explore: why Italy? The 
section ends with an explanation of the timeframe by which my research is limited (1970-
2000). The rest of the introduction then provides detailed accounts of Garland, De Giorgi and 
Lacey’s three analyses. It lays out the theoretical framework within which my argument 
proceeds. The introduction concludes with a note on methodology and an outline of the 
thesis’s structure. 
 
                                                     
12
 For critiques of The Prisoners’ Dilemma see: "Review Symposium on Nicola Lacey, The 
Prisoners' Dilemma: Political Economy and Punishment in Contemporary Democracies" 
2011) For a sample of critical literature on The Culture of Control see: Ian Loader and Sparks 
(2004); Zedner (2002). 
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I. Research Questions 
This thesis addresses a number of questions. The first and broadest question is whether 
contemporary Italian penality can be characterised in terms of increasing punitiveness. I have 
already given a brief, headline: Italian penality presents a leniency-punitiveness dualism. The 
question that follows is how to explain this dualism. In particular, and given my theoretical 
starting points, the research investigates the socio-political changes that have affected Italian 
penality between 1970 and 2000. I also ask what political-economic transformations have 
influenced its penal evolution over the same period. This subset of questions aims to 
investigate whether Italian penality can be analysed as ‘late modern’ or indeed as ‘post-
Fordist’.  
Considering where and why Italian penality diverges from the more macroscopic 
accounts provided by Garland and De Giorgi, I then interrogate whether this divergence can 
be explained by reference to Italy’s institutional structure. The Prisoners’ Dilemma provides 
the theoretical framework for this line of inquiry. I thus ask if and how Italy fits the models 
used by Lacey, and what the penal incentives are that the Italian institutional/political set up 
creates. Given that all three theorists provide a guide but not a blueprint for my analysis, I ask 
if other factors are important in explaining Italian penality. This is also a question of relative 
weight: I thus ask whether particular institutional variables (the electoral system as opposed to 
modes of production as opposed to social interpretations of punishment) occupy a more 
significant place in Italy than they do in Garland’s late modern polities, De Giorgi’s post-
Fordist economies, and Lacey’s varieties of capitalism. The final question that this thesis 
asks, and which underlies it, is what Italian penality tells us about broader theories of 
contemporary penality. If the latter are supposed to encompass Italy and its penal evolution, 
but do not do so, can my account of Italian penality help us refine their claims?  
II. Why investigate punishment? 
At the root of this thesis lies one other question of fundamental importance: why investigate 
punishment in Italy at all? Aside from interesting challenges posed by the Italian case, this 
also raises the broader question of why we should investigate contemporary punishment and 
penal escalation in any context. The answers that Garland and Lacey give to this issue are 
particularly insightful. They are, moreover, answers whose sentiment I share, to the point of 
having chosen their theories as a starting point for this thesis. It is therefore useful to look at 
each in turn.  
 13 
Garland argues that his ‘history of [crime control’s] present’ implicitly bears  ‘a critical, 
normative dimension’13. This dimension is one that ‘[urges] us to identify the dangers and 
harms implicit in the contemporary scheme of things, and to indicate how our present social 
arrangements might have been – and might still be – differently arranged’14. His concern is, 
therefore, to undertake a critical appraisal of ‘the culture of control’ and all it entails: 
including the ‘danger’ of increasing incarceration.  Garland, by analysing the evolution of 
criminal justice in the contemporary context, also points to historical junctures at which 
different policy choices could have been made. Of course, to the extent that his explanations 
are tethered to the coming of ‘late modernity’, i.e., to the onset of global changes, they seem 
to offer a ‘counsel of despair’15. Garland appears to be focusing more on what ‘might have 
been’ rather than what ‘might still be’ different. Here Lacey’s account offers more hope, 
identifying institutional conditions under which penal moderation has been sustained. The 
aspiration is that we may maintain and even replicate such conditions where possible
16
. My 
thesis forwards this aim by investigating conditions of punitiveness/leniency in a nation not 
easily encompassed in either Garland or Lacey’s accounts, but that can nonetheless be seen as 
posing similar concerns on the dangers of punishment in contemporary polities. 
The normative concerns that inform The Prisoners’ Dilemma are articulated in its preface: 
‘[it] is generally agreed that the humanity, fairness and effectiveness with which governments 
manage their criminal justice systems is a key index of the state of a democracy’17. A nation 
in which incarceration is increasingly relied upon to manage social exclusion, thus seems to 
go against our (albeit debated) notions of contemporary democracy. Similarly, so does a state 
in which social exclusion is stigmatized through narratives that point to crime as ‘evil’, and 
urge a forceful and condemnatory response
18
.  
Clearly the position that critiques contemporary penal expansion in terms of its anti-
democratic credentials is controversial; not least because the very concept ‘democracy’ is 
highly debated
19
. A word is needed, therefore, to explain how this thesis conceptualises the 
link between punishment and democracy. My interest in investigating penality, and in 
particular Italian penality, rests on the belief that punishment and political membership are 
connected. The way we punish – the extent to which we punish and the means with which we 
do so – speak of how our societies constitute their political membership. They speak in 
                                                     
13
 Informed by Michel Foucault: Garland (2001, p. 3) 
14
 Ibid., p. 3 
15
 Lacey (2008, p. 25) See also: Ian Loader and Sparks (2004, p. 15); Zedner (2002) 
16
 Lacey (2008, p. xvii) 
17
 Ibid. p. xv 
18
 Narratives of the ‘criminology of the other’: Garland (2001, pp. 184-185) 
19
 Lacey (2008, pp. 6-7) 
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particular of who is ‘defined out of the edifice of citizenship’20; of the ‘insiders’ and the 
‘outsiders’ within our political communities. Ultimately, personal belief and political 
philosophies will determine what level of penal exclusion we feel is compatible with 
democracy. Yet we can still posit a link between the construction of our political 
communities, punishment’s role in this construction, and conceptions of contemporary 
democracy. An investigation of contemporary punishment thus becomes an important 
investigation of the conditions of membership in our political communities.  
Punishment in contemporary Western societies also speaks to how we confront the crucial 
issue, articulated by Lacey, of ‘[responding] effectively and even-handedly to rights 
violations represented by criminal conduct without resorting to measures which in fact negate 
the democratic membership and entitlement of offenders’21. Here, investigations of penality 
are important insofar as they allow us to gain clear understanding of the political and 
institutional conditions under which this challenge is best met.  
We could, in fact, extend Lacey’s statement to argue that investigations of 
contemporary punishment can help us understand when social conflict might be better 
resolved without the criminal law; even where the apparent absence of criminal law seems to 
precipitate social conflict. This dilemma is particularly salient in Italy, where the ambiguity of 
the criminal law is at the forefront, and its presence and absence can be equally problematic. 
Public debates in Italy have often centred around the absence of law, understood as the law’s 
ineffectiveness or frequent breach. Italy is, in this interpretation, ‘Illegal Italy’22; a nation 
beset by scarce respect for the law, and whose democracy suffers for it
23
. Here the challenge 
is to break down the issues raised by ‘illegality’ without turning to the penal law as the 
obvious or unique solution. The challenge is to pre-empt over-reliance on the criminal law, 
knowing that it may, under given circumstances, lead precisely to the high levels of 
incarceration experienced in the UK.  
 In Italy, the need to understand this dilemma is more important still where we consider 
that responses to challenges to the state – for example organised crime – have often come 
from within the judicial sphere. This has coincided with the growing vision of judges as 
guardians of democracy. Surely this interpretation of the judiciary is much idealised, and 
glosses over differences within the judicial class (Chapter 5). However, to the extent that the 
narrative of judges as democratic guardians persists in Italy, in public and political circles, it 
has to be confronted. The danger in not doing so is to stimulate an acritical reliance upon the 
penal law and its agents, ignoring the pitfalls of such an approach. The danger is that attempts 
                                                     
20
 Dahrendorf (1985, p. 98) quoted in Lacey (2008, p. 6) 
21
 Lacey (2008, pp. 7-8) 
22
 Scamuzzi (1996a) 
23
 See also Foot (2003, p. 62) 
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to bolster democracy will be enacted with penal tools, whose excess use may threaten the 
very same.  Expanding outwards from Italy we can say that the urgency lies not just in 
identifying the institutional conditions that have limited penal expansion in Europe, but also 
in identifying those national features that might become opportunities for penal expansion: 
such as perceptions of ‘lawlessness’. These conditions and opportunities should be identified 
to bolster existing buffers to punitiveness by indicating, for example, when the apposite 
solution lies outside the penal realm
24
. My thesis aims to contribute to this endeavour: first for 
Italy and then for our broader accounts of contemporary penality. 
 
III. Scopes and limits of this thesis. 
My thesis provides hypotheses and theoretical conclusions on penal trends in Italy and on 
their implications for Garland, De Giorgi and Lacey’s accounts of contemporary punishment. 
Some of my hypotheses/conclusions are supported by statistical data, in particular statistics on 
imprisonment and recorded crime, and statistics on migrant presence, employment and 
incarceration in Italy. However, not all claims advanced in this thesis are tested empirically,  
partly because available data is lacking (see below). My claims have been formulated at a 
‘middle theoretical level’, i.e., sensitive to contextual variation but pitched at the level of 
Italian institutions and institutional history, rather than at the level of more particular 
analyses. I argue that my claims provide the theoretical framework within which more 
particular accounts can be inscribed
25
.  
The hypotheses and theoretical conclusions that I put forward are consequently 
articulated in terms of political and political-economic structures, national political 
economies; modes of employment; patterns of civic trust; judicial actors; political 
ideologies
26. This has meant that certain ‘elements’ of the Italian experience have been dealt 
with at a general level: the level of  ‘national penality’. I am thinking here in particular of 
organised crime and political terrorism, phenomena that I discuss primarily in terms of the 
impulses they produce in favour of penal moderation or penal expansion, though both would 
be worthy of theses unto themselves. Where I have formulated hypotheses at this general 
level, I have however indicated paths for further research that would allow the hypotheses to 
                                                     
24
 To achieve what Loader and Sparks term ‘more intelligent public discourse about crime, 
and less anti-social forms of social control’ (2004, p. 27) 
25
 Garland has a similar approach but a higher level of generality (2001, p. 21) 
26
 In some cases, given the nature of the phenomenon in question, empirical data will not be 
available. For example, claims on political ideologies and their effect on attitudes to crime 
cannot easily be verified by data. This should not stop us from hypothesising about these 
effects, seeking support in existing historical and political accounts, and fuelling future 
empirical studies. 
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be tested, either by seeking additional existing empirical data or by generating further data 
through primary investigation
27
. 
Given my emphasis on Italian political culture and its institutional articulations, my thesis is 
not strictly an account of criminology and criminological discourse in Italy; its approach is 
akin to that adopted in The Prisoner’s Dilemma. This again follows from my decision to 
concentrate on dynamics – political and economic – external to the criminological sphere. It 
also follows from the fact that the context itself suggested fruitful lines of inquiry in this 
direction. Italian political culture and institutional evolution emerged as particularly suited to 
an analysis of Italian penality, even where they were not paramount within my theoretical 
starting points. There may of course be other, equally plausible ways of investigating Italian 
penality. I hope to have provided a solid framework within which to conduct future research 
and with which to investigate other avenues that are complementary to my own analysis. 
The Italian context again offered guidance for two of the specific areas that I investigate in 
this thesis: judicial actors and migrants. The choice of judicial actors follows also from the 
basic assumption that the agents of penality should be part of our broader analysis of penal 
trends
28
.  Whatever the causal mechanisms that we identify as crucial to contemporary 
punishment, we need to understand how judicial actors mediate them, and thence how they 
are or are or are not ‘translated’ into punishment. Judicial actors also have particular 
importance in Italy, given the role that the judiciary has played in the Republic at the national 
political and judicial levels. I will analyse in Chapter 5 how the Italian judiciary has, to some 
extent, become a force pitched against the political class. This has occurred through a re-
calibration of the institutional balance of powers in Italy (Appendix), and has had a lasting 
impact on the rhetoric and themes of the Italian political scene. It thus becomes essential to 
analyse the way in which the evolution of the judicial role has affected the deployment of 
penal powers; and what impact this may have had on Italian penality.     
David Nelken’s work further suggests that judicial actors, and indeed penal procedures, 
occupy a noteworthy role in Italian penal trends:  
‘In Italy […] to make sense of prison numbers it is crucial to focus on what actually 
goes on in the criminal process. Prison rates are low […] as a default consequence of 
processes of attrition; many cases start out, but few arrive at a conclusion.’29 
                                                     
27
 In Michele Salvati’s words this thesis provides ‘an interpretive scheme […] a skeleton with 
sufficient meat on its bones to give an idea of how the whole body might appear’ which,  
‘precisely because of its incompleteness, shows the [body’s] principal mechanisms’ (2000, p. 
V). 
28
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Nelken here is arguing that legal delays are a crucial aspect of Italian penality: delays, 
produced or precipitated by Italian penal procedure, are such that they filter out a good 
portion of cases before a custodial sentence can be imposed
30
. This is just an example of the 
relevance of the judicial sphere to Italian punishment. We can take Nelken’s insights and 
combine them with an institutional approach to penality, contextualising judicial actors within 
the broader Italian institutional framework. We can ask how penal procedure relates to this 
framework; what causes high levels of attrition; whether they can be interpreted as the 
expression of wider (institutional, political, cultural) trends? Chapter 5 provides my answers 
to these questions.  
The thesis investigates not just the (judicial) agents of Italian penality, but also its 
subjects, and in particular non-EU migrants. This is partly because of the significant role that 
immigrants occupy in two of the theories on which my work builds. Non-EU migrants are, 
indeed, important figures in both De Giorgi’s and Lacey’s accounts of contemporary penality. 
In this the latter can be set alongside a growing body of work on the punishment of migrants 
in contemporary European polities
31
. Note, however, that the significance of non-EU migrants 
is quite different in De Giorgi’s theorisation than in Lacey’s. In the former, migrants are the 
‘archetypal’ post-Fordist workers; their punishment is a concentrate of broader penal trends32. 
By contrast, for Lacey the punishment of migrants can – in given circumstances – be an 
exception within otherwise penally moderate nations. It marks the conditions of inclusion in 
re-integrative polities
33
.   
Migrants are highly relevant within the Italian context. During the last decade of the 
twentieth century, Italy became a host nation to non-EU migrants. Since then, migrants’ 
presence has increased on Italian territory, in the Italian economy, in the media, in political 
discourse; in the Italian prison system. This has itself sparked academic interest in the specific 
dynamics of migrant punishment in Italy, one primary example of which is the work of Dario 
Melossi
34
. My own analysis (which responds to the ‘social relevance’ of immigrants in Italy) 
asks how we should understand the punishment of migrants in Italy: as an archetype, as an 
exception, or neither? (Chapter 6) I also relate this question to my broader analysis: I 
interrogate how Italy’s institutional structure and political system – reflecting on Italian penal 
trends – also reflect on migrant punishment. What, if anything, does the incarceration of 
foreigners tell us about Italian penality? 
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IV. Boundaries: theorists, time and space 
In this section I explain how I have constructed my investigation. I explain why I have chosen 
to work with Garland, De Giorgi and Lacey’s analyses; why I have chosen Italy as my case 
study; and why I have narrowed my exploration to the period 1970 - 2000
35
.  
 
i. Why the theories? 
Why have I selected Garland, De Giorgi and Lacey as a basis for my thesis? Their claims are 
not, after all, uncontested
36
. Beginning with David Garland – and aside from the ‘scope and 
authority’ of The Culture of Control37 – we note that he sees ‘the institutions of crime control 
and criminal justice’ as part of a broader ‘network of governance and social ordering’38. 
Penality, he argues, is ‘grounded in specific configurations of cultural, political and economic 
action [and] will tend to signal correlative transformations in the structure of social fields and 
institutions that are contiguous to it’39. This means that, by tracing changes in penality, we can 
also trace broader contextual changes: punishment acts as litmus test for ‘cultural, political 
and economic’ evolution in contemporary polities. Since this theory allows us to treat 
punishment as something more than a matter of criminal justice, it leads us to ask what is 
being talked about and what is at stake – over and above the ‘reality’ of victimisation – when 
(as in contemporary Britain) crime and social order dominate the political field
40
.  
Garland’s approach also enables us to investigate the connection between penality 
and ‘statehood’. I use the term ‘statehood’ to denote the standing and evolution of the 
contemporary nation state and, in Garland’s account, the transition from the ‘modern’ to the 
‘late modern’ state. I also use the term to indicate membership of the political community in 
contemporary polities, and the mechanisms through which it is constituted. Punishment plays 
a role in constituting this membership; Garland’s account is invaluable in investigating this 
connection, insofar as it tethers changes in criminal justice to ‘the creation of […] new […] 
civic narrative[s]’41.   
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 For a historical account of Italy see Appendix. 
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 Ian Loader and Richard Sparks have critiqued The Culture of Control on substantial and 
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One additional feature of The Culture of Control that makes it an apt starting point for 
my thesis is the level of generality at which the account operates. This is a feature that it 
shares with De Giorgi’s account, though Garland’s analysis functions in terms of ‘late 
modernity’ and De Giorgi’s in terms of ‘post-Fordism’. In both cases transition into these eras 
is thought to have occurred at a ‘global’ level: the changes they brought have occurred over 
and above single national realities
42
. Pitched at this level of generality, Garland and De 
Giorgi’s accounts lend themselves to contextualisation, an approach that Garland himself 
urges us to adopt
43
. Contextual adaptation is precisely what my thesis undertakes.  
 
Re-Thinking the Political Economy of Punishment is a fruitful theoretical starting point in that 
it analyses contemporary penality through the lens of the political economy. This position 
draws explicit links between contemporary economic conditions and contemporary penal 
evolution. It also demystifies the link between crime and punishment that, in its most basic 
form, would have punishment and crime react directly one to the other
44
. By contrast, in De 
Giorgi’s as in other political economic accounts, changing modes of production will have 
greater impact on modes of punishment than crime control policies
45
. Much like Garland, De 
Giorgi sees penality and incarceration as symptomatic of broader societal evolution. The work 
of the two authors is complementary: while De Giorgi provides a heightened and detailed 
attention to political economy, Garland provides an analysis of the cultural implications of the 
political economic changes detailed by De Giorgi. Garland’s discussion of ‘new collective 
experiences’ of crime provides us with a new way of conceptualising the relationship between 
crime and punishment (see below). He allows us to re-introduce crime in our analyses of 
contemporary penality, even where we agree with De Giorgi that punishment may have more 
to do with modes of production than with rates of recorded crime
46
.  
 
De Giorgi and Garland, however, do not constitute a sufficient basis for an analysis of Italian 
penality. Both theories, precisely because articulated at the macroscopic level, can and have 
been subject to critique
47. De Giorgi’s account, for example, pays little attention to agents of 
penality. His analysis may, like other political-economic accounts before his, be critiqued on 
the grounds that it tends to prioritise economic determinants of punishment, at the expense of 
all other factors
48
. His lack of attention to penal agents also follows from the fact that he deals 
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with political economic and penal processes at a very general level. His work presumes 
‘global’ convergence both at the economic level (where all Western nations are assumed to be 
post-Fordist) and at the penal level (where all Western nations are assumed to have 
experienced increasing punitiveness). Garland is more attentive to agents of change, in 
particular criminologists and criminal justice professionals
49
, but he too presumes substantial 
convergence across Western European democracies. His theory of ‘late modern penality’ 
operates on the assumption that statehood has developed in a similar fashion across Western 
polities and that cultural and political transformations have everywhere been similar to those 
detailed in The Culture of Control. Garland’s account also presumes that the outcome of such 
changes has been a ‘late modern penality’, visible across contexts, with increasing 
incarceration as its beacon.  
However, as Nicola Lacey has noted, comparisons across European nations reveal 
divergence as much as they reveal convergence. This is so at the penal level and at the level 
of political economic/social change. Here, Lacey’s attention to systematic penal variation 
makes her work a useful starting point. It allows for a critical analysis of contemporary penal 
theories through the medium of a national case study. By working with The Prisoners’ 
Dilemma we can do a number of things: firstly, we can try and understand Italian penal 
divergence in a systematic fashion, i.e., linking to its institutions; secondly, we can construct a 
dialogue between Italy and broader theories of contemporary punishment. Moreover, the 
additional advantage of an institutional analysis is that it ties penality to more ‘manageable’ 
phenomena: institutions rather than macroscopic processes; electoral systems and industrial 
relations rather than ‘late modernity’ and ‘post-Fordism’. As Lacey herself contends, this 
means that we can then identify where to intervene should we wish to influence current penal 
trends
50
. An institutional approach to punishment allows us, that is, to resist the conclusion 
that punitiveness and rising prison rates are a settled fate for all contemporary Western 
polities. 
ii. Why Italy?  
Why then is Italy an interesting critical case study? Most basically because, though it should 
fall within the remit of Garland, De Giorgi and Lacey’s theories, in many respects it does not 
do so. This is true in terms of penality  – with its oscillation between punitiveness and 
leniency – but also in terms of the components of the three theoretical models. Italy presents a 
number of discrepancies with these models, and this prejudices their capacity to explain 
Italian penality. To give one example, we can look to Italian economic evolution. I will show 
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in Chapters 3 and 4 that the Italian political economy has developed in a regionalised and 
stratified manner. So much so that analyses of the Italian political economy have often been 
centred on the nation’s fractures. Italy has been characterised as divided into three broad 
economic areas; it has also been described in terms of the differences existing between north 
and south
51
. Debated as these characterisations have been, they demonstrate the existence of 
multiple, if interlinked, economic systems in Italy. These range from the north-west and its 
large scale industries; to the north east and centre, with their multiple small and medium-sized 
industries; to the south with its agricultural past and an economy that rests heavily on 
absorption into public bureaucracy (Chapter 3)
52
. This is a simple and synchronic description, 
but it highlights that the Italian political economy escapes unitary categorisation as ‘Fordist’ 
and ‘post-Fordist’. Italy never was a nation characterised – as a whole – by large-scale 
industrial production relying primarily on unskilled labour. Moreover, differences across 
regions and across sectors have persisted, as the nation has responded to ‘global econmic 
crisis’. Given these persisting differences, Italy raises interesting questions about the 
applicability of De Giorgi’s account to its political economy and (thence) penality.  
Shifting away from the Italian economy to look at the Italian state, we then note a 
first discrepancy with Garland’s account. This discrepancy is of particular importance given 
the connection posited by Garland between statehood and punishment. His theorisation of 
‘late modern’ penality builds upon the transformation of the ‘modern nation state’ – 
unchallenged in its authority and monopoly over law and order – into the ‘late modern’ nation 
state – no longer possessed of such monopoly or unequivocal authority. This account is 
difficult to superimpose upon Italy, where the state’s authority has been challenged from the 
outset. Partly this reflects the nature of Italy’s unification: ‘unification from above’, enacted 
primarily by Italian elites, unable to iron out existing territorial differences within national 
territory
53
. The relationship between the Italian state and its components has remained tense 
and, without foreshadowing coming chapters, I suggest that Italy’s centre and periphery are 
engaged in a competition that neither is strong enough to win. This has produced a state beset 
by internal weaknesses, even as it asserts strong central power. Looking back at Garland, we 
then see obvious discrepancies with the evolution of ‘his’ modern state and the evolution of 
modern Italy. We should also note how challenges to state authority in Italy have had a 
criminal, highly political, form. During the course of the post-war years the Italian Republic 
has faced violent challenges at the hands of national terrorism (left and right) and organised 
crime (Appendix and Chapters 2 and 3). These phenomena have affected crime and 
punishment in Italy. They also emphasise that, if penal accounts that link state sovereignty 
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and contemporary punishment are to apply to Italy, they will have to incorporate these and 
similar challenges to state authority. Such accounts should, that is, be capable of applying to 
European nations like Italy, whose formation and consolidation has not followed the ‘typical’ 
transition into modernity
54
. Where they do not, the Italian case is an appropriate one with 
which to refine their claims.  
It seems that Italy, contrasting with Garland and De Giorgi’s theoretical starting 
points, is best seen in comparative context, the approach taken in The Prisoners’ Dilemma. 
However, and this is why Italy is such an interesting case study, even Lacey’s comparative, 
context sensitive theory, is unable to fully incorporate Italian penality. The Prisoners’ 
Dilemma builds upon the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) models put forth by Hall and 
Soskice
55. The two primary ‘varieties of capitalism’ in this account are liberal market 
economies and co-ordinated market economies (LMEs and CMEs) which possess institutional 
features that act in concert. They act, that is, via a series of positive feedback loops, with each 
feature reinforcing the others. The Italian institutional structure cannot easily be described in 
terms of such feedback loops; often its institutions seem to act in contradictory ways
56
. This is 
why comparative analyses of the Italian political economy and institutions have tended to 
emphasise its ‘hybridity’ relative to existing models: for example Italy has been classed as a 
‘mixed market economy’57. The difficulties of classifying Italy are aptly summarised by John 
Foot in his historical account: 
 
‘One of the most important interpretative questions regarding Italy is that of 
comparison. Who do we compare Italy with? […] Italy has both Southern European 
and Northern European characteristics […] has been “backward” and highly 
advanced at the same time, and often in the same region. One of the fascinating 
features of Italian history lies in […] the difficulties [of ] placing it into easy 
categories.’58 
 
 
Extending this analysis to the penal realm, we then find that Italian penality is difficult to 
explain in terms of institutional ‘coherence’: whether the latter stimulates punitiveness or 
moderation. I argue that the institutional set up in Italy nonetheless produces penal incentives 
worthy of investigation. In fact the very absence of coherence, comparable to the CME/LME 
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models, is the outcome of Italian institutional features: first and foremost a political system 
highly permeable to diverse, fragmented interests. The question then becomes if and how the 
different penal incentives produced by the Italian system can be mapped within a framework, 
so as to situate Italian penality. Given that Italy shares features with its neighbouring nations 
– including the archetypal LME Britain, and the archetypal CME Germany – we also need to 
ask why its penality differs from the punitiveness of one and the moderation of the other. We 
cannot assume that Italy is necessarily ‘exceptional’ in Europe, or that the VoC models 
necessarily exhaust the field
59
. We should, instead, endeavour to find plausible explanations 
for Italy’s penal dualism within the European context. Ultimately this exercise will enhance 
our understanding of punishment in ‘central’ LME/CME cases: perhaps by highlighting 
features of the relationship between institutions and penality, otherwise overshadowed by the 
models’ coherence. 
 
iii. Why the timeframe? 
These preliminary examples illustrate why Italy is an apposite case study against which to test 
theories of contemporary penality. What remains to be explained is the timeframe for my 
investigation: 1970 to 2000. The starting date for this period has been selected by reference to 
the theories on which my thesis builds. Both Garland and De Giorgi identify the early 1970s 
as the beginning of the political, social economic and penal transformations, that they deal 
with
60
. De Giorgi is in fact even more specific, arguing that 1973 is a ‘watershed’ for penality 
‘found in the same years in which the crisis of Fordism has been located’61. My own decision 
to investigate Italian penality, as of 1970, is a means of testing Garland and De Giorgi’s 
theories against the Italian reality: testing penality in ‘late modern’ or ‘post Fordist’ times 
from the time at which they are (roughly) thought to have begun. 
 The cut-off point for my investigation is motivated more by ‘internal’, national 
factors than external comparators
62
. Before explaining what these are, I should specify at the 
outset that there is a sense in which all periodisations are artificial: it is very rare to find 
historical ‘clean breaks’ from the past and this is also true of Italy63. Thus, my choice of the 
year 2000 as a cut-off point is not meant to imply any ‘clean break’ between what came 
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before and what came after. What I have sought to do, in picking my timeframe, is find a 
spectrum of time that would encompass the Italian political crisis of the 1990s – without 
which my account would have been stunted – but that was sufficiently removed from the 
present day, to allow me to make an intelligible evaluation of Italian penality. The 1990s are 
thought to have initiated a political ‘transition’ in Italy64; the three decades from 1970 to 2000 
thus take us from one (global) crisis to the peak of one (local) crisis. However, if Pasquino is 
right, the political transition, that began in the 1990s is still ongoing in Italy
65
; and here 
pragmatism plays its part. By choosing the year 2000 as the end-date for my investigation I 
have given myself a margin of detachment from the phenomena I am analysing. This margin 
(just over ten years) is advisable generally: as Hancké claims, researching a ‘moving target’ is 
a highly complex and not always fruitful endeavour
66
. It is also advisable at a more specific, 
national level. In Italy political changes can be both unexpected and drastic: ‘[all] scholars of 
Italian politics are well aware of the risk that their analysis can be made obsolete by some 
sudden and unpredictable event, always a possibility in a political and institutional transition 
that no politician could control, steer, bring to an end’67. Caution thus suggests that a wise 
cut-off point pre-dates the years during which my research is written; particularly where we 
aim to make sense of Italian penal trends without being blown off course by the (immediate) 
volatility of the Italian scenario
68
.   
 
Further explanations for the cut-off point can be sought in the political history of Silvio 
Berlusconi and his coalitions (see Appendix). Berlusconi first descended into politics in 1994; 
he brought with him a new style of mediatised leadership politics
69
 which has coloured Italian 
politics since the mid-1990s. However it is only with the elections of 2001 – after having 
reconstructed his party, his economic patrimony and his alliances – that Berlusconi and his 
right-wing coalition came to power
70
. They remained in power for seven years (five of which 
successive)
71
. Admittedly, Berlusconi represents both political change and political 
continuity
72, though this is not the place to elaborate on either. Nonetheless, his ‘ascent’ to 
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power has potentially important penal implications, which can help us explain the need for a 
timeframe ending in 2000. Indeed, during the years of Berlusconi’s right-wing coalitions, 
there were a series of executives whose attitudes to legality are explicitly contradictory
73
. 
They also entrenched the conflict between judiciary and executive that first came to a head in 
the 1990s with Tangentopoli, i.e., the judicial investigations into political corruption that 
precipitated the collapse of existing political parties, and thus the transition into the so-called 
‘Second Republic’ (Appendix). This conflict was articulated with vitriol by Berlusconi, even 
when Prime Minister
74. Thus we find a government that ‘within weeks in office had rendered 
innocuous the legal sanctions against accounting fraud’75, attempted to halt the introduction of 
the ‘European warrant for arrest for crime such as corruption […] and the laundering of dirty 
money’, and ‘reintroduced into Italian law the concept of “legitimate suspicion”’, whereby 
defendants could ask for their trial to be transferred to another court, where they adduced 
‘legitimate suspicion’ of the court’s bias against them76. This was an executive whose attitude 
to the ‘forces of law and order’ has contemporaneously been described as ‘unqualified 
support’77. It is the executive that modified immigration law to punish with up to four years 
imprisonment non-EU migrants who had previously been ordered to leave the nation and had 
nonetheless remained on Italian territory, without a ‘good reason’78. Under Berlusconi’s 
executive, legislation on drugs was also modified and made harsher
79
. Similarly, in 2005, the 
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law on recidivism was reformed, increasing penalties for recidivists, and reducing their access 
to benefits once detained
80
.  
This contradictory ‘penal scenario’ at the very least raises the question of how these 
polarised stances have influenced Italian penality. I suggest, however, that before we can 
answer this question, we must be able to trace lines of change and of continuity in Italian 
penality. We must, that is, be able to compare the later decades of the 21
st
 century with the 
First Republic, and with the first decade of the Second Republic.  
In truth, the hostility to judicial power and its deployment against political corruption 
(often embodied by Berlusconi and his executive) was visible also in the 1980s and 1990s 
(Chapter 5)
81
. Similarly, as this thesis will show, there is nothing novel in the contradictory 
stance to punishment: I am, after all, arguing that Italy demonstrates a penal dualism. What is 
different is the incidence, under the right-wing coalitions, of legislation of a more ‘typically’ 
law and order kind. Again, legislation on immigration, recidivism and drugs are examples of 
this. Looking at this legislation alone, we might be justified in assuming that Italy has now 
aligned itself with other ‘Western counterparts’: as De Giorgi, or indeed Garland, might have 
led us to expect. I would, however, resist this conclusion, wary of taking explanatory 
categories – for example ‘populist punitiveness’ – from the Anglo-American context and 
simply superimposing them on the Italian context
82
. Even if we ultimately conclude that Italy 
today is aligned with its more punitive neighbours (and that the categories were thus 
accurate), we need to understand how and why this convergence has occurred. Again, the year 
2000 appears as a useful cut-off point for us to do so. It halts our analysis before the election 
of Berlusconi and his coalition – and their potential penchant for ‘law and order’ – allowing 
us to look at penality after 2000 in a way sensitive to continuity as well as change.  
V. The literature 
The following section provides a detailed account of the three analyses that I am working 
with. It serves as a means of contextualising my work in the broader literature, and as an 
explanatory guide for the thesis’ analysis of Italian penality. 
 
i. Cultures of Control 
David Garland’s work is partly geared to explaining the increasing punitiveness that has 
peaked in the last decades of the 20
th
 century. This punitiveness is worthy of attention because 
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of its significant ethical implications, but also because it appears to stand in stark contrast to 
the penality that it has replaced
83. Garland’s work refers primarily to the United States, but his 
analysis explicitly extends to the United Kingdom and makes claims that, by implication, 
apply across contemporary Western societies
84
. Garland argues as much insofar as his 
analysis of the changing criminological scenario is anchored in broader transformations that 
‘swept society in the second half of the twentieth century’85. These, he argues, are 
characteristic of ‘late modernity’, though the use of this term poses significant difficulties 
because of its elusive nature. In Garland’s theorisation, late modernity ‘transformed […] the 
social and political conditions upon which the modern crime control field relied’86 whilst 
posing ‘new problems of crime and insecurity, [challenging] the legitimacy and effectiveness 
of welfare institutions, and [placing] new limits on the power of the nation-state’87.  
Consequently, the penal mode of late modernity shifted away from a welfarist approach, and 
towards a simultaneously more punitive and more instrumental approach to crime and 
punishment. The following sections explain this transition, abridged to focus on those aspects 
of The Culture of Control most relevant to my analysis of Italian penality. 
 
a. Penal-welfarism 
Penal welfarism can be defined as a set of practices
88
, and their ideology, dominant in the 
post-war years up to the 1970s, emphasising the rehabilitation and re-education of the 
offender. Garland describes the ‘penal welfare structure’ combining ‘the liberal legalism of 
due process and proportionate punishment with a correctionalist commitment to 
rehabilitation, welfare and criminological expertise’89. The criminology associated with this 
structure considered crime as a consequence of ‘poverty and deprivation’: its solution lay in 
expanding prosperity and social welfare
90
. The role of punishment was to rehabilitate and 
reintegrate deviant individuals back into the body politic
91
 through ‘individualized 
correctional treatment [and] welfare-enhancing measures of social reform’ such as education 
and employment
92
. This was an approach which presumed that individuals could, under the 
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apposite circumstances, change for the better
93
. It also followed from the rationale of the 
welfare state
94
. In this framework – that of correctionalist criminology – it was the state’s 
responsibility to effect this change through its broader social and political measures; but also 
through its criminal justice institutions: ‘the state was to be an agent of reform as well as of 
repression, of care as well as of control, of welfare as well as punishment’95. This also 
presumed a belief in the state’s competence to undertake such tasks, and a ‘widespread 
confidence’ in the state’s ‘crime control institutions’96. Of these institutions, the prison 
theoretically occupied a ‘residual’ function. Prison was to be a measure of last resort in the 
penal welfarist logic
97
, rather than the first port of call, and its purpose was to be re-educative.  
What were the roots of this approach to crime and punishment? Garland traces them 
to ‘modernity’, and in particular to the modernist state and the modernist project of near 
universal social inclusion. As part of the evolution of the modern nation-state, Garland tells 
us, ‘in the course of the 18th and 19th century’ the state came to monopolise ‘policing, 
prosecution and punishment of criminals’98. The power to punish was gradually removed 
from ‘competing secular and spiritual authorities’ and bestowed upon the institutions of 
criminal justice. With the expansion of democracy, the law itself changed, such that in the 
19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries it laid claims to expressing popular will
99
, in the name of which the 
state also punished. This development of state and crime control gave rise to what Garland 
calls the ‘myth of the sovereign state’ and of its monopoly over crime control100. The latter 
rested upon the state’s ‘claimed capacity to rule a territory’ without being (seriously) 
challenged by alternative sources of authority. Integral to this was the capacity to ensure law 
and order, and to control crime and criminal conduct
101
. 
 In reality, of course, the modern state did not act on its own in controlling crime and 
deviance: as Garland notes, it also relied on informal social controls: ‘the learned, 
unreflexive, habitual practices of mutual supervision, scolding, sanctioning, and shaming 
carried out, as a matter of course, by community members’102. Families, neighbours and social 
institutions such as school and the workplace, exerted informal social controls. They worked 
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in harmony with the law, creating a series of ‘norms and sanctions’ complementary to ‘the 
law’s demands’103.  
 
If penal-welfarism relied on the modern state’s monopoly of power and claims to crime 
control, it also relied on the state in its welfarist guise: the state that reformed and repressed, 
cared and controlled. Garland argues that penal welfarism ‘interacted with a contiguous set of 
institutions’ characteristic of modernity: ‘the labour market and social institutions of the 
welfare state’104.  In particular it shared their ideology: ‘moderately solidaristic’ and geared to 
the inclusion of individuals into ‘full social citizenship’ with equality of rights and 
opportunities
105
. This project of extended social inclusion was sustained by the economic 
prosperity experienced by the UK and USA between 1950 and 1973
106
. In this scenario a re-
integrative approach to punishment was materially possible, as well as ideologically coherent. 
 
b. What changed? Economics, politics and the welfare state. 
In Garland’s account, the passage from modernity to late modernity brought about historical 
changes that cumulatively caused a ‘shift in social practice and political sensibilities’107. This 
shift, in turn, shaped and maintained contemporary penality. The changes can be seen as 
occurring across three interlinked dimensions: the social, economic and cultural dimension; 
the political dimension
108
; the dimension of crime and the experience of crime. I deal with 
each in turn. 
 At the economic level – capitalist production and market exchange109 – we witness a 
shrinking of industrial production, with fewer, higher skilled jobs; the re-appearance of mass 
unemployment; and an increase in conflict between social partners, i.e., government, 
employers and trade unions
110
. Ultimately, workers became entitled to less job security and 
fewer benefits
111
. Cumulatively these economic changes led to increasing income inequality 
and to the creation of a mass of ‘low-skilled, poorly educated, jobless people’, many ‘young, 
urban and minority’112 and likely to face systematic exclusion from the job market113. The 
labour market became highly stratified; the ties of solidarity across, and within, classes 
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decreased.  Changing social and cultural relations also played their part, with the ‘grip’ of 
more traditional social institutions – community, church and family – ‘relaxing’114; replaced 
by ‘communities of choice’ i.e. groups one opted into and out of, such as subcultures, or 
consumer identities
115
. Much as these communities of choice overcame the often coercive and 
hierarchical relations of more traditional institutions
116
, they also represented a decline of 
erstwhile ties of solidarity: ‘face-to-face […] local […] grounded in a shared sense of place or 
in the tight bonds of kinship’117.   
As these economic developments were unfolding, political changes were also 
occurring with ‘realignment and policy initiatives’118. This realignment displayed a 
contradictory mix of free market neo-liberalism, and social (neo) conservatism; best 
exemplified by the Reagan and Bush administrations in the United States, and the Thatcher 
governments in Great Britain
119
. The new political discourses that emerged in this period 
produced what Garland has called a ‘reactionary reading’ of late modernity120. This expressed 
itself in hostility to the welfare state, to public spending, to the ‘permissive culture’ of the 
1960s and to the heretofore dominant, inclusive politics of social democracy
121
.  
Part of this reactionary vein expressed itself in an interpretation of crime and of 
‘immoral behaviour’ as the criminal and immoral conduct of the poor122. Discipline was 
increasingly reserved for the poor 
123
. Social stratification, which already followed from 
changes in the labour market, was thus entrenched. If the ideology of the post-war years had 
been solidaristic and inclusive, the ideology of late modernity enhanced class and race 
divisions; it led to a ‘cultural mood that was defensive, ambivalent and insecure’124. In this 
context, violent crimes, substance abuse and street crimes worsened
125
; crime (in general) 
came to occupy a privileged position in the narratives through which social and economic 
realities were interpreted
126
. 
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One other and key aspect of late modernity deserves attention: the crisis of the welfare state – 
a phenomenon that straddles both economic and political realms. This crisis can be seen as 
composed of both internal and external challenges to the welfare state. Internal were those 
that originated from the workings of post-war welfare (as articulated in Britain and America). 
The welfare state was prey to what Garland has called a series of ‘self-negating’ processes127 
that resulted in its being discredited. For example, as it uncovered more and more unmet 
needs, it increasingly appeared unable to satisfy the needs
128
. As it nonetheless endeavoured 
to meet them, it expanded its apparatus: consequently appearing unwieldy as well as 
unsuccessful
129
. State welfare was recast as an economic drain on the middle class and skilled 
workers
130, the welfare state’s ‘central constituency and tax-base’131, now prosperous enough 
to substitute state provision with private provision
132
. 
 In sum, the welfare state appeared to be cumbersome and doomed to fail. This 
interpretation was then heavily entrenched by the external challenges it faced, those deriving 
precisely from the reactionary line of politics described above
133
. Crucially, from the neo-
conservative perspective, ‘welfare policies for the poor’ were cast as ‘luxuries’ for the 
undeserving, paid for by harassed middle-class taxpayers
134
. This feeling spilt over into 
criminal justice with ‘penal-welfare measures for offenders […] depicted as absurdly 
indulgent and self-defeating’135.  
c. What changed? Collective experiences of crime. 
In this transformed scenario, we witness the changing incidence and interpretation of crime. 
The outcome of such changes was what Garland has called a ‘cultural formation’ typical of 
high crime societies
136: the ‘crime complex’ that endowed the ‘late modern’ experience of 
crime with a ‘settled institutional form’137.  
 At its outset, this new experience of crime rested on what Garland has called ‘rapid 
and sustained increase in recorded crime rates’, across offence categories, that occurred the 
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UK and USA in between 1960 and 1980
138
. The causes of this increase were multifarious; 
including, for example, reduced informal social controls and increased opportunities for crime 
(as the circulation of commodities increased) 
139
. Demographic and ecological changes also 
played a part, with the creation of ‘decaying inner city areas’ removed from ‘middle-class 
white suburbs
140. Suburbs became ‘well-stocked’, but anonymous and unsupervised141 ‘laden 
with criminal temptations’ and devoid of those social structures that had prevented temptation 
becoming opportunity
142
.   
Robert Reiner’s analysis of crime trends adds nuance to Garland’s account by, for 
example, giving greater space to the discrepancy between recorded crime rates and 
victimisation rates (measured by the BCS)
143. Reiner’s account focuses on the UK, Garland’s 
focuses on the US: nonetheless Reiner’s discussion of the difficulties posed by crime statistics 
has general validity 
144
. Whatever the (ever chimerical) reality of crime, he concludes, it 
seems certain that fear and anxiety over crime rose: ‘the public [saw] crime as rising […] 
throughout’145. Here, in pointing out the ‘lack of correspondence between […] statistics and 
public perception’, Reiner and Garland’s accounts coincide146. Returning to Garland, we can 
then claim that high crime rates soon became a ‘normal social fact’ for contemporary polities 
and an ‘organizing principle of everyday life’147. This was so not just for the poorer social 
strata, but also for the middle-classes
148
. More crime was thus (in/directly) experienced, but it 
was also experienced by more people. Moreover, fear of crime acquired independent force 
and persisted even after recorded crime rates began to drop
149
.  Political discourse played a 
crucial role in this respect: crime, and law and order became a key subject of electoral 
competition
150
, such that crime came to occupy a strategic role within the political culture of 
late modernity. It came to stand in for the problems that had (purportedly) been created by 
modernist era and modernist policies. Crime also came to act as ‘rhetorical legitimation’ for 
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the development of a ‘strong disciplinary state’ that stood where the welfarist state had once 
stood.  
 
High crime rates also gave rise to the demise of the myth of the sovereign state (and I will 
later show how crucial this evolution is for a comparison of Italy with Garland’s account). 
The modern state had laid claims to monopolising crime control and to ensuring law and 
order. Now the broader experience of crime ushered in by late modernity seemed to signal 
that the state had, in effect, lost control over social control. At the same time, however, the 
politicization of law and order meant that even as ‘government authorities [saw] the need to 
withdraw their claims to be the primary and effective providers of security and crime control’ 
they found themselves unable to do so: ‘the political costs of [withdrawal]’ were far too 
high
151
. This predicament, as Garland describes it, did little to assuage fears. Crucially, the 
erosion of the sovereign state myth increased anxieties and disillusion amidst the middle 
classes and ‘liberal elites’152; those upon whose support penal welfare policies had rested. 
 
d. Late modern punishment: penal punitivism and increasing incarceration. 
What was the combined penal effect of such changes? As its social and institutional supports 
faltered, and as the ‘collective experience of crime’ was established, penal modernism entered 
into crisis. Garland describes this as an ‘assault upon penal modernism’s premises and 
practices’153. The ‘premises’ were precisely the contextual conditions that had changed with 
late modernity. The assault upon the ‘practices’ of penal modernism refers to the 
(unwittingly) combined efforts of those who criticised penal welfarism from within and those 
who adopted this criticism as instrumental to their political stance. Garland points to the 
instrumental role played by criminologists in discrediting rehabilitation. Those who had first 
advocated a shift to re-integrative, individualised treatment and diversion from prison, found 
themselves critiquing this system: on the grounds that it constituted an extension of a not 
always benign discipline, and left the fate of offenders to unmonitored discretionary 
decisions. However, this criticism - Garland recounts - was taken up and distorted by the neo-
liberal, neo-conservative forces. The consequent reaction to critique of the penal welfarist 
model was, to paraphrase Garland, hysterically disproportionate
154: ‘nothing works’ became 
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the tag-line for this reaction and its unwillingness to ‘seek reform and repair’ of past 
rehabilitative practices
155
.  
 
All this ushered in a new penality for late modernity whose articulation followed also from 
the double bind facing the state and its criminal justice apparatus. The ‘predicament’ of the 
late modern state is that, having claimed monopoly over crime control, it finds itself unable to 
deliver. Its penal reaction is dichotomous: the state simultaneously responds in ‘adaptive’ and 
‘non-adaptive’ ways156. The former are a pragmatic response to high crime rates and failing 
formal social control; the latter are a politicised, populist and expressive response to the same. 
These two opposite approaches are represented respectively by the state’s tendency to ‘define 
deviance down’ whilst simultaneously ‘deny’ and ‘act out’ against the demise of its crime 
control monopoly
157
. When defining deviance down, the State capitalised on the apparent 
normality of crime, cast as a risk of ‘late modern’ life, to be circumvented by means of 
managerial strategies
158
. Responsibility for this form of control is displaced and rests upon the 
shoulders of strictly non-state agents (the potential crime victim for example)
159
. The 
deviant’s role too is recast: she is a rational individual, not dissimilar to our own ‘selves’, who 
can simply be bought out of her tendency to offend. Crime is a thoroughly amoral event – a 
question of economy and opportunity: these are the criminology of the self and of everyday 
life
160
.  
Alongside this discourse, however, the state engages in contradictory behaviour. It 
‘wilfully denies [its] predicament and reasserts the old myth of the sovereign state and its 
plenary power to punish’161. It also ‘acts out’, employing an expressive mode to react to crime 
and the fear it provokes
162
. This reaction relies on the perceived need to protect victims of 
crime, where victims are abstracted, made into a symbol of contemporary fears
163
.  
  Denying and acting out, the state attempts to bolster its monopoly over crime control. 
It deploys its repressive and authoritarian apparatus over ‘residual’ deviants: those who will 
not desist even in the face of the requisite opportunity structure. In this criminological 
discourse – the criminology of the other164 – crime is thoroughly immoral, and those who 
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engage in it deserve to be quarantined
165
. Here, the prison comes to occupy an important role. 
From being the last resort of penal modernity, it becomes a ‘seemingly indispensable pillar of 
[late modern] social order’166. There is no subtlety to the deployment of imprisonment: it 
becomes a clear way to exclude and control those who endanger the public
167
. The –once 
problematic – stigma that accompanies imprisonment is now welcome: it serves to reinforce 
the penalty, and to identify dangerous deviants
168
. Imprisonment has a symbolic function and, 
where it manages risk and encloses danger, an instrumental function
169
. Unsurprisingly then, 
‘late modernity’ sees ever-increasing incarceration rates: ‘most decisively in the USA, but 
latterly in the UK as well’170. 
 
ii. Political Economies of Punishment 
In comparison with Garland’s account, De Giorgi’s analysis has a more explicit, if not 
exclusive, focus on the political economy. It illustrates how contemporary ‘punitiveness’ can 
be explained by the changed methods of production of post-Fordist economies. Like many 
existing political economic approaches to punishment, his thesis finds its roots in the classic 
account given by Rusche and Kirchheimer
171
. Theirs is fundamentally a Marxist theory of 
punishment, and many of its insights can therefore be traced back to the basic proposition 
whereby ‘the way in which economic activity is organized and controlled will tend to shape 
the rest of social life’172. In Punishment and Social Structure Rusche and Kirchheimer detail 
the connection existing between modes of production and modes of punishment
173
. Modes of 
production, they contend, possess corresponding modes of punishment: penality is thus not 
primarily determined by crime control policy, though criminal justice policy will, of course, 
affect mode and incidence of punishment
174
. Where modes of production emerge as the 
crucial factor in determining penality, we should look to the availability of labour in order to 
understand the distribution of punishment. Thus, Rusche and Kirchheimer contend, when 
labour is in surplus, punishment is more reckless with human life, and when labour is scarce, 
punishment is more careful of human life, tending to reintegrate the deviant into the 
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production system. Now that prison is the primary penal mode
175
, severity is measured in 
terms of more or less prison; so in times of labour surplus we witness greater incarceration, 
and in times of labour scarcity we witness a decreasing use of incarceration. More recent 
articulations have chosen to operationalise this basic hypothesis by using unemployment as a 
measure of labour availability and prison population as a measure of punishment
176
. This has, 
unsurprisingly, yielded rather reductive interpretations of Rusche and Kirchheimer, not least 
because unemployment is a poor substitute for complex processes within capitalist economies 
(see below).  
 
Re-Thinking the Political Economy of Punishment takes political economic analyses, and 
adapts them to the contemporary scenario. Adopting Rusche and Kirchheimer’s main insights, 
De Giorgi analyses the shape of penality now that we have shifted away from ‘Fordist 
capitalism’ to ‘post-Fordist capitalism’. De Giorgi describes ‘Fordist capitalism’ as 
characterising the years between the end of the Second World War and 1970
177
. This period 
saw the expansion of mass industrial production; labour market stability; limited 
unemployment levels. Lacey describes Fordist production as premised on ‘standardised 
systems of industrial production which depended on high levels of relatively low-skilled 
labour’178. Fordism was also a time during which ‘the institutions of social control shared with 
those of the welfare state a program of social inclusion for those segments of the working 
class who remained outside the labour market: citizenship was still imagined as a complex of 
social rights, and crime was seen as a consequence of economic deprivation’179. In this 
restatement De Giorgi’s characterisation recalls Garland’s account.   
 This is the scenario we have left behind us; the new scenario is somewhat more 
difficult to grasp. As De Giorgi warns us, ‘post-Fordism’ is an ill-defined phenomenon180. 
However, for the purposes of his theory it can be detailed in terms of ‘transformations of 
work and production’181. These transformations, that are purportedly articulated ‘at a global 
level’, run as follows182. Firstly, a decline of the industrial model: the ‘fixed, rigid, centralised 
factory’183 has been replaced by more flexible and decentralised labour, located in one of two 
hypothetical sites – ‘the small, automated and hyper-technological factory’ or the ‘many 
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sweatshops where […] residual material labour is performed’184. Secondly: a fragmented 
labour force, with workers increasingly falling outside formal labour (and union protection), 
and outside labour statistics
185
. Post-Fordism displays ‘total work-flexibility imposed by the 
de-regulation of markets in a neo-liberal economy’186.  
De Giorgi’s analysis further explains changing modes of production in terms of 
labour ‘surplus’ or ‘scarcity’. Post-Fordism is a time of labour surplus which is being 
contained through (increasing) incarceration. In De Giorgi’s schema, today’s surplus is 
distinctive because it is both a productive and a social surplus. This means that it should be 
measured not just in terms of the ‘amount of labour directly employed’187 , but also in terms 
of the rights that it does, or better does not, give rise to.  The increasing informality and 
flexibility of the labour force
188
, combines with the neo-liberal attack on the welfare state, to 
produce a situation of ‘vulnerability […] and new poverty’189. From the Fordist ‘jobs’ –  
productive activities with ‘stability […] some legal guarantees [and] a complex of social 
rights’190, we have shifted to post-Fordist ‘work’ – any productive activity ‘naked’ but for is 
productive outcome. In the gap between work and job we find the social surplus poor, 
marginalised and insecure.  
 The surplus is then also productive because labour is increasingly informatised and 
automated. Production is ‘immaterial’ and ‘symbolic’191, but sustained by a residuum of 
material labour
192
. The site of production is no longer the disciplined factory; it is the 
productive ‘network’ and its ‘social disorganisation’193. Labour has become stratified: a top 
tier of ‘hyper-integrated, high income workers’ engaged in immaterial production; a lower tier 
of labourers ‘expelled from the (formal) circuits of  [industrial] production’; in between ‘a 
growing portion of the new labour force’, insecure, precarious and exploited.194 
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How is this new political economy linked to punishment? At the time of the Fordist factory, 
punishment was the disciplining of deviants to make Fordist workers
195
. This meant 
disciplining them into accepting the economic rationality of industrial production, in order to 
reduce their inadequacy, insufficient socialisation and reluctance to take their place within the 
capitalist economy
196
. Disciplined were not just those in prison, but also those one step away 
from the prison, kept in check (and in their economic position) by the ‘lesser eligibility’ of 
imprisonment
197. This ‘transformative project of disciplinary control’ was part of the 
modernist project of universal citizenship: geared at producing ‘“good citizens” […] by 
producing efficient workers’198. The mode of punishment during Fordism was thus to 
discipline; and it was to discipline scarcity. This scarcity explains the relative (quantitative) 
‘moderation’ of punishment and the limits on incarceration.  
Today, however, mode and amount of punishment have changed. If Fordist 
punishment ‘disciplined scarcity’, De Giorgi tells us, post-Fordist punishment ‘governs 
surplus’199. The type of work performed in the post-Fordist economy – ‘immaterial’200 – and 
the social surplus – the ‘underclass, the permanently unemployed, working poor, informal 
workers’201 – escape the disciplinary logic. The surplus escapes unitary definition and is best 
characterised as a ‘multitude’202: at the individual level its members no longer present the 
clear markings of deviance
203
. Institutions of social control must thus regroup and reclassify 
the surplus in terms of risk categories
204
. Those who fall within these categories are then 
confined and incapacitated. Confinement has become ‘mass confinement’ through the prison 
– and here we find the increasing incarceration of contemporary penality. 
Building upon the work of Loïc Wacquant , De Giorgi also posits that post-Fordist 
penality is most visible in the US, but is not thereby limited to the US. Indeed he borrows 
Wacquant’s notion of a ‘neo-liberal common sense’ spreading across Europe205, carrying with 
it the progressive restriction of the welfare state; of the latter’s citizenship project; of its penal 
logic. In this context, but across contexts, the prison occupies pride of place. This is not just a 
cyclical return of the prison as institution of punishment; and we will not ‘cyclically’ return to 
a future of rehabilitation. The changes of today are durable: 
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‘[…] what has changed – with the transition from the industrial working class to the 
post-Fordist multitude – is the very rationality of control’206 
 
A clear indication of contemporary productive-penal processes can be seen in the fate of 
immigrants in Western polities, and particularly Europe. Non-EU migrants are, according to 
De Giorgi’s schema, a ‘paradigmatic case study of the emerging strategies of social 
control’207. They provide us with an extreme but representative version of contemporary 
punishment. Whether or not this is the case, and whether it is the case in Italy, will be 
discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
iii. The Prisoners’ Dilemma and comparative penology 
So far I have described analyses of punishment unified in their generality, and in their 
pessimism. By contrast to Garland or De Giorgi, Nicola Lacey argues against a ‘dystopian 
vision’ of contemporary penality208. In The Prisoners’ Dilemma she notes that not all nations 
have experienced the rising punishment identified by ‘the dystopian current in contemporary 
theory’. The current, of which Garland and De Giorgi are examples, seems to have adopted an 
analysis in fact suited mainly to neo-liberal polities, which has then been made into a 
blueprint for ‘global’ penality209. 
Even where, as in the UK, the penal scenario does seem to be one of increasing 
incarceration, Lacey asks whether increasing incarceration should thereby be seen as 
‘inevitable’210.  No such conclusion follows if, Lacey suggests, we pay close attention to the 
existing divergence in punishment levels across Europe
211
. In particular our analysis should be 
attentive to the ‘features of social, political and economic organisation [that] favour or inhibit 
the maintenance of penal tolerance and humanity in punishment’212. This means not just 
criminal justice policy, cultural norms and ‘macro-economic forces’, but also ‘institutional 
factors distinctive to particular political and economic systems’213. These – which include 
economic and political institutions – have, by and large, remained intact even in our 
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‘globalised times’. By analysing their impact on penality we can then hope to understand 
existing penal divergence. More than this, Lacey argues, an institutional analysis will allow us 
to understand how ‘political-economic and institutional variables coalesce to produce family 
resemblances at the level of punishment’214. In so doing we can also hope to understand what 
‘options for reform’ are open to us where we feel that penal reform is necessary215. 
 
To further this endeavour, Nicola Lacey provides us with a series of hypotheses that link 
institutional organisation to polities’ capacity for penal moderation.  She builds upon Hall and 
Soskice’s Varieties of Capitalism216 and its analysis of ‘comparative institutional advantage 
and […] capacities for strategic co-ordination’217. Here ‘comparative institutional advantage 
refers to ‘how the institutions structuring the political economy’ favour a nation relative to 
other countries, influencing its evolution in the face of ‘globalisation’218. Different ‘varieties 
of capitalism’ are thought to produce different structures of ‘institutional advantage’, such 
that what is advantageous in one is not necessarily advantageous in the other. In particular 
Hall and Soskice distinguish between ‘co-ordinated market economies’ (CMEs) – with 
Germany as a paradigm example – and ‘liberal market economies’ (LMEs) – where the 
European paradigm is the United Kingdom. CMEs operate primarily on the basis of ‘long-
term relations and stable structures of investment’219. This is visible at the level of education 
and skills training, where individuals are trained in company/sector specific skills
220
: long-
term skills that cannot easily be replicated or replaced
221
. CMEs, as their name indicates, are 
also ‘co-ordinated’, in the sense that their governmental structure incorporates ‘a wide range 
of social groups and institutions’222 which are placed in conditions of interdependence to 
produce what could be termed a co-operative whole.  
 Lacey argues that, at the penal level, CMEs produce a ‘relatively inclusionary 
criminal justice system’223. Their institutional structure produces incentives for decision 
makers to re-incorporate offenders into ‘society and economy’224: reintegration is, in this 
context, the institutionally advantageous thing to do.  The ‘interlocking’ structure of CMEs is 
also thought to produce and sustain ‘relatively extensive informal social controls’225, thus 
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reducing reliance on formal penal control. This state of affairs has an additional implication 
(and here we see how institutional analysis can incorporate cultural variables), namely that of 
sustaining attitudes that reinforce ‘a moderated approach to formal punishment’226.  
In this, CMEs stand in contrasts to LMEs, whose criminal justice systems are 
typically harsher. In LMEs there is a lower cost to developing exclusionary systems such as 
those described in Garland’s and De Giorgi’s analyses. This ‘lower cost’ results from LMEs’ 
institutional structure, premised on ‘flexibility and innovation’227, and a ‘hands-off’ approach 
to state regulation
228
. If CMEs can be characterised as polities premised on long-term social 
relations and mutual investment, LMEs are best characterises as polities premised on more 
individualistic, fast-changing interrelations
229
. In LMEs, we are then likely to find high levels 
of ‘surplus unskilled labour’; and are also likely to find it ‘contained’ through imprisonment. 
Penality in LMEs appears to be more exclusionary than in CMEs.  
 
Investigating the reasons behind such difference, Lacey analyses four ‘areas’ in which 
institutional structures and penality interact. These include: ‘political systems: electoral 
arrangements and the bureaucracy’230; ‘the structure of the economy: production regimes, 
labour markets, education and training, disparities of wealth’231; ‘the welfare state’232; 
‘decision makers, veto points and constitutional constraints on criminalisation’233. Lacey also 
discusses the impact of ‘outsiders’ – non-EU – migrants on European CMEs’ re-integrative 
capacities
234
. With the exception of this last issue (which will be dealt with only very briefly 
in this introduction) I now propose to detail each of these four areas.  My aim is to provide a 
guiding framework for my analysis of Italy. Given that differences between Italy and the 
CME/LME models do not allow simple transposition of the latter on the former, I will 
reframe Lacey’s hypotheses so that they can apply to the Italian case.  
a. Political systems 
Garland, in his analysis of contemporary penality, characterises prevalent attitudes to 
punishment as ‘populist punitiveness’. This is visible both amongst government elites but also 
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in popular attitudes to punishment
235. As Lacey reminds us there are, however, ‘contrasts’ in 
attitudes to punishment
236
 and this may in part explain divergence in punishment levels. 
However, where crime and punishment do become salient social issues, they do not 
necessarily translate into policy concerns. Here political institutions are paramount, as they 
affect both political systems’ ability to sustain penal moderation and their ability to resist 
shifts in popular attitudes to punishment
237
. Lacey argues that this ability will depend on two 
factors: existing electoral arrangements and the status and influence of professional 
bureaucracies.  
In terms of electoral systems, Lacey contrasts CME systems with proportional 
representations (PR)
238
, against systems with majoritarian, first-past-the-post voting systems, 
more characteristic of LME nations
239
. PR systems, she hypothesises, are premised on 
‘negotiation and consensus’ between the different political parties that typically form 
governing coalitions
240
. They are thus less volatile in their policy-making, including criminal 
justice policy, which is consequently less susceptible to potential surges in populist 
punitiveness. 
 By contrast, majoritarian systems produce executives that are far less constrained 
when in government (not having to account to coalition partners)
241
. They are also more 
influenced by public opinion at election time, given their direct accountability to the 
electorate
242
. These systems, for example the UK and US, have also tended to suffer from 
‘relatively low trust in politicians’243 and increasing convergence between political parties. 
This has decreased parties’ capacity to appeal to a solid electoral base, and has left them 
dependent upon ‘“floating”, median voters’244.  Median voters have begun to see crime and 
punishment as an increasingly important issue, which has consequently affected the extent to 
which parties appeal to median voters on a law and order agenda. This combination of factors 
has created a situation in which there is high volatility in policy-making, at the same time as 
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criminal justice has become a salient electoral issue. The result is greater volatility in criminal 
justice policy, and greater political receptivity to popular punitive attitudes
245
.  
 In LME/ majoritarian systems such as the United Kingdom, we have thus witnessed a 
politicisation of law and order. This trend has then been exacerbated by the position of 
professional bureaucracies within such polities. Professional bureaucracies, Lacey tells us, are 
less respected and less influential in majoritarian systems, where ‘governments [have 
preferred] to work with their own, politically appointed advisers’246. Executives have thus 
acted in relative isolation from any advice that ran counter to their political programmes, 
ignoring, where this was expedient, the opinion of ‘neutral civil servants’ 247. Thus where law 
and order have become crucial electoral issues, policy has been ‘insulated’ from professional 
opinion advising against penal harshness
248
.  
 Events have followed a different route in CMEs where ‘deference to the expertise of 
professional bureaucracy […] including […] penal system officials […] prosecutors [and] 
[…] judges’ has tended to be high249. Expert opinion has thus remained a valued contribution 
to the formation of criminal justice policy; it may then have contributed to sustain penal 
moderation, even in the face of contrary public attitudes. 
 
From Lacey’s account it emerges that political systems and penality interact. I propose to then 
‘remove’ specific references to CMEs and LMEs so as to make Lacey’s insights applicable 
beyond the two central models. I suggest that this process yields the following hypothesis: the 
extent to which negotiation and consensus are built into a political system will affect its 
policy-making, including criminal justice policy. The greater the need for consensus and 
negotiation, the greater the likelihood of policy stability. The lesser the need for consensus 
and negotiation, the greater the likelihood of policy volatility, where volatility indicates both 
the speed and the ease with which policy is changed.  The status of professional 
bureaucracies within different institutional set-ups will also affect policy-making, including 
criminal justice policy, by affecting the extent to which such professionals contribute (directly 
or indirectly) to the policy-making process. 
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b. The structure of the economy 
In discussing the structure of the economy Lacey again contrasts LMEs and CMEs. LMEs, 
she claims, have suffered from the economic restructuring of more traditional political 
economic analyses of punishment. Modes of production have changed with, in particular, a 
collapse in Fordist production and a flexibilisation of labour markets
250
. This shift has been 
accompanied by increasing differences in incomes and skill
251; as a consequence ‘low skilled 
workers in liberal market economies’ are now facing ‘structural economic insecurity’252. 
Changes have also occurred at the cultural level, with the growing influence of ‘a more 
aggressively market-oriented culture’. This has affected attitudes to poverty, such that 
economic exclusion is now also a mark of social exclusion, and poverty has itself become a 
(reviled) social status. At the level of the criminal justice system, changing economic and 
cultural ‘mores’ have begun to sustain ‘harsh and extensive punishment’253. 
 Things are different in CMEs, given different economic and social arrangements. 
Comparative institutional advantage in co-ordinated market economies rests on the 
incorporation of so-called ‘social partners’ – managers and unions – in running the 
economy
254
. This creates structural interdependence between such partners, and also increases 
workers’ bargaining power. The type of economic activity that CMEs display increases this 
bargaining power, as the production of ‘high quality goods’ requires ‘technical and industry-
specific, non-transferable skills’255. The result is that employers have incentives to invest in 
their workers, not just at the level of training, but also by promoting welfare policies to 
safeguard those workers, who are temporarily unemployed, but whose skills will have to be 
reabsorbed into the economy
256
. Overall, this set up contributes to lower levels of income and 
skill disparity; it also places a high price on exclusionary criminal justice policies
257
.  
 
In sum: polities whose economic systems are premised on long-term investment in, and 
interdependence between, its members are more likely to produce attitudes and policies that 
favour penal re-integration. These polities are also more likely to have lower income 
disparities. By contrast, polities whose economic policies are premised on short-term, 
prevalently unskilled labour, where working relations are characterised by flexibility and a 
high worker turnover, are more likely to produce attitudes that stimulate penal exclusion. 
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Policies are also less likely to be influenced by the need to re-integrate individuals into the 
economy.   
 
c. The welfare state 
In explaining the link between differing welfare states and levels of punishment Lacey builds 
on literature analysing different welfare typologies: notably Esping-Andersen’s distinction 
between liberal, continental and social-democratic welfare regimes
258
. From liberal through to 
social-democratic we find an increase in welfare provisions, with liberal regimes having 
reduced, and social-democratic regimes having maintained their post-war welfare state.  
Continental countries situated somewhere in the middle (though tending toward a social-
democratic model)
259
. Lacey also builds on literature that emphasises the link between welfare 
states and punishment, such as work by Katherine Beckett and Bruce Western, correlating 
welfare provision and punishment across American states
260
. This line of scholarship has 
suggested that high prison populations are associated with low welfare provision, and vice-
versa.  
 Lacey links the welfare state to national political economies, and thence to 
punishment. It is the different ‘economic and […] structural arrangements’ of such political 
economies, she argues, that affect the viability (indeed the rationality) of generous welfare 
provision. In CMEs extensive unemployment benefits are complementary to an economic 
structure that is premised on long-term investment in non-transferable skills
261
. By contrast, in 
flexible, service-heavy LMEs, the emphasis has been on stimulating workers to retrain, and 
rejoin the labour market when they lose their job, a policy made possible by the ‘high degree 
of transferable skills’ that workers typically display in LMEs262. Unemployment provisions 
are consequently less generous in such systems, in keeping with their overall economic 
structure. The further conclusion to be drawn from this is that, if welfare and penality are 
linked, and welfare itself is linked to national institutional arrangements, such arrangements 
will also affect penality. Moreover, given that differences between national institutional 
arrangements have tended to persist over time, we can hypothesise the consequent penal 
differences in punishment are also likely to persist
263
.  
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In sum: where generous welfare provision and broader economic structure interlock in a 
mutually reinforcing relationship, the resulting set-up is also likely to stimulate inclusive 
penal policies. By contrast, where the broader economic structure sustains lower levels of 
welfare provision, delegating to market mechanisms, there will be fewer incentives to create 
or sustain inclusionary penal policies. 
d. Criminal justice policy and constitutional structure 
In her discussion on criminal justice policy and constitutional structure, Lacey deals with 
three main features: the distribution of decision making points among political actors; the 
structure of legal institutions and, in particular, methods of selection and status of prosecutors 
and judges and constitutional constraints on criminalisation
264
. Her investigation of these 
three factors illustrates the more general proposition that ‘the constitutional structure of a 
country provides parameters for the institutional environment […] and for the legal 
system’265.   
 
In this section, and given my interest in the role of judicial actors to Italian penality (Chapter 
5), I propose to deal primarily with Lacey’s arguments on the appointment and tenure of 
judges and prosecutors. Regarding the other two factors, her general position is as follows. 
Firstly, the distribution of veto points will affect the ‘style of policy-making’ in any given 
polity
266
. It will affect the need for co-operation and consensus in the formation of policy, 
influencing the extent to which the latter is influenced by sways in popular sentiment: 
including over law and order
267
.  As regards constitutional constraints, we need to identify the 
different conceptions of law that exist within different constitutional set-ups. As Lacey 
details, law may be conceived of as a policy instrument (the more ‘managerial mentality’ that 
is associated with Britain and the United States)
268, or it may be conceived of as ‘an 
autonomous system [placing] constraints on [political] power’269. Admittedly in Italy the 
constitutional conception of ‘law’ does not always accord with its practical deployment; 
however these distinctions (and their potential distortion) are important to bear in mind as we 
investigate the role of Italian penal law, and the evolution of the nation’s penality. 
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Returning to judicial actors, Lacey argues that ‘the selection, training and tenure of judges and 
other key criminal justice officials will be likely to have distinctive implications for the 
environment in which penal policy is developed and implemented’270. Thus where, as in some 
US states, judges are elected, this creates a more direct link between popular sentiment on 
penal matters and penal practices. Where, as in Great Britain, lay magistrates hear a large 
portion of criminal law cases, this is likely to increase the likelihood of ‘lay’ rather than 
professional opinion on law and order, informing their decision-making
271
.  
 Lacey contrasts the British judiciary to continental European judiciaries whose 
‘professionalised system’272 reduces their susceptibility to popular sentiment on crime and 
punishment. Lacey also contrasts the different status of judges and prosecutors in the two 
contexts. In support of the argument made in relation to political systems, Lacey argues that 
different conceptions of the judicial role and judicial independence have an impact upon the 
levels of co-operation between judiciary and executive, in the formation of criminal justice 
policy. Where, as in Germany, judges are independent, but integral to the civil service, they 
tend to be understood as partners in the formation of criminal justice policy
273
. This contrasts 
to the way judicial independence is understood in the UK in which contact with government 
is considered improper– what Lacey calls ‘Olympian’ judicial independence274. Where this 
‘Olympian’ conception is combined with increasing hostility between the two state branches, 
the likelihood of co-ordinated penal policy decreases. As does the likelihood of professional 
opinion, contrary to law and order rhetoric, informing penal policy in a context where law and 
order has key electoral importance 
275
. 
 
In sum: the constitutional distribution of veto points, which affects the need for co-ordination 
in policy making; the constitutional conception of criminal law, which affects the latter’s 
deployment and its symbolic role; and the tenure and status of the judiciary, which affects 
their susceptibility to public sentiment and their ability to co-operate with other governmental 
branches cumulatively affect the stability of criminal justice policy. They also (all) affect the 
role of the criminal law and of the judiciary within different polities 
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e. Immigrants (in brief) 
Does it follow from this account that CMEs are always purveyors of penal moderation? 
Clearly it does not. In systems premised on close integration and co-ordination, those who 
come from outside the system may find themselves excluded; the key to re-integration is 
belonging from the outset. Punishment in CMEs may thus be stratified – as in Germany – 
along an insider/outsider boundary. Outsiders may then indicate to the necessary coordinates 
for inclusion, and re-inclusion, in the body politic
276
. Chapter 6 will discuss the punishment of 
immigrants in Italy, in part testing the following observation: 
 
In systems premised on integration and co-ordination it may be more difficult to integrate 
‘outsiders’ and, all other things being equal, ‘outsiders’ may be more exposed to penal 
exclusion. By contrast, in systems premised on ‘laissez-faire and individualistic culture 
typical of liberal market economies’ it may be easier to integrate ‘outsiders’ where they find 
space in the labour market
277. All other things being equal, ‘outsiders’ may thus share the 
same penal fate as ‘insiders’ in similar economic positions. 
 
VI. A note on methodology 
Having thus reviewed the relevant literature, I now summarise my position vis-à-vis its 
claims. My thesis builds upon the analyses advanced by David Garland, Alessandro De 
Giorgi and Nicola Lacey. Combined, their work yields a theoretical framework that considers 
punishment as a ‘social institution’, expressive of broader social and political transformations 
and anchored to the political economy and its evolution. In this framework, penal variation 
can be explained by reference to different national institutional configurations. The 
framework thus provides us with a fruitful way of conceptualising contemporary penality, and 
of understanding its conditions of existence. I use this structure to investigate Italian penality 
and, with the resulting account, to critique the theories upon which my work builds. 
 
In formulating my account of Italian penal trends I have drawn on a number of sources. 
Firstly, I have drawn on penological literature, concerned with contemporary punishment, and 
contemporary punishment as it varies across contexts. I have also consulted analyses of the 
history of Italian incarceration and Italian prison reform as well as criminological accounts of 
clientelism and corruption and their internal ‘orders’. I have not, however, limited myself to 
criminological literature. Taking an inter-disciplinary approach, true to the idea of punishment 
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as a feature of broader social evolution, I have drawn on a number of other sources. These 
include historical analyses of Italy; political science literature concerned with Italy’s 
institutions; literature explaining Italian political economy; accounts of Italian political 
developments over the decades. For Chapter 5 and its discussion of judicial actors, my 
investigation has then embraced texts detailing the history of the Italian judiciary since the 
early days of the Republic; but also manuscripts in which judicial actors themselves provided 
accounts of their involvement in Tangentopoli and the shifting nature of the judiciary after 
1990. Chapter 6 has relied on existing accounts of migrant punishment in Western Europe and 
on literature that detailed the shape and incidence of immigration to Italy and to Southern 
Europe. This has included analyses of the economic insertion of non-EU migrants in Italy, 
with its implications for social excusion. Some of the literature I have relied on has been both 
written in, and for, the Anglo-American context and some has been written in, and for, the 
Italian context. I have therefore tried to bring together two bodies of scholarship that have not 
always been in conversation. My aim is to use this combination of sources to avert the risk of 
producing an ‘orientalistic’ account of Italy. It has also contributed to the ‘mid-level’ 
theorisation that I set out to achieve. 
  
In Chapters 2 and 6 of this thesis, I have used statistical data as a means to advance my 
arguments. Chapter 2, which investigates Italian incarceration between 1970 and 2000, uses 
primarily criminal justice statistics. Data are both Italian and European, and include 
comparative imprisonment rates, as well as data on foreign incarceration in Italy. I have 
extracted some of these figures from already existing articles or monographs. A large part, 
however, I have collected from yearly Italian statistics published by the Italian national 
statistical association (ISTAT), and spanning the years 1970-2000
278
. Some imprisonment 
data have also been taken from the Italian Department for Penitentiary Administration
279
. 
However, the overwhelming majority have been collected from ISTAT publications, since 
they are more complete both in terms of historical series and available datasets.    
 Chapter 6, which investigates the punishment of migrants in Italy, includes not just 
data on immigrant incarceration, but also data on immigrant presence in Italy between 1990 
and 2000. I have collected the bulk of these data from the Caritas’ yearly Dossier Statistico 
Immigrazione
280
, the Italian Caritas having been the one association that over the past decades 
systematically collected and compiled data on immigration in Italy. Their figures are 
elaborated from data provided by the Italian Interior Ministry and the Dossier remains one of 
the most complete sources of information on non-EU migrants in Italy. I have collected select 
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datasets from Caritas publications, collating them to produce historical series from which to 
derive an overall picture of immigration into Italy during the 1990s. 
I have used these data as a means to test some of the assumptions contained in the 
literature. Thus, when investigating the existence or otherwise of Italian ‘punitiveness’ I have 
used imprisonment data to verify if this label could prima facie be applied to Italian penal 
trends. When investigating the punishment of migrants in Italy, the data served to test claims 
on migrants’ economic marginality in Italy, and on their relative over-incarceration in Italian 
prisons. In both Chapter 2 and Chapter 6, my interpretation is based only on descriptive 
analysis of the statistics, rather than on more complex statistical calculations. This is a 
conscious choice: my thesis is not a statistical thesis, and though the claims that I make are 
informed and sustained by statistical data, they remain rooted in the theoretical account 
developed throughout the thesis. 
There are also limitations with the statistical data, such that they cannot be taken 
alone in drawing conclusions on Italian penality. One limitation lies in the divergence of 
prison data across official sources. The existence of divergent data sources is not an 
uncommon issue for official databases, each of which may have been constructed for different 
purposes
281
. Thus imprisonment data for Italy provided by Eurostat databases, when 
compared to ISTAT databases, or to the World Prison Brief, (referred to in widely consulted 
secondary sources such as Cavadino and Dignan’s Penal Systems), have not always been 
identical
282
. However, the trends which they disclose are the same (Chapter 2). In light of this 
fact, my choice of database (ISTAT) was conducted on the basis of the completeness of the 
statistics available. 
The second limitation with the statistical material has been one of availability. This is 
in part due to the nature of the phenomena with which I am dealing: historical and social 
processes are not easily translated into statistical indicators, susceptible to measurement. In 
part, however, it is due to the fact that certain indicators either do not exist, or are not easily 
forthcoming in Italy. To give one example: few if any data exist that measure immigrant 
incarceration before the year 2000, layered by migrant socio-demographic characteristics. 
This type of data would have been useful in Chapter 6, to provide additional support for my 
hypotheses on how migrant incarceration relates to their position within Italian society. To 
seek out such data I researched ISTAT archives, Caritas publications, and directly consulted 
the Department for Penitentiary Administration (DAP). In none of these cases did I find the 
required statistics.  
                                                     
281
 Hancké (2009, pp. 98-99) 
282
 Cavadino and Dignan (2006); World Prison Brief. International Centre for Prison Studies 
http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief 
 51 
This absence of data can be explained in a number of ways. In relation to prison data, 
concerns for detainees’ privacy restrict the creation of detailed databases. Data that are 
layered too specifically may lead to detainees being identifiable, if additional contextual 
evidence is also available to the researcher. To prevent the detainee being identifiable by a 
process of elimination, for example, data are not collected that specify detainees’ nationality, 
layered also by their marital status
283
. Another explanation for the absence of data rests on the 
interest raised by a particular topic that catalyses the research efforts through which datasets 
are produced. Large-scale immigration to Italy, for example, only began in the 1990s, and 
only after that date did migration clearly become a topic of interest for statistical 
investigation. Even then there may have been a time lag between the stage at which 
immigration became a topic of interest, the collection of data, and the collection of sufficiently 
varied data on immigration in Italy. This means that available historical series may not go as 
far back as the time frame for my research: such is the case with DAP statistics on 
unemployed migrants in prison, whose historical series begin in the year 2000
284
. This 
absence of data should not, however, stop us from investigating a given issue: theoretical 
arguments are still possible, and indeed necessary (not least to stimulate future collection of 
relevant data). 
The topic of migration raises one further, and important, issue on the limitations of 
statistics, and an additional reason why not all my hypotheses have been subject to empirical 
verification. Some of the phenomena and processes analysed in this thesis are informal and 
difficult to capture statistically. Thus non-EU immigrants in Italy may be irregular, and their 
presence may not be officially quantifiable. Similarly, labour in Italy may be irregular: it will 
thus fall outside the remit of employment statistics; or only be available as an estimate 
measure
285
. Lack of data also means that any statistics I do rely on to measure these informal 
processes, can at best be rough guides for what I am describing. We need not thereby be 
dissuaded from investigating these informal processes: the lack of data must simply act as a 
catalyst for thorough theoretical research. I suggest that it will also pre-empt us from falling 
into the false security that derives from having statistical data measuring informal processes, 
thus over-determining both their certainty and quantifiability.   
VII. The contents of this thesis 
Alongside the introduction, this thesis consists of 6 chapters. Chapter 2 – Italy’s Differential 
Punitiveness – asks whether we can talk of Italian penality between 1970 and 2000 in terms 
of increasing punitiveness, or whether its penal trends reveal an alternative scenario. I argue 
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that, on the basis of statistical data and historical accounts, Italy’s punitiveness is in fact best 
classed as differential. The nation’s penal trends oscillated between repression and leniency, 
and should be seen as an example of contained penal expansion. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 both 
go under the title Penality and Politics. Chapter 3 – subtitled Politics and the Political 
Economy – investigates the Italian political economy in terms of the penal incentives that it 
creates. In this chapter my main referents are De Giorgi and Lacey, whose assumptions and 
theories are questioned as they intersect with the Italian context. Chapter 4 – State and 
Citizen, Politics and Culture – analyses the relationship between Italian state and Italian 
citizen, and the impact it has had upon the purchase and role of the penal law in Italy. If 
Chapter 3 investigates the penal incentives created by the national institutional structure, 
Chapter 4 investigates how the nation’s political evolution has affected the extent to which 
such incentives find penal expression. Here my referent is Garland, with his account of 
statehood and its contemporary ‘predicament’. The two chapters conclude that Italian penality 
should be understood in terms of political dynamics: the political conflicts and political 
dualisms that characterise national reality. Following on from this conclusion, Chapter 5 –
Judicial Actors and Penality – investigates one particular political conflict that has had lasting 
impacts on Italian penality: that between judicial and political actors. The chapter analyses the 
Italian judiciary in terms of its structure, its interrelation with other state branches, and its 
variable legitimacy. I argue that, as a result of how these features have combined over the 
decades, judicial actors have had variable effects on Italian penality. Thus, if at some times 
they have been purveyors of pressures for penal expansion, at other times they have resisted 
such pressures, and contributed to penal containment. Chapter 5 concludes that patterns of 
punishment in Italy cannot easily be predicted by looking at the agents of penality (here, 
judicial actors) and that a more fruitful attempt at prediction can be made by looking at penal 
subjects. In Chapter 6 – The Legal Vice – I then investigate one particularly salient penal 
subject: non-EU migrants. The chapter analyses their punishment in 1990s Italy, and in it I 
argue that the punishment of migrants should be understood as a legal vice. In this ‘vice’, 
migrants’ status as political and legal outsiders combines with their economic marginality to 
yield migrant over-incarceration across the decade. The chapter stresses the importance of 
political belonging in Italy, asking whether, in light of this theoretical conclusion, punishment 
is not therefore more likely to fall on non-EU migrants. The thesis concludes in Chapter 7, in 
which I return to the central argument whereby Italian penality is best understood in terms of 
its political conflicts and political dualisms. I explain how each level of conflict produces 
different pressures for penal expansion or penal reintegration, and how each dualism affects 
the purchase and role of the criminal law in Italy and thus its use as a tool for conflict 
resolution. Having detailed the main conflicts and dualisms that have emerged throughout the 
thesis, I conclude by reflecting on the interaction between my account of Italy and the 
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theories from which this work began. I finally explain how the theories themselves can be 
altered in the light of insights drawn from my account of Italian penality. An appendix is 
included, with background information on Italy and its history, primarily aimed at readers not 
familiar with the Italian context.  
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Chapter 2 - Italy’s Differential Punitiveness 
 
I. Introduction – Hypothesising Differential Punitiveness 
As I have argued in Chapter 1, Garland and De Giorgi seem to agree on the shape – if not the 
cause – of contemporary penal developments, talking of Western Europe’s increasing 
punitiveness. Furthermore, they locate the onset of ‘punitiveness’ in the early 1970s and point 
to increasing prison population as its primary manifestation. In Chapter 1, I had noted how 
this assumption has been questioned, and how increasing punitiveness may not in fact be 
Western Europe’s unequivocal fate. Given existing penal divergence across Western Europe 
(and the US - Figure 1), comparative literature rightly argues for a more differentiated 
approach to penal theory
286
. It intimates that, looking beyond ‘late modernity’ and ‘post-
Fordism’, we will find more complex national scenarios. These may be affected by global 
level phenomena, but the latter need not spell global convergence in punishment levels
287
. In 
the light of this argument (and as a precursor to determining the why of Italian penality) I 
propose to verify whether or not Italy displays the ‘increasing punitiveness’ of many 
influential analyses. This chapter will chart the development of Italian penality between the 
years 1970 and 2000. Note that the chapter is not an attempt to draw out a statistical 
relationship between prison rates and their determinants, but aims to chart Italian penality by 
reference to the criteria used in my theoretical models. 
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Figure 1 – International Prison Trends 1950-2010 
 
  
Sources: International Centre for Prison Studies (accessed February 2010); John Pratt (2008); 
Lacey (2012)
288
 
 
Assumptions on the shape of Italian penality run throughout the whole of my first chapter. 
Italian penality appeared to shift between punitiveness and moderation, and thus stood out 
relative to Garland, De Giorgi and even Lacey’s models. The Italian political economy, and 
the Italian state, also seem to fall outside these theories, and these features suggest we need to 
qualify our accounts of punitiveness and moderation in Western polities if we are to account 
for the Italian case.  I now bring these observations together into one single hypothesis, that of 
differential punitiveness
289
. This hypothesis embodies the idea that Italian penality develops 
along two separate but interlinked strands. Italian penality is split between poles of repression 
and leniency. The pre-eminence of one or the other varies: over time, for example, with the 
1990s standing out as a time of steeply growing prison rates. But also across subjects, where 
punishment levels differ for ‘outsider’ migrants compared to nationals (see section below). 
Differentiation also occurs on a number of other levels: between symbol and substance where 
the letter of the penal law fails to match its application, and between types of crime, with 
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crimes ‘against the state’ (see below) receiving particularly harsh treatment. I hypothesise that 
comparatively Italy can perhaps still be seen as a penally moderate nation (at least relative to 
England and Wales) despite the visible instances of punitiveness in Italian penal trends.  
 
To talk of prison rates and penality raises the question of the adequacy of prison rates as 
measures of penality. Why have I chosen to use prison rates, as shorthand for penal 
evolution? This is in fact a question that can be directed to many of the contemporary 
analyses of Western penality. Implicit in this question is the further issue of whether reliance 
on prison rates does not betray an obsession with the carceral, which ignores other equally 
significant aspects of penality. One answer to this is to acknowledge that surely penality is 
more than just prison rates, and that prison rates are not an exhaustive measure
290
. They are, 
however, a highly convenient measure of punishment, and my decision to rely on prison rates 
is a pragmatic one. I am not arguing that 'penality' and 'incarceration' are synonyms, nor that 
levels of incarceration on their own are sufficient gauges of national penal systems. However, 
I am arguing that prison rates are very useful within the context of political economic/cultural 
analyses of punishment.  Firstly they are useful for comparative purposes
291
: despite their 
shortcomings they remain an easily available measure of punishment, and one that is fairly 
consistent across Western polities (because collected on the same basis). Though there may 
be differences in prison conditions which make imprisonment a different experience, the 
formal meaning of imprisonment remains fairly uncontroversial across such polities. By 
contrast, alternatives to imprisonment are not necessarily the same in all nations: not just in 
terms of the variety of alternatives that exist in different countries, but also in terms of how 
developed such alternatives are
292
. Nations may have introduced alternatives at later dates, 
staggered their introduction, or may rely more on the fine, on home arrest, or on (one Italian 
alternative) affidamento in prova al servizio sociale (consignment to social services). It thus 
becomes extremely complex to ensure that we are comparing like to like, when we compare 
Italian alternatives to, for example, alternatives in England and Wales over a period of three 
decades. Prison rates, for all their pitfalls, are less subject to such contextual variation. 
 Looking to questions of comparison we can also see that prison formally remains, in 
contemporary Western Europe, the most serious type of punishment available and ideally a 
measure of last resort
293
. If we are talking of levels of national punishment, of penal 
expansion and penal moderation, it is then both useful and interesting to see just how different 
nations use their most extreme form of punishment. How parsimonious are they in their use of 
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detention? With what ease do they deploy it and against whom? Arguably, where a nation 
considers prison a measure of last resort yet is 'prison-happy', this raises prima facie questions 
on its punitiveness. Of course prison rates cannot be de-contextualised, and good 
criminological analysis only sets forth from incarceration rates to build up a more complex 
picture within which to contextualise them. This is the use made of prison rates in Garland, 
De Giorgi, and Lacey. Given that my thesis aims to set itself within this literature, it makes 
sense for me to have adopted a similar approach: ultimately, my critical analysis of the 
literature is not premised on questioning its use of prison rates, but on investigating the 
applicability of the literature’s theses to the Italian context294.  
 
The present chapter is structured as follows: it begins with a descriptive account of Italian 
penal trends, over time and in comparative perspective. It argues that Italian penality displays 
a ‘differential puntiveness’ characterized by a harshness-leniency tension manifest in Italy’s 
fluctuating prison rates. The succeeding section interprets these trends: it analyses the role 
and use of clemency provisions in Italy and examines some of the penal legislation of the 
period 1970-2000. It also provides preliminary explanations for the penal trends of the 1990s, 
focusing in particular on arguments advanced by Massimo Pavarini and on one particular 
phenomenon that stands out during this decade, the incarceration of non-EU immigrants.  
 
II. Italian penal trends: time trends and comparison
295
 
I start my investigation of Italy’s differential punitiveness by considering prison rates between 
1970 and 2000 (Figure 2). Italian prison rates do not seem to present any unequivocal trend 
across the 30 years at hand. They do show an upward motion, most visible if discontinuous 
readings are taken
296
, but they mainly progress in peaks and troughs
297
. This undulating 
motion can in part be attributed to the pardons and amnesties cyclically passed by the Italian 
government in an attempt to reduce the population detained (Table 1). From Figure 2 we can 
also identify two main periods during which prison rates increased: 1981 to 1984 and 1990 to 
1994. The latter increase is particularly noticeable, marking a turning point in levels of Italian 
imprisonment, so that the lowest prison rates after 1992 are still higher than the highest rates 
before 1990. Before proceeding with further analysis, it is thus worth considering whether this 
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temporal dimension of Italian penal expansion should not also be built into our hypothesis, by 
hypothesizing that punitiveness became more prominent from 1990. 
 
Figure 2 – Prison Rates Italy and England & Wales Compared 1970-2000, including 
Italian clemency provisions. 
 
 
Sources:  
Italy: my elaboration from ISTAT – Annuari di Statistiche Giudiziarie Penali 1970-2000298 
and ISTAT- Demo, Geodemo http://demo.istat.it/ (accessed October 2009) 
England and Wales: my elaboration from Home Office and Population Estimates, UK 
National Statistic. Population estimates available at: http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/pop-
estimate/population-estimates-for-uk--england-and-wales--scotland-and-northern-
ireland/population-estimates-timeseries-1971-to-current-year/rft---table-1-total-persons-
constituent-countries-regions.zip (accessed October 2009)
299
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Table 1 – Pardons and Amnesties 1970-2007 
 
Measure D.P.R 
283/70 
(amnest
y and 
pardon) 
D.P.R. 
413/78 
(amnest
y and 
pardon) 
D.P.R 
744/81 
(amnest
y and 
pardon) 
D.P.R. 
865/86 
(amnest
y and 
pardon) 
D.P.R. 
75/90 
(amnesty
) 
D.P.R. 
394/90  
(pardon) 
L. 
207/2003 
(pardon 
‘indultino’
) 
L. 
241/200
6 
(pardon) 
Years 1970 1978 1981 1986 1990 2003 2007 
Pardoned 
population 
as a 
percentage 
of total 
population 
incarcerated
. 
53,5 34,1 22,1 22,3 38,0 16,9 44,0 
Source: Elaboration carried out by Centro Studi Ristretti Orizzonti Available at: 
http://www.ristretti.it/index.htm (accessed October 2009)
300
. 
 
From a comparative perspective we see that throughout the three decades at hand Italian 
prison rates remained lower than those of England and Wales’ (Figure 2). Prima facie this 
would suggest that Italy is penally more moderate than England and Wales. This conclusion is 
disrupted, however, if we consider the percentage increase in prison rates over the relevant 
period. In Italy, prison rates increased by 141% between 1970 and 2000, compared to the 
55% increase in English and Welsh prison rates. Much of the increase in Italian prison rates is 
concentrated during the 1990s: with a 107% increase between 1990 and 2000 (though 
exaggerated by the 1990 clemency provisions – see below) compared to a 13% increase 
between 1970 and 1990 (again considering the 1990 amnesty/pardon). These findings show 
that between 1970 and 2000 Italy experienced pressures towards penal escalation, as did 
England and Wales. Comparative prison data thus suggests that Italy displays relative 
moderation but also punitiveness (here represented by the background increase, and 1990s 
peak, in prison rates). 
 
A comparison with other European nations – Germany and France301 – also confirms that 
between 1987 and 2000, neither Italian penal expansion nor Italian penal stability were ever 
unequivocal. Thus, Italy’s prison rates, which in 1987 start out lower than those of its three 
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comparators, rise substantially in the 1990s, surpassing for a time both German and French 
rates. Italian prison rates appear more variable than German and French rates 
302
. Similarly, 
returning to Figure 1 it appears that Italian penal trends fluctuate more than prison trends for 
England and Wales. 
 
 
Figure 3 - Prison Rates, European Comparisons 1987-2000
303
 
 
 
Sources:  
Italy: my elaboration on ISTAT data, England and Wales: my elaboration on Home Office 
data and Population Estimates, UK national statistics. 
Germany, Spain, France: my elaboration on Eurostat data
304
 
Note – after 1989 Germany includes DDR 
 
 
The fluctuation in Italian prison rates is partly due to a deflation achieved by means of 
cyclical amnesties/pardons. As I will show in the next section, these provisions are examples 
of politically willed penal moderation, but they also owe much to instrumental considerations. 
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Whatever the design behind them, they are de facto examples of penal leniency, ‘ameliorating 
the levels of imprisonment in practice’305. This alerts us to the fact that ‘leniency’ and 
‘punitiveness’ are crude, if instrumental, concepts306. We should in fact concede that we face 
not a discontinuous divide between the two, but rather a ‘leniency-punitiveness’ spectrum. 
This can encompass a number of factors – from the ‘unintended’ consequences of amnesties 
to more explicit legislative provisions for alternatives to prison. Once we concede that 
punitiveness and leniency can co-exist in Italy, the question becomes how the two are 
distributed and why. In order to analyse the distribution of punishment in Italy, and situate the 
nation in the broader criminological literature, we then need to ask how punitiveness was 
differentiated between 1970 and 2000. We also need to interrogate where and why Italy was 
moderate relative to the Garland/De-Giorgi scenario. The next section provides a partial 
answer to these questions by analysing the sources of Italy’s penal fluctuation.  
 
III. Interpreting the figures 
i. Amnesties and Pardons 
The rise and fall of Italian prison rates is partly due to their deflation by cyclical amnesties 
(amnistie) and pardons (indulti). Given their visible effects on prison rates, it is worth 
discussing the provisions in more detail. This discussion also acts as a preamble to topics 
analysed in later chapters, as amnesties and pardons – in their structure, history and use – 
point to important issues relevant to broader evaluations of Italian penality.  
 
Amnesties are defined as ‘general clemency provisions with which the state, in exceptional 
circumstances, waives the punishment of a given number of offences’ committed before and 
up to the amnesty
307
. Amnesties are distinguished from pardons insofar as they extinguish the 
offence, whereas pardons extinguish the principal penalty only
308
. The offences encompassed 
in amnesties/pardons are identified in the clemency provision: often by reference to offences’ 
maximum penalties
309
. The procedure for clemency is found in article 79 of the Constitution, 
as modified in 1992
310
. Before 1992 the President of the Republic, following an enabling law 
passed by Senate and Chamber of Deputies, issued clemency provisions by means of a 
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presidential decree. Since 1992 the procedure has been ‘parliamentarized’311: clemency 
provisions now require a 2/3 majority in each house
312
. This change was introduced in the 
wake of the 1990s corruption scandals (Chapter 1 and Appendix) with the aim of making the 
process more stringent, and clemency less frequent. Commentators judge that this objective 
has been achieved. As Vincenzo Maiello notes: given the political fragmentation that 
followed from the 1990s collapse of the party system, and the successive electoral reform, the 
required majority is difficult to achieve (Appendix & Chapters 3 and 4). The reduction of 
clemency provisions has had visible effects on incarceration: after 1990 it took ‘one decade 
alone for the prison population to double’313. The 1992 reform thus stalled what had been a 
regular practice in Italian history (pre and post Republic). Piraino estimates that, on average, 
clemency provisions were issued about every three years between 1960 and 1990
314
. This 
‘liberal use of amnesties and pardons’ has always and only had short-term effects (Figure 
2)
315
. 
 
Italian clemency provisions are thought to derive from the sovereign power that ‘in absolute 
monarchies represented the superiority of the monarch over judicial power’316. By contrast, 
the procedure laid down in Italy’s Republican Constitution was designed to engage all the 
‘principal constitutional organs’317. Indeed, as Massimo Palmerini argues, in most cases it was 
the executive that initiated the proceedings. The legislature was then called upon to pass the 
enabling law; the head of state issued the decree; and the judiciary implemented it 
318
.  
Palmerini also notes that, at the outset, clemency provisions were intended as ‘exceptional’ 
measures: their repeat use (up until 1992) suggests that they have been interpreted otherwise.  
 Surveying contemporary uses of amnesties/pardons, numerous commentators have 
noted their pragmatic and instrumental character. Thus Ruggiero describes the provisions as 
legislative measures resulting from ‘both prisoners’ pressure and authorities’ concern about 
[…] overcrowding and unrest’319.  Maiello goes further, positing a direct link between 
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political expediency and amnesties/pardons, describing Italy’s use of clemency as sensitive to 
the political class’ contingent needs320. Clemency provisions were used for their short-term 
deflationary effects, but also to produce electoral consensus
321. Maiello’s analysis points to 
two additional features of the provisions, which can be used in a broader evaluation of Italy’s 
differential punitiveness. He argues firstly that the ‘ideal’ function of amnesties/pardons was 
to act as a ‘corrective’ to the harshness of the penal law322. He then contends that in their 
actual use they became not just politically expedient tools, but also the state’s ‘paternalistic’ 
means of resolving social conflict. This, I add, was especially so where amnesties and pardons 
were passed contemporaneously to moments of social unrest
323
.  From this analysis I pick out 
four (interlinked) features of clemency provisions: the connection between clemency and 
politics; clemency provisions as pragmatic measures; clemency provisions as paternalistic 
measures; amnesties/pardons as a ‘corrective’ to penal harshness.  
 
The first – clemency provisions as susceptible to political contingencies324 – raises the issue 
of the influence of politics on Italian penality, a subject that I will discuss at length in the 
coming chapters and will therefore not expand upon here. The second characteristic points to 
a certain pragmatism existing within Italian penality (indeed within Italian political culture – 
Chapters 3 and 4). Here pragmatism lies in the instrumental use of deflationary measures as 
short-term solutions to structural problems that would otherwise have required more 
considered measures (not forthcoming within the Italian political scenario)
325
. Thus amnesties 
and pardons helped reduce the prison population – and in this were de facto measures of 
leniency
326
 – where the problem of overcrowding would have demanded more significant 
reforms
327
.  This resort to short-term, stop-gap solutions expresses a certain volatility in 
Italian penality which, I suggest, also reflects the alternation between punitiveness and 
leniency manifest in Italian prison rates. 
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The pragmatic use of amnesties/pardons may be seen as a distortion of their original 
design where clemency became a frequent and instrumental, rather than exceptional, measure. 
The ‘paternalistic’ use of amnesties, as Maiello has termed it, is perhaps more coherent with 
clemency’s original (unreformed) design. The Republican constitution envisaged 
amnesties/pardons as products of Presidential will (supported but not yet supplanted by 
parliamentary will)
328, and clemency was dispensed by the ‘head of the State’, upon the 
subjects of state law. Maiello argues, however, that the actual use of clemency testifies to a 
paternalism that goes beyond that inherent in the institutional design. As a routine measure, 
susceptible to political contingency, and used as a ‘corrective’ to penal harshness, clemency 
has come to reconstitute the relationship between state and citizen. Where amnesties are 
concerned, the relationship between state and citizen becomes one between ‘the giver of 
paternalistic protection and its devoted subjects’, a relationship sapped of the political 
autonomy that should ideally characterise citizens’ participation to their polity329. Maiello also 
discusses the use of clemencies to favour specific groups of ‘individuals close to the ruling 
class’, in particular, Piraino adds, via the ‘special attention’ paid by the legislative to financial 
offences
330. These more ‘specific’ uses of clemency provisions have an ulterior distortive 
effect on state-citizen relations: they make its recipients not just subjects, but ‘clients’ (and 
‘ethically subordinate’)331. This clientelistic relationship between state and citizen, and the 
effect it has on citizens’ status within the Italian polity, is one that returns in coming chapters. 
Chapter 4 investigates the impact of this type of citizen-state interaction on the criminal law’s 
appeal, its use and its circumvention. Here it is enough to register that Italian penal 
instruments – such as clemency provisions – have been used to ‘dispense’ leniency, and that 
amnesties/pardons have been interpreted as both a form of paternalism and of patronage. This 
suggests that we need to qualify our analyses of ‘contemporary punitiveness’ to allow for the 
co-existence of punitiveness and leniency after 1970
332
. It also suggests that we need to adapt 
our analysis of Italian penality to encompass paternalistic/clientelistic interactions between 
state and citizens, with their (potential) penal articulations. 
The fourth relevant feature of amnesty/pardons, i.e., their use to ‘soften’ penal legislation, 
supports the idea that a tension between repression and leniency runs through Italian penality. 
Maiello, for example, talks of clemency provisions as a means to avoid the penal system’s 
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‘short circuit’, provoked by its ‘excess [of] penalisation’333. Maiello is not alone in pointing to 
Italy’s over-reliance on the criminal law. Nelken also talks of Italy as a nation in which many 
‘forms of conduct’ are ‘theoretically regulated by criminal law’, that would ‘in common law 
countries […] be the subject of administrative or civil law’334.  This ‘hypertrophic’, i.e. 
overdeveloped, criminal legislation then finds its contrapositive in the routine use of 
clemency provisions:  ‘[Italy’s] excess penal legislation has provoked […] the hypertrophic 
expansion of a culture of indulgence’335. The word ‘indulgence’ may over-state the case, but 
Italy does emerge from this portrait as a country with extremes of both of punitiveness and of 
leniency. The next section explores this tension in relation to Italy’s penal code and penal 
legislation. 
 
ii. Differential punitiveness and penal dualisms: repression and leniency 
The idea that a nation’s penality should be split between repression and leniency is neither 
new nor limited to the Italian context. Garland himself talks of the ‘twin faces’ of state 
punishment, whereby the state simultaneously casts off responsibility for certain crimes and 
offenders while reasserting its authoritarian control against the ‘residual’ deviants336. In Italy, 
the oscillation between punitiveness and leniency is visible throughout national penal history: 
in penal legislation, in prison reform, and in the very principles thought to inform punishment.  
 
The aims of punishment are laid down in the Italian Constitution: punishment ‘[…] must tend 
to the convict’s re-education’337. Orthodox legal doctrine has further emphasized that 
punishment ‘cannot […] aim to enforce a superior idea of justice’, and that penal law, and 
prison, should be a measure of last resort
338
. The Italian Constitutional Court has recognised 
that retribution and deterrence can also be legitimate penal purposes, though they should not 
supplant re-education
339.  Following the Constitutional Court’s pronouncement, punishment 
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in Italy can thus be defined as ‘polyfunctional’340: this implies greater flexibility in Italian 
penality than the ‘rehabilitative myth’ – the pretence that punishment is a matter of ‘re-
education’ - would suggest341.  We should also note that Italy’s penal code – the Codice 
Rocco – was passed in 1930 under Fascist rule. The code has not been fully revised but only 
subject to piecemeal modification, and it still bears signs of the authoritarian regime under 
which it was devised
342. It provides, in Pavarini’s words, ‘the possibility of draconian prison 
sentences for the most minor offence’343, ‘[reflecting] the authoritarian system of the 
thirties’344. Similarly ‘almost every offence carries a statutory minimum sentence’ and the 
code considers prison as the primary method of punishment
345
. The persistence of these 
features suggests that there is an undercurrent of punitiveness, present in Italian penality, at 
least in potential. Italy’s over-reliance on penal legislation has heightened this potential by 
creating more opportunities for the deployment of punishment, including incarceration
346
.  
That Italy has not experienced unequivocal increases in prison rates is partly due to a 
discrepancy between primary and secondary criminalization, formal punishment and social 
demand for punishment respectively. As Pavarini explains: if Italy shows high levels of 
primary criminalization –‘unusually severe [formal] sanctions’ 347– it nonetheless displays 
low social demands for punishment
348
. This discrepancy is also expressed in judicial softening 
of severe sanctions, producing what Pavarini calls ‘paternalistic indulgence’ in practice349 (see 
also Chapter 4).   
 
The penal code’s evolution – piecemeal and with no overall design – has, according to Musio, 
given rise a system ‘neither authoritarian nor liberal’, but simply ‘arbitrary’ (presumably 
because of its incoherence)
350
. This mode of change is not limited to Italy but what is 
interesting in Italy is that the penal law seems to evolve in response to political contingencies, 
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a connection at times very evident
351
. Reforms passed to counteract Italy’s ‘emergencies’ 
provide an example of this process
352
. Here I will deal primarily with political terrorism and 
organised crime
353
, significant insofar as they represent direct challenges to the Italian state
354
. 
State reactions to such challenges point to Italian penality’s volatility, as penal law changes in 
response to political contingencies. Terrorism and organised crime have also been 
‘opportunities’ for punitive turns in Italian penality, that often co-existed with opposite penal 
impulses (e.g. the emphasis on the re-education of the prisoner). If amnesties and pardons are 
an aspect of the leniency, within the harshness-punitiveness dualism that characterizes Italy’s 
‘differential punitiveness’, then the responses to the emergencies can be seen as an aspect of 
the harshness within that dualism. I will discuss these responses in the coming sections. 
Note that my focus in this section is the legislation’s character in terms of the link 
between Italian penality and politics, and of Italy’s harshness-leniency tension355. Starting 
with the terrorist ‘emergency’, we can look to Luigi Ferrajoli’s critical evaluation of the 
‘normative tools’ employed against it356. These ‘tools’ were partly found in the Codice Rocco 
and partly introduced in the late-1970s, early-1980s
357
. They included an increased use of 
preventive custody (roughly remand in prison) and an extension of its maximum period
358
. 
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This produced a de facto penal harshness that, however, also sat along a form of leniency: 
reduced penalties for of those who ‘repented’ of their terrorist affiliations, and cooperated 
with antiterrorism investigations
359
.  Luigi Stortoni contends that preventive custody was 
often used precisely to obtain such ‘cooperation’ and further cites this mechanism as a 
practice born during the ‘antiterrorist emergency’ that later transformed into generalised 
praxis
360
.  We do indeed find the same devices (preventive custody and collaboration) 
employed when countering organised crime
361. Stortoni’s claim can further be read as 
pointing to a broader phenomenon whereby emergency practices persisted beyond the 
emergency. This has been referred to as a ‘halo effect’362 and may explain ‘the paradox [in 
Italian penal policy] whereby campaigns against specific offenders’ such as political terrorists 
and organised criminals ‘turn into increased penalties for […] those who are not [direct] 
targets [of the campaign] or [even for] offenders in general’363. The notion of a ‘halo effect’ 
also lends support to the existence of a punitive potential within Italian penality: a harshness 
present but not always manifest, here engendered by the emergency legislation. Where this 
potential is realised we could logically expect it to lead to an increase in incarceration rates. 
Admittedly, the potential for leniency is also present, but not constantly realised, in Italian 
penality. It is contingent – in the political terrorist’s case, on collaboration – and therefore 
does not give rise to clear penal moderation
364
.  
This co-existence of punitiveness and moderation can also be found within Italian 
prison legislation, in particular the Prison Acts of 1975 and its 1986 reform
365
. Both aimed to 
enact the Constitutional principle of punishment as re-education
366
. They embodied the 
‘positivistic treatment model’ which ‘in other countries [had] lost ground to the ideologies of 
“just deserts” and “law and order”’367. Article 1(6) of the 1975 Prison Act (retained in the 
1986 law) summarises the law’s position. It states that punishment must consist of ‘re-
educative treatment [tending] to the re-socialization’ of detainees’.  Treatment must be 
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‘individualized’, i.e., responsive to the needs of the specific prisoner, gauged by ‘scientific 
observation’ during detention (article 13). Re-education should also be achieved via contact 
with the outside world. Article 15 further specifies ‘education, work, religion, cultural, leisure 
and sporting activities’ and ‘relations with the family’ as means of re-socialisation368. 
Importantly, (and because we should not assume that rehabilitation equates with 
moderation) the 1975 law also introduced alternatives to custody
369
. These included release on 
parole, day release and early release after successful participation in re-education 
programmes
370
. Custodial alternatives spell some degree of moderation, at least where 
punitiveness and moderation are gauged by incarceration levels. However, amidst the 
reforms’ generally moderate outlook there also existed particularly harsh provisions. Thus 
article 90 of the 1975 Act allowed for the total or partial suspension of detainees’ re-educative 
regime, where necessary to maintain ‘order and security’ in prison. As Ruggiero has noted, 
this single article effectively annulled the whole law of which it was part. It was the 
legislators’ warning ‘that punishment in the community and other alternative measures were 
not […] part of an irreversible process of decarceration’ but only a contingent one371. I further 
suggest that the presence of article 90, in the 1975 reform, formalized the repression-leniency 
split of Italian penality. The act reserved repression (suspension of rehabilitation) for 
prisoners whose particular ‘dangerousness’ made them suitable subjects for incapacitation372. 
These included political terrorists, and it was precisely ‘when political prisoners began to fill 
Italian institutions’ that the ‘exceptionally serious circumstances’ which in principle triggered 
article 90, ‘came to be seen less as [temporary] than as permanent’373.  Article 90 was 
eventually abolished by the 1986 prison reform. However the harshness-leniency tension it 
represents remained within the new legislation. The split was successively intensified by 
changes introduced against organised crime.  
 
The 1986 law, premised on facilitating decarceration, further expanded the range of 
alternatives to custody
374. Alternatives were now available that ‘completely [diverted] 
offenders from the prison system’ or that ‘applied while offenders [were] already serving a 
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sentence’. The latter were granted by judges overseeing prison supervision375, and contributed 
to ‘[shift] […] power’, to decide length of incarceration, away from the sentencing judge, to 
the prison administration
376
.  Having abolished article 90, the 1986 Act still included 
provisions that established special restrictive surveillance for given detainees, and that 
allowed the suspension of re-educative treatment in emergency situations – articles 14-bis and 
41-bis respectively
377
. In the early 1990s, in response to the organized crime emergency, 
article 41-bis was extended to cover prisoners thought to retain connections with organised 
crime (or indeed terrorist/subversive associations)
378
. The reform was further modified with a 
1991 legal decree, later converted into legislation
379
, which introduced article 4-bis in 
penitentiary legislation. This article excluded prisoners, detained for specified offences, from 
benefitting from custodial alternatives. The relevant offences included so-called ‘mafia 
association’, but also drug trafficking and extortion, i.e., offences that ‘in the official wisdom, 
are typically associated with the Mafia’380. The reacquisition of benefits was conditional on 
proof that no further connections subsisted between prisoner and relevant criminal 
association
381
. Treatment and alternatives to custody were, however, open to offenders who 
fell under article 4-bis but collaborated with police or judiciary against their former criminal 
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organization
382
. The condition for receiving treatment was, as with terrorists, a renewed 
allegiance to the established legal order
383
. Again the legislative structure here appears split 
between harshness (article 41-bis) and leniency (treatment regime and collaboration).  
The legislative interventions of the early 1990s against organised crime have been defined 
in terms of ‘reform and counter-reform’384. I suggest that the expression can in fact be applied 
to Italian penality more broadly
385
. It is a fitting expression because it communicates both 
fluctuation and volatility. Fluctuation is between moderation and repression and is integral to 
differential punitiveness as evidenced by Italy’s prison rates. Volatility is inherent in this 
fluctuation: we see it in relation to prison reform and penal legislation, we had seen it in 
relation to amnesties. Penal volatility here seems to point to a state that is trying to 
monopolise and direct not just the power to punish, but also the power to forgive: not just 
harshness but also leniency
386
. It is also a state torn between principle and pragmatism, one 
that wishes to re-educate and decarcerate as a matter of principle to the extent of re-education 
being enshrined in the Republic’s Constitution. Yet it is the same state that is drawn to a more 
pragmatic use of the penal law, where benefits are used as a bargaining tool to obtain 
collaboration and where amnesties – in principle exceptional – become routine deflationary 
measures.  
iii. The 1990s – growing prison rates 
So far my discussion thus has provided a theoretical account of Italy’s differental punitiveness 
and the tensions the latter embodies, in particular the harshness-punitiveness dualism. My 
account is not an attempt to correlate Italian penal legislation and Italian prison rates, tracing 
direct links between penal reforms and penal trends
387. As Pavarini notes ‘ more or less severe 
laws, or major changes in criminal offences do not translate, sic et simpliciter, into more or 
less use of imprisonment’388. However, when looking at Italian prison rates, it is useful to 
provide some starting hypotheses on the increase in prison rates experienced during the 
1990s, given that the decade stands out as a time of increased incarceration. In this section I 
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will cover two main arguments that can help us account for the 1990s: they will be developed 
in greater depth in coming chapters. The succeeding section (nationality and immigrants) 
covers a third argument that also helps us explain 1990s penality. 
 The first argument points to the change in the procedure for clemency provisions: 
after 1992 amnesties and pardons became more difficult to approve, and the Italian penal 
system was thus deprived of one frequent and immediate means of reducing incarceration. 
The second argument has been developed by Massimo Pavarini, according to whom crime 
has typically been construed as a political question in Italy. In this political ‘interpretation’, 
crime calls for resolution by political means rather than recourse to penal law. Pavarini 
provides a number of reasons for this approach, one being the prominence of political 
terrorism as crime emergency, during the 1970s and early 1980s
389
. However, this 
interpretation was not static in time and though, Pavarini argues, it began to change in earlier 
decades, it is in the 1990s that we witness the most visible shift. Pavarini describes the 1990s 
terms of a ‘new penology’ born of the ‘socio-political’ crisis of those years, i.e., the overhaul 
of the Italian political system in the wake of the large-scale corruption scandal 
Tangentopoli
390
. This crisis, fostering disillusionment with the political system, contributed to 
a paradigm shift in public conceptualization of crime. After the crisis crime came to be 
perceived as a social and moral issue whose solution lay in ‘identifying an enemy and 
[appropriate] legal punishment’391. This caused social (secondary) demands for 
criminalization to grow closer to formal (primary) demands for criminalization, with ‘ever 
increasing levels of punishment […] invoked socially and sanctioned institutionally’392. This 
followed also from an increased legitimacy of the criminal justice system.  As I have shown, 
demands for repression then extended beyond their initial targets, becoming a ‘much wider’ 
phenomenon
393
. Undoubtedly, the significance of the 1990s corruption scandal should not be 
overstated, and in Chapters 3 and 4 I will provide a broader account of the changing 
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interaction between Italian politics (widely conceived) and penality up to the 1990s. Yet, 
Pavarini’s argument remains compelling insofar as it points to the decade as a time marked by 
a new way of conceptualising politics – bereft of Italy’s heretofore dominant ideologies 
(Chapters 1, 3 & 4 and Appendix) – and thence crime. Solutions to social problems that had 
in the past been sought within the political system and its ideologies were now sought 
elsewhere. The judicial sphere offered one new source of conflict resolution, particularly 
given its revived role as buffer to political misfeasance (Chapter 5). One of the consequences 
was, as in Pavarini’s account, the creation of fertile ground for a ‘social interpretation’ of 
crime as moral wrong with ‘increasing levels of punishment’394.  
Here then, we have a starting explanation for the 1990s penal escalation and its reflection 
in Italian prison rates. Again, I suggest, this escalation testifies to the punitiveness always 
present in potential within Italian penality, one that co-existed with an equivalent potential for 
moderation and informal resolution of conflict.  I argue that the 1990s’ expansion can be seen 
as an example of Italy’s puntiveness materialized, and not just as potential. It can then also be 
attributed to the entry of migrants as a ‘new penal subject’ on the Italian scene. In the next 
section I will investigate if and how this ‘entry’ is reflected in Italian prison data, and how it 
affects my differential punitiveness hypothesis.  
 
iv. Nationality and immigration 
Scholars of contemporary Western penality agree on the relevance of migrants as subjects of 
punitiveness. Thus Alessandro De Giorgi sees immigrants as the paradigm exemplars of the 
‘social surplus’, whose penal fate magnifies general trends present in Western penality395. By 
contrast, The Prisoner’s Dilemma sees migrants as the ‘outsiders’ of co-ordinated market 
economies and their penal moderation
396
, subjects of a punitiveness that is not equally 
distributed within, and across, national polities
397
. I will deal with the punishment of migrants 
in Italy in Chapter 6. For the time being I note that where literature has dealt specifically with 
the Italian situation it has tended to stress the invidious position occupied by immigrants vis-
à-vis the Italian penal system
398
. A series of processes operate whereby migrants are over-
penalised and consequently over-imprisoned. In ethnically homogenous societies such as 
Italy, for example, migrants are highly visible targets for policing even when they are not 
engaged in criminal or deviant behaviour
399
. Moreover, if and when apprehended, non-EU 
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migrants do not possess those socio-demographic characteristics – economic stability, 
supportive networks, fixed address – required to receive non-custodial alternatives or 
sentence reductions once detained (Chapter 6)
400
. Unsurprisingly, the implications of these 
processes is that, if Italian penality does operate on the basis of differential punitiveness, 
migrants are likely to be among the recipients of its harsher aspects.  
 
My investigation of this claim starts from data on incarceration of non-EU migrants in Italy. 
Italian national data (ISTAT and DAP) on the incarceration of foreigners is available 
beginning from the year 1990 
401
.  
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 De Giorgi, 2010, p. 156. See also Van Kalmthout A. et al (2007, pp. 78-88) 
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 The reference period 1990–2000 is explained in Chapter 6. For alternative data beginning 
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Table 2 – Foreigners Detained in Italian Prisons (absolute numbers and percentages) 
 
Year 
Number of foreigners 
detained  
Foreign detainees as a percentage of total 
detainees  
1990 4.017 15.4 
1991 5.365 15.1 
1992 7.237 15.2 
1993 7.892 15.7 
1994 8.481 16.6 
1995 8.334 17.5 
1996 9.373 19.3 
1997 10.825 21.4 
1998 11.973 24.3 
1999 14.057 26.4 
2000 15.582 28.6 
Sources: my elaboration on Dipartimento dell’Amministrazione Penitenziaria; ISTAT402. 
 
 
Looking at foreigners detained in Italy between 1990 and 2000 (Table 2), we can see that 
their number increased throughout the whole decade. This is a more marked increase than that 
registered by the prison population as a whole: the total number of detainees doubles between 
1990 and 2000 whereas the number of foreigners detained quadruples over the same period
403
.  
Migrants thus appear as amongst the preferred targets of 1990s penality and its increased 
punitiveness.  
For further confirmation of this analysis, we can look at the contribution of foreigners 
to the total prison population increase between 1990 and 2000
404
. In 1990 the total population 
detained was 26,150, and increased to 54,491 by 2000; over the same period the number of 
foreigners detained increased from 4,017 to 15,582. This constitutes 41% of the total increase. 
We can see this by charting the Italian prison population between 1990 and 2000, with and 
without foreign detainees (Figure 4). The difference is marked where foreigners detained are 
compared to the total prison population (or national prison population). Nationals do make up 
for the bulk of the rapid increase associated with Italy’s political crisis, but their numbers 
fluctuate, even decreasing across certain years. By contrast migrants make up the sustained 
character of the growth across the 1990s.  
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Figure 4 – Italy, prison population with and without migrants, and foreign detainees 
alone, 1990-2000 
 
Sources: My elaboration on Dipartimento dell’Amministrazione Penitenziaria, Ministero della 
Giustizia; ISTAT – Annuari di Statistiche Giudiziarie Penali 1970-2000, Rome: Istituto 
Nazionale di Statistica
405
. 
 
Before drawing any conclusions on migrants as subjects of Italy’s punitiveness, we need to 
consider whether the increase in detention of immigrants may not simply be the result of 
immigrants increasing within Italy’s population. We can do this by calculating the so-called 
‘over-representation’ ratio used, for example, by Dario Melossi406. The variable ‘represents 
the ratio of the percentage of foreign inmates to the percentage of resident foreigners from 
countries other than the European Union’407. This measurement runs up against all the 
uncertainties linked to evaluating the presence of immigrants within Italy. Thus the number of 
foreigners present in Italy is estimated using the number of residence permits granted each 
year. Moreover, by excluding undocumented migrants, this underestimates the number of 
foreigners
408. At the same time, prison figures for ‘foreigners’ include (non-Italian) EU 
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citizens, or people from North America, whose penalization is not at issue in this chapter. 
This may itself mean that we are overestimating the number of ‘outsider’ migrants in Italian 
prisons
409
. In the light of such limitations the ratios can therefore be considered as no more 
than an approximate measure.  
 
Table 3 – Italy - Overrepresentation ratio 1990-2000 
 
 Foreign 
detainees in 
Italian 
prisons as a 
percentage 
of total 
detainees in 
Italian 
prisons 
Residence 
Permits as a 
percentage 
of the 
Italian 
Population 
(CARITAS 
data) 
Ratio of percentage 
detainees/residents 
1990 15.4 1.4 11.2 
1991 15.1 1.5 9.9 
1992 15.2 1.6 9.3 
1993 15.7 1.7 9.0 
1994 16.6 1.6 10.2 
1995 17.5 1.7 10.0 
1996 19.3 1.9 10.0 
1997 21.4 2.2 9.8 
1998 24.3 2.2 11.1 
1999 26.4 2.2 12.0 
2000 28.6 2.4 11.7 
Source: my elaboration on DAP data, ISTAT data and CARITAS data
410
 
 
 
The estimates in Table 3 show that, throughout the decade, Italy had a share of foreign 
nationals within its prison population that was at least 9 and at most 12 times higher than the 
share of non-nationals within its resident population. Cumulatively, these data suggest that the 
high proportion of foreigners within Italian prisons is not entirely accounted for by their 
growing presence in the population. Solivetti
411
 has also calculated an ‘incarceration index’ 
(to use his term) for the decade 1990 to 2000, while controlling for age, gender and illegal 
                                                                                                                                                        
of Italy’s periodic ‘regularisations’. This highlights the problem of assuming that the ‘regular’ 
and ‘irregular’ population are two distinct groups: Calavita (2005, p. 50) 
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immigration
412
. His data confirm the over-representation of non-EU migrants in Italy across 
the decade. 
 
Solivetti and Melossi also provide comparative data on immigrant over-representation in 
European prisons
413
. In both cases Italy emerges as one of the western European nations with 
the highest over-representation ratio for non-EU immigrants. In Solivetti’s calculations, for 
example, Italy has the third highest ratio amongst 18 EU countries for the period 1990-2000: 
this is so even when controlling for age, gender and illegal migration. Melossi’s data 
(extracted in Chapter 6) show Italy as the nation with the highest over-representation
414
 for 
the year 2000, compared with Spain, Germany, France and the United Kingdom. Admittedly 
our observations are qualified if we acknowledge that ‘in former colonial countries, such as 
France or the United Kingdom, there may be naturalized citizens […] in prison because of 
social mechanisms not unlike those that preside to foreigners’ imprisonment but [who] do not 
show up in foreigners’ statistics’415. This may have contributed to exaggerate Italy’s 
punishment of foreigners relative to these particular European nations (France and England 
and Wales). However, the fact remains that Italy incarcerated a particularly high relative 
proportion of immigrants across the 1990s. In the chapters that follow it is therefore necessary 
to explain this over-incarceration and its (potential) broader significance for Italian penality. 
 
 
IV. Conclusions: differential punitiveness 
I had begun this chapter with the intention of answering the questions ‘is Italy punitive?’, and 
‘does the shape of Italian penality conform to a Garland-De Giorgi model of contemporary 
Western penality?’. My introduction had suggested that Italy in fact departed from this model. 
I had thus put forward an alternative hypothesis, according to which Italian punitiveness was 
differential: differentiated, for example, by both time and subject. This hypothesis was in part 
informed by the history of Italian penality that, since its inception, had been torn between the 
two opposites of leniency and repression. This was the possible effect of punishment’s ‘pluri-
functionality’ within the Italian system, whereby punishment ‘[possesses] a wide variety of 
attitudes that [can] from time to time be privileged, according to contingent pressures or the 
type of offender that the [criminal justice system comes up against]’416. Literature and 
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preliminary data analysis also suggested that if any period had to be singled out as a time of 
particular punitiveness, it would be the decade 1990 to 2000. During the greater part of this 
decade, migrants appeared as a group of subjects at risk of receiving harsh penal treatment.  
 
I contend that the picture drawn in this chapter has shown Italy as a nation of  ‘differential 
punitiveness’. Between 1970 and 2000 Italy displayed both the capacity for punitiveness and 
for leniency, an alternation that is partly reflected in its fluctuating prison rates. The nation’s 
prison trends are not univocal: they varied across the three decades, and did so on the 
backdrop of a general penal increase, particularly marked between 1990 and 2000. How we 
characterise Italian penality therefore differs according to whether we take continuous or 
discontinuous readings of national prison rates, as continuous readings reveal fluctuations 
otherwise masked by a calculation of percentage increases. The background increase makes 
Italy’s comparative position difficult to interpret. Indeed though the nation maintained low 
prison rates relative to England and Wales – suggesting moderation – it also experienced a 
greater change in prison rates than did England and Wales – suggesting that its moderation is 
in some sense qualified. Similar conclusions can be drawn from broader European 
comparisons.  
 
Throughout this chapter I have linked the variability of Italian penal trends to the 
differentiation of punishment which occurs at a number of levels, and can be seen as having 
contributed to a particular penal ‘dualism’, i.e., the alternation of punitiveness and leniency. 
Looking outwards to general penal trends, Italian penal duality was visible in yet another 
form, namely the various peaks and troughs of Italian prison rates. The 'troughs', as I have 
shown, are the direct effects of amnesties: deflationary provisions which, until the 1990s were 
routinely and pragmatically deployed, for example, as a solution to overcrowding. 
As hypothesized, Italy’s penal dualism also reflected a number of historical features, 
such as the structure of contemporary penal reform. This was one but not the exclusive line of 
differentiation. Nationality also emerged as another prominent penal discriminant, with 
migrants experiencing over-representation in prison relative to their presence in the 
population. 
 
 I have suggested that prison trends, rising over three decades, but systematically dotted by 
amnesties, speak of penal volatility; of a system in which pressure towards penal escalation 
exists and affects Italian penal expansion, but in which there is also a margin for de facto 
leniency. At the very least, then, what this scenario confirms, relative to contemporary 
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analyses of Western penality, is that we do not face global penal convergence
417
. Variation in 
prison rates persists across European nations, despite the presumed onset of ‘late modernity’ 
or ‘post-Fordism’. At a more theoretical level the Italian context also warns us against relying 
excessively on the concepts ‘penal punitiveness’ and ‘penal moderation’.  It warns us against 
phrasing comparative criminological questions in the form ‘is Italy more moderate than 
England and Wales?’. This type of question presumes that penal leniency and penal 
punitiveness are mutually exclusive:  Italy shows this is not so. Italian prison trends also 
suggest that the terms ‘punitiveness’ and ‘moderation’, when coupled with an analysis of 
prison rates, are primarily applicable to scenarios with clear penal patterns. Thus it may prima 
facie make sense to talk of increasing punitiveness in relation to England and Wales, as the 
latter’s penal trends show an increase across (most of) the period 1970 to 2000. Arguably, 
even this characterisation glosses over variation in the British context. It certainly is not 
capable of describing the sort of variation that we find in the Italian penal context, where 
‘punitiveness’ can be a workable notion only if it is qualified as  ‘differential’. There is merit 
in thus qualifying the term, and applying it to Italy, insofar as it keeps our analysis of the 
nation within the context of existing theories of contemporary western penality. Similarly, 
there is merit in starting our account by reference to Italian prison rates: the data act as a 
springboard for more theoretical analyses. However, as in the rest of this thesis, data and 
concepts (‘punitiveness’/‘leniency)’ need to be contextualized.  
 
What I have ultimately concluded in this chapter is, therefore, that an analysis of Italian 
penality should not simply ask whether Italy is as punitive as, or more moderate than, a 
Garland/De Giorgi paradigm. Rather, my investigation should interrogate the various ways in 
which Italy is more moderate (or possibly more punitive), and why this is so. This implies that 
I need to explore not just Italy’s potential penal trends, but the mechanisms behind them418. 
The latter may indeed differ from context to context even where penal trends would suggest 
similarity
419
. It will be my task to uncover these mechanisms by asking a series of questions: 
what have been the primary influences on Italian penality between 1970 and 2000? How can 
they be systematized (under what organizing principle) and not cast solely as an example of a 
‘particular’ penal scenario? What does this analysis tell us about other accounts of 
contemporary penal trends? I start by investigating the political, economic and cultural 
influences on contemporary Italian penality. 
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Chapter 3 - Politics and Penality: the Political Economy 
I. Introduction 
This chapter aims to identify some of the determinants of Italian penality and to account for 
the penal variation analysed in Chapter 2. It advances a series of theoretical hypotheses on 
how Italian politics – the political system and institutions, but also Italian political culture – 
have affected the distribution of penal pressures in Italy. The chapter starts from the political 
economic and cultural analyses of Garland, De Giorgi and Lacey, which all point to the 
significance of the political economy and culture in defining the shape of contemporary 
punishment
420
. Lacey also alerts us to how punishment varies across polities. She systematises 
this variation by reference to contextual institutional structures, and the incentives or 
opportunities they create to re-integrate or exclude deviants
421
. By understanding the links 
between the political economy and penality in these terms, we can look at Italy’s political 
economy and analyse it in terms of the pressures it produces in favour of penal moderation or 
penal exclusion in order to explain its penal trends. Given the ‘hybrid’ nature of the Italian 
political economy we may need to look beyond political economic categories to systematize 
Italian penality. 
In this chapter I argue that political variables play a primary role in shaping Italian 
penality. In particular the notion of political conflict, the competition between different 
interest groups within Italian society, ranging from political parties through to more loosely 
‘political’ groups such as familial structures, can help us understand the variation between 
Italian punitiveness and leniency. This is because political conflict has constrained the 
evolution of the Italian political economy, contributing to its hybridity. It has thus affected the 
various penal pressures that arise from the Italian political economy, consequently affected by 
political conflict. More broadly, political conflict can be used to describe a second set of 
dynamics shaping the Italian state, its formation and the allegiance it is able to command. 
Chapter 4 deals with the relationship between state and citizen and its importance in 
understanding Italian penality. In particular the ‘conflict’ between state and citizen – the 
incomplete allegiance of citizens towards the Italian state and the scarce trust of state in its 
citizens – reveals the variable purchase of Italian penal law. It reveals that penal law has been 
used by the Italian state as a means of imposing authority on a divided national polity, and 
that it is often circumvented. This is so where informal means of social control are relied on 
to resolve social conflict created by deviance, contributing to the ‘leniency’ of differential 
                                                     
420
 De Giorgi (2006); Garland (2001); Lacey (2008) 
421
 Lacey (2008, pp. 56-57) 
 82 
punitiveness. As this and the following chapter will show, incentives for informal conflict 
resolution are produced and sustained by the combined effect of political economic structures, 
political institutions and political culture. Politics and conflict are the common denominator 
across all three fields. 
 
This questioning of the purchase and role of the criminal law should be a crucial aspect of 
analyses of contemporary punishment, and not just Italy. The political-economic analyses of 
punishment that I start from can indeed be seen as making two orders of claims. The first 
concerns the exclusionary/inclusionary character of given political-economic setups. For 
example, in a liberal market economy there is greater push towards the exclusion of deviants. 
The second concerns the use of the penal law in such political economies. For example, in 
liberal market economies (LMEs) the criminal law is also a crucial tool in effecting this 
exclusion. This second statement addresses the political system and its institutions, but also 
state history and cultural variables. So in co-ordinated market economies (CMEs) the 
political-economic structure makes it advantageous to reintegrate deviance but also, in co-
ordinated market economies there tend to be political/judicial cultures that stimulate a 
parsimonious use of the criminal law vis-à-vis deviance
422
. In these contexts, the criminal law 
is not necessarily seen as the best tool for the resolution of social conflict. I argue that this 
second order of analysis is essential to our understanding of contemporary punishment and 
that, as the Italian case shows, it addresses the politics of the different polities under 
consideration.  
 In Chapters 3 and 4 I am going to make these two orders of claim in relation to Italy. In 
this chapter, I will discuss the Italian political economy and its reintegrative or exclusionary 
tendencies. In Chapter 4, I will discuss the viability of the penal law as a tool for exclusion of 
deviance. Political conflicts and dualisms will be present throughout this discussion, as 
politics remain the factor through which we can systematise Italian penality. Political conflict 
and dualisms shed light on the nature of the political economy, on the existence of pressures 
for penal moderation or punitiveness, and on when these pressures engage the criminal law. 
The first section of this chapter details the Italian political economy, in the light of Garland, 
De Giorgi and Lacey's analyses, and asks if and how Italy fits their explanations and how 
political conflict can be used to understand its shape. For my purposes political conflict is 
defined as follows: persistent struggles for power and resources, occurring between ideologies 
and between political parties, within party factions, and between interest groups as they vie to 
influence decision-making. These struggles are pervasive and have been incorporated into 
Italian institutions and are, for example, traceable in the distribution of labour and welfare 
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provision. The institutional incorporation of political conflict is particularly marked in Italy, 
and distinguishes it from its European comparators.  
 In this chapter I argue that, to the extent that political struggles create a systemic 
volatility in Italy, they also help explain the oscillation between leniency and punitiveness. 
Using the intellectual framework provided by the relevant theorists, this chapter analyses the 
Italian political economy in terms of its push towards punitiveness or moderation.  
 
i. Italy and political conflict: interest fragmentation and institutional permeability 
Political variables affect Italian penality at a number of levels: post-war politics have 
constrained the evolution of the Italian political economy and its penal effects. Penality has 
been shaped both in the short and long term by very evident political events such as 
Tangentopoli and the subsequent transition to the ‘Second Republic’. In order to understand 
how politics have had such an effect on Italian penality, and why it can be seen as its 
organising principle, we first need to look at the Italian institutional structure. Thus, we will 
see how direct and visible the link can be between political arrangements – for example party 
dynamics – and policy evolution. This includes policy that affects penality, either indirectly, 
by affecting political economic features that to feed into penal dynamics, or directly, where 
they shape criminal justice policy. It is important that the Italian institutional structure can be 
said to have incorporated political conflict, magnifying rather than containing its effect on the 
functioning of the Italian polity and on its penality
423
. This incorporation of conflict into the 
state institutions is distinctive to Italy, and is the subject of the following section. Its visibility 
in post-war Italy can be explained as a function of numerous features
424
 amongst which the 
fragmentation of interests in Italy. Italian decision making institutions also display high 
permeability to these interests
425
, because of the existence of veto points within its 
institutional structure
426
. The interests capable of exploiting permeability or veto points 
include political parties but also political ‘currents, groups, clans, clienteles, single individuals 
and their personal following’: those whom Alessandro Pizzorno has termed the ‘intermediate 
stratum’ of the political class427. I would also add social partners to this list – for example 
trade unions – the latter having been engaged in policy negotiation across the decades.  
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The combination of fragmentation and permeability has led to policy decisions in 
Italy being influenced by the numerous pressures present within the system, in such a way as 
to defy any overarching policy agenda
428
. As I will show below, this has led to difficulties in 
defining the Italian system in terms of its institutional structure. As Lange and Regini have 
commented, looking across Italian policy areas ‘we find few signs of designs [or] governing 
visions’ but rather ‘a crazy quilt of sometimes contradictory, sometimes complementary 
modes and institutions for regulating the production and allocation of resources’429. As Lange 
and Regini remind us, ‘this does not mean that the actors involved in policy-making do not 
have goals’; it means ‘that their outcomes do not reflect the intentions of any single actor or 
coalition’430. Lange and Regini further argue that ‘in the most immediate sense’ this 
combination of policy modes and output ‘can be explained as the outcome of the push and tug 
of relatively fragmented social and political actors’ operating within ‘an institutional 
environment that offers [the actors] ample access to multiple decision points’. This allows 
them to ‘defend their particularistic interests’431. It is in this sense that Italy is beset by 
conflict: as the ‘push and tug’ of parties, factions, interest groups, social partners and so on, 
plays out in a system which incorporates but does not broker stable compromises between the 
divided interests that it encounters. I will show examples of this dynamic at several points in 
my analysis of the Italian political economy: one prominent example being the welfare state, 
described by Paci as ‘highly politicized in its focal points’432. The existence in Italy of 
everything and its opposite, and their manifestation through policies and institutions, is what I 
have tried to capture with the notion of Italy’s ‘dualisms’ – oppositions created by the Italian 
political system and institutional structure.  
 To further explain this conflictual dynamic, we must look to the post-war Italian party 
system.  Particularly between 1945-90, Italy has been characterised as a ‘republic of parties’ 
or partycracy
433
 characterized as a system whereby political parties are the primary political 
players, ‘occupying’ the state at national and local levels. In Alessandro Pizzorno’s analysis, 
this ‘occupation’ can be seen in the attitude of the then governing parties, in particular the 
Christian Democracy, (DC) whose various constitutive groups – parties but also interest 
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groups within and affiliated to them – possessed a ‘quota’ of power434 used to veto legislative 
initiatives, or as a bargaining tool in political deals, with the ultimate aim of increasing the 
group’s relative weight in the political system435.  
The ‘occupation’ of the Italian system also occurred through so-called lottizzazione, 
i.e.,  ‘the subdivision of jobs and public posts, within public bodies and institutions according 
to political (rather than professional) criteria’436. Through this process, state institutions and 
resources have de facto been divided up amongst parties and, within the parties, amongst 
different factions
437
. A typical example is the distribution of managerial posts in government 
bodies, primarily on the basis of political affiliation. This process was initially bolstered by 
the presence of a high level of state control of Italian economic resources including state-
owned firms. This control had, for example, allowed the particularistic distribution of posts 
by political parties aimed at obtaining political consensus, an exchange crucial to Italy’s 
clientelistic practices (see below). With the passage into the Second Republic, the demise of 
the main existing parties and the beginning of (some) privatization of state owned companies, 
this mechanism has become more difficult. Pasquino, however, suggests that the practice of 
lottizzazione has persisted after 1992
438
, not least because of the belligerence and 
‘wrangling’439 between and within parties/coalitions 440. This again suggests a divided 
political class, intent upon constant competition, and engaged in ‘wheeling and dealing’ 
between its members. I argue that this continuing ‘carving up’ of Italian institutions along 
political lines has incorporated political conflict into the workings of the Italian system and 
affected the formation of policy, including policies that impact upon penal pressures, for 
example welfare policies. 
 Giorgio Rebuffa’s characterization of the Italian political and institutional system can 
further help us flesh out this effect. Rebuffa argues that the Italian constitutional setup 
displays a general mentality of ‘proportional representation’441. Proportional representation 
(PR) not only characterized the Italian electoral system until 1993 – after which the nation 
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transitioned to a mixed majoritarian system
442
 – but the entire institutional setup. Rebuffa 
talks of a ‘diffuse’ proportional system found across all elective organs: local government, but 
also other political governing bodies including constitutionally relevant bodies
443
.  In chapter 
5, for example, I will discuss the judiciary’s governing body – the Higher Council – partly 
staffed by lay members, who are elected by parliament to represent ‘the majority and 
opposition in government in a proportional way’444. Rebuffa also includes lottizzazione as 
further expression of Italy’s diffuse proportionality, insofar as it entails the subdivision of 
public posts to mirror the weight of different Italian political forces. Gianfranco Pasquino 
uses the term ‘proportional’, as Rebuffa does, to describe a general trait of the Italian political 
system. Crucially for my hypothesis, Pasquino also characterizes Italian democracy as a 
‘proportionalistic, conflictual democracy’445, where conflict is incorporated by Italy’s 
‘proportionalism’ – proportional representation within parliament, but also the proportional 
division of spoils
446
.   
 Italy’s ‘proportionalism’ is then important if we consider Lacey’s argument on how PR 
systems, and their ‘negotiation and consensus’, affect policy-making, and indeed on how PR 
may operate differently within different national systems
447
. The presence of more extensive 
‘PR-type’ mechanisms throughout Italian institutions suggests a number of things. Firstly that 
power is diffuse in Italy – within its political system and institutions448 – and that this 
diffusion of power is manifest in the fragmentation of interests and their access to decision-
making. Secondly, as a consequence of the diffusion of power, Italian institutions have 
internalized conflict and fragmentation. As I will discuss below, extensive requirements for 
consensus have produced some policy stagnation, where policy change occurs slowly, 
incrementally, and not always as planned
449
. This slow, negotiated change has, at times, had 
to give way to more immediate reform when policy problems that have come to a head 
require short-term solutions
450
.  
 
Political conflict emerges as crucial to my analysis of the pressures brought to bear on Italian 
policies and decision-making, including those that influence penal pressures. In my discussion 
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of Italian penality, politics are then important at a second level: they allow us to understand 
Italian punitiveness and moderation by illuminating the purchase and role of criminal law in 
Italy. They do so by drawing our attention to the political relationship between Italian state 
and citizens, interrogating the claims made by the state through its law, and the purchase of 
state law amongst Italian citizens. Here, as with the political constraints on the economy, one 
crucial aspect of Italian politics is their highly conflictual nature. I have described how 
conflict occurs at a variety of levels: between different parties; between factions within 
parties; between coalition partners. It also occurs between different ideologies, between state 
and citizen, between levels of allegiance (to state/to private interests). Crucially, the different 
conflicts are incorporated into the highly permeable institutional structure. Aside from the 
effects on policy formation, this situation has a general impact upon ‘Italy’ where the latter is 
conceived of as a unitary project including, I argue, formulation of and allegiance to the law. 
Salvati describes the Italian situation as one in which ‘contrasts in [political opinion]’ have 
not been reconciled within a ‘collective project […] common in its general traits’ yet capable 
of containing ‘different ideal and cultural orientations’451. This results, he argues, from defects 
in Italian political culture and political institutions, such that political conflict is very rarely 
‘useful and progressive’452 but is divisive and immobilizing. Arguing from the political 
economic perspective Molina and Rhodes echo this analysis, describing Italy as possessing a 
‘high degree of interest fragmentation’ and high state permeability to vested interest demands. 
The combination of these factors impedes the creation of (national) collective goods
453
.    
   
In sum, from an analysis of its political system, power and interest groups, Italy can be 
conceived of as organized around a ‘conflictual political paradigm’454 composed of different 
political groupings that exist at various different levels (e.g. parties but also kinship networks, 
or political clienteles) and which compete for allegiance. On the basis of an analysis of Italy’s 
institutional structure and political history, I now formulate the following theoretical 
hypothesis on Italian penality: each level of conflict produces different penal pressures in 
favour of penal exclusion or penal repression, by affecting policies that directly or indirectly 
affect penality – economic and social reforms, but also criminal justice policy. The conflict is 
diffuse – a constant negotiation and renegotiation between interest/political groups – and it 
produces variable penal pressures which are reflected in Italian prison rates, oscillating 
between repression and leniency. Politics in Italy are also characterised by various dualisms, 
tensions set up by contradictory structural dynamics and contradictory interests. These 
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include the dualism between centre and periphery; or between private and public realms; or 
crucially between formal and informal social control. These dualisms are particularly 
significant in that they help us see if, and when, the criminal law will be the preferred tool for 
the resolution of social conflict.  
 
II. Politics, Penality and the Political Economy 
i. Political conflict and the political economy 
Political-economic analyses of punishment contend that our explanations of punitiveness and 
incarceration should focus on changes in the political economy. This is true even where the 
political economy itself is instrumental in shaping a primarily cultural ‘environment’, which 
in turn makes for escalating punitiveness. Referring again to Garland, we see that changes in 
the welfare state and its accompanying ‘solidarity project’455 play an important role in 
explaining both increasing socio-economic exclusion and a decreasing interest in the 
rehabilitation of offenders
456. In De Giorgi’s more structural thesis it is the changing nature of 
Western systems of production and labour relations that has produced a ‘surplus’ to be 
contained by incarceration. Lacey’s differentiated political-economic analysis of punishment 
has then refined such broad explanations by linking varieties of capitalisms, and their 
different institutional arrangements, to their capacity to re-integrate deviants (Chapter 1).  
To summarise: CMEs ‘[function] primarily in terms of long-term relationships and 
stable structures of investment [including] in education and training’457. They are premised on 
incorporation of a ‘wide range of social groups and institutions into a highly co-ordinated 
governmental structure’458 in which decision-making occurs mainly by consensus and 
negotiation
459
. The latter are stimulated by the coalition politics typical of CMEs. CMEs have 
experienced lower levels of economic disparity compared to LMEs
460
, and possess greater 
incentives to reintegrate individuals into economy and society, for example in cases of 
unemployment. This has meant that CMEs have also produced ‘other things being equal […] 
incentives for […] a relatively inclusionary criminal justice system’ 461, a tendency broken 
only in relation to ‘outsider’ migrants462. 
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By contrast, the economy of LMEs is premised on ‘flexibility and innovation’ and 
they thus ‘depend [much less] on the sort of co-ordinating institutions […] needed to sustain 
long-term economic and social relations’ in CMEs463. LMEs have tended to experience both 
high income disparities
464
 and high levels of ‘surplus unskilled labour’465. In LMEs, which 
often possess majoritarian electoral systems, decision-making is also less constrained by 
coalition politics than it is in CMEs, and is more influenced by ‘floating voters’ who have 
increasingly been swayed by ‘law and order’ issues466. This has increased the electoral appeal 
of ‘harsh, exclusionary criminal justice’ that, because of LMEs’ economic organisation, also 
bears lower costs than it would in CMEs
467
. The outcome has been more volatile and 
comparatively more exclusionary penal policy. 
 
The question to ask is how the Italian political economy has affected its differential 
punitiveness; and whether this correlation coincides with any of the models proposed by 
Garland, De Giorgi and Lacey.  The simple answer to the second question is that these models 
do not describe Italy satisfactorily. I have argued that Garland and De Giorgi’s models 
operate at too macroscopic a level to account for Italian specificities. The two varieties of 
capitalism models 
468
 are also incapable of capturing the Italian political economy, as the 
latter is neither a liberal market economy nor a co-ordinated market economy. In order to 
classify the nation’s political economic characteristics, the literature has had to search 
‘beyond varieties of capitalism’469. Italy has been classed as a ‘mixed-market’ economy 
(MME). Italy is ‘mixed’ in this classification because it presents a ‘high degree of 
institutional incoherence’470. It is situated between the LME and CME models, and possesses 
elements of both. It also possesses elements that are best analysed in terms of ‘Southern 
European’ countries471 characterised, alongside ‘Europe’s Mediterranean MMEs’, as: 
 
‘[…] more fragmented than either LMEs or CMEs by large/small firm, public-private 
and territorial divides. They […] contain different logics of coordination and forms of 
actor interaction, making it difficult to talk of one national production model with a 
single form of comparative advantage. These cleavages underpin two […] features of 
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these MMEs: the organizational fragmentation and politicization of interest 
associations and the greater role of the state as a regulator and producer of goods’472.  
 
‘Political power’ is a crucial strategic asset in this scenario473, where fragmentation reduces 
the mechanisms for producing national-level collective goods, and where the state is 
permeable to vested interest
474
. Political power becomes the means to access channels of 
decision-making and impose ‘formal or informal vetoes’ upon the process475. Certain features 
of the Italian political setup enhance this tendency, for example proportional representation 
and the centrality of Italian political parties, discussed further in the next section.  
Over the course of the last few decades attempts at reform have been made in Italy 
(more or less explicitly) that would have pushed it closer to either a CME or an LME model: 
no single market model has emerged from these reforms
476
.  What we have witnessed in Italy, 
particularly during the 1990s, has been the birth of novel forms of ‘coordination’. These 
reflect the relative political and organizational strength of socio-economic actors (such as 
unions and employers), and their capacity to form coalitions
477
. These new forms of 
coordination depart from the more integrated mechanisms of CME coordination, given the 
multiplicity of veto points in the Italian system, and a lower cohesion between socio-
economic actors and interest groups. Examples of Italy’s coordination mechanisms include 
new mechanisms of concertation (negotiation between social partners, to reach a common 
agreement) that have evolved at the firm level, that is at a lower, local level than national 
concertation
478
. They also include forms of cooperation through which smaller Italian 
enterprises have expanded and adapted to external pressures, including the ‘global crisis’ of 
the 1970s and increasing international competition over manufactured goods. 
These pressures have led to what Molina and Rhodes call a ‘recalibration of 
production and protection systems’: changes in the labour market and in labour relations, as 
well as welfare reform in Italy. These changes have been shaped by political conflict and 
political exchange, with no single interest group emerging as predominant. Neither the 
employers – beset by the differences between small, medium and large concerns479 – nor the 
unions – not always acting in concert – have been strong enough to gain the upper hand. But 
they have both been involved in the negotiations through which Italy has adapted to changing 
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economic conditions. These negotiations reflect both the fragmentation of the Italian context 
and the interdependence of its socio-economic actors. These same features have also meant 
that change has been slower and less drastic than in other countries: in relation to, for 
example, the liberalisation of employment relations. This aspect should be borne in mind as I 
investigate Italy’s supposed transition into global ‘post-Fordism’. Fragmentation and 
interdependence also explain Italy’s mixed status: in Italy cooperation is more chaotic than in 
CMEs yet it exists; and thus has also meant that at least up until the year 2000, Italy had not 
experienced unbridled labour market reform associated with liberal market regimes. 
One additional feature of Italy as MME is the important role the state still plays 
within the economy. It does so directly, through central provision of assistance such as 
unemployment benefits or by being a third party in collective bargaining agreements
480
. It 
also plays an indirect role where its absence stimulates alternative forms of regulation, or 
where state regulations are circumvented in favour of more ‘voluntaristic, ad hoc solutions  
[…] by subjects of civil society in order to fill the gaps created by the weakness of the 
institutions’481. Examples of the more ‘ad hoc’ forms of regulations include the circumvention 
of formal hiring practices (even in large firms) in favour of hiring through clientelistic 
mechanisms or mechanisms premised on family connections
482
. This is one illustration of 
what Regini has called the discrepancy between ‘overt’ and ‘covert’ regulation of the Italian 
political economy
483
. The discrepancy mirrors a more general feature of normativity in Italy, 
where the state is present as the purveyor of rules that are later re-negotiated in their 
application
484
. Voluntaristic regulation will also be found in enterprises that employ less than 
fifteen workers, as they fall below the system of rules that regulates labour conditions and 
labour relations, established by the 1970s Worker’s Statute.  
 
To sum up: as a mixed market economy, Italy sits between the two varieties of capitalism on 
which Lacey builds. Italy does not display the ‘liberal’ character of LMEs: the political and 
economic structures that have allowed a liberalization of the labour market, a flexibilisation 
of labour, a ‘rolling back’ of welfare entitlements, effected by executives whose policy 
making is relatively unconstrained by the need for consensus and negotiation. Yet Italy is also 
not ‘co-ordinated’ as CMEs are, where co-ordination signifies integration into a system that 
functions according to positive feedback mechanisms (complementarities) that cumulatively 
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and coherently strengthen the whole institutional system
485
. The Italian system is, to some 
extent, premised on co-operation, but is comparatively chaotic. Thus policy changes are 
constrained, but cannot necessarily be understood in terms of coherence and 
complementarity
486
. Rather, Italy demonstrates fragmentation and (sometimes reluctant) 
interdependence.   
 
Despite its ‘mixed’ status and differences compared to CMEs and LMEs, I suggest that an 
institutional analysis of the Italian political economy is useful to understand its penality. By 
adapting Lacey’s analysis, I build a framework through which to interpret and systematise 
Italian penality. I argue that Italy’s particular political economic setup, though less integrated 
than the LME/CME models, will have influenced its penality by producing incentive 
structures that either resist or allow penal expansion. These incentive structures can be 
understood by isolating those elements of the Italian political economy most relevant to its 
penality and analysing them in terms of re-integrative and exclusionary penal pressures. As I 
have argued before, the ‘mixed, ‘hybrid’, ‘regional’ nature of the Italian political economy 
means, however, that an organising principle for Italian penality cannot be sought in the 
political economy alone. Rather, it is by reference to political variables and dynamics that we 
can hope to systematise Italian penality. The following section illustrates precisely this point 
by investigating how Italy’s post-war politics have affected the shape of its political economy. 
It focuses particularly on the role of political parties in this process. I then investigate the 
Italian political economy in depth, foucsing on the Italian welfare state and the more general 
features of the labour market between 1970 and 2000. In both sections I analyse the 
fragmented nature of the Italian political economy and the pervasive private/public dualism it 
displays. I also compare Italy to Garland’s claims on the penal effects of the changing nature 
of welfare and to De Giorgi’s claims on the penal effects of the changing nature of labour. 
Using Lacey’s framework, I then translate this analysis to the penal level by interrogating the 
reintegrative/exclusionary pressures that follow from Italian welfare and production 
mechanisms.  
ii. Italian parties – ‘partitocrazia’ and conflict as constraint 
In order to understand Italy’s political-economic and institutional shape, we have to look in 
more detail to Italian politics and their development after the Second World War. This allows 
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us to see how political conflict has constrained political-economic evolution
487
, with a view to 
understanding its penal repercussions. I start with the formation of the Italian Republic. The 
Republic, established in 1946, is described as a ‘partitocrazia’, which loosely translates as 
‘partycracy’488. Partycracy has been characterised as the take over of the post-war Italian state 
by political parties; the systematic colonisation of the state-machine by the parties
489
; the 
ubiquity of (clannish) political parties within the Italian state
490
. Partycracy also operated 
through so-called lottizzazione (see above). As the various characterisations of partycracy 
indicate, in the First Italian Republic, parties were the primary players at all levels of Italian 
life, permeating the greater part of its institutions, since the nation was composed of often 
competing, political sub-groups. According to Cotta and Verzichelli, this phenomenon finds 
its roots in the early formation of the Italian Republic when, between 1943 and 1945, parties 
gained control over the process of state reconstruction
491
. Political parties were able to occupy 
such a significant position because of the Italian state’s weakness following the ‘breakdown 
of the Fascist regime’, Italy’s ‘occupation by Allied forces in the south’ and ‘the subsequent 
collapse of the state […] its central administration and army’. In this situation, it was political 
parties that took charge of rebuilding the Italian state, ‘progressively gaining control of the 
process that would lead’ to the election of a Constituent Assembly, and to the Italian 
Constution itself
492.  After 1946 parties also came to control what Pasquino terms ‘[Italy’s] 
purse strings’ including the allocation of jobs and other economic resources493. This was also 
due to state control of economic sectors such as Italy’s ‘large industrial holdings’494.  
Parties’ prominence was magnified, as it became apparent that the Italian state was 
increasingly likely to face legislative immobility
495
. Immobility followed partly from an 
institutional structure chosen to ensure that ‘no government organ prevailed over the rest’496 
and to reduce opportunities for the centralisation of power
497
. This created a ‘weak 
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parliament, a weak government and a weak head of state’498. Parties thus became primary 
intermediaries between state and civil society
499
 and the ‘main actors for the aggregation of 
social interests’500. This structure allowed the diffusion of political conflict throughout the 
Italian institutions: conflict passed into the institutional structure as parties and their interests 
came to colonise the very same. 
The legislative immobility that catalysed (and was then entrenched by) the 
development of Italy’s partycracy, can be linked to the early formation of the post-war state. 
As Cotta and Verzichelli note, the Italian Consitution of 1948 was de facto created by 
‘consensus’ between ‘the largest parties’501. However, the dominant parties of the time could 
not maintain this level of consensus in the practice of Italian politics. This was true 
particularly of the two great players within the First Republic: the Christian Democrats 
(Democrazia Cristiana or DC) and the Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano or PCI). 
The Christian Democracy was post-war Italy’s Catholic and anti-Communist party. They 
were formally pitched against the PCI, which, despite its large following
502
, was never within 
governing coalitions
503. This was partially a result of the DC’s own manoeuvring: the 
Christian Democrats’ anti-Communism ‘[excluded the PCI] a priori from [any] opening to 
the left’, leaving the PCI constrained ‘into the somewhat sterile role of semi-permanent 
opposition’504. This formally constituted Italian politics around a broad ideological fault line 
that, according to Salvati, severely impaired the evolution of Italian economic policy
505
. In 
particular, Salvati argues, the ideological ‘fracture’ prevented the evolution of consensus in 
matters of economic policy that would have brought Italy closer to its ‘Germanic and Nordic’ 
European counterparts
506. The political conflict ensuing from this ‘fracture’ was further 
compounded by enmity within the left: particularly between the PCI and the Socialist Party 
(PSI)
507
.  
This is not to say that there was no contact between PCI and DC during the First 
Republic. Pizzorno, amongst others, has noted that covert cooperation occurred among Italian 
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parties – so-called consociativismo508 – with a de facto convergence between governing forces 
and opposition
509
. A similar point is made by Lange and Regini, who note the apparent 
contrast between the ‘conflictual and polarized vision of Italian politics’, and the ‘relatively 
stable, distributive cooperation’ that occurred between parties510. This points to an additional 
dualism in Italian politics between formal conflict and actual cooperation. Lange and Regini 
argue that the two sides of this dualism are, in fact, tightly linked. Cooperative games acted to 
grease a system that would otherwise have faced decisional stalemate
511
 had polarization been 
extreme and untempered. If decisional stalemate was avoided, however, what remained was 
institutional change constrained both by the formal division of Italian politics, and by the 
deals that occurred behind the scenes. The result was relative policy stagnation, and policies 
more akin to the ‘crazy quilt’ described by Regina and Lange, reflecting the push and pull 
between political forces rather than policies following clear political programmes. 
Only in the 1990s did this set up change, first and foremost with the demise of the 
existing political parties. The PCI was dissolved after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and 
the PSI and DC swept away by their involvement in the corruption scandal of Tangentopoli. 
The electoral reforms of 1991 and 1993 also helped to alter the scenario since the new mixed-
majoritarian system increasingly centred Italian politics around two large political coalitions 
(centre-left and centre-right). These changes ushered in the ‘Second Republic’ with ‘new’ 
political players but analogous levels of conflict. The Second Republic is no longer a 
partycracy in the same terms as the First Republic: as Pasquino notes, the parties of the First 
Republic are quite different from the parties of the Second Republic
512
. This is because old 
parties changed names and identities and new parties came to life
513
. The new parties differed 
from the old terms of their organisation, of the size of their membership, the territory they 
covered, and the discipline they displayed
514
. They were smaller, had a reduced (and less 
capillary) presence on national territory and were, overall, less overtly ideological. The parties 
of the Second Republic were also no longer mass parties and were unable to command the 
same allegiance as their predecessors. They also found themselves relying primarily on state 
                                                     
508
 This is defined, with reference to Italian politics, as a method of governing whereby 
governing parties and opposition parties converge to allow the latter some influence over 
political choices. The term has been used in a derogatory fashion to denote the subdivision of 
political power (lottizzazione) through agreements between major political forces including 
opposition parties: "Consociativismo," http://www.treccani.it/vocabolario/consociativismo/ 
Accessed July 2012. My translation 
509
 Ideological conflict was then limited to areas of Italian political life that did not endanger 
the distribution of state resources: Pizzorno (1992, p. 60) 
510
 Lange and Regini ((1989) 2010, p. 23) 
511
 Ibid. 
512
 Pasquino (2002); see also Cotta and Verzichelli (2007, pp. 35-66) 
513
 Cotta and Verzichelli (2007, p. 55) 
514
 Cotta and Verzichelli (2007, p. 64 see also 41); Pasquino (2002, p. 157)  
 96 
contributions as their main source of income
515
. I would add that, for reasons internal to 
Italian politics, but also because of the international developments that followed from the end 
of the cold war, political parties also changed ideologically. The cold war had contributed to 
structure Italian politics around anti-communism (represented primarily by the DC) and 
communism: this was no longer a necessary arrangement. The viability and perhaps appeal of 
the ideologies that had accompanied this set-up was also decreasing.  
However, it is also true to say that the Second Republic shares a number of features 
with the First. Elements of continuity can be traced, relevant to my analysis of political 
conflict, as a constraint on Italian evolution. Firstly, we find that the Italian parties of the 
Second Republic were as fragmented, if not more so, than their predecessors
516
. This has also 
meant that, though the system became formally bipolar in structure
517
, governments were 
formed by multiparty coalitions
518
. Much like the First Republic, the Second Republic thus 
experienced the constraints on government action imposed (for better or worse) by intra-
coalition negotiations
519
. With the birth of new splinter parties, and with the passing of Italy’s 
ideological split, particularisms have also remained within the Second Republic: as new 
parties engage in ‘a high level of activities […] directed mainly at reaffirming their [now 
fuzzy] identities […] and [at] marking their territory’520. This has also been possible because 
parties have managed to maintain some control over ‘the power centres of the state’, both 
cultural and political (national television) and economic (industrial holdings)
521
. Incentives 
still exist for parties to continue their attempts to ‘occupy’ the state, leaving the general logic 
of the partycracy spoils system intact
522. The Second Republic is perhaps a ‘partycracy 
without ideology’ with many of the ‘partycratic’ mechanisms intact, but without the 
dominating narratives of the First Republic. 
 
Cumulatively, the elements of continuity between First and Second Republics have meant that 
Italian politics is still beset by fragmentation and conflict, with political parties as their 
vectors, and an institutional structure with numerous entry points for fragmented interests to 
influence policy-making. Relative immobility has ensued, in both Republics, because the 
capillary conflict that characterised Italian politics was ensconced within a consensus-oriented 
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system with a large number of veto-points
523
. It was a system that required consensus and in 
which (formal) consensus was not forthcoming. The type of reform possible in this context is 
aptly summarised by Ilvo Diamanti in his discussion of change and continuity in 1990s’ 
Italian politics, when he refers to Italy as (roughly) an ‘unintentional republic’ 
(‘preterintenzionale’)524. Diamanti uses these terms to indicate the mode of political reform in 
Italy so different from what was envisaged at the Republic’s inception, because it became 
waylaid by ‘the unexpected effects of political action’525.  At the legislative level, immobility 
was then enhanced by governments that could rarely command a very cohesive majority in 
Parliament’, and consequently lacked ‘a strong control of the parliamentary agenda’526; and 
by a series of short lived executives whose reform proposals were often interrupted by the 
frequent change of guard
527. Cassese tellingly notes that ‘during the one hundred and fifty 
years of its history as a unified nation, Italy has had 121 governments, with an average life of 
just over one year’528. During the First Republic, this instability was to some degree countered 
by the fundamental continuity of political personnel, and by the DC’s domination of national 
governments between the end of the war and 1994. Yet it broke the momentum of political 
reform, where ‘continuity at the level of executive action was interrupted’ even though the 
same men returned to govern
529
. Reform was therefore not linear in Italy
530
. Ferrera, for 
example, looks to this political impasse as a reason why the Italian welfare state remained 
caught in the dualism between centralisation and fragmentation. Cassese (though not referring 
specifically to the welfare state) reminds us that government instability, affecting policy 
coherence, was due also to the persisting ‘territorial dimension’ to Italian politics, that is, its 
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localism and regionalism
531
. Moreover, if the political mobilisation that Italy experienced 
during the 1960s and 1970s did achieve some, albeit sectoral, change, the succeeding two 
decades of (1980-2000) unfolded as a period of ‘policy stagnation punctuated by sporadic 
consensus based reform’532. Amidst this stagnation, political parties were still primary 
purveyors of political interests
533
. 
 
In sum, Italy between 1970 and 2000 was a nation dominated by politics and political 
conflict
534
; in which the possibility for economic planning was constrained by conflict; and in 
which conflict was incorporated into the institutional system via party-permeation of the state. 
The evolution of the nation, beset by political volatility, created and entrenched existing 
political fragmentation. The fragmentation of welfare entitlements provides one illustrative 
example.  
 
iii. The Italian political economy: the welfare system 
Beginning first with a more detailed account of the Italian political economy, we see that it is 
state-driven, with a ‘social transfer-oriented welfare state’535 limited by sector and territory536. 
The political economy is divided along a number of lines, despite existing pressures in favour 
of centralisation. This structure is mirrored in Italy’s welfare state, which is at one corporatist 
and fragmented
537
 and thus ‘[maps] imperfectly on to the standard liberal versus social 
democratic/ […] continental division’538. Italy provides welfare entitlements to some, and in a 
manner that mimics what Ferrera calls the ‘Bismarckian’ continental models539. However the 
Italian welfare state also excludes others from its provisions, and does so along definite 
fracture lines. Molina and Rhodes note, for example, how ‘southern European welfare 
systems [such as Italy] typically have less social protection and more employment 
protection’540. Further divisions include those between large firms and small firms, with 
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regulation and welfare entitlements concentrated in large firms
541
; but also regional divisions 
that mirror the territorial distribution of different economic activities/sectors and the 
distribution of different sized firms. Ferrera has described the Italian welfare system as 
‘almost “polarized”’542 the most visible differentiation being that between a ‘core sector of the 
labour market force located within the […] regular market, and those located in irregular or 
less regulated sectors: the latter are entitled to ‘weak subsidization’ only543.  It is here, where 
there are ‘weak’ entitlements, that additional support structures such as the family act to 
supplement welfare deficits
544
. The family typically allows a sharing of protection, moving 
from one member ‘anchored’ in the core labour sectors, to the remaining members545. 
Alternatively, in the post-war years, political clientelism has provided a measure of de facto 
re-distribution of employment and welfare support: where ‘the emergence […]  of a 
“clientelistic market”’ ensured ‘state transfers to supplement inadequate work income [in 
exchange] for party support’546. This is a system that sports a ‘formal resemblance’ to 
‘universalistic welfare states’ but in fact displays a ‘particularistic’ division of resources547. 
Part of the fragmentation displayed by Italian welfare can be explained by reference 
to the territorial segmentation of Italy’s political economy, which is so acute that it has 
prompted authors such as Carlo Trigilia to talk of Italy as an example of ‘regionalised 
capitalism’, defying both the CME/LME model and Italy’s classification as an MME548. The 
regional subdivision of Italy has given rise to much debate about different ways of 
conceptualising this division
549
. For the purposes of this chapter I adopt what has been an 
influential analysis of Italy, first formulated by Arnaldo Bagnasco. Bagnasco describes the 
nation as being divided into ‘three Italies’550: the northwest characterised by the highest level 
of large scale industrialisation; the northeast and centre with their small-scale kinship based 
firms; the south once rural and now the source of large numbers of tertiary sector workers
551
. 
The division between these ‘Italies’ is, of course, not carved in stone; and the First and Third 
Italy have drawn closer in more recent decades. However it remains true to say that the Italian 
political economy is divided. This, I argue, also influences the viability and distribution of re-
integrative pressures in Italian penality.   
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We recall that the welfare state – changing over time and varying across contexts – plays an 
important role in Garland’s and Lacey’s accounts of contemporary punishment. Theirs are 
only two examples of criminological literature that focuses on the correlation of punishment 
and welfare
552
 (Chapter 1). At its most basic, this line of literature argues that the greater the 
welfare coverage, the lesser the likelihood of penal expansion; conversely, the lesser the 
welfare coverage, the greater the likelihood of penal expansion. In Garland’s schema, changes 
in the welfare state are thought to have brought parallel changes at the penal level: the 
rehabilitative logic that accompanied the welfare state receded as the welfare state shrank. 
What of the Italian welfare state? What are its features and what are the incentives it 
creates for penal moderation or penal exclusion? I begin with Esping-Andersen’s tripartite 
categorisation of welfare states that allows for contextual variation even as it systematises this 
variation across welfare state ‘clusters’. In The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism Esping-
Andersen divides existing welfare states into liberal, conservative corporatist and social-
democratic regimes
553
. Italy is classified, alongside Austria, France and Germany as part of 
the corporatist traditions. As such it distributes social rights on the basis of status differentials, 
in particular, the position occupied within the labour market. As Cavadino and Dignan state, 
‘the system is based on a hierarchical ordering of occupational groups’554. This partly reflects 
the fact that the corporatist model, with its compulsory state insurance
555
, is financed by tax 
contributions that are themselves anchored to individuals’ employment status556. In Italy, this 
reliance on contributions create a further fracture line within the welfare system: not just 
between those who are covered by state provisions and those who are not, but also between 
those who contribute to state finances through taxation, and those who do not. The former 
tend to include dependent workers in large private concerns, and public sector workers; the 
latter include the self-employed, and those working in Italy’s small and medium-sized 
concerns.  
The corporatist welfare model is also characterised by a sharing of welfare 
responsibilities between the state and more traditional institutions such as the (in Italy, 
Catholic) Church and family
557
. This feature, as we have seen from Ferrera, acquires 
particular importance in Italy, as it has stimulated a ‘more traditional’ pattern of employment 
that presumes a single wage earner
558
. The state also assumes a residual role relative to the 
family: the state will not oust the family from its welfare role, and will only ‘interfere’ when 
                                                     
552
 Beckett and Western (2001a, 2001b); Cavadino and Dignan (2006, pp. 3-39); Garland 
(1990, 2001); Lacey (2008); (Wacquant, 2009) 
553
 Esping-Andersen (1990, pp. see 26-32) 
554
 Cavadino and Dignan (2006b, p. 17); Paci (2009, p. 287) 
555
 Esping-Andersen (1990, p. 23) 
556
 Paci (2009, p. 272) 
557
 Cavadino and Dignan (2006, p. 18); Esping-Andersen (1990, p. 27) 
558
 Cavadino and Dignan (2006, p. 18) 
 101 
the family is unable to fulfil its function
559
. This persistence of traditional institutions 
contributes to the ‘overall philosophy and ethos of conservative corporatism’: ‘a 
communitarian one’, premised on the integration of ‘all citizens within the nation’560. 
Integration occurs via ‘individuals’ membership of interest groups and other social 
groupings’, which act as the link between individual and state561. This membership of 
intermediate interest groups is in fact a crucial characteristic of Italian welfare, though it may 
not have bound Italians to the nation so much as to their specific interest groups. Here we find 
further examples of Italy’s ‘particularism’ and ‘fragmentation’ within the context of a 
contested nation-state. 
 
This categorisation of Italy as a ‘conservative-corporatist’ welfare regime has been changed 
and refined over the years. Ferrera thus classifies Italy as a ‘Mediterranean’ or ‘southern 
European’ variant of the corporatist model. Massimo Paci characterizes Italy as a ‘mixed’ 
welfare model; a description that chimes with Molina and Rhodes’ account of the Italian 
political economy
562. The ‘mixed’ nature of the Italian welfare state is due, Paci argues, to the 
presence of a combination of (occasional) universalistic measures and more typically 
corporatist measures. Integral to Italian welfare are also ‘agencies’ that are ‘subsidiary to the 
State’ and on which the state relies for additional support563. These are the traditional 
institutions such as Church and family, though the extent of Italy’s reliance on the family may 
set it apart from northern European corporatist nations. I now look at examples of each 
feature – universal, corporatist, traditional – of the Italian welfare system. 
  One notable example of a universalistic measure is the 1978 National Health Service. 
At its outset the latter was universalistic insofar as it aimed to provide health care to all Italian 
citizens, though it has since been reformed with a delegation of functions to the private sector 
(see below). Other universalistic measures in Italy have included the so-called minimum 
pension (means tested and granted to those who do not have a right to a ‘work’ pension); free 
compulsory education; and inexpensive high school and university education
564
. Many of 
these features were introduced during the 1970s, partly under the impetus of the women’s 
movement and of the students’ movement. They represent, in Ascoli’s analysis, an 
uncharacteristic ‘bracket’ in a nation where welfare distribution and reform were otherwise 
heavily marked by a particularistic and clientelistic logic
565
. 
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Notable examples of Italy’s more ‘typically’ corporatist measures are work pensions 
and unemployment benefits, where the extent of coverage varies on the basis of indiviudals’ 
occupational status
566
. The pension system was first introduced in 1968-9 and was further 
reformed in 1995
567
. Under its original provisions, workers’ pensions were calculated on the 
basis of workers’ remuneration and the number of years worked. After 1995, they were 
calculated on the basis of contributions paid by each worker, in principle adjusted to take into 
account demographic changes and changes in national GDP
568
.  The 1995 reform is an 
example of persisting consensual reform in Italy, insofar as it was devised and implemented 
in concertation with Italian trade unions (see below). The unions have also softened the 
impact of the ‘adjustment’ to GDP and demographic trends569.  
 Alongside Italy’s universalistic and corporatist measures we then find supplementary 
non-state forms of welfare provision, for example, the family. Paci also lists voluntary 
associations as complementary forms of support in Italy
570
: often but not exclusively 
religious
571
. He further argues that the importance of these associations has grown over the 
decades, as the family unit has changed in Italy: ‘particularly [its] more traditional […] 
“extended” form’ and especially ‘in the centre-northern’ regions572. Despite such changes the 
family still remains an important unit of Italian welfare
573
, both in terms of its care function 
but also where it offers anchorage to state welfare provisions: ‘access to social rights is 
granted through a family relationship (as a wife or a child) to someone having [a paid job and] 
work status’574. This makes the family the ‘main redistributive and caring social agency in 
Italy’575 particularly in those regions of Italy where volunteer services are small and 
unsupported
576
.  
An additional feature of the Italian welfare regime is the centrality of income 
transfers as a measure of social support, rather than the provision of services to citizens
577
. 
This is a particularly important aspect of welfare in Italy, given its links to clientelism and to 
direct welfare redistribution to achieve political consensus. Income transfers, unlike social 
services, are easier to distribute in a particularistic manner; they are also more susceptible to 
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being used as ‘currency’ within a clientelistic exchange578. From Ascoli’s characterisation, we 
should also note how short-term political objectives play an important role in the evolution of 
Italian welfare. In his account of the history of Italian welfare, Ascoli repeatedly mentions the 
‘use of social legislation’ as a means to manufacture political consensus, and increase the 
legitimacy of those in power
579
. This was a feature visible during fascist Italy as it was during 
republican Italy, and it is thought to have brought about ‘clientelistic dependency’ amongst 
Italian citizens, weakening civil society
580
. 
It is in this political use of welfare that we can find a reason for the particularism of 
provisions in Italy. Similarly, fragmentation is rooted in the political use of ‘social legislation’ 
at a time when the social interests, whose consensus had to be attained, increased and 
multiplied after the Second World War
581
. The 1950s and 1960s, for example, saw reforms 
geared to satisfy the growing middle classes, and in particular Italy’s self-employed 
workers
582
. Here Ascoli (echoed by Paci) describes the growth of Italian welfare as an 
‘incremental process’: responding to specific ‘pressures and problems’ rather than in the 
interest of a more general, unitary plan
583
. Note here the difference with the more decisive 
post-war welfare state settlement of Great Britain
584. The ‘incremental’ growth of Italian 
welfare is significant because it represents a general tendency within the Italian system, in 
which reform is incremental and highly responsive to short-term political pressures. As such 
it mirrors the ‘volatile equilibrium’ that, I argue, characterises the Italian system, and is also 
reflected in its penal oscillation between leniency and punitiveness. Ascoli’s characterisation 
also emphasises the importance of politics and political conflict – here vying for political 
consensus, power, and control over resources – as an explanatory variable for accounts of 
Italy. 
  
Analysing the Italian welfare state in terms of its impact on penality, I would now argue a 
number of things. Firstly, that the ‘corporatist’ features in Italian welfare offer some 
protection against what Cavadino and Dignan call the ‘vicissitudes of unfettered market 
forces’585. Indeed so do the more universal features discussed above. Economic exclusion is 
kept at bay with methods of support built into the Italian welfare state, whether through the 
provision of (some) services, or the provision of income support. This in itself is likely to 
reduce exposure to criminal punishment where the latter derives from economic marginality. 
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In its more corporatist articulations, however, the support provided by Italian welfare is 
fragmented – divided according to occupational status. Here we return to Ferrera’s 
‘polarization’ of welfare provisions. Further fragmentation follows from the existence of 
regional discrepancies in welfare services: services that are in principle universal, such as 
health provision
586
, in fact become discontinuous due place of residence
587
.  
Where state-provided welfare support is not sufficient, we find increased reliance on 
‘private’ forms of support such as the family. This interplay produces a dualism between 
public and private welfare in Italy, further enhanced by the clientelistic use of welfare 
entitlements.  The dualism suggests that Italy does display incentives to social and economic 
inclusion, but that these incentives are stratified and conditional. They may not be conditional 
on market forces, as in the more ‘unfettered’ (neo) liberal systems, but they do rest upon 
qualifying for support: through direct anchorage to the labour market, through indirect 
anchorage via a family member, through membership of a client-patron relation. The 
conditions for inclusion simultaneously produce a potential for the exclusion of those who do 
not ‘qualify’. In a sense this could be seen as an upshot of the ‘communitarian’ ethos thought 
to accompany corporatist systems, where belonging to the ‘community’ is a pre-requisite to 
being reintegrated. 
A corollary of this dynamic is that, where anchorage to welfare support passes 
through intermediate ‘bodies’ such as the family, or intermediate ‘private’ uses of the public 
realm such as clientelistic re-distribution, this reinforces intermediate loyalties. Loyalty will 
be to the family, or the political faction through which support passes
588
. Note that here 
‘loyalty’ may be an entirely opportunistic sentiment rather than a deep-set allegiance. I 
suggest that it will, however, stand in competition with allegiance to the Italian state, where 
the latter is conceived of as an entity in some sense ‘neutral’ and capable of producing 
collective goods
589
. It stands to reason that this will impact upon allegiance to state laws, 
particularly where intermediate loyalties develop in contrast to formal state norms, for 
example where a supposedly universalistic provision is carved up along particular, politicised 
lines. My suggestion is that here we also find an incentive not to rely on formal state law in 
the resolution of social conflict and an incentive to respond to social conflict at the level of 
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the ‘intermediary orders’ and thus through their normative dynamics. This includes the more 
traditional ‘informal social control institutions such as the family and religion’590.  
In the sections that follow I develop this hypothesis in more detail. Before doing so, 
however, it is worth noting one additional implication of the existence of ‘intermediate’ 
welfare providers in Italy, and particularly the family. Looking back at Garland we can draw 
differences between the Italian reality and Garland’s penal scenario. We should note, for 
example, that in contrast to Garland’s account, social solidarity in Italy is clearly not premised 
on an extensive welfare state. Welfare coverage is piecemeal and sectoral and relies on the 
family and clientelistic networks as welfare supplements. We have seen that this makes it 
inappropriate to analyse the Italian reality in terms of waning family support, as Garland’s 
analysis suggests we should
591
. We cannot then argue that (even during the 1990s) Italy was 
traversing the crisis of the ‘solidarity project’592 of Garland’s analysis593. The project did not 
exist in such terms in Italy, and its demise does not, therefore, carry the same explanatory 
capacity as it does in Britain. The private/public welfare dualism that we witness in Italy 
produces precisely those pressures towards informal social control that the ‘culture of control’ 
seems to have ushered out. This persistence in Italy of informal social control structures, and 
of (non-state distributed) social solidarity has thus prevented the development of an ‘emphatic 
overreaching concern with [formal] control’594.  In light of the high stratification of Italian 
welfare, I suggest that it is more likely that ‘[c]oncern with control’ has been selective, falling 
most intensely on those ‘outsiders’ who lacked the support mechanisms that catalysed penal 
diversion and reintegration
595
.   
 
iv. The Italian political economy: fragmentation and dualisms - territorial divisions, public 
and private Italies. 
In order to better understand the fragmentation of the Italian political economy, not just of 
Italian welfare but as a whole, we can look to Bagnasco's characterisation of the ‘three 
Italies’596, the political economic ‘regions’ into which he divides the nation. In particular his 
analysis allows us to focus on the presence or absence, in each Italy, of features likely to 
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stimulate inclusion and reinclusion into economy and society.  
 In the First Italy, inclusion was initially through employment in large industrial 
concerns, with union-negotiated worker rights. Here we find the most plausible example of 
Italian ‘Fordism’ and also of labour co-ordination not dissimilar to the one found in CMEs. 
The First Italy is composed of the industrial, northwestern regions of Italy enclosed between 
Turin, Milan and Genoa (the ‘industrial triangle’). Here, the 1950s and 1960s saw a rapid 
growth of industrial firms, where the Italian share of ‘Fordism’ emerged premised on 
standardized production in large concerns
597. The sectors that flourished in the ‘First Italy’ 
include the automobile industry, the chemical industry and mechanical engineering
598
, with 
state industries dominant in the steel and energy sectors
599
. Between 1950 and 1960, their 
period of major expansion, the industries of the northwest benefitted from cheap labour 
provided by internal migration: southern Italians who came to fill the ranks of the industrial 
working class. If, initially, industrial workers in northwestern industries suffered from poor 
working conditions and limited labour regulations, it was precisely this group that came to 
benefit from growing trade union strength and mobilization. The years 1969 to 1973 saw what 
Trigilia describes as a ‘wave of industrial and social conflict’600 whose primary demands were 
increased welfare protection and improved working conditions. These demands were ‘largely 
satisfied’601 (the ‘Workers Statute’ was passed in 1970), though they came to privilege the 
'adult male breadwinners' working in large-scale industries, with an emphasis on pensions and 
(to a lesser extent) unemployment benefits
602
. This sowed the seeds of the fracture between 
large and small firms in Italy. 
 The Third Italy displayed different production systems compared to the First Italy, and 
with them different methods of labour regulation. Here regulation was often informal, 
facilitated by personal and kinship ties and integration into the political subculture typical of 
Third Italy’s regions. The Third Italy is composed of the northeastern and central Italian 
regions; these tended to rely on small and medium sized industries (SMEs)
603
. Their presence, 
strengthened during the late 1970s, grew throughout the decades, becoming a stable feature of 
Italian economy during the 1980s and 1990s, and spreading beyond their regions of origin to 
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the northwest and even some southern regions
604
. SMEs are involved in traditional 
manufacturing sectors – textiles, clothing, and furniture605  – but also in ‘novel’ sectors such 
as mechanical engineering and the manufacture of specialized machinery. The enterprises of 
the northeastern and central regions eventually developed into so-called ‘industrial districts’, 
described by Trigilia as a local system, premised on horizontal rather than hierarchical 
integration between firms, with each enterprise in charge of a particular stage or component 
of production
606. Production in SMEs has been characterized as ‘decentralized’ but premised 
on ‘high levels of collaboration’607, with levels of productivity sustained by the presence of a 
skilled labour force and by the availability of local infrastructure
608
. SMEs typically fell 
outside the trade union protection system and, often, broader state control. Regulation was 
primarily ‘micro-social regulation’, where personal trust, community ties and ideological 
belonging were particularly important
609
. This was certainly true where enterprises were 
kinship based where, it has been suggested, historical sharecropping arrangements ‘provided 
the model for the family as a productive enterprise and for the family sized enterprise’ also 
strengthening ‘attachment to the place of origin’610. Family businesses were bolstered from 
within the political class, particularly the DC
611
, and such political support for familial 
enterprise further stimulated the family’s welfare role in Italy. The system of support also 
betrayed the DC’s hostility to introducing a ‘Western Europe-style welfare state’612. Cavadino 
and Dignan link this sentiment to the party’s Catholic inspired fears of state competition with 
‘church and family’, in the provision of social services613. The DC’s tendency to support 
family businesses, as well as its fiscal welfare and economic policies, also stimulated irregular 
employment and tax evasion
614
. Its attitude, I will argue, also had an impact at the penal level 
by influencing identification with the Italian state and its law.  
 As this discussion of the DC reveals, local political-ideological subcultures played an 
important role in the evolution of the ‘Third Italy’615. Different areas in the northeast and 
central regions of the Third Italy were characterized as either ‘red’ or ‘white’. ‘Red’ were 
regions where either socialist or communist movements prevailed; ‘white’ were those where 
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Catholicism prevailed
616
. The importance of these subcultures and their associated parties the 
DC and PCI lies in the fact that they strengthened the trust and identification crucial to the 
‘micro-social regulation’ of the Third Italy. At the institutional level they also played a role in 
local government, providing the social services and infrastructure necessary to streamline the 
functioning of the networked small and medium sized enterprises
617
. At both the formal (local 
government) and informal (identification) levels, industrial relations in the Third Italy 
developed on what Trigilia calls a ‘cooperative model’618, echoing Molina and Rhodes’ 
‘autonomous coordination’. Additional support was also provided by the family – particularly 
‘extended families’ – in the form of income support and care functions619: an unsurprising 
feature given the nature of the Italian welfare state.   
 
Over the decades, and particularly after the 1970s, First and Third Italies have drawn closer 
together. The industries of the First Italy, responding to global economic pressures, began 
replicating aspects of the Third Italy: relying on already existing networks within their home 
regions
620
 and decentralising part of their labour to small concerns
621
 to produce ‘locally 
rooted networks of […] firms’622. This change partially redirected social security in the 
northwest away from state provision and towards private forms of welfare
623
.    
 Different to both First and Third Italies, the Southern economy has depended mainly 
upon its workers being employed in public adminstration. Here inclusion into economy and 
society often rested upon clientelism, with jobs distributed by means of patron-client 
relations. The South had had a primary role as Italy’s agricultural base, but saw its agricultural 
economy shrink after the Second World War. This occurred without it developing the high 
number of large or small/medium industries found elsewhere in Italy
624
. The South did 
possess some large industries: large state-owned firms intended to stimulate industrial 
production in this area of Italy, but they soon became ‘cathedrals in the desert’ because they 
were exceptions within the southern political economy. Italians from the south, facing high 
levels of unemployment, thus tended to emigrate both to the north of Italy and the north of 
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Europe (between 1950 and the early 1970s), only to be ‘replaced’ by non-EU immigrants 
towards the end of the 20
th
 century. The Italian public administration also absorbed many 
workers from the South
625
. Some of these posts were in fact distributed along clientelistic 
lines, where political clientelism clearly functioned as a means of supplementing lagging 
economic development
626
. State transfers constituted a principal source of income for the 
south: ‘cash-transfers’ to families, ‘hand-outs’ in the form of welfare benefits, and jobs in the 
public sector
627
. In the south, the Christian Democrats operated as a primary political patron, 
making these regions an important clientelistic base.  
 If clientelism was rife in southern Italy, it was, however, not limited to such regions. As 
Della Porta points out, the phenomenon was widespread across Italy
628
. This was partly an 
effect of partycracy: where political parties acted as the primary conduit for citizens' access to 
state resources, and state resources were divided up along party lines, the road was open for 
clientelistic relations to develop. The road was in fact also open for corruption to emerge
629
, 
and this combination of partycracy and clientelism contributed to further fragment and 
particularise the Italian state. The state consequently appeared as carved up along lato sensu 
political lines: it was not neutral but composed of numerous, competing, political groups, 
whose competition was not constrained by the unitary project ‘Italy’, and whose allegiances 
were not necessarily within the confines of the state
630
.  I argue that this state of affairs 
produced a ‘volatile political equilibrium’ – constant conflict within an institutional set-up 
that simultaneously fosters conflict, and forces change when conflict becomes crisis, thus 
avoiding total system paralysis. As argued in Chapter 2, this mechanism is reflected in Italian 
penal trends. Penality emerges as ‘organised’ around constantly competing penal influences – 
the different re-integrative/exclusionary pressures produced by each level of political conflict 
– whose ‘penal translation’ depends upon the varying purchase and role of the criminal law in 
Italy. 
 
Despite the fragmentation, Italy’s political economy has unifying characteristics that aid a 
systemization of Italian penality. First, we see the significance of political actors in shaping 
the Italian political economy, and of conflict of political interests in constraining its evolution. 
We also see how the Italian institutional structure, especially partycracy, allowed the 
diffusion of political conflict throughout the Italian state. This has, among other things, 
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permitted political conflict to be transferred to the penal realm: where penal impulses are 
produced by political conflict, they are magnified rather than moderated by Italy’s 
institutional structure. In this, Italy stands in contrast to other polities such as Germany, where 
institutional structures have been more integrated and have tended to contain political 
conflict. The Italian welfare state, for example, has evolved through the incorporation of 
different instances, expressed by various different political interest/actors, including the trade 
unions, but also the PCI and the DC and their electoral following (for example, the DC’s 
supporters among entrepreneurs of the ‘Third Italy’). Such interests have been able to 
influence welfare as a result of Italy’s institutional permeability to their requests. Permeability 
has, in some cases, been achieved by means of patron-client exchanges, with a party politician 
acting as a patron. These multiple influences have produced a mix (but not amalgam) of 
welfare institutes, and have stratified welfare protection. This will also have stratified the 
protection from economic exclusion, and/or the incentives for economic reintegration, that are 
provided by the welfare state. Likewise it will have stratified the penal effects thought to 
follow from expansive welfare protection. Since inclusion into the welfare state marks 
protection against penal exclusion, and different levels of inclusion are affected by political 
conflict, political conflict will have an indirect effect on penal protection. The state’s 
permeability magnifies but does not homogenize Italy’s fragmented interests (it suffers from a 
low production of collective goods): it incorporates but does not contain political conflict. 
  
The Italian state is beste by a fundamental dualism between public and private realms, 
illustrated (and enhanced) also in Italy’s territorially divided political economy. Differences 
between large and small/medium concerns, between regulated and unregulated sectors, 
between welfare support systems, all betray a tension between public and private in Italy. 
This tension is visible, for example, in the ‘public’ rules that are supposed to regulate labour 
relations – such as rules on hiring – and the private forms of regulation that in fact replace the 
public rules with particularistic (clientelistic, familistic) criteria
631
.  The tension between 
public and private is also visible in the evolution of Italy’s welfare state. As analysed by 
Massimo Paci, the welfare state evolved incrementally, as ‘petitions advanced by the more 
diverse […] groups have obtained institutional recognition’632. This has created a public 
system constituted of non-homogenized ‘private blocks’633. Moreover, Paci contends, welfare 
reforms such as the introduction of mandatory schooling (1962) and the establishment of the 
National Health Service (1978), have been universalistic in principle but not universalistic in 
application. Looking at the Italian national health service as an illustrative example, certain 
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functions are delegated to the private sector from within the public sector. Specific medical 
examinations or laboratory analyses may be carried out by private clinics or laboratories, and 
patients may be referred to private clinics
634
. Such delegated activities are performed within 
the private sector, yet paid for by means of social security contributions. In this sense, the 
Italian health service illustrates the blurred line between public and private in Italy, in 
particular within the welfare system
635
. Comparatively, we also see how the presence of 
private welfare provision is nonetheless different from the ‘neoliberal policies committed to 
“rolling back the state”’ that we associate with Britain636. 
 In his essay, Italy: a state-less society?, Sabino Cassese also points to the tension 
between public and private realms
637
, emphasising the overlap between private and public 
interests in Italy. He explains the State’s ‘permeability’ to vested interests, in particular 
economic and electoral (party) interests
638
, arguing that the Italian state has never been able to 
assert its independence vis-à-vis ‘civil society’639 – the realm ‘in which individuals pursue 
their private interests, particularly economic’. This has prevented the state from fully 
representing ‘public’, ‘collective’ interests640 – interests of citizens qua citizens, rather than 
qua clients. Public state institutions have too often become tools for the realisation of  ‘all 
sorts of private interests, farmers’, traders’, industrialists’, workers’, [have] found [their] 
space within the state’s organisational structure’ but without a collective project. ‘[T]heir 
voice has been heard’ either because their representatives were part of the public decision-
making process, or because their representatives have managed to influence the public 
decision-making process’641. Again, the conflict between political interest has been 
incorporated into the Italian system, and under the umbrella of the Italian state, without 
thereby producing anything claiming the name of collective interest.  
 
In referring to this mix of public and private, I use the word ‘tension’ rather than division, 
because as Cassese’s quote illustrates, the subdivision of labour between these two spheres 
has never been clearly defined
642
. Here we find Italy’s hybridity. Partycracy and clientelism 
are particularly apt examples of this tension, as they sit on the dividing line between public 
and private. Clientelism acts as a distribution mechanism for public entitlements, but through 
                                                     
634
 See Granaglia (1987, pp. especially at 302-303); Paci (2009, p. 289) 
635
 Paci also sees the public/private tension in the state’s inability to regulate some areas of 
Italian welfare (1987, p. epecially at 284). 
636
 Lacey (2011, p. 229) 
637
 Cassese (2011 My translation.) 
638
 Ibid., p. 90 
639
 Ibid. 
640
 Ibid. 
641
 Ibid. 
642
 Salvati (1984, p. 73) 
 112 
a private client-patron exchange
643
. Public goods are thus conceived of as available for private 
distribution
644
. I argue that Italy's public-private dualism also reflects a discrepancy between 
the 'project' that post-war Italy was at its inception – a substantively unified nation – and the 
reality of Italian political life as it evolved. I suggest that institutional features such as a 
welfare state that is corporatist but fragmented, or a consensus-based system without 
consensus, all point to this fundamental discrepancy.  
 
How does this reconnect to Italy’s differential punitiveness? We can refer to the two orders of 
claim made by contemporary penal theories. The first concerns the capacity displayed by 
given political economies to reintegrate or exclude deviants. Applying this schema to Italy, 
we need to ask how the political economy that I have described displayed such capacity and 
how this influenced Italian penal trends. The second order of claim concerns the propensity to 
penal exclusion, that is, how institutional advantage affects the propensity to exclude deviants 
via the penal system. This raises questions on the role of, and reliance on, the penal law in 
contemporary polities. Here Italy's political conflicts and dualisms, in particular the private-
public division, are crucial to our understanding of both the role and relevance of criminal. 
Given this public-private dualism we need to ask what role the criminal law was endowed 
with by the Italian state, and what its actual authority was amongst citizens. Is it in the 
discrepancy between public and private realms that we find an explanation for Italy’s 
oscillation between repression and leniency? The rest of this chapter considers the re-
integrative and exclusionary pressures produced by the Italian political economy, while I turn 
to state-citizen relations in the next chapter. 
 
v. Reintegration or exclusion? 
I argue that the Italian political economy is structured in a manner that stimulates a certain 
level of re-inclusion of deviants. In this, Italy immediately stands in contrast to the more 
‘dystopian’ scenarios painted by Garland and De Giorgi. It appears to share similarities with 
Lacey’s co-ordinated market economies, at least insofar as elements of the economic system, 
welfare state and political relations have cumulatively created incentives for reintegration. 
Italy has a lower level of institutional integration, and has higher levels of internal, political 
economic variation than CMEs, but I will not cover all such particular dynamics as my 
interest lies in creating – as far as possible – a picture of ‘Italian’ penality. I will focus on 
those existing local mechanisms that illustrate my basic hypothesis, using Bagnasco’s 
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subdivision as my main framework. My hypothesis is that Italy’s political economy, in its 
different articulations, creates multiple incentives towards reintegration of deviance back into 
economy and society. It does so at a number of levels: by protecting individuals from 
economic hardship through subsidies; by investing in them as part of a complex productive 
mechanism; and by stimulating informal resolution of conflict. At each of these levels, local 
political economies are so structured that exclusion represents a costly disruption of socio-
political and economic balances.  
Starting with the ‘First Italy’, for example, we see that reintegration may have been 
stimulated by trade union policy and its successes. In this it may share some similarities with 
processes at work in CMEs, where unions are social partners ‘integrated’ in the management 
of the economic system
645. Unlike in Lacey’s analysis of Germany, however, this may have 
less to do with long-term investment in workers, through skills training and integration into 
co-ordinated systems of production
646. In Italy’s northwestern regions impulses towards re-
inclusion may be more directly linked to trade union strategy. Indeed during much of thirty 
years at hand, and particularly during the 1970s, the trade unions were intent upon ensuring 
full-time, secure employment for workers (even low-skilled workers). They campaigned for, 
and won, provisions against unemployment such as the Cassa Integrazione Guadagni (CIG) – 
‘a special state redundancy fund that covers salaries of laid off workers’647 – and union-
negotiated transfers of workers between firms to ensure that given workers remain in 
employment
648
. Promoting job security was a particularly important goal for the trade unions, 
given Italy’s then-recent past of ‘pervasive un- and under-employment’649. Note also the 
contrast with Germany, where union strength is premised on a highly coordinated negotiating 
system involving employers and government, with unions integrated into the system of 
government.
650
 It would be logical to suppose that this type of integration produces relatively 
more stable union protection than in the more volatile Italian system. 
Cumulatively, union policy concerned with employment protection acted as a 
protective barrier for workers, halting or buffering their exclusion from the labour market and 
even mandating their re-insertion within the economy. I suggest that this constituted a de 
facto investment in the labour force, and that it may have stimulated penal re-inclusion in the 
‘First Italy’. The incentives coming from the economic system here are premised more on 
political dynamics – trade union strength and agendas – than they are on co-ordinated systems 
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of production
651
. This further suggests that incentives for re-inclusion deriving from trade 
union gains would have been greater when union strength was greatest (the 1960s and 1970s), 
and where union strength was greatest. This reintroduces the distinction between large and 
small firms, where the latter fell outside trade union protection, and leaves the question open 
as to whether the incentives to reintegration persisted, even when trade union influence 
declined, during the 1980s for example
652
. The political-economic literature on Italy suggests 
that to a certain extent the incentives persisted. Indeed, if it is true to say that the ‘First Italy’ 
did suffer from deindustrialization and decentralisation of production after 1970, with the 
introduction of more flexible forms of employment
653
, it is also true that such changes were 
tempered. Even to the extent that Marino Regini can talk of the wage-bargaining and social 
security reforms of the 1990s as examples of concertation and negotiation
654
. Molina and 
Rhodes also echo this sentiment, describing the emergence of new forms of macro-
concertation ‘between employers, unions and governments’655 (see below). On the basis of 
their analyses it is logical to suppose that features of the First Italy persisted across the period 
1970-2000 that were capable of sustaining incentives towards reintegration, even as industrial 
relations changed, and trade union strength declined. Moreover family ties were still – across 
Italy – crucial buffers to the worst effects of political economic changes (see below). They 
provided de facto welfare support, enhanced employment opportunities, and informed 
employment structures
656
. Cumulatively, this suggests that persistence of structural factors 
that stood in the way of the exclusionary penality thought to accompany a free, ‘liberal’, 
economic system.  
 
In addition to formal methods of negotiation such as concertation and the support role played 
by the family, we should note reintegrative pressure created by Italian political economic 
structures also derived from more ‘informal’ collaborative relations. Thus, in the more 
deregulated areas of the ‘Third Italy’ (and eventually ‘First Italy’) reintegration also results 
from reliance on kinship structure and personal relations. Note that I am not implying that 
relations in Italy’s industrial districts and their SMEs were necessarily ‘based in […] 
harmonious cooperation’657. I am merely arguing that productive structures that required 
informal collaboration to function and flourish, created incentives in favour of the re-
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inclusion of individuals insofar as this was functional to the persistence of informal 
collaboration. My additional hypothesis is that these incentives also extend to the penal realm. 
Indeed, resort to penal law and formal social control, in the face of conflict, is not a pragmatic 
choice where economic advantage rests on informal trust networks, as these risk being 
ruptured by penal ‘interventions’. Moreover, the existence of family or family-like ties in 
Italy’s small and medium enterprises may themselves have acted as a form of control, 
potentially reducing the incidence of deviance, and thus the need for penal exclusion
658
.  
This hypothesis leads us to ask who benefitted from the political economy’s various 
incentives for penal reintegration/moderation and who was excluded from them. After all 
Italian penality does not show unequivocal moderation, but rather an oscillation between 
punitiveness and leniency. Much as Lacey does in relation to Germany, we thus have to 
interrogate the conditions for penal leniency in Italy. Who are its insiders and who are its 
outsiders?  How are these outsiders constituted? This is an important question given the 
informality of some of the co-ordinative methods found in Italy. I suggest that informality 
here acts as a double-edged sword: if on the one hand it operates to reduce pressure for penal 
exclusion, it does so on a basis that is relatively uncertain insofar as it is informal. The 
uncertainty of the informal relations is tempered by kinship, community, subcultural ties but, 
where these ties are weakened or absent, then informality may more easily become insecurity. 
This may be the case, for example, in the case of new ‘arrivals’ into the political economy and 
social fabric. We should indeed note the relative homogeneity of the ‘Third Italy’ during the 
first decades of the Italian Republic: unified by subculture and, unlike the northwest, 
relatively ‘undisturbed’ by internal migration659. Unsurprisingly, the issue of conditions for 
inclusion and re-inclusion into polity and economy, was to become particularly salient as an 
increasing number of non-EU immigrants began to fill the lower tiers of the Italian labour 
market during the 1990s (Chapter 6).  
vi. Italy and post-Fordist economies 
Temporarily bypassing questions of insiders and outsiders, I compare my preliminary account 
of the incentives created by the Italian political economy with De Giorgi’s and Garland’s 
analyses of contemporary penal changes and their political-economic roots. The comparison 
reveals a number of differences between the literature and the Italian case. De Giorgi’s 
analysis sees contemporary penality as the containment of a post-Fordist ‘surplus’, produced 
by the restructuring of contemporary economies. In particular, he points to the passing of 
‘Fordist’ labour – mass industrial production, typically premised on low-skilled labour. 
Industrial production has ceased or been greatly reduced; in its stead we find ‘post-Fordist’ 
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flexible and fragmented forms of labour that are increasingly informal and rarely linked to the 
manufacture of ‘material goods’. Labour insecurity has also increased, as productive activities 
have been decoupled from the social entitlements that characterised Fordist labour. This 
produces a ‘surplus’ that is productive and social, and defies the classifications and penal 
strategies of the Fordist era (premised on disciplining individuals into efficient workers and 
thus good citizens
660
).  Contemporary penality is a way to manage the insecurity that follows 
from the passing of Fordism and the Fordist penal logic.  
De Giorgi’s analysis is premised on the shift from Fordism to post-Fordism. At a very 
basic level, if his theory were to apply to Italy we would thus have to find Italy to have been 
both ‘Fordist’ and then ‘post-Fordist’. I suggest that this poses a number of difficulties.  
Firstly, we would be hard pressed to describe Italy (as a whole) as ever having been ‘Fordist’. 
From the accounts of the Italian political economy that I have analysed, what emerges is 
Italy’s high territorial differentiation: whether in terms of north and south, in terms of the 
three Italies, in terms of Italy’s ‘mixed’ and ‘hybrid’ economy. Moreover, analyses such as 
Bagnasco or Trigilia’s, illustrate how ‘mass industrial production’ premised on ‘relatively 
low-skilled’ labour, developed only in certain portions of Italy for which the ‘economic 
miracle’ of the 1950s and 1960s took a Fordist character. These ‘portions’ tended to be 
concentrated in the First Italy and in the few public industries set up in the South. Even if 
such industries monopolised the nation’s policy aspirations, ‘seen as hypothetically valid for 
the entire nation and [thus as] the implicit framework in debates on [economic] policies’661, 
they did not in fact represent the entire Italian political economy. Our ‘Fordist’ starting point 
begins to waver.  
 
We then need to consider the changes that occurred, to use De Giorgi’s periodisation, after 
1973, asking how they were articulated across Italy. The question is whether, in its evolution 
between 1970 and 2000, Italy has become ‘post-Fordist’ in a manner that coincides with De 
Giorgi’s analysis. First, we can detail what changes did occur in Italy over the three relevant 
decades, particularly as regards changing ‘modes of production and labour relations. Large-
scale industrial manufacturing contracted during these years, shedding part of its labour. 
‘Shedding’ here may, but does not necessarily, imply unemployment, and indeed during the 
1980s large industries imposed early retirement on portions of their workforce as a means of 
reducing their labour force
662
. As large-scale manufacturing contracted they also reorganized 
and decentralized
663
. New forms of labour were introduced, such as part-time work – 
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previously anathema to the trade unions
664
. However it is only in the 1990s that we witness 
the introduction of so-called ‘atypical’ contracts: for example fixed-term contracts665.  
Decentralization of large industries was then often decentralization of labour to 
smaller and medium sized enterprises. This was a bid to achieve greater flexibility, given the 
different (lower but also informal) forms of regulation on which SMEs operated. The change 
in industrial labour in Italy after 1970, should be understood as a transformation from a nation 
‘oriented towards large scale enterprise’ to a one whose ‘industrial sector [was] characterised 
by many very small producers, some medium-sized ones, and a few large ones’666. The small 
and medium sized industries came to constitute a ‘kaleidoscope’ of enterprises667 in which 
Italian manufacturing found means to flourish after 1970, to the extent that in 1995 
manufacturing and construction still accounted for 32.5 percent of Italy’s employment668. 
Alongside manufacturing, the service sector – particularly retail – grew from 48.3 percent of 
employment in 1980, to 60.1 in 1995
669
. In the service sector family and political patronage 
played an important part, with the ‘extraordinary importance’ of small family shops, but also 
because ‘economic protection and privileges’ were offered to the various small shopkeepers 
in exchange for electoral support
670
.  
 
Do these changes mark the advent of ‘post-Fordism’ in Italy? Admittedly some of the 
innovations do mirror characteristics associated with (narratives of) ‘post-Fordist’ change: 
increased labour flexibility, decreased industrial production, and an increase in the relative 
weight of service sector. However, shifts in modes of industrial production were not 
unequivocal in Italy: they were generally contained and locally varied. In Molina and Rhodes’ 
analysis we find a general picture of Italy’s contained restructuring after 1973. The two 
authors note, for example, how the extension of flexibility in the hiring and firing of workers 
was ‘gradual and limited’671. Similarly, innovation in the labour market occurred in a 
consensual manner
672
. This is evidence of existing veto points available for social and 
economic actors to influence decision-making. The manner in which the Italian political 
economy changed was, in fact, sufficiently restrained for Molina and Rhodes to observe that, 
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the effects of ‘privatization and the liberalization of goods and services’, were faster and had 
greater impact upon Spain than Italy
673
, despite the similarities between the two nations as 
Mediterranean MMEs. In Italy, ‘market colonization’ – market regulation of labour – has 
been limited. Moreover throughout the 1980s and especially 1990s, we witness the co-
existence of forms of ‘market’ coordination, such as increasing labour flexibility, and new 
forms of ‘non-market’ coordination. One such mechanism is negotiation between firms and 
workers – not at the national or sectoral level, but at the firm level674 – which has in some 
cases been able to maintain protection for workers even as demands for flexibility increased. 
It is also important to note that the Italian state has continued to play a prominent role in the 
economy: for example, by absorbing the costs of economic adjustment and thereby converting 
it into social contributions falling on both employees and employers
675
.  
This mix of adaptive changes and continuity has produced a ‘series of puzzles’676: the 
Italian scenario contradicts the patterns of cause and effect (reform and results), witnessed in 
other ‘varieties of capitalism’. One puzzle is the ‘consolidation and re-organization of 
collective bargaining systems that have resisted pressures for decentralization’, despite ‘a 
gradual loss of trade union strength’ compared to the 1960s and 1970s. The ‘renegotiation of 
the welfare state’ is also a ‘puzzle’ insofar as it was not accompanied by ‘substantial cuts in 
benefit entitlements’677. What is interesting for our purposes is that these apparent 
contradictions indicate that the Italian political economy has been reformed in response to 
exogenous pressures (the oil and gas crisis, increasing international competition) in a manner 
that might have been expected to make it more ‘liberal’, but that has nonetheless not seen 
transition to ‘liberal’ post-Fordism. The ensuing political-economic scenario is difficult to 
classify in a univocal fashion: Italy remains ‘mixed’. Moreover, differences subsist across 
Italy’s fracture lines, with distinctions persisting between firms under trade union 
representation and those that fall outside their remit. However, I am at the very least led to 
claim that political-economic restructuring in Italy cannot be seen as a transition into De 
Giorgi’s post-Fordism, which again appears to be more context-specific than it claims to be. 
 
Similar conclusions can also be drawn from Marino Regini’s account of ‘responses of 
European economies to globalization’678. Regini investigates modes of adaptation to the 
globalization of markets and intensification of competition during the 1990s, looking 
specifically at labour markets, collective bargaining and social security. Regini’s argument 
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can be seen as twofold: firstly, he claims that in most European nations we witness neither 
convergence towards a deregulation of the economy, nor convergence to what he calls 
‘neocorporatism’. ‘Neocorporatism’ entails ‘bargaining centralization, close regulation of the 
labour market and expansion of welfare benefits’679. Rather, what we see is that European 
nations are trying to strike a balance between these two poles. Moreover – the second aspect 
of his argument – different nations have adopted divergent strategies that reflect their 
different political economies
680. Here, Regini’s approach mirrors Lacey’s call for attention to 
differences across European political economies, and for analyses attentive to comparative 
divergence, rather than tied to categories such as ‘post-Fordism’.   
 What is also interesting about Regini’s argument is that, in detailing European 
responses to ‘globalization’, he describes the limits that exist in Italy to economic 
restructuring and ‘deregulation’. Regini draws a picture of Italy in which change has been 
gradual and contained. Thus the labour market regime is one in which flexibility is a 
‘controlled exception’ where, for example, work contracts have changed and new temporary 
contracts increased, but restrictions still exist on the use of temporary agency labour
681
. 
Furthermore, labour flexibility is conceived of as a ‘limited and partial exception’ to the rules 
that otherwise apply to the labour market
682
. In this, Italy contrasts with nations such as 
Britain where ‘flexibility has acquired the role of general principle’ applicable to the 
functioning of the labour market as a whole, ‘guiding […] new legislation and social partners’ 
strategies’683. Italy has also experienced greater levels of consensus in the formulation of 
welfare reform. Reform of the Italian pensions system, for example, was negotiated and 
centred on projects drawn up by the trade unions
684
. The spending cuts that followed from it 
were gradual, achieving ‘more or less convinced endorsement by workers’685.   
In sum, what emerges from this and Molina and Rhodes’ account, is that changes 
wrought to the Italian economy have been influenced by social partners – employers, unions 
and even the state – and have consequently been limited686.  Admittedly, market segmentation 
has remained, with an increasing number of small firms falling outside formal regulation
687
; 
here it is more ‘informal’ methods of ‘autonomous coordination’ that have influenced labour 
relations.   
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Overall, given features such as the gradual and limited flexibilisation of labour, the 
‘controlled deregulation’ of the market and the persistence of consensual modes of economic 
reform, the shift between Fordism and post-Fordism appears an inadequate conceptual 
explanation to account for recent shifts in the Italian political economy. I now ask how this 
reflects on Italian penality. I answer this question on the basis of my institutional analysis of 
the Italian political economy, combined with Lacey’s approach in The Prisoners’ Dilemma. 
My basic premise is that across Italy’s various political-economic ‘localities’ we find 
mechanisms that stimulate reintegration into the body politic, and hence stave off penal 
exclusion. They do so to an extent that allows Italy to maintain relative (formal) penal 
moderation. However, particular features of the Italian scenario – fracture lines, the 
informality of coordinative methods – suggest that the incentives for reintegration/diversion 
are not equally distributed. As in other ‘co-ordinated’ contexts, such as Germany, there are 
‘insiders’ and there are ‘outsiders’, and ‘insiders’ are those more likely to benefit from re-
integrative pressures. What is more, it may be that the boundaries of the ‘insider’ category are 
becoming less permeable over time. Having already described how re-integrative mechanisms 
are thought to work in relation to formal mechanisms of coordination I now focus on more 
informal means of collaboration, specifically those based on personal trust and networks of 
interrelation. In particular I investigate SMEs (and by extension industrial districts) and 
clientelistic networks, formulating some hypotheses on how these political economic 
structures/relations foster the informal resolution of conflict. 
 
vii. The penal incentives of a politicised political economy: in-groups, identification, and 
informal social control 
In my analysis of the increasing fragmentation of labour in Italy, such as that occurring in the 
northwest, I have noted that fragmentation was to some extent controlled by formal processes 
of negotiation. In addition to these methods we have also seen that fragmentation has partly 
occurred in the context of territorial, community-linked economic structures
688
. This is 
particularly true in Italy’s ‘industrial districts’ with their networks of small and medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs). Here a ‘widespread sense of community based on family and 
neighbourhood ties’ creates levels of trust needed in an economic environment that is broken 
up into small units
689
. It also ensures the informal coordination premised on personal 
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relations, necessary for the industrial districts to function
690
. Labour relations in such 
structures may not be ‘Fordist’, and irregular labour may be high, yet we still find some level 
of ‘group identification’ within the economic units691. Moreover, this identification may be 
the result of previously existing economic structures, rejuvenated in the light of economic 
crisis, but not introduced ex novo out of the presumed shift from ‘Fordism’ to ‘post-Fordism’. 
Thus the northeastern and central regions of Italy have been described as having premised 
their ‘post-war industrialization’ on SMEs692, whose incidence increased after 1973. Mark 
Warren notes also that ‘laws granting […] financial benefits to small and artisan firms’, were 
passed by the DC during the 1950s
693
, suggesting that the growth and presence of such small 
firms in the Italian political economy should be traced at least to this date, i.e., to the Italian 
‘economic miracle’ and the presumed heyday of ‘Fordism’694.  
From the perspective of penal reintegration or exclusion, what is crucial in this 
scenario is both the persistence of political groupings – as found in the industrial districts of 
the Third Italy – and individuals’ belonging to such groupings. Together the two factors 
provided buffers against penal exclusion even as structures of production changed in Italy. 
For those who belonged, the mixing of life – with its affective and personal relations – and 
work – the productive activity – seems to operate as a source of social stability. It is thus not 
necessarily the source of insecurity that De Giorgi describes as a corollary of the 
contemporary melding of life and work
695
. In fact it could be seen as the distinguishing factor 
between small or medium sized firms and larger firms, in their adaptation to economic 
adjustment. Though, as Regini notes, while both increasingly relied on informal processes of 
‘joint management’ to streamline labour changes, the informality brought greater uncertainty 
in large firms. By contrast, in SMEs embeddedness in ‘the social fabric and […] community 
trust relations’, the subcultures that have characterised the Third Italy, provided stability even 
in conditions of informality
696
.  
The existence of coordination within SMEs, whether informal or formal, and to some 
extent even the existence of informal co-operation in larger firms, suggests that our account of 
production changes in Italy cannot be simply of an increasing fragmentation of the labour 
force. The implications for social control that in De Giorgi’s account are thought to follow 
from labour shifts, are also called into question. We are instead taken back to Lacey’s analysis 
of CMEs, though Italy is more fragmented and more conflictual than CMEs and has produced 
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its own forms of ‘autonomous coordination’697. Keeping these differences in mind, we can 
draw an analogy with Lacey’s institutional account, and formulate a theoretical conclusion on 
penal pressures arising from the Italian political economy: where collaboration is essential to 
the functioning of Italian enterprises, there are greater incentives to reincorporate individuals 
into the social and economic fabric. This is particularly so in Italy’s SMEs, especially where 
the work force is both ‘highly specialized’ and ‘integrated in the life of the firm’698. My 
hypothesis is that this follows from what amounts to a de facto investment in the workforce, 
and in the stability of informal networks through which the enterprise functions.  
 
We need not look to Italy’s industrial districts alone to locate the nation’s ‘re-integrative’ 
tendencies. The southern regions also point towards reintegration as a preferred option (even 
after 1973). Where the economy rests on patronage, there are incentives not to incarcerate 
one’s clients, particularly if the client-patron relationship is not above legal board. To 
illustrate this point, we find evidence Pizzorno, and Della Porta and Vannucci's discussions of 
corruption in Italy
699
. I am not here assuming equivalence between clientelism and corruption: 
as Della Porta notes, clientelism in Italy was the exchange of administrative decisions for 
votes, whereas corruption was the exchange of administrative decisions for money
700
. 
However, not only are the two tightly linked in practice
701
, but similarities can also be drawn 
between the two phenomena in terms of the mutual investment patterns that develop within 
the clientelistic network or the corrupt exchange, and the social control mechanisms deployed 
within them
702
. Both rely, for example, on bonds of solidarity between their members
703
 that 
are reinforced where the relationship in question - clientelistic or corrupt - is illicit. The illicit 
nature of the transactions creates an incentive for resolution of conflict to occur in a 
confidential and ‘protected’ manner that does not carry with it the risk of formal penal 
exposure
704. Pizzorno describes ‘sanctions’ being ‘distributed within the collective subject’ 
that is born from the ‘hidden’ exchanges of Italian politics705. He also describes its members’ 
‘mutual interest in the continuity of the relationship’ and in the ‘regularity of ties’ forged 
within the political grouping. This ‘mutual interest’ acts as an incentive for informal 
resolution of conflict, effectively shielding it, to the extent that it succeeds, from formal penal 
dynamics.  
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Inferring from this discussion, I suggest that this set of interrelations also impacts on 
the likelihood of ordinary crime being dealt with through the penal law. As a preliminary 
interpretive hypothesis, we can envisage that their impact will be felt in one of two ways. 
Where an ‘ordinary’ crime, for example a theft, occurs within the context of the clientelistic or 
corrupt relationship, it may be that the systems of mutual interests intervenes to prevent the 
crime from being denounced. Here, there is greater advantage to be gained by maintaining the 
relationship than by formal recourse against the theft. ‘Advantage’ could be in terms of the 
resources that can be accessed through the clientelistic or corrupt exchange and that would no 
longer be accessible if the exchange itself were ruptured. Advantage could also be that of 
avoiding exposure of the exchange where it is not above legal board: where denouncing the 
theft in fact leaves a power of blackmail in the ‘thief’s’ hands. This mechanism, I suggest, 
will be more likely to work where the ordinary crime is ‘minor’, where the author of the 
ordinary crime is known, and where the crime does not itself threaten the interests created 
within the collective subject at hand
706
. Admittedly, this interpretation may work better for 
corrupt exchanges compared to clientelistic exchanges. Della Porta distinguishes between the 
two on grounds that what predominates in corrupt exchanges is an ‘instrumental rationality 
tied to the expectation that the rules of the game’ will continue unaltered707. Clientelistic 
relations are more premised on ‘personal obligations and gratitude’708. Moreover, whereas 
corruption is clearly unlawful, clientelism is not formally illicit (as Della Porta states, it is not 
a crime for a client to vote for a politician who has done him a ‘favour’709). Rather, it 
represents a distortion of existing norms and political procedures. Nonetheless, I suggest, both 
clientelistic and corrupt exchanges produce their own normative orders/schemas. Where the 
exchanges are sufficiently systematized and diffuse, they also produce ‘intermediate 
collective subjects’ premised on mutual interest. I further claim that, in the case of a conflict 
arising between its members, including conflict created by ordinary crime, there may be a 
tendency to resolve the conflict by reference to this intermediate normative schema.  
Where an alternative normative order is relied upon, this does not mean that all 
conflict will be resolved in a predictable fashion. Where interactions are premised on informal 
relations, as in the example of the illicit relations of a corrupt exchange, the informality 
inevitably leads to some instability. Thus mediation may not always be the outcome where 
actors within the exchange have to deal with instances of ‘ordinary crime’ and denunciation 
may be preferred. Here, again, we have the seeds of the ‘volatility’ that accompanies attitudes 
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and recourse to the penal law 
710
, though investigating this hypothesis is beyond the scope of 
this thesis, and should be explored in future research. 
 
The second way in which the ‘mutual interest’ created by a clientelistic network may 
stimulate the informal resolution of conflict is less direct. It rests on hypotheses about the 
effect that clientelism and patronage may have on attitudes to legal norms (hypotheses that I 
develop more fully in Chapter 4). It runs as follows. The clientelistic exchange – for example 
the exchange of a job for a vote – happens in the interstices of existing legal norms – such as 
the norms regulating hiring practices
711
. Formal legal norms are not directly relied upon in the 
relationship established between patron and client (though they should be) and are superseded 
by the norms that operate within the confines of the clientelistic exchange
712
.  We have here a 
doubling of the legal order by a parallel, informal order. This type of doubling exists to some 
extent in all systems, but my analysis thus far suggests it is distinctively strong in Italy. 
Moreover I hypothesise that where, in Italy, this doubling is widespread, it may affect the 
purchase of formal legal norms. This includes not just the norms that, as in my example, 
should regulate employment relations and voting practices, but all legal norms, including 
penal ones. If, as Reyneri argues, particularistic practices flourish in the regulation of the 
Italian market since ‘they alone can “circumvent” rigid juridical norms thanks to the widely 
diffused complicity of family, community and clientalistic networks’713, might the penal law 
not itself be subject to circumvention? The criminal law may, as a consequence, cease to be 
the ‘first port of call’ where deviance and ordinary crime are concerned714. Its purchase is 
weakened, insofar as the law itself appears irrelevant or capable of being evaded in the 
regulation of other aspects of daily life. Where these ‘other aspects’ include matters as 
important as work and income, the absence of the law may register as particularly 
conspicuous. Members of clientelistic exchanges thus learn from the clientelistic interaction 
(and the network of relations that accompany it if it is sufficiently diffuse) and apply this 
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lesson in the penal realm. The mechanism here is similar to that described by Alessandro 
Vannucci (recalling Pizzorno) whereby a ‘sense of belonging, the loyalty to certain 
organizations, such as one’s enterprise or party, can represent alternative sources of moral 
recognition’715. These alternative sources, which can also accompany clientelistic exchanges, 
‘attenuate, where they do not cancel, the psychological unease’ at engaging in illegal 
activities
716
.  
 
It is not a foregone conclusion that penal norms will be circumvented as a result of diffuse 
networks of clientelism or corruption. Dario Melossi has, for example, suggested that one 
effect of Italy’s malleable norms is an insistence that migrants comply with the penal law. 
This, he argues, is a form of ‘displacement’ following from the ‘malaise’ that Italians 
experience seeing ‘[their] own image in the strangers’ behaviour’717, specifically illicit 
behaviour. The malaise then expresses itself as intransigence vis-à-vis the stranger. By 
analogy, it is logical to suppose that involvement in ‘intermediate collective subjects’ that 
operate between, or despite, legal norms, might produce a certain hypocritical resort to 
legality where others deviate. This would produce, not informal mediation of conflicts, but its 
opposite, recourse to formal penal law. It may also produce such a response in individuals 
who are not part of the clientelistic exchange, but witness its existence. The penal law may 
then stand in as a remedy to clientelism and corruption: if not directly against them then at 
least in relation to ordinary crime.  In both cases the question would be whether this 
instrumental use of the law tends to be directed against a particular set of subjects – migrants 
in Melossi’s example – or occurs in a more haphazard fashion.  
 
To sum up: I have been hypothesizing that the existence in Italy of channels of resource 
distribution, such as work/welfare supplements premised on patronage, produce incentives 
towards reintegration or towards informal conflict resolution. This is because, where these 
channels are sufficiently diffuse and complex, they produce intermediate normative orders 
that reduce the purchase of the penal law. The penal law is thus circumvented, either in the 
interest of safeguarding the patron-client relationship; or because the latter indirectly reduces 
the purchase of legal norms including criminal laws
718
. However, these exchanges also have 
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the potential to produce an opposite penal effect. This may be because they produce an 
instrumental deployment of the penal law, or a ‘corrective’ deployment of the penal law. The 
extent to which these mechanisms affect ‘Italian penality’ as a whole, will of course depend 
upon the diffusion of the ‘intermediate normative orders’ created by Italian political and 
economic dynamics. It is also likely to vary from region to region, as well as over periods of 
time
719
. Both these questions need to be answered by future empirical research
720
.  
 
Notions of solidarity and mutual interest that are relevant to clientelistic/corrupt exchanges 
may also be applicable to Italy's other, non-illicit, political networks. As observed in relation 
to small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), even where there is no need to shield the 
‘network’ from the law, there may nonetheless be group identification, solidarity and personal 
trust, perhaps reinforced by family ties
721
. The bonds existing within this structure create a 
sense of allegiance, and produce behavioural norms that are then internalized by its 
members
722
. They subsequently place a high price on the rupture of such bonds by defection 
or denunciation
723
: incentives are again towards informal social control and away from formal 
penal censure. This is of particular relevance in Italy, where allegiance to the state is often 
shared with allegiance to other ‘strong alternative sources of loyalty’724, and where the latter's  
‘private […] ends’ may well take precedence over ‘public procedures and laws’725. 
‘[A]dditional institutional matrices are […] created – complementary to political economic 
features – that exist in parallel to formal institutional matrices, and that rely on ‘informal and 
self-enforcing conventions’726. These networks, anchored in political-economic units, create 
structural incentives pulling away from criminal punishment and penal expansion. I claim, 
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based on my institutional analysis of Italy thus far, that the multiplication of these may partly 
explain why Italian incarceration rates were relatively contained between 1970 and 2000.   
 
This is not to say that all ‘in-group’ relations created by political-economic structures will 
endure regardless of external pressures. David Nelken has, for example, argued that the 
timing of the 1990s corruption scandal (Tangentopoli) can partly be explained by the 
economic strain placed on businesses by the kickback mechanism
727
. Economic crisis made 
this particular system of exchanges untenable, with a knock-on effect on the penal pressures it 
created and sustained. Where kickbacks overlapped with existing networks of clientelism, the 
issue then became one of resilience: did clientelism persist after 1992? Did it continue to act 
as a catalyst for informal resolution of conflict? I suggest that it did, having been too far 
engrained not to pass into the Second Republic
728
.   
 This had consequent implications for the resilience of incentives to re-include 
deviants into the body politic, even in the face of the economic restructuring described by De 
Giorgi
729. Economic restructuring is not enough to explain the existence of a ‘penal surplus’ 
in Italy, where changing labour may have been experienced only to a limited extent. The 
existence of a penal surplus will also depend on factors set outside economic/labour 
transformations. We cannot, for example, look at ‘informal labour’ – so crucial to De Giorgi’s 
characterisation of contemporary labour – and presume that it carries with it the social 
insecurity described in De Giorgi’s post-Fordist penality. ‘Informal labour’ in Italy spans a 
number of activities and a number of income groups. Aside from the re-integrative 
mechanism I have described, often linked to informal ties, we also need to consider that the 
informal economy carries with it a range of human relations from – to use Warren – 
exploitation through to co-operation
730
. Similarly, not all those who are involved in the 
informal sector suffer from equivalent levels of marginality and vulnerability: informality is 
articulated differently across different matrices. In Warren’s analysis, for example, the effects 
of informality vary whether one considers the northwest, or the northeast and centre, or the 
south of Italy. Informal labour is more exploitative in the south, but leads to more 
                                                     
727
 Nelken (1996, pp. 103-104) 
728
 Della Porta and Vannucci (2012, p. 252)  
Lange and Regini observe the ‘capacity of the individuals and groups whose interests seem 
threatened to resist changes through evasion or to get subsequent changes in policy or its 
implementation that frustrate the global intentions of [the] reforms’((1989) 2010, pp. 254-
255). Bull and Rhodes talk of a ‘post [Tangentopoli] of institutional (re-)stabilisation and 
negotiated change in which the “new” […] looks remarkably similar to the “old”’ (2009, p. 
6). See also Pasquino (2002, pp. 67-68) 
729
 See Chapter 1. 
730
 Warren (1994) 
 128 
‘egalitarian’ relations in the northeast and to ‘mixed’ interrelations in the northwest731. The 
implications of informality also vary across individuals: the public administrator who 
moonlights in a second, informal occupation, does not experience informality in the same way 
as the southern Italian worker who earns a low wage in ‘building [or] agriculture’732. I argue 
that we should ask how these differences play out in the penal field: do they register as 
differences in the government of the ‘post-Fordist’ surplus? Who, amongst the individuals 
involved in the Italian informal economy, is (to use De Giorgi’s schema) being actuarially 
evaluated, and then contained? And does their involvement in the criminal justice system 
derive from their labour condition alone? 
The ‘identity’ of the ‘penal surplus’ is, in Italy, constructed out of something more 
than economic conditions. From my analysis of the Italian political economy thus far, and 
from the work of authors such as Molina and Rhodes, Warren, and Mingione
733
, I suggest that 
this ‘extra’ characteristic in Italy is to be found at the level of political belonging. Note, for 
example, how Molina and Rhodes’ emphasise investment in ‘political power’ as a strategic 
asset in MMEs. I suggest that, given the importance of political belonging in the various 
(regional, sectoral) articulations of the Italian political economy, we should try and locate the 
‘surplus’ in those who fall outside matrices of political belonging. This means outside the re-
integrative structures that, I suggest, have shielded Italian nationals from the penal effects of 
(putative) changes in the global political economy. These structures, I argue, are political as 
well as economic – in the sense of being rooted in political relations and identification, even 
as the economic dimension remains important. Thus, if it is true that reintegration follows 
from belonging to a sector, or even a firm, that engages in concertation, it can also follow 
from belonging to SMEs in the northwest or centre of Italy
734
, where belonging was often 
articulated through the Communist and Catholic subcultures and the local organizations 
through which they were expressed
735
. Both have been integral to the functioning of 
enterprises that rest on inter-personal identification and trust, more than (or in addition to) 
formal regulation. Note also how, during the 1990s, with the formation of new political 
identities, some of these ‘subcultures’ have acquired an exclusionary articulation. This has 
occurred in those areas of the northeast where the Northern League has garnered electoral 
support
736, partially replacing the DC’s electoral base737. The Northern League espouses both 
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a localist and an anti-immigrant rhetoric and is politically less inclined to integrate 
‘outsiders’.  
One additional, explicit example of political belonging can be found in the case of 
patronage-based assistance, given that the relation between patron and client is political
738
. 
Where economic advantage accrues from being client, for example in a clientelistic vote 
exchange, the economic advantage is gained within the political patron-client relation. 
Exclusion from such a relationship is also exclusion from a political relation – a form of 
political exclusion – from which economic disadvantage may then follow739.  In this, Italy’s 
re-integrative structures do not simply mirror economic advantage or economic changes.  
Of course the economy remains at a very basic level relevant to punishment, such that  
‘punishing the poor’740 is still a fairly apt description of what Western penal systems do most. 
However where, in Italy, we want to specify penal disadvantage beyond the generic label 
‘poverty’, I suggest that we look outside the economy to politics and political belonging. Note 
that this may be simply a methodological point: Re-Thinking the Political Economy of 
Punishment is a political-economic thesis of punishment, and thus causes and consequences 
within De Giorgi’s schema are seen through a primarily economic lens741. This presumes a 
particular type of causality, where exit from stable, formal, employment more often than not 
spells disadvantage, and the consequent insecurity and vulnerability that follow require penal 
management. This may well have been the case in neo-liberal economies such as the United 
Kingdom and the United States. However, I suggest that this type of causality is ill-suited to 
describe the Italian reality (which has more than once been described as defying ‘economic 
rationality’742). In Italy, just as ‘unemployment’ does not necessarily mean ‘unemployment’ 
(and in this De Giorgi is correct) informality does not necessarily spell disadvantage
743
.  
The inadequacy of applying a strict political-economic lens to Italy is further 
illustrated if we look at the ‘paradox’ of southern Italy, where ‘the economy was patchy and 
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unconvincing’ for most of the period under consideration, yet ‘standards of living continued 
to rise’744. Here state transfers and clientelistic relations made up for the absence of 
widespread – and legitimate – enterprise, boosting consumption without boosting 
production
745
. Here, politics were paramount to resource distribution (such as income) more 
so than (modes of) production. I am not arguing that mechanisms of distribution in southern 
Italy can simply be transposed to the rest of the nation: clearly there are marked regional 
distinctions. Nor am I arguing that there is no economic marginality in Italy.  
In stating that our ‘surplus’ must be defined in something more than political 
economic terms, I am also not claiming that there is no connection between economic 
marginality and punishment. What I am hypothesising is that the marginality that often 
correlates to penalisation must, in Italy, be understood as having numerous dimensions. These 
include but are not exhausted by the economic dimension and are not necessarily subordinate 
to the economic dimension. Looking across the Italian political economy/economies with all 
their differences, the political dimension, especially political belonging, emerge as 
particularly important.  
 
In synthesis: political economic features exist in Italy that stimulate informal resolution of 
conflict. They do so by creating alternative normative orders or strong sources of loyalty, 
which stand in competition with the state and its law. This is the case in relation to economic 
units found especially in the Third Italy and its industrial districts, where community, kinship 
and political subcultural ties have produced this alternative loyalty. Given the role of trust and 
identification in the functioning of SMEs and industrial districts (Trigilia and Burroni call 
these ‘intangible factors’ supporting productivity746) there is also strong instrumental 
advantage in resolving conflict informally. The advantage lies in not rupturing the informal 
networks upon which SMEs rely – where informality also indicates operating in the 
interstices of formal legal norms (for example, labour regulations).  
 A similar (but certainly not identical) mix of politics and economy can be found in 
clientelistic exchanges and in corrupt exchanges. Again, such exchanges function according 
to alternative normative schemas that produce incentives to informal resolution of conflict. In 
the case of corruption these alternative schemas have the added advantage of not exposing 
already illegal practices. 
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III. Politics and the political economy: theoretical conclusions  
I now combine insights gained from the Italian scenario with insights gained from De Giorgi 
and Lacey. Italy has pointed to the importance of politics to the shape of the national political 
economy, and to the shape of its re-structuring after 1970. From De Giorgi I take the basic 
insight that political economy and punishment are linked, and changes in one will affect the 
other. From Lacey I borrow the hypothesis that given institutional set ups will sustain or 
militate against formal penal moderation by affecting incentives to re-integrate deviance into 
society and economy. Together these insights yield the following theoretical hypothesis: 
politics and political belonging, which are crucial to the Italian political economy and to 
Italy’s institutional structure, are also crucial variables in our explanations of Italian 
punishment. Politics are important to the distribution of power and resources across the 
nation, including economic resources; they are important in creating incentives for 
reintegration of deviants; they are important for the circumvention of formal punishment and 
incarceration
747
. If nothing else, then, the political dimension seems to offer the possibility for 
a systematic explanation of penalisation in Italy, without needing to rely on such globally 
indefinite categories as ‘post-Fordism’, yet without limiting ourselves to excessively 
particularistic analyses. 
 
To sum up the particularities of Italian political dynamics remain the best way to allow a 
fruitful conversation between Italy and other penal regimes, rather than simple comparison 
and a description of difference. We can understand Italian penal evolution as a whole by 
looking at its political conflicts and political tensions. Political power is a crucial resource in 
the Italian political economy
748
, which has been shaped by political conflict. Political conflicts 
occur across ideologies and between parties; within party factions; between interest groups as 
they vie to influence decision-making. Once political crisis struck, conflict also flared up 
between political class and judicial class (Chapter 5). In a more general, theoretical sense, 
conflict occurs also between normative orders: the state-mandated normative order, and 
orders created by intermediate political subjects such as client-patron networks, and political 
economic structures whose functioning often rests on the circumvention of formal labour 
regulations. Political players in Italy have also stimulated the growth of practices that 
produced pressures towards reintegration: for example, by entrenching group identification 
and inter-dependence amongst group members. 
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Group identification also reinforced the opposition that existed between public and 
private realms in Italy: between public and private welfare, but also between public and 
private forms of conflict resolution. It left many spaces in which informal social control, 
rather than the penal law, was the preferred means of resolving conflict. This can explain why 
penal expansion in Italy has been contained relative to the penality of De Giorgi and Garand’s 
analyses, between 1970 and 2000, even against the backdrop of an overall increase in prison 
rates. I argue that the tension between formal and informal social control is then reflected in 
Italy’s differential punitiveness, and that differentiation very often follows lines of political 
belonging. Not-belonging seems to emerge as a crucial factor increasing the chances of penal 
exclusion in Italy. Here, Lacey’s general schema for CMEs – generous to ‘insiders’ but 
harsher to ‘outsiders’ – is very relevant, as Italy differentiates between those who are 
integrated within Italy’s politico-institutional structure and those who are excluded from it. 
Given that my institutional analysis of Italy has revealed the importance of politics in Italy, 
and the utility of political over economic variables in systematising Italian punishment, it 
should come as no surprise that ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ here are also defined in political 
terms.   
Political conflict is then also relevant in that it very visibly affects the feasibility of 
some of Italy’s re-integrative practices: the corrupt practices of Tangentopoli, for example; 
but also the re-integrative impulses, rooted in Italy’s dominating ideologies, which ended with 
the First Republic. Thus the exposure of corrupt political practices and clientelistic exchanges 
forced these practices to change. If the extent of the practices may not have decreased overall, 
I argue that it may nonetheless have decreased in its extension and inclusiveness
749
. This 
follows in part from the demise of mass parties – parties capable of appealing to broad 
ideologies and able to rely on networks of local political infrastracture – but also, in the DC’s 
case, parties made up of internal factions each involved in the pursuit of consensus, where 
consensus was bolstered through clientelistic exchanges. This had allowed a certain breadth 
of inclusion into the various clienteles: widening the group of ‘insiders’ (to the party 
electorate and client-patron relations). With the passing of this party structure and with the 
‘emersion’ of corruption in Tangentopoli the ‘insider’ group restricted in breadth750 both 
because of structural reasons (shrinking party structure) and for instrumental reasons (the 
need to reduce the immediate visibility of corrupt practices). This also affected the incentives 
for informal social control that derived from such practices. If I am right, then these 
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incentives applied more selectively. In a different fashion, yet still linked to political change, 
the ‘passing’ of Italy’s great ideologies may also have reduced the integrative effect thought 
to follow from their ‘communitarianism’751. This was so particularly where 
‘communitarianism’ was replaced by ‘localism’: as in the DC’s replacement by the Northern 
League
752
.  
Where political changes made re-integrative practices, premised on ideological 
incentives or following from corruption/clientelism, unsustainable or unfeasible or made it 
expedient to denounce them, they had to cease. Their resilience then depended on a number of 
factors, including their anchorage in Italy’s political-economic and institutional structures; or 
their independence from the economy, such that they persisted even where the contraction of 
the economy (and ‘economic rationality’) would have suggest otherwise. In the case of 
corruption, resilience may have been achieved by deflecting public denunciation onto more 
‘suitable’ targets: and here we also see a potential pressure towards penal expansion. 
Hypocritical resort to formal censure became an expedient way to place a distance between 
the censored (corrupt) practices, and their previous ‘practitioners’. This produced cries for 
‘law and order’ after Tangentopoli, and legislation to the same effect. An example of is the 
reform of article 79 of the Italian Constitution, and the procedure for granting amnesties 
(Chapter 2), which reduced one of the safety valves that the Italian penal system had relied on 
to limit its penal population. Amnesties had become ‘politically unacceptable’ after 
Tangentopoli
753
. However, and because Italy presents numerous structural oppositions, we 
should not think that Tangentopoli had univocal legislative and penal effects. Thus David 
Nelken talks of laws having been passed ‘partly under the shock of the Tangentopoli 
investigation […] that allowed those sentenced to less than three years in prison to ask to be 
placed under what is often little more than nominal social work tutelage outside prison’754. 
Combined with the change in amnesty laws, this second change illustrates Italy’s penal 
dualism, from the political crisis we have new laws that on the one had keep the prison 
population high (which we can dub ‘punitive’) and laws allowing for decarceration (which we 
can dub ‘lenient’). We also have insights into the important role of politics in Italy, as the 
political class were the implicit or explicit point of reference for both sets of changes – lenient 
and punitive. This was so whether or not in practice politicians were the ones to suffer/benefit 
from the legal provisions (Chapters 2 and 5). 
 
The 1990s can also be singled out as a time when political conflict produced pressures in 
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favour of a strategic deployment of the criminal law. I say ‘strategic’ because even after 1990 
the actual recipients of penal censure were not primarily those whose actions were being 
condemned (Chapter 2)
755
. Political belonging was again crucial in avoiding the full impact of 
Tangentopoli’s penal backlash (Chapter 6).  Interestingly, the 1990s’ peak in incarceration 
rates alerts us to the fact that Italy’s re-integrative impulses carried with them an opposite, 
exclusionary potential. Where there was need for visible censure, but also the necessity to 
maintain political interconnections, it became easier to look for appropriate targets of censure 
outside the political ‘grouping’756. Again similarities emerge between Italy and Lacey’s 
Germany: kind to insiders but harsh to outsiders: again the difference in Italy lies primarily in 
the conditions of ‘outsiderness’. This additional political dualism – between insiders and 
outsiders – is itself reflected in the penal tension between repression and leniency, and may 
help explain variation of Italian prison rates analysed in Chapter 2
757
. 
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Chapter 4 – Politics and Penality: State and Citizen, Politics and Culture 
I. Introduction 
In Chapter 3, I analysed the Italian political economy, its susceptibility to particular political 
dynamics, and the combined effects of politics and political economy in producing 
exclusionary or reintegrative penal pressures. The current chapter also investigates the 
importance of politics to Italian penality, but analyses politics as the relationship between the 
Italian state and Italian citizens, with implications for the role and purchase of penal law in 
Italy. This chapter implicitly interrogates the type of state-citizen relations presumed in other 
accounts of contemporary penality and the relevance of penal law within differently-
structured contemporary polities.  
 
I will first analyse the historical evolution of the Italian state, focusing on the ‘divided 
allegiances’ it ‘enjoys’ among its citizens. I elaborate upon the penal implications of these 
divided allegiances, comparing the Italian state to the ‘modern state’ of Garland’s analysis. I 
then investigate the symbolic and practical use of criminal law in Italy, linking it to the nature 
of the Italian state, and to Italian political culture. Finally, I discuss Italy’s penal dualism 
between principle and pragmatism as a symptom of Italian penality, which I characterise as a 
‘volatile equilibrium’ that alternates between leniency and punitiveness. 
 
II.  State and citizens, politics and culture. 
i. Italy – divided allegiances and penal authority 
The Italian state is a contested state and, I argue, is incapable of commanding exclusive 
allegiance. It is also a state that suffers from a defect of legitimacy that extends to Italian law 
in general and to the penal law in particular. We can find an explanation for the tensions 
existing between the purchase and the role of the Italian penal law, as well as the existing 
discrepancy between primary and secondary criminalisation, in the nation’s divided 
allegiances. I have analysed the intermediate normative orders found in Italy (loci of informal 
social control) attached, for example, to political economic units such as SMEs or client-
patron networks. I have argued that these intermediate political subjects affect reliance on, 
and the purchase of, legal norms insofar as they can command allegiance in parallel to the 
State and its formal legal frameworks. There is also a notable difference between the 
existence of criminal laws (primary criminalisation), and public or even judicial demands for 
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their deployment (secondary criminalisation)
758
 in Italy. This often produces reliance on 
informal means of social control. I argue that sources of the discrepancy between stringent 
legal dicta (primary criminalisation), their softened application and social demands for 
punishment (secondary criminalisation) can also be found by investigating the historical 
evolution of the Italian state. Similarly, the latter can help us explain why the Italian state 
commands only divided allegiances, and how this has affected national penality.  
 
Alessandro Pizzorno provides us with an interesting way of conceptualising the scenario that 
engages explicitly with state-citizen identification, and leads us to the penal articulations of 
Italy’s divided allegiances. In his preface to Della Porta’s Lo Scambio Occulto, Pizzorno talks 
of ‘intermediate collective loyalties, institutionally subordinate, but psychologically 
alternative, to loyalty for the State
759. These include ‘party loyalties; but also […] alternative 
loyalties’ which were ‘associational, religious, territorial and, in various forms, personal’760: 
this is an apt description of the Italian reality, as characterised in Chapter 3
761
. Pizzorno also 
points to the existence of two types of ‘public ethic’ in democratic polities. One, he argues, is 
the so-called senso dello stato, or sense of state; to be contrasted with a senso della politica, 
or sense of politics
762. The two differ insofar as those who possess a developed ‘sense of state’ 
conceive of state institutions and their set up as a means to achieve ‘cohabitation […] within 
the confines of the state’763. This also entails ‘respect for [legal] procedures’ as a ‘symbolic 
acceptance of  […] cohabitation’764. Those who possess a more developed ‘sense of politics’ 
however, ‘conceive of political activity as a means to achieve long-term ends […] directed to 
a collectivity that does not necessarily coincide with the population living within national 
boundaries’765. This alternative collectivity may be unified by ‘social class, or belief, or 
religious practice’ or even ‘kinship or cultural bonds’766. Pizzorno argues that the latter 
attitude, displayed for example by the Italian Republic’s ‘great ideologies’, has significant 
implications for legality. A developed ‘sense of politics’, he claims, stimulates a pragmatic 
attitude to ‘institutions and procedures’ that are ‘respected or violated purely on the basis of 
their utility in achieving aims that go beyond the State’767. Italy, Pizzorno concludes, has 
traditionally shown a high sense of politics, which takes precedence over its collective sense 
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of state
768
.  It is logical to suppose that this discrepancy between state and politics also 
produced an attitude to Italian law, including penal law, which ranged from indifference 
(where other forms of social control were preferred) to circumvention, to active avoidance. 
This attitude was displayed by Italian citizens, but was also found within state institutions – 
where ‘state servants’ conceived of institutions as tools for the realisation of superior aims769.  
 
We should not assume that Pizzorno’s two categories are mutually exclusive or place too 
much reliance on them. I argue (and Pizzorno’s own account allows for this) that both sense 
of state and sense of politics co-existed within Italian reality. Even Italy’s ‘great ideologies’, 
for example, allowed for some investment in the Republican state
770
: the very same Republic 
that they had contributed to create after the Second World War. Pizzorno’s categories are 
better seen as an alternative means of conceptualising Italy’s centre-periphery dualism (with 
its additional implications for tensions between public and private realms). Translated into 
penal terms, his account also points to the co-existence of deployment and avoidance of penal 
law in Italy. Thus if, on the one hand, divided allegiances produced a certain reluctance to 
engage with, and employ the criminal law, it can be argued that they also produced a 
repressive state reaction that used the criminal law to bolster its authority (Chapter 2). The 
interplay between the symbolism and deployment of the penal law – between reaction and 
avoidance – is key to understanding Italy’s penal oscillation between repression and leniency.   
 
In order to further understand the existence of Italy’s divided loyalties, and their impact on 
penality, we can look to the creation of the Italian nation during the late 19
th
 century. Italy 
was unified in 1861
771
, a famously troubled process carried out primarily by a liberal elite
772
, 
that brought together ‘a number of regional states and […] parts carved out from the declining 
[…] [Austro-Hungarian] monarchy’ 773. As John Agnew points out774, the unifying process 
began in northern Italy and was ‘initially at least, by [initiative of] northern Italians’775 with 
the monarchy of Savoy-Piedmont at their helm.  Unification occurred by progressive 
annexation of Italy’s regional state to Savoy-Piedmont rather than by ‘consensual 
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unification’776. Given its difficulties unification has in some cases been characterised as 
incomplete. This “incompleteness” refers, amongst other things, to the fact that the nascent 
Italian state was not homogeneous and faced substantial internal opposition
777
. Cotta and 
Verzichelli point in particular to the opposition of the Southern aristocracy and of the 
Catholic Church
778
; Agnew notes the republican opposition and the lack of peasant support 
for a unified Italy
779
. Although not strong enough to seriously threaten Italian unity, this 
opposition did impact on the evolution of Italian institutions. It affected, for example, 
relations between central and local government, whose relative powers and responsibility 
have been debated, refined and re-defined across the centuries
780
. Internal opposition also 
influenced levels of citizen identification with, and investment in, the Italian nation. Varying 
identification was partly due to the territorial differences that existed and exist in Italy, the 
nation having been constructed from a series of separate polities, which bear significant 
political-economic divergences (Chapter 3)
781
. The obvious European comparator here is 
Germany, whose federal system has effectively provided a stable national framework for 
negotiation between, but preservation of, local differences
782
. The process of annexation, 
rather than unification by consensus in Italy meant that ‘the national institutions created at the 
time […] were seen by significant minorities as foreign impositions […]  [The] state [also] 
brought novel practices to regions where the writ of any sovereign was historically weak 
(Sicily, for example), and many groups (such as serious Catholics and anarchosyndicalists) 
regarded the state itself as illegitimate’783.  The opposition of the Catholic Church to the 
Italian nation was crucial – and lasting784 – further weakening the Italian’s state legitimacy 
vis-à-vis portions of its citizens. In Agnew’s words, the state’s fundamental inability to 
‘[capture] the religious beliefs and practices of the Italian population’, eventually 
compromised ‘the ritual power of the Italian state’ and the extent to which it could obtain 
‘symbolic investment’ from its citizens785.   
 Of course, we should be wary of over-emphasising the narrative of Italy’s incomplete 
unification. The issue is a contested one, and is highly debated both at the academic level
786
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and within the public and political realm
787
. One useful way of conceptualising Italy is, I 
argue, as a nation beset by a tension between centre and periphery; a tension that cannot 
easily be resolved. Thus Italy appears unified in many significant respects – not least of which 
in its criminal laws – and must be dealt with as unified788. But it also appears as internally 
divided and must be dealt with as internally divided. Throughout this thesis, my aim has been 
to navigate this and the numerous tensions and contradictions of the Italian scenario, trying to 
do them justice without abandoning the quest for a more generalised analysis.  
 
With these complexities in mind, it is worth returning to the Italian state’s contested 
formation and its initial defect of legitimacy. Commentators agree that this defect continued, 
in some form, from unification through to contemporary Italy
789
. I suggest that this 
contestation has significant penal implications that emerge if we view the creation of the 
Italian nation in light of Garland’s discussion of punishment and modernity. In his discussion 
of ‘the emergence of a criminal justice state’790, Garland argues that ‘criminal justice 
institutions first emerged as integral elements of the long-term process that produced the 
modern nation-state’791. Part of the process saw the ‘various victorious sovereign lords hold 
out the promise of [peace and justice] to their subjects’792. This included guaranteeing ‘law 
and order’, which, in Garland’s words, ‘originally meant the suppression of alternative 
powers and competing sources of justice as well as the control of crime and disorderly 
conduct’793. By contrast to Garland’s account of modern state building, in Italy the creation of 
a nation failed to overcome the ‘alternative powers’ threatening its sovereignty. I suggest that 
this line of reasoning can be extended to argue that the Italian state also failed to overcome 
the ‘competing sources of justice’ that existed within its boundaries. Note the additional 
theoretical implications of this hypothesis: the Italian state’s initially contested authority 
affected its ability to make claims to authority. It also had an impact on the claims to authority 
that the Italian state nonetheless made – for example as it attempted to force unification – 
using the law not as an expression of the authority it had, but of the authority it aspired to. 
However, the limits to its monopoly over ‘justice’ also limited the extent to which the Italian 
State’s authority was received and accepted by its citizens. Taking the connection between 
sovereign power and punishment, and state punishment as a manifestation of state 
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sovereignty, this argument can be ‘translated’ into penal terms. The Italian state’s inability to 
command exclusive authority can be thought to have affected all of the following: the state’s 
effective power to deliver law and order; its attempts to deliver law and order; its use of the 
penal law to command authority; and the effectiveness of the penal law in reducing 
‘alternative powers’ and ‘disorderly conduct’. It also influenced the extent to which the 
claims made through the penal law were accepted and internalised by Italian citizens. 
Particularly in relation to this acceptance, Sabino Cassese has noted the detachment that 
existed between Italian society and State, between the Italian reality and the Italy imagined in 
its laws, and between citizens and authority. This distance, he argues, notable at the time of 
Italian unification, has become a constant feature of ‘public power’ in Italy, i.e., of the power 
commanded by the state and its institutions
794
. Interestingly, Cassese links this distance 
between state and citizen to an additional feature of Italian unification, namely the restriction 
of suffrage in Italy
795
.   Low levels of participation, even where citizens could vote, further 
limited the state’s popular political base. This combination created, Cassese argues, a 
detachment that went two ways: ‘lack of trust by the citizen in the State, exclusion [of 
citizens] by the State’796.  If Garland is right and penality expresses notions of state 
sovereignty, then it follows that this detachment (and the issues highlighted above) will have 
influenced Italian penality. What is more, I argue that penal expressions of modern statehood 
will have also played out differently as different nations transitioned into ‘late modernity’, 
whose penality Garland links to changing myths of state sovereignty (Chapter 1). The scarce 
credibility of the myth of the sovereign state in Italy forces us to reconsider if, and how, Italy 
can be said to have transitioned into ‘late modern penality’ where the latter expresses, as per 
Garland, the waning of such a myth. 
 
Support for my interpretations can be sought in two particular consequences that followed 
from the contested nature of the early Italian state. First is the Italian state’s inability to 
overcome its territorial cleavages – a feature that characterised the nation in 1861 as it did 
after the Second World War. This inability was matched by the inadequacy of any federal 
claims as against Italian unity: opposition to a unified Italy was never strong enough to 
threaten the ‘Italian’ project, but was always strong enough to affect the evolution of the 
Italian polity
797
. Second, as Cotta and Verzichelli note, is the ease with which liberal elites 
used repressive means against any ‘subversive’ manifestations that threatened the unified 
                                                     
794
 Cassese (2011, p. 72 My translation.) 
795
 By census and by literacy; universal (male and female) suffrage was granted in 1945: ibid., 
pp. 73-74 
796
 Ibid., p. 74 
797
 This has been referred to as Italy’s ‘asymmetric’ regionalism: Cotta and Verzichelli (2007, 
p. 171). Italy has also been described as having a ‘weak centralism’: Cassese (2011, p. 100) 
 141 
state
798, manifesting the centre’s willingness to rule the periphery by ‘repressive means’. 
Centre and periphery should be understood then as physical and symbolic realms: ‘centre’ 
denotes not just the nation as a whole, but also the aspiration to a unified and centralised 
nation, and ‘periphery’ denotes Italy’s regions but, more generally, its fragmentation. A 
passage through Fascism did not eradicate this tension, despite the regime’s markedly 
centralising and repressive tendencies
799
.  
The Italian Republic inherited this tension and was likewise marked by divided 
allegiances. I have shown, for example, how it came to include several political sub-
groupings, whose existence provided heavy incentives in favour of group identification: in 
parallel to or, at times, against the state. Ilvo Diamanti claims that the Italian state ‘is poorly 
recognised. In Italy […] it enjoys limited trust amongst [its] citizens’800. The Italian state was, 
at various stages, explicitly challenged in its monopoly of political power by both terrorism 
and organised crime
801
. The dynamic of divided allegiances was then reinforced by the 
existence of partyocracy and clientelism, as they contributed to politicise and carve up the 
Italian nation
802
. Moreover, beyond the existence of these opportunistic attitudes to 
institutions, there existed also ideological motives to citizens’ diluted identification with the 
Italian state. Indeed both Catholicism and Communism, the dominant ideologies of the time, 
acted as primary competitors in commanding loyalty over and above the Republican 
institutions
803
. This occurred even as political efforts at centralisation were being made, with 
the contemporary Italian state formally ‘spreading its wings’804 over a multiplicity of interests 
that it co-opted without co-ordination
805
. Not only did this state of affairs reinforce the tension 
between centre and periphery, it also entrenched the dualism between public and private: 
where the public realm appeared as constituted of non-integrated interests.  
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ii. The penal law – symbolism and deployment, reception and avoidance. 
The symbolic and instrumental use of the penal law – as a means to impose cohesion on a 
fragmented reality – was clearly visible within the Italian Republic. It found explicit 
articulation, between 1970 and 1990, in state reaction to terrorism and organised crime.  
These phenomena gave rise to what is known as the ‘logic of emergency’806, a willingness to 
react to deviance in a punitive fashion, when faced with explicit and organised threats to state 
power. In Chapter 2 I showed how this repressive ‘logic’ was in fact built into contemporary 
Italian penal reforms, as the legislation contained provisions for incapacitation that were 
reserved precisely to those individuals who threatened the Italian state and refused to sever 
their alternative political loyalties
807
, notably terrorists and organised criminals. A primarily 
incapacitative prison regime was thus laid out for those individuals whose allegiance lay 
unashamedly with an authority other than the state, and who had manifested this alternative 
allegiance in violent opposition to the state. What is interesting about this ‘logic’ is its 
capacity to produce a punitive momentum going over and above the single ‘emergencies’ at 
which it was initially directed. Thus when, in the 1990s, public and political attention shifted 
to ordinary  (‘micro’) crimes808, existing emergency provisions were applied to ordinary 
crime. 
As explored in Chapter 2 preventive incarceration – remand in custody – as one 
illustrative example of this dynamic. Preventive incarceration was reformed in 1974 in 
response to terrorism, so as to allow an extension of the maximum period of remand in 
custody
809
. Though softened in the early 1990s, the legal institution remained even after the 
end of the ‘terrorist emergency’, and the ‘organised crime emergency’ against which it had 
been deployed (the ‘halo effect’). Preventive incarceration inflated Italian prison rates across 
the three decades 1970 to 2000, as its punitive mode persisted beyond its initial targets
810
. It 
became, that is, a tool available for use against diffuse, general deviance despite the latter 
being very different crime to the crime it was initially intended to curb. I suggest that this 
collision of punitive momentum and ordinary crime may subsequently have influenced the 
increase in Italian prison rates, particularly visible across the 1990s when a new and more 
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visible target – non-EU migrants – offered itself to Italian penality811.  
 
 The continued existence of a ‘logic of emergency’ and emergency provisions in Italian 
penality speaks of the penal law as a tool to bolster authority amidst contestation. It reinforces 
the picture of a state in which unresolved conflicts and alternative allegiances imbued the 
penal law with particular symbolic and practical functions. The role of the penal law in this 
scenario – practical and symbolic – produced a potential for punitiveness that was present 
throughout contemporary Italian penality.  This ‘potential’ originated where the symbolic use 
of the penal law, as a means of imposing unity/loyalty, set in motion criminal justice 
processes that produced penal expansion in their collisions with ‘ordinary’ crime. I argue that 
the particular role the criminal law was thus invested with also contributed to cast the 
relationship between state and citizen as one of mutual distrust
812
. Unsurprisingly, it failed to 
integrate Italy’s various components, or even to monopolise political authority. This was 
particularly true where structural and institutional factors, few of which were curtailed by 
penal repression of alternative political allegiances, entrenched fragmentation. By contrast 
this use of the penal law reinforced what Cassese has termed the Italian ‘fear of Bonapartism 
and its abuses’813, a fear of central authority, given its use as a tool of repression. The 
symbolic/instrumental use of the criminal law further bolstered the notion that crime was a 
political issue, and that criminal law was itself political. Once again, and in certain circles, 
this produced incentives not to rely on the penal law to resolve social conflict
814
: as a political 
problem, crime required a political solution
815
. 
This meant that, paradoxically, an authoritarian deployment of the penal law reinforced 
existing incentives to informal social control
816
. I have analysed how these incentives were 
anchored in political-economic and institutional structures. I also suggest that they were 
rooted in a reaction against the criminal law’s more repressive roles. The incentives to 
informal conflict resolution were then sustained by the penal philosophies issuing from 
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Catholicism and from Communism
817
. Structural characteristics do not alone explain the 
incentives for informal social control in Italy: re-integrative impulses had politico-cultural 
roots, moulding citizens’ reception to, and potential avoidance of, penal law. The Communist 
ideology, for example, contributed to the politicisation of social conflict. It stands to reason 
that as an ideology with purchase amongst portions of the Italian population, it contributed to 
the translation of ‘collective sentiments of insecurity’ into ‘political demand for change and 
greater participation’. As analysed by Pavarini, this conversion can be seen as a partial 
explanation of Italy’s typically low social demands for penality818. Communism, and in 
general the leftist ideologies present in Italy, can also be seen as having stimulated a sense of 
solidarity and social responsibility: if penal solutions were sought to social conflict they were 
thus likely to be re-integrative rather than geared to containment. As Cavadino and Dignan 
argue, reform and re-education of the deviant are ‘congruent with […] Communist 
communitarianism’819.  
This is not to say, however, that an analogous attitude was displayed by the Communist 
party, or indeed by the Left-wing parties more generally
820
. Here in fact is another example of 
the dual penal pressures originating from the same or similar sources: in this case, left-wing 
ideology and its formal articulation. Pavarini notes how ‘with moderate and conservative 
parties reluctant to commit themselves on criminal policy issues’, penal matters fell into the 
hands of the Left
821
. This was true as regards penal reform (Chapter 2) and to some extent 
penal procedural reform (Chapter 5); it was also true in relation to the penal policy formulated 
during the mid-70s, against ‘red’ and ‘black’ terrorism822. I have discussed the duality of the 
1975 and 1986 penal reforms, which legislated for resocialization and treatment yet contained 
provisions allowing for their suspension, when applied to deviants committed to normative 
orders alternative to the state. Similarly, dualisms can be found in legislation against 
organised crime whose introduction was again supported by the Italian Left. In this sense, 
whilst communist and socialist ideologies may have had a moderating impact on Italian 
penality – by stimulating a communitarian ethos and a conception of crime as a political issue 
– their support for emergency legislation may have had the opposite effect of inflating general 
punishment levels
823
.    
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Turning now to the second ideology dominant in Italy – Catholicism – we see how it too 
shared a focus on social responsibility and solidarity
824
. If left-wing ideology emphasised the 
political nature of criminal law, Catholicism emphasised personal morality and repentance as 
preferable to state intervention in social conflict. Ginsborg describes the Italian Catholic 
Church’s approach to authority as being premised on ‘submission and docility, accompanied 
by the unparalleled virtue of mediation’825. Mediation was preached, for example, as the 
preferred mechanism for families to seek ‘solutions in their relations to the outside world’ 
rather than more active, collective solutions
826
. This attitude can be seen in the Christian 
Democracy’s own tendency towards mediation, sustained as it was by those politico-
institutional structures described in Chapter 3
827. It is best exemplified in the DC’s 
clientelistic practices, in which the ‘affairs of the State’828 were mediated within the 
clientelistic relation rather than regulated by formal state laws and procedure, with the patron 
‘mediating’ between his client and the centres of power829. It would seem to follow that the 
tendency to mediation may then have influenced ways of resolving social conflict: not by 
reference to neutral, formal state laws, but by reference to closer, more personalistic, informal 
normative orders (unified, for example, by the Catholic faith).  
Dario Melossi provides us with a further characterisation of Catholic attitudes to penality 
that he describes as marked by ‘soft authoritarian paternalism’830. This attitude embodies a 
paternalistic tendency in favour of the informal resolution of deviance (restoring the sheep 
back to the fold), nonetheless sided by authoritarian reactions to direct challenges to ‘religious 
or political hierarchies’. In this formulation we find echoes of the tension between formal and 
informal resolution of conflict in Italy, where the penal law was used to bolster established 
authority, even as portions of this ‘authority’ created incentives for informal resolution of 
conflict. This is yet another instance of the oscillations between punitiveness and leniency 
present within Italian penal trends between 1970 and 2000, influenced by political dynamics – 
conflicts and dualism – as they affect both the capacity to reintegrate deviance, and the use of 
the criminal law where deviance arises. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
prevent the Left from ever reaching government. Thus ‘[for] the parties of the democratic 
Left’ reaction against these types of crime ‘was tantamount to a struggle for political 
survival’, waged by ‘enlisting the […] assistance of criminal law sanctions’ (1997, p. 95 note 
91.) 
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iii. Dualisms - widespread illegality and legalist utopias 
 
Melossi has also argued that Italy’s system of ‘de facto informal social control’ is deeply 
entwined with what he terms ‘widespread illegality’831. Widespread illegality here does not 
mean high crime rates. Italian crime rates have tended to be similar to those experienced 
across Europe during the same period, growing between 1970 and 2000
832
. The term 
‘widespread illegality’ indicates a more ‘diffuse and capillary’833 phenomenon: in Melossi’s 
words, ‘traditional practices of moderate but pervasive violations of the law’834. The latter are 
well exemplified by the high levels of tax evasion and informal labour by which Italy is 
beset
835
. The collection of essays, Italia Illegale, is dedicated precisely to charting 
‘widespread illegality’, its consequences and its institutional anchorage. Among the essays, 
Sergio Scamuzzi’s contribution provides us with a clear (if not univocal) articulation of the 
concept. Scamuzzi subdivides ‘widespread illegalility’ into a fourfold typology836. The first 
‘type’ is so-called truffe – roughly translatable as ‘scams’– encompassing formal frauds 
including tax evasion and more informal examples of ‘swindling’837. The illegality here is 
‘diffuse’ because it is not ‘concentrated [in] particular social groups or specific territories’ but 
rather ‘involves relatively wide portions of the population’838.   
 The second expression of ‘widespread illegality’ quoted by Scamuzzi (and, I add, one 
intimately linked to the Italian political economy) is diffusion of informal labour. Informal 
labour here means ‘licit activities [not illegal] yet not disclosed [as existing economic 
activities] to the public administration’839.  Under this label Scamuzzi includes a complex mix 
of behaviours. The latter range from moonlighting, second jobs taken on by those already 
formally employed where a second job is forbidden and/or on which no taxes are paid; 
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working as an employee where the job is the employee’s principal activity but is not disclosed 
as such, and on which no contributions are paid
840
; self-employment that is unregistered, falls 
outside commercial regulation, and on which no taxes are paid
841
. Though the phenomenon is 
difficult to gauge, given its informality, Italian national statistics on levels of informal labour 
do give us an idea of its diffusion during the 1990s. They show that irregular workers as a 
percentage of all individuals employed ranged between 13.4 and 11.7, in 1991 and 2000 
respectively
842. Mark Warren, writing in 1994, provides us with a comparative outlook: ‘[the] 
informal economy accounts for between 20% and 33% of the gross national product in Italy, 
while averaging around 5% for Scandinavia and the [European Union] countries’843. 
 In Scamuzzi’s analysis, this type of informal labour betrays the existence in Italy of a 
‘tacit complicity’ between those who demand and those who provide informal labour844. This 
establishes, I add, a different set of norms regulating the request for – and delivery of – 
labour, which falls outside the formal law. As Scamuzzi notes, this type of interaction, and the 
incidence of informal labour, are linked to the more general aspects of the Italian political 
economy and economic policy. The incidence of informal labour, and the less than stringent 
application of fiscal rules have characterised the evolution of the so-called ‘Third Italy’ 
(Chapter 3).   
 Political corruption is Scamuzzi’s third ‘type’ of diffuse illegality (‘diffuse across the 
nation’ and not limited to the instances emerged during the Tangentopoli scandal)845. By 
allowing the concentration of power and resources, and by permitting their distribution 
through particularistic means, clientelism, nepotism, partycracy, the domination of one 
political party over the course of the decades
846
 have created both material and social 
incentives for corruption. Here it is the structure of the Italian political regime that contributes 
to ‘diffuse illegality’.  
 Fourth, and final, in Scamuzzi’s list is organised crime847, a phenomenon more 
territorially specific than other forms of diffuse illegality. Though no longer limited to such 
regions
848
, different organised crime cartels originated in distinct Italian localities, most 
notably, Cosa Nostra in Sicily
849
. Here the illegality – which covers a wide variety of 
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activities
850
 – is of particular interest for our broader theorisation of Italian penality in that it 
represents a form of deviance that directly competes with state authority
851
. It speaks, 
therefore, of a state beset by alternative allegiances, but also a source of formal legal reactions 
to illegality that feed into Italy’s leniency-punitiveness dualism (see below). 
 
In Scamuzzi’s analysis, ‘widespread illegality’ covers numerous forms of behaviour, from 
scams, through informal labour and tax evasion to organised crime
852
. These are examples of 
‘diffuse’ illegality in that they are present (to different extents) throughout the Italian social 
and political fabric. I also suggest that they are, importantly, a corollary of the Italian 
institutional setup. Italian welfare institutions, with the gaps in provision highlighted by 
Ferrera, are supplemented by compensatory mechanisms such as clientelistic exchanges 
(Chapter 3). Partycracy, by concentrating power and resources in party hands, allows party 
politicians to act as patrons within the clientelistic relationship. Scamuzzi points to the 
institutional ‘supports’ for ‘widespread illegality’853, talking of its intimate links with the 
‘organisation of power’ in Italy. This means both the distribution of politico-economic power 
and resources that results from the institutional setup; and the opportunity for their re-
distribution through the mechanisms of widespread illegality. Scamuzzi phrases this 
institution-illegality link in terms of the ‘opportunity structure’ created by the Italian setup 
(almost an ‘informal’ version of the ‘institutional advantage’ which form the basis for 
archetypal ‘varieties of capitalism’). 
  
I argue that, crucially, all these forms of ‘widespread illegality’ point to the existence of 
normative orders in Italy, according to which the illegality functions, ‘alternative’ to the 
formal legal order. Recall Pizzorno’s discussion of Italy’s ‘intermediate collective 
loyalties’854. The breach of formal legal rules here is relatively systematic, and the 
systematicity derives both from the diffusion of illegal behaviour (‘widespread’) and from the 
fact that it follows alternative normative schemas. So, for example, the ‘tacit pact’ between 
those who provide and those who request informal labour represents not just a breach in 
labour regulations but, widespread as it is in Italy, an alternative ‘informal’ economic 
structure. The ‘informal’ economy here functions in parallel to the ‘formal’ economy, in the 
interstices of the laws that are laid down to regulate the latter. Here the nature of Italian norms 
also plays a part in stimulating diffuse illegality. Sabino Cassese gives an account of the 
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interplay between ‘ordinary’ norms and ‘derogating’ norms855. In particular he points to a 
tendency existing within the Italian system, to lay down a norm that is then derogated from by 
additional, and subsequent, legal norms
856
. The discrepancy between the two then creates a 
space for the ‘negotiation’ of legal rules: where multiple and conflicting norms apply to the 
same situation, those who have recourse to the norms are incentivised to select the most 
advantageous
857.  Similarly Lange and Regini describe the Italian bureaucracy as ‘available to 
penetration and ready […] to interpret the law in a way that allows exceptional treatment or 
[delayed] implementation’ albeit behind its ‘veil […] of […] rigid universalistic rule-
making’858. It is logical to suppose that in this space for negotiation, we also find 
opportunities for ‘widespread illegality’: as in the case of violations of construction laws, later 
rectified by so-called condoni or pardons. Here the original norm restricts the opportunities 
for construction, yet its violation is condoned post-hoc by the derogatory norm, the pardon
859
. 
This interplay, given its repeat occurrence, creates further incentives to repeat the breach 
despite its fraudulent nature: the consequence is for that illicit practice to become 
‘widespread’. 
 
Here we find the ‘informal social controls’ that are deeply embedded in Italy’s widespread 
illegality. Informal social controls are necessary where legal norms are negotiable, or 
routinely not applied. Informal social controls also spring forth from illicit exchanges where 
they are sufficiently diffuse and/or systematic. The notion of ‘social control’ is complex and 
well debated and I will not enter into this debate in this thesis
860. For my purposes ‘informal 
social control’ indicates the use of norms and rules that breach, bypass or contradict formal 
legal norms, or in relation to which legal norms are not directly relevant; whose use is geared 
to controlling human interaction, in order to achieve a particular result (e.g. economic 
advantage); or resolve a social conflict (e.g. as caused by deviance) 
861
.  Recall my hypothesis 
on mechanisms of clientelism and corruption where, for example, the existence of clientelistic 
relations reduces the feasibility of penal solutions to crime and deviance. Here the resolution 
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of conflict, created by an ordinary crime of one member of the corrupt exchange against 
another, may have to be resolved outside formal penal procedure.  
 
Conceding the ‘widespread illegality’ of Italian society, however, does not mean that we 
should also assume the criminal law has had no purchase amongst Italian citizens. Nor should 
we assume that it has had unquestioned purchase within the state. My analysis of Italian 
politics – its different components, its numerous conflicts and oppositions – should in fact 
have alerted us to the multiplicity of penal impulses that are produced at every level of the 
Italian setup. Similarly, we note how many of the analyses contained in Italia Illegale locate 
the sources of illegality in state structure: the practices and rules of government and public 
administration. Thus if it is true that the state relies on the penal law to impose social 
cohesion, it is also true that components of the state are themselves purveyors of ‘illegality’. 
The lack of trust in Italian law is also a reaction to these instances of collusion
862
, wherein the 
state itself is seen to breach its laws. This co-existence, within the state, of law and its breach 
produces two opposed reactions to the penal law, one providing incentives for penal 
exclusion, and one pulling away from penal exclusion.  
On the one hand, the unreliability of the state reinforces both informal social control 
and widespread illegality. Reliance on informal orders may also be the more pragmatic option 
given that in Italy the legislative process is notably sluggish, and the legal process beset by 
high attrition rates
863
. Legal delays in particular follow from Italian penal procedural rules. 
Procedural guarantees – which after 1989 include a mix of both accusatorial and inquisitorial 
guarantees (Chapter 5) – can dilate trials to such an extent that a final verdict ‘sometimes 
[takes] over 10 years’864. The trial is also affected by so-called prescrizione – the statute of 
limitations period – after which ‘criminal proceedings become null and void’865. The 
combination of lengthy trials and the running of the limitation period are thought to increase 
the number of cases that end up being declared void. Nelken in fact sees this interaction of 
procedural rules as a primary reason why Italian prison rates are relatively low in comparative 
perspective
866
. I suggest that delays will also impact upon reliance upon the penal law: where 
the latter is perceived as being ineffective by reason of legal delays, it may no longer be a 
sensible option for resolving social conflict. In a polemic vein, Emanuele Sgroi notes how ‘a 
strategy adopted by victims who wish to avoid the futile […] resort to the State’s repressive 
apparatus’ is simply not to report the crime they have suffered867. Where they do, they may 
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find that the level of delay achieves much the same result. Cavadino and Dignan make a 
similar point, noting that the ‘agonising slowness’ and inefficiencies of the Italian criminal 
system produce a cynical attitude to criminal justice: my suggestion is that this may reduce 
the system’s overall efficiency and, in some cases, decrease the instances in which criminal 
justice is relied upon
868
. I also suggest that it manifests a discrepancy between state (penal) 
legal dicta and their application that reduces the purchase of such dicta overall. 
 On the other hand, the co-existence of law and its breach within the state apparatus 
also produces an impulse towards more, and more rigidly applied, laws. These are seen, by 
certain sectors of the legal and political profession and the public, as the necessary solution to 
widespread illegality: but also as the necessary remedy to the politicised fragmentation of 
Italian society. The latter approach rests on a formalistic conception of equality before the 
law, which presumes that law is the apt remedy to the excesses of Italian partycracy and to the 
private distribution of public entitlements. Much simplified, the reasoning might run as 
follows: before the law we are all equal, thus more law, better applied, amounts to greater 
equality, and this counters the excesses of a politicised society.  
 
The co-existence of law and its breach, and the dual results it produces, are well described by 
Cassese in his discussion of discrepancies between Italian norms. These discrepancies arise he 
argues, because Italian codified norms have too often been sidelined and – Cassese implies, 
distorted by ‘special norms, exceptions, derogative norms’869. The result is ‘legal 
disobedience’, or ‘legal a-legality’870, marked by the existence of multiple norms, all 
applicable to the same case, yet standing in contradiction with one another. This is ‘legal a-
legality’ because legal norms exist (they are ‘legal’) that seem to undo what other legal norms 
have put in place (producing ‘a-legality’). Within the context of administrative law, this has 
produced legal uncertainty and, Cassese claims, an incentive to negotiate over which norm 
should apply in any given case
871
. Cassese extends this argument beyond administrative law, 
arguing that ‘Italian history is replete with [examples] of this state of legal a-legality, in which 
the multiplicity of norms […] makes every sort of negotiation possible between citizen and 
State, whether [the negotiation] is legitimate or illegitimate’872. I suggest that this might 
bolster a more general tendency to negotiate in situations of social conflict, including 
deviance, pushing towards means of social control that do not rely on formal legal dicta or 
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procedures. This may also result from what Sgroi has called a ‘reduced sense of entitlement to 
rights’: where the rights are de facto reduced to requests (as in client-patron exchanges) the 
right-holder begins to perceive them as favours
873
. Overall this ‘reduces social actors’ 
expectations’ of what they can obtain from the law; including penal law and penal 
procedure
874
.  
However, as Cassese does, I also argue that the ‘malleability’ of legal norms in Italy, 
manifest in administrative law, may have the opposite effect, producing, alongside incentives 
towards informal resolution of conflict, a marked tendency to rely on the law. The latter may 
indeed appear as the best (if not the only) tool to overcome the vagaries of an over-inflated 
and negotiable system of norms. This again leads us to the idea of law as a solution to 
inequality
875
; but also to the high judicial caseload that this attitude can lead to; and thus to 
further increases in legal delays
876
. Delays are then interpreted as marks of state inefficiency, 
bolstering persisting inequalities within Italian society, creating incentives towards informal 
resolution of conflict… and so on in a vicious circle.  
 
Feeding into Italy’s penal dualism, the tendency that I have just analysed – the (paradoxical) 
reliance on more and stricter law – is also expressive of ‘legalism’, or what Reyneri describes 
as Italy’s ‘juridical-formalistic culture’877. This attitude can be found both amongst Italian 
citizens and within state elites. It is marked by an almost utopian belief in the power of the 
law such that law is seen as a necessary and sufficient solution to social problems (including 
deviance)
878
. I suggest that its roots are to be found in the history of Italian unification
879
, 
where law offered one way to stimulate (and not just impose) the cohesion that Italy lacked. 
Moving to the penal law, I also suggest that in its contemporary articulations legalism can be 
linked to Italy’s tendency to regulate by criminal law ‘many forms of conduct’ that would 
elsewhere ‘be the subject of administrative or civil law’ (Chapter 2)880. This tendency 
produces an inflation of criminal legislation that itself expresses an over-reliance on the law. 
Set in context, this reliance produces what Cassese has described as one of Italy’s 
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contradictions: the co-existence of high legalism and low étatisme
881
. It can also be linked to 
Pizzorno’s categories – sense of state and sense of politics – and likened to the ‘ritualism’ 
that, he argues, is one side-effect of an extreme ‘sense of state’882. It is a form of ‘ritualism’ 
because state procedures and laws are seen as ends unto themselves, and divorced from the 
principles that inspired them
883
, and because the laws are divorced from the context in which 
they are being applied and from the results they are actually achieving
884
. This ritualism may 
well characterise those state elites that, in opposition to collusion and pervasive illegality, 
relied primarily on the law to remedy Italy’s over-developed sense of politics. Where it 
expressed itself as over-reliance on criminal law, legalism clearly produced an impulse to 
penal expansion
885
. An example of legalism as reliance on the formal dictates of the law can 
be found in the attitude of left-wing parties to Italy’s crime emergencies. As analysed by 
Pavarini, the Left’s ‘commitment to the idea of the State’886, which co-existed with its more 
‘anti-system’ articulations887, led it to ‘conceive of any reform of the state in terms of changes 
in the law, including the criminal law’ and thus to insist on criminal policies888.  
 
I argue that, during the 1990s, legalism also provided an existing discourse, ready to be 
adopted in the face of, and in contrast to, the political crisis that followed Tangentopoli. By 
the end of Tangentopoli the Italian political scene was bereft of its past ideologies and of a 
credible political class, a substantial part of which had been revealed as corrupt. The left-wing 
itself was, in Pavarini’s words, ‘at a complete loss, with no solution to offer’889 to existing 
social and political issues, except that of bolstering the fight for formal legality
890
. The left-
wing, in a sense, re-constituted its new identity around law and legality
891
. Moreover, by 
contrast to the immobile and discredited political class, at this time Italy possessed an active 
judicial class – the most visible author of political change892 – as well as a legalistic 
‘ideology’ to embrace (Chapter 5). This combination of factors – legalism, political 
corruption, judicial investigations – led to the situation described by Pavarini, whereby 
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emphasis was placed on legal solutions to deviance, and judges and penal law enjoyed a 
heretofore unprecedented legitimacy
893
. Demands for penal censure grew in this decade, 
untempered by the more inclusive influences of Italy’s past ideologies. In a ‘partycracy’ 
devoid of ideology
894
, demands for penal censure came to occupy a strategic role: diverting 
attention away from persisting structures of political interest
895
 and towards ‘outsiders’. 
Furthermore Pavarini emphasises how the social and political insecurity caused by the 
political crisis led to demands for immediate improvements: an immediacy that doomed these 
demands to being unmet. The result was ‘a moralist intransigence that foments righteous 
crusades to seek out scapegoats on whom to heap all the ills of society’896, a process not 
dissimilar to the ‘displacement’ tactics described by Melossi897. Cumulatively, I argue, these 
tendencies produced a push towards incarceration that tended to fall on subjects other than 
those at the heart of the 1990s political crisis
898
. The notable example here is non-EU 
migrants, ‘new arrivals’ within the Italian context precisely during this turbulent decade. As I 
will argue in Chapter 6, immigrants, as ‘naked’ legal subjects, were unable to rely on the 
informal social control available to most nationals, paying the penal price of Italy’s high legal 
formalism. 
 
In sum: Italy’s widespread illegality produced a tendency to legalism whose punitive potential 
came to the fore after Tangentopoli, but whose effects found a novel target – non-EU 
migrants – during the 1990s. 
iv. Principle and pragmatism, and Italian penality as a volatile penal equilibrium  
Even legal formalism, however, fell short of its aim: political conflict continued to bolster 
Italy’s fragmentation, political tensions continued to produce incentives towards informal 
conflict resolution, both contributed to maintain pockets of illegality in Italy. This continued 
to defuse calls for ‘law and order’ even during the 1990s, such that any Italian ‘populist 
punitiveness’ was at the very least selective. In this context, the principled stance of the 
legalist was often forced to yield to pragmatism
899
, highlighting yet another unresolved 
political tension in Italy, between principle and pragmatism, with its varying penal effects 
(Chapter 2).  
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Amnesties embody this contradiction. They are a concession to pragmatism: as short-
term solutions to the chronic overcrowding of Italian prisons, they operated as safety valves 
within Italian penality, tempering penal expansion and forestalling the penal system’s 
implosion
900. They are also a symbol of the state’s monopoly over penality, whether through 
repression or through leniency, and they give us an insight into Italian penality as a whole, in 
which punitiveness and moderation vary on the basis of political conflict, as the competition 
between political groupings affects both the propensity to exclude, and the capacity to re-
integrate deviance. They vary also on the basis of political dualisms – such as the tension 
between principle and pragmatism – which influence the use of the penal law as a tool for 
conflict resolution. Within this system amnesties and immigrants have provided short-term 
solutions to penal expansion, respectively by defusing it and by directing it towards more 
‘suitable enemies’901. Bringing together insights from this and previous chapters I can now 
provide a definition of Italy’s ‘volatile penal equilibrium’. The term indicates a system 
marked by the co-existence and alternation of repression and leniency, with Italy’s ‘safety 
valves’ providing, at times very explicit, means for the system to ‘self-correct’, to temper 
penal expansion. The use of the word ‘equilibrium’ is meant to indicate the recurring 
alternation of repression and leniency, distinct from the type of penal escalation witnessed in 
the UK. The term ‘volatility’ is meant to indicate that the oscillation between the two 
nonetheless occurs, hence Italy does not produce the same moderation witnessed in Germany. 
Finally, the expression is meant to mirror my description of Italian politics as a ‘volatile 
political equilibrium’, indicating the susceptibility of penality to Italy’s political conflicts and 
tensions. 
 
Placing this scenario in theoretical context, Italy presents more than one contrast with the 
literature with which this chapter started. Comparing Italian penality to Garland’s account, for 
example, we see that Italy between 1970 and 2000 did not display the ‘increasing 
punitiveness’ that he describes in The Culture of Control. Nor does Italy coincide with the 
cultural scenario that Garland draws. In Italy, informal social control is still (at times 
unexpectedly) a very relevant part of contemporary penality. My discussion of the role of 
Italian criminal law also suggests that it cannot occupy the type of symbolic position that it 
did in Garland’s Britain: the law in Italy has variable purchase, and variable roles, and it is not 
politically feasible, or necessarily popular, to insist upon ‘law and order’902. Moreover, 
ideologies that supported penal re-integration were for decades central to Italian life and were 
sustained by structural features whose persistence suggests the continued existence of re-
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integrative impulses, forgiveness, or mediation. Even where we assume that the crisis of the 
1990s left nothing of the post-war ideologies, their structural anchors remained, though less 
ideological and more personal in their political character, and continued to produce insulating 
networks of belonging. The ‘culture’ that exists in Italy is thus of a different type of control, 
not equivalent to the one analysed by David Garland. 
Of course, this critique partly reiterates the idea that penal pressures, rolled out at a 
‘global’ level, have national institutional structures to contend with. As Lacey’s analysis 
shows, institutions do a lot to mediate penal pressures, producing quite distinct national penal 
scenarios. Lacey’s analysis has informed my own approach to Italian penality and it is 
fundamentally bolstered by my account of Italian penal trends. However, when comparing 
Italy with Lacey’s models, we see the inability to systematise Italy’s volatile political 
equilibrium alongside The Prisoner’s Dilemma’s CMEs and LMEs. The institutional structure 
in Italy is not as integrated as it that of the United Kingdom or Germany. It is structurally a 
hybrid, and differs from both models insofar as it produces networks of inter-dependence 
without also producing co-ordination. In the Italian context, the organising principle for 
penality is best sought in politics, as political variables play a crucial role in shaping Italian 
penality. Such variables are part of the account offered in The Prisoners’ Dilemma but, in 
Italy, they are of particular relevance: in a nation where the institutional structure has 
incorporated and magnified political conflicts and dualisms, they are the key to systematising 
Italian penal trends. 
III. Conclusions 
In Chapters 3 and 4, I have been arguing that we need to look to political institutions and 
dynamics in order to explain, and systematise, Italy's differential punitiveness. Contemporary 
Italy can be understood as composed of numerous competing political sub-groups. Its politics 
are thus conflictual, and are also beset by political dualisms, tensions originating from 
contradictory structural dynamics, which are incorporated and magnified by Italian 
institutions. These institutions are ‘proportionalist’ and dominated by political parties but 
unable to broker resolution of conflicts. In this, Italian political dynamics are prima facie 
more volatile than in those European nations where the institutional structure is, for better or 
for worse, more integrated. 
 
Starting from the notion of conflictual politics, I have argued that Italian penal trends can be 
understood on two levels. On one level, they can be understood as the end point of existing 
structural incentives to either punitiveness or moderation. The Italian political economy, even 
as a hybrid, produces incentives to re-include or exclude deviants. The industrial districts of 
the Third Italy, the industries where changes were negotiated and contained, or the 
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clientelistic relations of the South, have all been examples of structures that stimulate the re-
integration of deviants. In all such structures, whether through informal bonds or through 
formal labour relations, penal exclusion is a costly disruption. Political dynamics are crucial 
in understanding not only how these structures work, but also their historical development 
and their commonalities. 
 I have also argued that, at the second level of analysis, Italian penal trends should be 
understood in terms of the penal translation of existing structural incentives. This level of 
analysis investigates whether or not the penal law is the apt tool with which to realise 
institutional advantage, in favour of exclusion or re-integration. The question concerns the 
purchase and role of the criminal law in Italy, and Italy's political dualisms are particularly 
significant in this respect. They help us explain the discrepancy between the purchase and the 
role of criminal law and how it produces explicitly penal tensions, between formal and 
informal social control, and between repression and leniency. This analysis has engaged 
Italian history, but also culture, and has interrogated the structural anchorage of relevant 
historical and cultural features. I have pointed to the dualism between centre and periphery, 
expressing divided allegiances to the Italian state, and rooted in the history of the latter’s 
formation. I have shown how divided allegiances produce a strong state reaction to 
dissidence, in which the penal law has been a principal tool of imposed cohesion, producing a 
potential for penal expansion. Yet divided allegiances also produce the opposite tendency, 
namely the tendency to avoid the penal law and to deploy informal social control in its stead. 
This produces a potential for penal containment and it is an attitude stimulated, for example, 
by the network of clientelistic relations found throughout Italy. The latter are the same that 
contribute to fragment the Italian state, stimulating an authoritarian penal reaction to 
fragmentation, and further avoidance of the penal law… and so on.  As illustrated, these 
dynamics produce a condition of volatile equilibrium, which recalls the continuous conflict 
and tensions of Italian politics. 
 
Italy’s volatile penal equilibrium differs from Garland's culture of control and De Giorgi's 
post-Fordist penality. Partly this is because Italy does not present the 'increasing punitiveness' 
of their theories, but also because it diverges from the political economic and cultural 
scenarios their theories relate to. Analysed through an institutional lens, Italian penality does, 
however, fit Lacey's claims on comparative penal variation. Italian institutions do act to 
mediate penal pressures, and this produces a distinctive (though not sui generis) penal 
scenario. As in my account of Italy, political dynamics are also an integral part of The 
Prisoners’ Dilemma, albeit within the context of more integrated LME and CME models.  
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My explanation of Italian penality can then be put in conversation with Lacey's 
models, and with Garland and De Giorgi, via renewed focus on the notion of politics as a 
conceptual bridge between Italy and broader theories of contemporary punishment. From this 
‘conversation’ I conclude that the three theorists are themselves making claims about the 
influence of politics on penality. What differs compared to Italy, but also when the three 
accounts are compared, is the explicitness and centrality of political dynamics to the accounts. 
So, for example, The Culture of Control makes claims about the political viability of calls for 
law and order, in the same way as De Giorgi makes claims about the political changes that led 
to the economic shift into  'post-Fordism'. In The Prisoner's Dilemma political variables have 
a more explicit place. The one primary distinction with Italy remains, therefore, the primary 
role that political dynamics play in Italian punishment. This distinguishes Italy from CMEs: 
Italy has some dimensions typical of CMEs (collaboration and interdependence) but set 
within such a fragmented (politicized) context that they fail to produce real capacity for co-
ordination. If political variables are, as I argue, important penal determinants across contexts, 
it still remains true that in Italy they stand out for their visibility and their particular 
connection to penal trends. 
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Chapter 5 – Judicial Actors and Italian Penality 
  
I. Introduction 
Judicial actors – judges and prosecutors – are particularly significant to our analysis of Italian 
penality. This is not just because, as Nelken argues, criminal procedure should be seen as an 
‘independent variable in its own right’ when investigating penal systems 903, it is also because 
of judges’ and prosecutors’ particular institutional position, which has caused them to purvey 
different penal pressures either for penal expansion or penal containment. This in turn is a 
further source of the variation between repression and leniency that is integral to Italy’s 
differential punitiveness.  
 In order to explain the effect that judicial actors have had on Italian penal trends and 
to understand it in a broader comparative scenario, I start from the models suggested by 
Savelsberg and Lacey, which I apply to the Italian context
904
. I argue once again that Italy is 
not yet well accounted for by these models, and in this chapter I build from and modify them 
to increase their explanatory capacity, whilst maintaining their fundamental insights, by 
factoring in the notion of ‘legitimacy’. In this chapter I am not charting direct correlations 
between judicial action and Italian prison rates.  This endeavour (especially in its historical 
aspects) ‘would require a research program that could not be realized by an individual 
researcher’905. Rather, this chapter develops a series of interpretive conclusions on judicial 
contributions to Italian penality that are premised on an institutional analysis of judicial actors 
similar to that found in Savelsberg and Lacey. 
The two authors rightly note that judicial structure and institutional situation will, in 
given contexts, contribute to penal stability or penal dynamism
906
. Specifically, they argue 
that levels of judicial bureaucratization will affect the judiciary’s capacity to resist popular 
calls for law and order
907. Additionally, judges’ interrelation with politicians will affect levels 
of institutional co-ordination over penal matters
908
. With all other contextual circumstances 
aligned, such co-ordination may sustain levels of penal moderation and stability. By contrast 
where there is no co-ordination, there may be greater leeway for penal expansion, if catalysed 
by other institutional features. Lacey’s and Savelsberg’s main axes - 
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bureaucracy/independence, and institutional co-ordination/conflict – help to elucidate the 
potential relationship between judicial and political actors; and between judicial actors and 
public opinion. Both of these interrelations in turn affect the judicial contribution to penality. 
Taking my cue from their work, in this chapter I will ask whether, and to what extent, 
the Italian judicial structure protects judges and prosecutors from putative, punitive pressures 
from public and politicians. How will the judiciary react to calls for law and order, should 
these arise (as in Garland’s scenario909)? Will their institutional structure, and their relations 
with other Italian institutions, allow them to resist such pressures should they feel the duty to 
do so? Or will punitive pressures be channelled through the judiciary and into the penal 
process? Following on from these questions I will also analyse the evolution of judicial 
legitimacy, asking how changing legitimacy has influenced judges’ role in Italy, and with 
what penal effects. 
 When applying the models to Italy, three main considerations have to be made. 
Firstly our analysis of structure must allow for a judiciary that is both bureaucratized and 
highly independent. Judges in Italy are not appointed or politically elected: they are members 
of the civil service, selected through public examination. However they are also autonomous 
of other state branches: they are, for example, self-governed rather than being accountable to 
the executive. Secondly, it is necessary to consider a range of interrelations, between the 
judicial and political classes, that go beyond co-operation and conflict. Judicial actors have 
variously collaborated, colluded and entered into conflict with political actors in Italy, with 
varying penal effects: an account of Italian penality should incorporate this variation. Thirdly, 
to understand the particular penal results that have accrued from structure and institutional 
situation within the Italian context, we need to consider the issue of judicial legitimacy in 
Italy. Judges’ legitimacy has fluctuated over the decades. Its waxing and waning has affected 
both the powers that judicial actors have been endowed with, and the deployment of such 
powers. Legitimacy should also be read to include internal legitimacy, or judicial self-
conception, whose evolution maps the changing Italian context and the changing relations 
between judiciary, public and political classes. The inclusion of legitimacy and self-
conception helps contextualise our analysis of Italian judicial actors. It puts in relief the fact 
that structure alone cannot account for judicial contributions to penal trends, and that it will 
only do so in conjunction with other institutional features. For example, bureaucracy and co-
ordination, in a context that is itself co-ordinated, may make for penal stability. By contrast, 
an independent judiciary in conflict with its political counterparts may make for penal 
volatility in a context where the institutional structure already stimulates penal exclusion. If, 
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in the same context, law and order become topical electoral issues, this volatility may then 
manifest itself as penal escalation.  
The Italian context is one in which the penal law has had variable purchase and a 
varying role. I argue that this variation can be mapped onto issues of judicial legitimacy. 
Judges and prosecutors contribute to, and partake of, the varying purchase, of the law, the 
extent to which citizens will appeal to and rely on the law. Similarly, issues of self-conception 
reflect the varying role of Italian law: where changing self-conception changes judicial ideas 
of what this role entails. Legitimacy and self-conception also speak to the evolution of judges 
as political actors where judicial self-conception is constituted in opposition to other state 
branches. In Italy, structure (bureaucracy, independence) and context (interrelations and 
legitimacy) have combined to produce a judicial class that is diverse, independent, and 
directly involved in the political dynamics that have influenced Italian penality. By 
understanding this intersection of structure, legitimacy and institutional setup, we can 
understand the details of how judicial actors have produced variable penal impulses in Italy. 
The result has been neither the penal stability of the German scenario nor the penal escalation 
of the British case, but oscillation between repression and leniency.  
 
 
Before continuing, I should specify that in this chapter I deal with judges and public 
prosecutors together. This conflation, which might strike a reader unfamiliar with the Italian 
context as counter-intuitive, reflects the institutional position of both actors in Italy. The 
conflation is common in the literature on Italian judicial actors, usually defined simply as 
‘judges’ – a rough translation of the word ‘magistrati’. The term encompasses ‘investigating 
magistrates […] judges of the bench [and] public prosecutors’910. They are all part of the same 
professional body
911
 and in principle the same individual could, over the course of her career, 
occupy both roles
912. This also means that ‘prosecutors enjoy the same independent status as 
judges’, which means total formal independence from the executive and thus from any 
‘institutional mechanism to direct criminal prosecution’913. It is true that after the 1989 reform 
of criminal procedure (see below) prosecutors should in principle occupy a partisan role 
within the trial, much like their adversarial cousins
914
. However, commentators have agreed 
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that the reform has not achieved the desired ‘adversarial’ transformation915. Prosecutors 
continue to view their role as ‘neutral quasi-judicial figures’ and claim to have ‘a similar duty 
of […] impartiality [as] the judge’ still acting ‘in some ways […] as […] examining 
magistrates in the inquisitorial tradition’916. This, apart from any formal institutional 
mechanism, justifies treating ‘magistrati’ (judges and prosecutors) together even after 1989. If 
anything can be said of Italian public prosecutors today it is that they occupy an ‘ambivalent’ 
space in the Italian trial, ‘still possessing many of the attributes of quasi-judicial actors 
searching for the truth whilst being inserted in a new legal architecture designed to cast them 
on one side of the contest’917. Until this ambivalence is resolved I will treat judges and 
prosecutors together under the labels ‘judges’, ‘magistrates’ and ‘judicial actors’. 
 
To proceed as set out above, I will first explain the structure of the Italian judiciary and its 
relation to the political class. The succeeding section discusses the waxing and waning of 
Italian judges’ legitimacy between 1970 and 1990. It draws out hypotheses on how this 
fluctuation, combined with judges’ institutional situation and internal organization, may have 
influenced Italy’s differential punitiveness. The discussion of legitimacy is set within a 
broader framework that investigates the relationship between judges and political class. I then 
analyse judicial receptivity/resistance to public opinion, investigated by discussing judicial 
legitimacy vis-à-vis the public, but also judicial self-conception – public demands made of 
judges and judges’ responses to such demands. I conclude with an overview of judicial 
contributions to Italian penality. 
 
II. The context: Italy and the comparative models. 
i. The Italian judiciary: bureaucracy and independence. 
This section first charts the structure of the Italian judiciary, paying particular attention to its 
independence and bureaucratisation.  The term ‘bureaucratic’ requires some explanation. 
Both Savelsberg and Lacey, when using it to describe judicial actors, refer to the latter’s 
position as part of the civil service. In Savelsberg’s words, members of ‘bureaucratic’ 
judiciaries are ‘appointed as civil servants with tenured positions, early in their professional 
career’ and their appointment is usually by ‘academic achievement tests’918. His and Lacey’s 
reference point is the Germany judiciary that Savelsberg contrasts to the US judiciary, and 
Lacey to the UK judiciary. According to the broader comparative studies by Guarnieri and 
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Pederzoli, of judiciaries across Western democracies, bureaucratic judiciaries are 
characterised by five main features: selection of judges; training; internal organization; 
judicial tasks; independence
919
. Selection is through examinations, at an early stage in the 
applicants’ career (usually just after university). Training occurs mainly within the judiciary, 
which is organised in hierarchical ranks
920
. Career advancement is competitive: through  
‘formal criteria combining seniority and merit’921. Bureaucratic judges have a ‘generalist 
approach to work performance’ and are presumed to carry out all roles ‘associated with their 
rank’, for example adjudication across a number of disciplines922. Bureaucratic judges also 
tend to have weaker ‘guarantees of independence’923. Professional judges, on the other hand, 
are appointed later in their careers, once they have acquired experience in the legal field 
(often, ‘but not always, as legal advocates’)924. The process of career advancement is less 
formalised than in bureaucratic judiciaries; promotions are not as frequent, and ‘higher-
ranking judges’ exert weaker controls over their colleagues than their bureaucratic 
counterparts, though concerns with being overruled by higher court judges will exert indirect 
influence on lower-ranking judges
925
. Guarantees of independence are stronger in professional 
than in bureaucratic judiciaries, hence, in Lacey’s words, the ‘Olympian independence’ of 
British judges
926
. 
 As Guarnieri and Pederzoli remind us, the two categories ‘professional/bureaucratic’ 
are highly stylized, glossing over the complexities of ‘actual’ judiciaries927. However 
‘judiciaries in democratic countries can be placed on a continuum’ with the archetypal 
bureaucratic and professional judiciaries at their extremes
928
. Where does Italy lie on this 
scale? Historically, the Italian judiciary shared similarities with the French, as both were 
premised on the Napoleonic model
929
. This model was accepted by the assembly formed to 
draft the post-war Constitution, and remained substantially unmodified throughout the 1940s 
and 1950s
930
. However, during the 1960s and 1970s, the Italian judiciary underwent a number 
of gradual, changes, moving further away from the ‘bureaucratic’ archetype931. Judicial self-
government is one example of such changes; similarly, methods of career advancement have 
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been reformed and advancement is now premised only on seniority
932
. These changes were 
intended to ‘shield the judiciary from all partisan interest’933. This aim was formally achieved 
and, institutionally, the Italian judiciary became almost entirely independent of executive and 
legislative branches
934
. However, as we will see, informal connections between judges and the 
political sphere have remained
935
.  
 With its high degree of independence, self-government and automatic advancement, the 
Italian judiciary is distinct from its bureaucratic counterparts
936
. Yet, I suggest, on the 
‘bureaucratic-professional’ continuum it is closer to the ‘bureaucratic’ than to the 
‘professional’ pole. Italian judicial actors are still akin to civil servants and are still recruited 
by a public examination, ‘a state-wide competitive procedure’ which can be taken by all law 
graduates
937
. Career progression within the judiciary is premised on seniority alone
938
, which 
means that ‘after a given number of years all magistrates reach the upper levels and 
[ultimately] also the career […] level of the highest court, the Court of Cassation’939. Italian 
judges are also expected to take a generalist approach to their role. It is because of these 
persisting features that I refer to the Italian judiciary as bureaucratic. However, throughout 
this chapter, we must bear in mind that it is bureaucratic with caveats, that is, features that fall 
outside the bureaucratic ideal-type, also difficult to reconcile with the professional archetype. 
This chapter will analyse how these features play out in penal terms.  
 
In terms of independence, Italian magistrati benefit from a very pure form of independence: 
the Italian judiciary is not accountable to the executive but is self-governed by a Higher 
Council (Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura – CSM) which has the power to nominate 
and promote, as well as remove or discipline, magistrates
940
. Judges and prosecutors together 
elect their representatives to this Higher Council
941. In the Republic’s constitutional order, the 
accountability of the independent judiciary is ensured by the legality principle, which 
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mandates compulsory prosecution of all offences
942
. This, in principle, pre-empts preferential 
treatment of certain cases over others, though in practice some discretion is necessarily 
exercised in the prioritising of cases
943
. Automatic advancement on the basis of seniority has 
bolstered internal independence by limiting the judiciary’s internal hierarchy and the extent to 
which senior judges can influence junior judges
944
. These characteristics, introduced by the 
Italian Constitution
945
, stem from fears of executive subjugation of the judiciary and judicial 
subservience to the executive, which had characterised the relationship between magistrates 
and executive under Fascism
946
. 
The high level of Italian judicial independence played an important role in 
Tangentopoli: though by no means the only factor that allowed prosecution of large scale 
political corruption, it did insulate judicial action from any political interference
947
. 
Unsurprisingly, given the aftermath of the investigation (the overhaul of dominant political 
parties) judicial independence became a focus of heated debate, and eventually a target of 
political attack. The main argument put forth was that such a high level of independence 
allowed for unaccountable judicial activity, leaving judges’ and prosecutors’ potential 
political motives unchecked
948
. This argument partly reflected a deep-seated distrust existing 
between the Italian executive and the Italian judiciary that came to the fore after 2000, 
particularly with Silvio Berlusconi’s entry into politics949. In one way or another, the conflict 
has coloured Italian political life since the late 1990s: after Tangentopoli, public (and media) 
debate on Italy’s ‘balance of powers’, has been polarised into pro-judge and anti-judge 
stances
950
. Literature on Italian judicial actors is not so coarsely divided, but it too has been 
engulfed by the terms of this debate, with invidious effects on the reliability of sources: such 
heavily politicised and polarised debate does not make for dispassionate appraisals, and make 
all seemingly ‘neutral’ appraisals suspect951. Discussions of the role judicial actors play in 
Italian penality has also been overshadowed by debates on what the appropriate judicial role 
should be in Italy. It is in part to overcome the ‘pro-judge/anti-judge’ debates that I analyse 
the Italian judiciary using Savelsberg’s and Lacey’s arguments. Their framework facilitates a 
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more comprehensive investigation of judicial contribution to penality by analysing their role 
within a broader institutional context.  
 
Of course we should not expect Italy to simply slot into existing institutional accounts. 
Investigating judicial interrelation with other state branches in Italy, for example, means 
investigating not just co-ordination and conflict with the political class
952
, but investigating 
collaboration, collusion and conflict between judicial and political classes and their 
alternation across the decades. This range of relations has also had unexpected results. Thus, 
if collaboration between political and judicial classes has contributed to contain penal 
expansion in certain European nations, in Italy, as we will see, it is the ‘refusal of […] 
collaboration’953 that has had similar effects. The unexpected nature of political-judicial 
interaction in Italy could in fact lead us to suggest, in David Nelken’s words, that the Italian 
judiciary is ‘a mysterious and unpredictable force’’954. Without going this far, I argue that we 
nonetheless need to acknowledge that Italian judicial actors have produced contrasting penal 
impulses between 1970 and 2000
955
.  
ii. Institutional models: judicial structure and penality 
Savelsberg contends that our analyses of contemporary punishment should incorporate 
‘knowledge and domination’956. ‘Knowledge’ indicates assumptions about crime and 
punishment prevalent within society/different social sectors. Domination is the power to have 
such knowledge acted upon once it is expressed as a ‘command’: it is the likelihood that 
knowledge is translated into legal or policy decisions
957
. The institutionalisation of knowledge 
production – the mechanisms by which it is produced and translated into decision-making – 
must be part of our analyses
958
. If these variables are built into theories of punishment, they 
will allow us to understand how macro-structural changes are accompanied by, and 
transmitted through, changes in knowledge. This will in turn tie penal changesto social action, 
including judicial action, engaged in both knowledge production and in domination.  
Savelsberg is interested in tracing the links between political and judicial classes and 
the links between the public and judicial classes. He asks: how direct is the relationship 
between public knowledge on punishment and legal decision-making? How does the 
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relationship between judicial and political actors affect knowledge on punishment? How does 
this influence judicial and political action in the criminal justice sphere?
959
  My chapter asks 
similar questions for Italy. 
To illustrate his arguments, Savelsberg compares the United States and Germany, 
useful case studies insofar as they possess significant institutional differences. The US is, in 
his analysis, a system of ‘universalistic personalism’: ‘[in which] public knowledge translates 
relatively easily into legal/political decision making’ such as ‘minimum mandatory sentence 
laws, guilty verdicts, or sentences’960. This is unsurprising considering that in some American 
states judges are elected 
961
. Direct accountability to the public may well mean that judicial 
decisions are swayed by public knowledge on crime and punishment: when public knowledge 
favours punitiveness – as in accounts of ‘populist punitiveness’ – judicial action may follow 
suit. Similarly, the potential volatility of public opinion may translate into volatility at the 
judicial level. Matters in America are further exacerbated by lay participation in juries – also 
a feature of the British criminal trial
962
. It stands to reason that this set-up contributes to the 
mechanisms witnessed in the US (and that partly inform Garland’s analysis): increasing 
punitiveness; increasing prison rates; volatile attitudes to punishment
963
.   
Different mechanisms operate in Germany’s judicial system, characterized as a 
‘universalistic bureaucracy’964 in which decision-making, including over criminal justice, is 
‘more strongly based on bureaucratised procedures’965. This implies that the influence of 
public knowledge will be heavily mediated by the procedures themselves, but also by the 
professional culture that the procedures foster. Professional culture may explicitly incorporate 
some resistance to public opinion, if public opinion diverges from professional knowledge on 
crime and punishment 
966. Even in the face of ‘populist punitiveness’, decisions in the 
criminal justice field are thus more likely to reflect the rationales developed within the 
judicial and political spheres. If these rationales support penal moderation, then they may 
intercept any ‘populist punitiveness’. In Germany, it is judges’ membership of the 
bureaucracy that stimulates this ‘interception’. German judges are tenured civil service 
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officials with no direct accountability to the public
967
. They are ensconced in a system that 
promotes negotiation between political branches, including over punishment
968
 and, 
interpreting Savelsberg, each level of negotiation can be a space for debate over the purpose 
and appropriate quantity of punishment. Given the right contingencies – a judiciary devoted 
to rehabilitation, a political class interested in re-socialisation of deviance – each level of 
negotiation provides an opportunity for penal moderation. Where judges are willing to 
negotiate policy issues with the (rest of the) bureaucracy, this helps develop moderate policies 
that have political support. Passing through these various ‘levels’, knowledge on punishment 
is also stabilised: Germany is again illustrative in this respect
969
.    
We can further understand Savelsberg’s hypotheses by looking at Lacey’s analyses of 
judicial actors and their influence on penality
970
. Lacey, building upon Savelsberg, 
hypothesises that different judicial structures, and different levels of co-ordination between 
judges and politicians, partially explain penal variance across contexts. Variance will also 
depend upon the institutional arrangements that the judiciary inhabit. Lacey is particularly 
concerned with the presence or absence of a bureaucratic judiciary, as well as the status that 
is accorded to judges within different polities. She compares Germany with England and 
Wales (rather than Germany and the US). Britain differs from the US insofar as there is no 
direct judicial accountability to the public, but even here the buffer provided by 
bureaucratization of the judiciary against populist punitiveness is attenuated. The bulk of 
criminal law cases in England and Wales are heard by appointed lay magistrates
971
 who can, 
to some extent, be seen as purveyors of popular sentiment within the penal process
972
. By 
contrast, nations such as Germany are better placed to resist popular penal demands because 
of the bureaucratic nature of their judiciary
973. The ‘selection, training and tenure of judges’ is 
instrumental in maintaining stable, moderate penality, insofar as it insulates ‘judicial decision-
making from the sway of popular sentiment’974. Stability and moderation in devising criminal 
justice policy are also thought to follow from high levels of co-operation between 
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governmental branches including the judiciary
975
. This is the case in Germany where co-
operation between judicial and political classes mirrors more widespread institutional co-
ordination
976
. 
In contrast to Germany, nations such as Great Britain do not possess much space for 
co-operation between judges and policy makers. In England and Wales, Lacey notes, this 
may be because judges, though independent, are nonetheless not bureaucratic. This means 
they are considered (and consider themselves) to be autonomous of the political sphere: co-
operation with legislative and executive is therefore thought to be improperly political
977
.  On 
the political side, this particular culture of judicial independence also allows politicians to 
write off judges as out of touch
978
 and thus makes co-ordination highly unlikely, particularly 
with the increasing politicisation of ‘law and order’. The clash between judicial and political 
spheres is, in some instances, so severe that it has led ‘the government […] to regard the 
judiciary as […] irksome and irresponsible […] to be thwarted as often as possible by 
legislative and other means’979.   
 
Stylizing the two authors’ arguments, the following general propositions can be formulated. 
First: analyses of punishment need to incorporate penal agents in their accounts, including 
judicial actors. Second: two particular dimensions are important to analyses of judicial 
contributions to penal trends. The first can be described as the susceptibility of judicial 
decision-making to public opinion. The second can be described as the relationship between 
judicial and political classes. Both dimensions reflect judges’ institutional organisation, 
‘likely to have distinctive implications for the environment in which penal policy is 
developed and implemented’980. They also incorporate the broader political and economic 
context in which judges act – liberal or co-ordinated market economies981 – which will have 
important implications for the manner in which different institutional actors interact and for 
how ‘knowledge’ on punishment is produced within the system. In LMEs with majoritarian 
electoral systems, for example, the importance of ‘floating voters’ swayed by ‘law and order’ 
has created the conditions for them to become important electoral issues, with consequent 
effects on politicians’ willingness to negotiate penal policy with judges. 
Consider the two dimensions in turn. Regarding judicial susceptibility to public 
opinion, we can argue that the more direct and institutionalised the link between public and 
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judiciary, the greater the probability that public opinion will influence judicial decisions, 
including sentencing. Examples of ‘direct and institutionalised links’ include the ‘electoral’ 
link between some American judges and their voters or the incorporation of the ‘lay’ 
perspective into the criminal justice process, as with the magistrates in England and Wales
982
. 
A more direct link may then mean more punitiveness at the judicial level when in the 
presence of public opinion that favours harsher punishment. It may also mean volatility of 
punishment: punishment will vary as judicial action varies, and judicial action will vary as 
public opinion varies. By contrast, the greater the institutional buffers between public opinion 
and judicial actors, the greater the institutional mediation of public opinion. Moreover, the 
greater the scope for divergence between public opinion and judicial action, the greater the 
probability of stable penal knowledge/decision-making. From their observations of Germany, 
Savelsberg and Lacey have hypothesised that institutional ‘buffers’ are more likely where the 
judiciary is ‘bureaucratic’. This is because a bureaucratic judiciary will act on professional 
(‘expert’) knowledge on punishment: reflecting a bureaucratic ‘rationality’ that is 
operationalised through bureaucratic procedures
983
.  
The second dimension is the type of relations existing between judicial actors and 
political actors such as government and civil service
984
. At its simplest, the relationship 
between judicial actors and political actors can be expected to affect decision-making in the 
criminal justice field. For example, from her analysis of Germany and the UK, Lacey 
hypothesises that a system in which judicial and political actors are willing to negotiate may, 
under the right circumstances, provide incentives for penal moderation. This is more likely in 
a nation such as Germany whose institutional set-up is premised on ‘co-ordination’, including 
between judicial and executive branches. In Germany, it is the judiciary’s status as members 
of the State bureaucracy that presumes and incentivises this type of negotiation. By contrast in 
nations such as the UK, the role of the judiciary, and the judiciary’s understanding of its role, 
generally preclude ‘negotiated co-determination of criminal policy’985. Overall, this reduces 
the margin available for existing discussions on ‘penal moderation’ to cross the 
judicial/executive boundary. This dimension encompasses the impact of bureaucratisation 
and coordination on judicial action. The hypothesis is that a bureaucratised judiciary, 
ensconced within a co-ordinated system, increases the likelihood of penally-moderate 
attitudes, where these attitudes are already prevalent within the system. 
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The final general assumption that can be drawn from Lacey and Savelsberg, crucial to 
the rest of the chapter, is that we should not expect the two dimensions – ‘public-judicial 
links’ and ‘judicial-political relations’ – to produce the same effects in all national contexts.  
 
iii. The Italian judiciary: structure in context and legitimacy. 
Judicial interaction with politicians and the public is also relevant to Italian penality: judges 
are integral parties to the political dynamics that influence Italian prison trends. How does 
Italy map onto Lacey and Savelsberg’s models? Before answering this question, it is worth 
recalling the shape of Italian penality. As seen in previous chapters, Italian penality can be 
characterised as a volatile equilibrium in which punitiveness and moderation alternate, and 
which exhibits safety valves – amnesties and a capacity to target punitiveness onto outsider 
groups – that prevent the system’s implosion. Penal trends are influenced by conflict between 
different political groups, and are beset by tensions (dualisms) created by institutional 
oppositions. Political ‘outsiderness’ has emerged as an important penal discriminant within 
the Italian scenario. An institutional analysis of this scenario requires that we ask how judicial 
structure relates to differential punitiveness. I build on the comparative models, verifying how 
much the Italian judicial structure isolates judges from potential punitive demands, and how 
far the political- and judicial-sphere are co-ordinated. 
Italy’s judiciary is bureaucratic and highly independent, and formally the judiciary’s 
independence from the executive is absolute. However, this has not prevented contact (formal 
and informal) and collaboration between the judges and the political class
986
. In Luciano 
Violante’s words, in contemporary Italy, judges and public prosecutors have acted as ‘high 
counsellors to government and parliament’ on legal matters987. Additionally, the particularly 
political nature of the Italian judiciary has encouraged further contact between magistrates 
and politicians. Italian magistrates ‘have traditionally been divided along political lines’988 
and their professional association – the National Association of Magistrates – is split into 
political factions
989. The latter have diverse ‘political orientations’, as well as ‘somewhat 
different conceptions of the role’ of the judiciary ‘[within] society’990. This structure is 
capable of accommodating different penal philosophies. Further links between the political 
and judicial classes are to be found within the Judicial Higher Council: one third of the 
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Council consists of lay members, lawyers and law professors elected by Parliament
991, ‘in 
practice […] chosen to reflect the strength of the different political parties in Parliament’992. 
Given this structure, it is not surprising that in past decades there have been ‘exchanges of 
different types’ between Italian judges and politicians993: some of these, at least, will have 
been relevant to the formation of penal policy. Here we have an independent and politicised 
judiciary capable, in its independence, of contact and collaboration with the political class. 
However, judicial and political classes have not always been in harmony, and the 
1990s – with the corruption investigations of Tangentopoli and the beginning of the Second 
Republic – marked a time of heightened conflict between judges and politicians. 
Collaboration between the two classes consequently declined, and I will investigate the penal 
changes that followed from this revised relationship. However if, for the sake of 
systematisation we temporarily halt our analysis pre-Tangentopoli, it seems that the Italian 
judicial system possessed characteristics that elsewhere have provided some insulation from 
penal populism. One such characteristic is bureaucratization, where incorporation into the 
civil service is thought to insulate the judiciary from fluctuations of popular sentiment. 
Another characteristic is political collaboration, where cooperation suggests greater leeway 
for judges and politicians to co-ordinate over criminal justice matters. The question is whether 
the elements of bureaucratization and collaboration have in fact influenced Italian penality by 
stimulating moderation.  
The answer is that these two factors alone cannot explain Italian penality and to them 
I add a third factor, judicial legitimacy. Italy’s differential punitiveness is not the same as 
Germany’s relative penal stability, or Britain’s relative penal escalation. An institutional 
analysis of judicial actors in Italy should therefore be capable of explaining how 
bureaucracy/independence and co-ordination/conflict have recombined to produce differential 
punitiveness. Why, for example, have elements that produced penal stability in Germany not 
had analogous effects in Italy? It is here, I argue, that contextual details are crucial. The 
specific context of the Italian judiciary’s experience has been the profound political crises that 
have affected the Italian state during our period. Judicial legitimacy has varied through, and at 
times because of, the course of these crises, and judicial legitimacy provides us with a third 
axis which has influenced the Italian judiciary’s practice. Only with an understanding of 
judicial legitimacy, which includes judicial self-conception (judges’ understanding of their 
own legitimacy), can we grasp the specific contribution that it has made to Italian penality. 
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In the remaining sections I investigate how legitimate the judiciary was in Italy between 1970 
and 2000, for whom, and with what effects. I also explore the notion of judicial self-
conception as a form of internal legitimacy: its existence, its evolution and its potential 
implications. This set up allows an investigation not just of the judiciary’s structure, but also 
of the powers with which the judiciary was progressively endowed, and the ideas under which 
these powers were deployed. Moreover it will allow me to ask if and how legitimacy has 
shaped judicial action in the penal sphere. 
Legitimacy may have two meanings: ‘conformity to the law or to rules’ and also 
‘ability to be […] justified’994. My discussion of judicial legitimacy encompasses both these 
uses. It touches on the first meaning insofar as I discuss the conformity of judicial action to 
judges’ constitutional role. It also addresses judges’ role vis-à-vis the political and executive 
branch, and the relationship between judiciary and political class. My discussion touches on 
the second meaning of legitimacy because it addresses the extent to which judicial action was 
seen as justified and justifiable by the public, by the political class and by the judiciary 
themselves. The notion ‘legitimacy’ encompasses the two questions ‘were Italian magistrates 
acting within their remit?’ and ‘how was their action received?’995. I should point out that I 
am interested in charting the answers given to these questions by judges, political class and 
public, as opposed to providing a normative evaluation of judicial action in Italy during these 
years. I aim to thereby set my chapter apart from the pro-judge/anti-judge stances that have 
influenced contemporary debate.  
  
Using Lacey’s and Savelsberg’s language, legitimacy – how judicial role was interpreted and 
enacted – has affected the type of interaction between judiciary and politicians over criminal 
justice matters. It has also affected the terms of this interaction: as discussed below, at times 
and for certain judges the relationship with the political class has been one of ‘role 
substitution’; at times and for certain judges it has been one of ‘collusion’996. Each type of 
interaction can be understood as embodying a particular conception of il/legitimate judicial 
action. The conflict between Italian judiciary and political class expresses a particular 
criticism of judicial activism as illegitimate; it expresses a particular judicial self-conception 
of this activism as not only legitimate but also necessary. It then affects the extent to which 
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judges and executive have been willing to negotiate over criminal justice matters, and with 
what effects. 
 Internal legitimacy (self-conception) also help explain the extent to which judicial 
actors have been willing to respond to public opinion on matters of crime and punishment. In 
other words, structure is not the only determinant of judicial contributions to penality. Judges’ 
interpretation of their own role, within their structural context, also affects these 
contributions. Judicial self-conception has affected the manner in which judges have 
legitimated their actions internally, even (perhaps especially) when these were in open 
conflict with the political class. External legitimacy also encompasses the extent to which the 
public saw judicial action as legitimate, the way the public’s evaluation changed over time 
and the effect this had on public reliance on the law, raising issues of the law’s purchase and 
role (Chapters 3 and 4).  
 
To sum up: the overall progression of my argument, from Savelsberg and Lacey, to Italy’s 
differential punitiveness, runs as follows. The structure of the judiciary and its role within the 
larger institutional setup, will affect judicial contribution to penality. In particular, the 
relationship between judiciary and public opinion (dimension 1), and the relationship between 
judiciary and political class (dimension 2), may affect national punitiveness/moderation. The 
directness of the judiciary-public connection and the relationship between judges and political 
class are good predictors of how judicial action will affect penal trends. However, the Italian 
judiciary presents features that set it outside these two axes. In order to systematise judicial 
contribution to Italian penality we therefore need to consider one further dimension, 
legitimacy, as the latter has affected the extent and terms of judicial interaction with the 
political class (dimension 2); and the extent and effects of judicial links to public opinion 
(dimension 1). Varying judicial legitimacy has also meant varying judicial powers
997
. The 
application of these powers has varied on the basis of judicial self-conception; this variance 
has not been linear and, I suggest, it has contributed the leniency-repression dualism of Italian 
penality.  
 
The next section specifically investigates the various phases of judicial legitimacy between 
1970 and 2000. 
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III. Judicial legitimacy: waxing and waning. 
The Italian judiciary experienced fluctuating external legitimacy between 1970 and 2000. 
Legitimacy varied across time, socio-political groups, and according to the different issues 
judges were called upon to resolve. The 1990s stand out as a decade in which Italian judges 
experienced a peak in their public legitimacy, given their role in uncovering the political 
corruption of Tangentopoli, and in precipitating the demise of the First Republic
998
. This 
decade also saw judges’ fall from favour once the early support for judicial activism 
dissipated. At this time political attacks against judicial action increased as renewed judicial 
activism began to threaten Italy’s ‘widespread illegality’ (Chapter 4)999. The preceding 
decades (1970 to 1990) are more difficult to characterise in terms of judicial legitimacy 
because of the many positions found in the judiciary, over and above an esprit de corps, 
which flourished only after 1990 and conflict with the political class
1000
. Variation of opinion 
– which can be traced to judicial recruitment1001 – was reflected in the different factions or 
‘currents’ within the judiciary’s professional association1002. 
 
The waxing and waning of judicial legitimacy has a direct link with the type and extent of 
powers granted by the political class to Italian judges, such as those devolved to the judiciary 
(through executive decrees and legislation) in order to face Italy’s ‘emergencies’ such as 
terrorism and organised crime (Chapter 2)
1003
. These powers have, in more recent analyses, 
been singled out as one potential cause of the penal expansion experienced by Italy across the 
1990s
1004. Recall my discussion of the ‘halo effect’ wherein preventive custody, broadened to 
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deal with the various ‘emergencies’, had outlived them and had eventually been applied to 
‘ordinary crimes’1005. 
The general attitude with which the emergency provisions were accompanied is also 
interesting: what did this ‘devolution’ signify over and above the specific provisions, and how 
did it reconfigure relations between judiciary, executive and legislative? I argue that it 
reconfigured the judiciary as political actors, a role that for penal judges was not limited to 
their role as criminal justice officials. Judges were ‘political’ not in the sense of party-political 
actors (though some have successively stood in this guise), but in the sense of being actors 
operating within the Italian polity on a par with executive and legislative. This 
‘reconfiguring’, in conjunction with the judiciary’s variable composition and penal/political 
positions, allowed judicial actors to purvey pressures both for penal expansion and penal 
moderation. These pressures derived from the interaction of judicial structure, judicial 
institutional situation and judicial role/legitimacy. The rest of the section tries to ‘periodise’ 
changing judicial legitimacy. 
i. The 1970s and 1980s: surrogacy, collusion and the eve of conflict 
To understand varying judicial legitimacy in Italy, I start by investigating the phenomenon 
referred to throughout the literature as ‘supplenza giudiziaria’1006 or ‘judicial surrogacy’. This 
label indicates that judges in Italy have acted as ‘surrogates’, even as ‘substitutes’, for the 
political class
1007
. This does not necessarily point to improper judicial expansion into the 
executive/legislature’s remit. As Nelken states: ‘penal rules and judicial interventions are 
often relied on as a substitute for political and policy-led decision making’, and this is done 
within constitutional rules
1008. In fact surrogacy was a ‘necessity’ in the First Republic’s 
otherwise ‘blocked’ political system where incessant political conflict stood in the way of 
timely reform (Chapters 3 and 4). Issues, for example those pertaining to labour relations, 
which might have been resolved by legislative means or policy change, fell to be resolved by 
judicial means
1009
.  
If this expansion of judicial activity is not exclusive to Italy
1010
, the increasing role 
played by judges in countering terrorism and organised crime is more particular to the Italian 
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context. Della Porta claims: ‘in the fight against terrorism and the Mafia, the magistracy 
exercised a proactive power, and acted as a surrogate for a weak political will’1011. 
‘Surrogacy’ in this particular ambit endowed the judiciary with a certain level of legitimacy 
among the public and political class. We witness this legitimacy increasing across the 1970s: 
‘during the years of terrorism […] public opinion supported investigating magistrates as the 
defenders of citizens in the face of a weak and internally divided political class’1012. Pizzorno 
claims that ‘during its actions against terrorism […] the organs of law enforcement acquired 
[…] a positive image vis-à-vis the population; [one] they had heretofore lacked’1013. A similar 
effect followed during the 1980s and early 1990s, in the wake of judicial engagement against 
organised crime. The legitimacy following from this proactive engagement was also reflected 
in the political sphere until it waned from the late1980s.  
In this sense, the expansion of judicial power at the hands of the political class can be 
taken as a testimony of politicians’ trust and belief that judges were well placed to defend the 
Italian state from challenges to its authority. To be sure, political willingness to co-ordinate 
with the judiciary over terrorism and organised crime was also instrumental: it was easier to 
deploy judicial action than to devise political solutions to Italy’s ‘emergencies’, and it 
contemporaneously allowed the government to placate the public anxiety the emergencies 
provoked. By passing penal legislation against terrorism – of the kind discussed in Chapter 2 
– the government seemed to be taking action against terrorism, though the legislation 
effectively delegated resolution of Italy’s ‘emergency’ to judges and the penal system. 
However, despite this instrumental side to political support for judicial ‘surrogacy’, judicial 
legitimacy did increase between 1970 and 1990 by reason of this delegation of responsibility 
to judges. This type of ‘surrogacy’ enhanced judicial standing amongst sectors of both the 
political class and of public opinion by giving judges power of effective action in an 
immobile political system. 
However, judicial surrogacy brought an increase and also a decrease in judicial 
legitimacy. In judicial surrogacy judges and political actors do not just negotiate over criminal 
justice policy, rather the political class delegates decision-making to the judiciary. Delegation 
was specifically over the repression of emergencies but it seems plausible that it produced a 
more general punitive potential, by endowing judges with additional powers of repression and 
the role to deploy them as they saw fit. However the same setup – judicial powers and 
surrogacy – also had the potential for reducing judicial legitimacy. This is precisely what 
occurred when judicial attentions shifted to political corruption
1014
. Significantly, the terms of 
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the subsequent political-judicial conflict have turned on an idea of judicial surrogacy 
negatively conjugated – as an example of judges overstepping their role, operating in a 
partisan manner, and trying to undercut elected politicians
1015
.   
During the late-1980s and the 1990s, in response to investigations against political 
misfeasance, portions of the political class embraced these arguments, contending that the 
Italian judges were excessively independent and their decision-making driven by ideological 
motives
1016
. The implication of this was that judges should be more accountable to the 
executive. This line of argument was, in a sense, bolstered by a period of explicit political 
engagement of certain judges during the 1970s. Members of the left-wing faction 
Magistratura Democratica (MD), for example, had rejected the idea of judges as mere 
executors of the law, and had chosen to participate in the political struggle of the times
1017
. 
They endorsed the notion of an activist judiciary, with the judge as ‘a general political 
subject’ (over and above the judicial role), applying the Constitution where the legislative and 
executive had failed to do so
1018
. This explicit judicial activism sowed the seeds for future 
attacks on the judiciary
1019
.  
The influence of Magistratura Democratica within the judiciary should not be over-
estimated. Italian judges have never been homogeneous, and MD has generally occupied 
minority positions
1020. Nonetheless the existence of ‘surrogacy’ – judicial action as a remedy 
to political inaction – contributed to the potential volatility of judicial legitimacy. Two 
alternative results have then accrued from the same structural and contextual features. 
Surrogacy followed from judges’ institutional position: independence, open politicisation and 
cooperation with the political class, to the point of judges standing in for the political class. 
This judicial surrogacy expressed and bolstered judicial legitimacy. Crucially, where 
surrogacy was not over criminal justice matters
1021
, it legitimised judges as broad political 
subjects. This set-up simultaneously paved the way for attacks against judicial legitimacy, 
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whereby judges were perceived as politicised, biased, and encroaching upon 
executive/legislative functions. The interaction of structure and context constituted the penal 
judiciary as a political subject provided with powers of repression, and cast doubts on the 
motives behind their use.  
 
In light of this account, I modify Lacey and Savelsberg’s analyses to yield hypotheses on 
judicial actors’ contribution to Italian penality. Looking at the interaction of the judicial and 
political classes in Italy, we note: 
 
1. Judges have been in contact with the political class over penal matters. Contact has 
included co-operation, but also judicial surrogacy. Surrogacy expressed and bolstered 
judicial legitimacy amongst political class and public. 
2. Italy’s institutional setup facilitated this type of variable interaction between judges 
and political class. Judges are part of the state bureaucracy and are thus seen as 
potential partners in criminal justice policy formation. Simultaneously, judges are 
highly independent of other government branches, and this allows for divergence 
between judiciary and political classes, including over criminal justice matters. 
3. Co-operation and surrogacy, as with the legal decrees of the late-1970s that expanded 
judicial powers regarding terrorism, has engendered a punitive potential. Elsewhere I 
have argued that, when realised, this potential contributed to the periods of harshness 
in Italy’s differential punitiveness. 
4. Judicial surrogacy had broader political articulations that went beyond engagement 
against terrorism and organised crime – as in the case of Magistratura Democratica. 
Again, this broader articulation is a result of the Italian institutional setup, where 
politicisation is part and parcel of the judiciary’s organisation. The judiciary’s 
independence, and their role as counterweight to the executive and legislative 
branches, has allowed for an interpretation of the judicial role in which judges are 
‘broad political subjects’ capable of acting autonomously to enact Constitutional 
aims, where the political class lags behind
1022
. 
5. In its broader articulations, and where judicial powers are directed against the 
‘wrong’ target, surrogacy has become a source of political attacks against Italian 
judges. The legitimacy of judicial action is called into question. The penal effects of 
these attacks have varied depending on their terms.  
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The dynamics illustrated in points 1 to 5 can further be understood by looking at the 1980s, a 
decade that provides other apt illustrations of variable judicial legitimacy in Italy. On the one 
hand, during the 1980s the judicial class gained power and status by dint of its engagement 
against organised crime (Chapter 2 and Appendix). This engagement increased the judiciary’s 
‘reserve of legitimacy’, testifying ‘to a commitment to the State that politicians were unable 
to show’1023. The ‘reserve’ increased still more when, in the early 1990s, anti-Mafia judges 
Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino were assassinated by organised crime
1024
. On the 
other hand, the late 1980s witnessed a series of legislative changes meant to impact on both 
judicial structure and role. In one interpretation, such changes testified to increasing political 
hostility to judicial investigations into corruption, directed against the independence of 
judicial action and the use of expanded judicial powers. Though judicial powers had been 
strengthened by the political class (Chapter 2), they became problematic when directed 
against politicians
1025
. Proof of political hostility to, and public interest, in judicial structure 
and function, can be sought in the 1987 referendum on judges’ civil liability. In the 
referendum ‘members of the judiciary were called on to accept responsibility for civil liability 
in the cases in which they took part’1026. Supporters of the referendum emphasised that the 
existing institutional setup, including judicial independence, gave rise to judges’ 
‘irresponsibility’ and ‘politicisation’1027. It left them with excess powers and excess discretion 
but limited accountability. The imposition of civil liability would curb this situation, 
presumably by deterring improper judicial action.  
The referendum does not lend itself to straightforward interpretation, though 
Chimenti is explicit in stating that it marked the onset of conflict between judicial and 
political classes
1028. For my purposes we can also refer to Della Porta’s analysis of the 
campaign that accompanied the referendum. She contends that the campaign, led by the 
Socialist Party (then part of the ruling coalition), expressed ‘the hostility of both individual 
politicians and political parties’ to judges’ ‘growing activism in bringing politicians to 
trial’1029. It was an example of political ‘attempts to reduce the power of the judges’1030 and, 
as such, prefigured political attacks of later decades in which the activism, and not the laxity, 
of the judiciary was criticised. The referendum also testifies to increasing public interest in 
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matters of judicial legitimacy and accountability, and growing public receptivity to political 
attacks against the judges
1031
. 
 Similar sentiments can be traced in the 1989 reform of Italian criminal procedure, 
which attempted to graft adversarial elements onto Italy’s existing inquisitorial system1032. 
The reform has been interpreted as the expression of ‘worries about [judicial] neutrality’1033, 
and concerns about a ‘machinery of justice […] unable to fully protect the defendant’s right to 
a fair trial’1034, to be assuaged by the increased separation between investigative and 
adjudicative bodies within the trial. The new procedure also aimed to streamline the criminal 
trial, and thus overcome Italy’s problem with legal delays1035. As with the 1987 referendum, 
the 1989 reform is not easy to interpret, not least because it embodied a variety of concerns 
and interests
1036. For example, as Nelken and Montana note, ‘the continued accuracy and 
validity of [Italy’s] traditional inquisitorial models’, which the reform aimed to change, was 
'widely criticized both by academic commentators and – for their own reasons – by 
politicians’1037. Politician’s reasons included concerns with judicial activism: at the political 
level, it seems that judicial actors were no longer considered sufficiently ‘trustworthy’ to be in 
charge of an inquisitorial system
1038
.  
Ultimately, the 1989 reform did not achieve a successful policy graft. Rather, it 
created ‘another type of non-adversarial model’ within the Italian system1039. Judicial actors 
resisted their new role, insofar as it presumed a more passive judiciary, and ‘judicial activism 
[remained] highly prevalent in Italy’s system’1040. Whatever its effects, the reform emphasises 
the increasing conflict between judicial and political class. It can in part be seen as a political 
attempt to influence judicial action via legislation. I will discuss the implications of such 
relations below. Here it is worth pointing to the difference between Italy and England and 
Wales. In both case we have structural similarity: an independent judiciary that, because of its 
independence, can and has entered into conflict with the political class. The effect of this 
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conflict has, however, had different results in Italy compared to the UK: in particular, in Italy, 
the conflict has been over judicial activism rather than judicial leniency
1041
. The executive has 
been concerned with limiting this activism and – with political misfeasance in mind – has 
approved provisions that have had wider penal implications (the 1987 referendum affected all 
judges; the 1989 reform to criminal procedure as a whole). These provisions have acted to 
restrain penal expansion. This difference between England and Wales and Italy is, as Nelken 
has observed, due to different contextual variables intervening to disturb our institutional 
models
1042. Yet we need not abandon these models: ‘legitimacy’ – as I define and use it – 
helps us explain penal divergence even in the face of apparent institutional similarity. In 
contrast to the UK, where the judiciary interpret their legitimate role as independent and aloof 
vis-à-vis the political class
1043
, in Italy, judges see their legitimate role as independent but also 
activist. This difference in judicial and political interpretations of judges’ roles determines the 
terms on which the political class critique/clash with the judiciary. 
ii. Judicial collusion: purchase and role of judicial action 
When discussing judicial actors and penal trends we cannot forget that the Italian judiciary is 
not homogeneous. The position that ascribed too many politically deployed powers to the 
judiciary is a limited interpretation of judicial actors, particularly where the argument takes its 
cue from judicial investigations into political misfeasance. In Ginsborg’s words, the attempted 
prosecution of political corruption during the 1980s, was happening at the hands of ‘an 
obstinate minority that would not toe the line’, rather than by a large contingent of judges. 
‘[M]ost magistrates were more than willing not to inquire too vigorously into the system’1044 
and it was only with Tangentopoli that investigations reaped success and support (both 
popular and within judicial ranks).  
Della Porta has observed that high levels of political corruption in Italy can in fact be 
associated with ‘high levels of collusion between judges and politicians’1045. Structure and 
self-conception are again important here. Structurally, it is important that over the decades 
‘the judiciary and political worlds […] judges and political parties’ and their factions, have 
‘developed contacts’1046. The judiciary’s formal, total independence has been accompanied by 
informal connections between judges and politicians
1047
. We can presume that some of these 
connections are simply informal channels of influence: informal, but not necessarily 
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dissimilar, to the negotiations within the German bureaucracy, including the judiciary. In 
Italy, however, some informal connections have fostered judicial ‘connivance […] with 
corrupt politicians’ and even with organized criminals1048. Connivance/collusion was obtained 
by ‘fees and favours’, or by outright ‘pay-offs’ to the judiciary, and has translated into 
delayed or even blocked criminal investigations
1049
.  
Della Porta explains this collusion between judges and politicians by reference to the 
strength of their informal ties and personal networks
1050
. Over time these ties have led some 
judges and politicians to share the ‘normative values’ found in corrupt networks (Chapter 
3)
1051. This was possible because, up to the 1990s, Italian judges ‘lacked a strong professional 
culture’ and were open to external reference groups and value systems1052. The absence of a 
professional culture reduced the ‘moral costs’ of corruption, lowered even further when 
judges’ external reference group comprised corrupt politicians1053.  
 This form of judicial-political collusion produced ‘uncertainty over the outcome of 
judicial action against entrenched powers’, an interesting counterweight to judicial 
involvement against Italy’s emergencies1054. Collusion has also had broader effects, as 
suspicion of the magistracy radiated outwards, from the impunity of corrupt politicians, to 
produce a more ‘atavistic distrust’ of judicial actors1055. I had discussed such sentiments for 
law and legal actors in my analysis of state and citizen in Italy. In Chapter 4, I noted how Italy 
displays a dualism between a formalistic insistence on the law and a tendency towards the 
informal resolution of conflict (Chapters 3 and 4). The latter, I argued, is enhanced by the 
existence of corrupt and clientelistic exchanges. Judicial actors can themselves be seen to 
have contributed to this dualism: here by fostering distrust with the law, stimulating reliance 
on alternative, informal means of conflict resolution.  
 
This statement must be qualified to account for judicial variability: judges’ multiple 
approaches to their role and the different reactions to judicial action. The interaction of 
internal variability, judges’ multiple relations with the political class, and judicial self-
conception can be synthesised into a notion of legitimacy. If, on the one hand, we have 
magistrates whose legitimacy is called into question because of (perceived) excess activism, 
on the other we also find judges whose legitimacy is eroded by the (perceived) impunity of 
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the powerful. These contradictory attitudes testify to the diversity of the Italian judiciary: 
some colluded, some investigated. They also testify to the divergence in political reactions to 
judicial action – desire for activism over ‘emergencies’ but not over political corruption – and 
to the diverse results of Italian institutional organisation, as judicial surrogacy but also 
judicial inactivity have occurred in a institutional context that allowed judges to adopt both 
approaches. This context, in which the law had variable role and variable purchase, permitted 
attacks against the judiciary whether as too active or not active enough. 
Here we see how the law’s role and purchase varied on the basis of judges’ deployment of 
the law. Where there was judicial collusion, for example, collusion suggested that there was 
no role for the law. There were thus increasing instances in which there was no purchase for a 
law that was imperfectly applied. I have argued that this lack of ‘purchase’ acted to restrain 
formal penal expansion. It would then seem to follow, from this analysis of Italian judges in 
context, that they have contributed to the nation’s penal volatility. Different impulses have 
been propelled from the judiciary into the penal realm, surrogacy feeding into a punitive 
potential (harshness), and collusion stimulating distrust and informal conflict resolution (de 
facto leniency). It also stands to reason that given the politicisation of the judiciary, expressed 
internally in its factions and externally in its conflict with the political class, judges should be 
seen as additional players in the ‘volatile political equilibrium’ to which I have anchored 
Italy’s differential punitiveness.  
iii. The 1990s: times of conflict  
So far I have described a judicial class that has collaborated, stood in for, colluded and 
clashed with the political class. Each different interaction has affected judicial legitimacy, 
which has consequently waxed and waned over time and affected the powers with which 
judges have been endowed, and the terms under which these powers have been deployed. 
These ‘terms’ have not always been interpreted in the same way by judges and politicians 
with penal impulses further influenced by the changing interaction between judicial and 
political classes. I now come to the 1990s: earlier chapters have emphasised that conflict 
between political and judicial classes peaked during the decade and its corruption scandal. 
This section addresses the flaring of this conflict, laying out some interpretive conclusion on 
its penal repercussions. For the purpose of this chapter the crucial events of the 1990s were 
the ‘clean hands’ (mani pulite) investigations through which Tangentopoli was uncovered and 
its political participants prosecuted
1056
. A significant contribution to mani pulite’s success 
came from the Italian judiciary’s institutional structure as well as the activist articulation of 
the judicial role. Both factors added to those circumstances that allowed the judges to succeed 
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where previously they had failed. The Italian judiciary’s particular independence, for 
example, permitted investigations to continue even against ruling politicians, as neither the 
legislative nor the executive had any means to curtail them
1057
. The consequent political 
‘revolution’ that the judges provoked was carried out by legal means and within the bounds of 
Constitutional propriety. Unsurprisingly, after Tangentopoli, judges’ role as ‘high 
counsellors’ on matter of justice began to wane1058. Judges became the primary target of 
increasingly direct political attacks against the breadth and misuse of judicial powers
1059
. As 
in the 1980s, these attacks took legal (and not just rhetorical) form, crystallised in political 
reforms with the potential of diluting judicial activism
1060
.   
Here, again, we have a concentrated version of the dynamics described above, where 
by contrast to the effect it has had in Britain, judicial-political conflict in Italy has contributed 
to contain rather than increase Italian penal rates
1061. ‘Containment’ has been achieved, for 
example, by means of political initiatives to curb judicial powers. These were to become 
particularly apparent in the early years of the successive decade with the introduction of 
procedural changes that lengthen the duration of the penal process. Nelken recounts: 
 
‘The centre-left coalition [in power during the second half of the 1990s] had […] 
been the author of a variety of stricter provisions to do with the validity of types of 
testimony, as part of the creation of “just trials” […]; these provisions were adding 
considerably to the difficulties of gaining convictions.'
1062
 
 
The right-wing government of 2002 passed the so-called Cirami law, modifying article 45 of 
the criminal procedural code
1063. The article allows ‘defendants the right to take their case to 
the Supreme Court and ask for a delay of sentence while a decision [is] made as to whether 
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the case should be removed from a whole tribunal area’1064. Referral can be requested on a 
number of grounds including – a motive introduced by the Cirami law – ‘legitimate 
suspicion’, ‘a grave, objective local situation, representing a real threat of judicial bias, or a 
threat to the trial unfolding serenely’1065. Referral may lead to the trial being transferred to 
another judge. Though chronologically it falls outside the scope of my thesis, the Cirami law 
is nonetheless a concentrate of the sentiments that bloomed in the 1990s after Tangentopoli. It 
speaks of conflict between judicial and political classes, phrased in terms of potential judicial 
bias, embodied in political provisions capable of limiting judicial activity by enhancing 
procedural delays
1066. Nelken’s research further testifies to generalised political unease at 
judicial action at the time of the Cirami law: I claim this unease also existed in preceding 
years
1067
.   
The procedural changes of the late-1990s and early-2000s are indicative of the 
broader penal effects of political reactions to the judicial-political conflict. They increased the 
obstacles that must be surpassed before the statute of limitation applies and criminal 
proceedings are discontinued
1068
. Nelken is not alone in observing that procedural changes 
have substantially slowed the pace of the Italian penal trial: legal delays have more than once 
been the subject of research and reform proposals
1069
. In one such instance, the Italian penal 
trial has been characterised as a series of ‘overlapping norms that have created a cumbersome 
system [...] full of traps’1070. Where these legal delays have combined with limitation periods, 
they have also given rise to the practice among lawyers, whereby ‘the ultimate aim of the 
defence is almost always, and explicitly, that of obtaining temporal dilations in view of the 
approaching prescrizione’1071. Again it is logical to suppose that, by adding to Italy’s already 
lengthy procedural delays, the set of procedural hoops introduced by political reform may 
have been used to reduce the total number of cases ending in a conviction, reducing penal 
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escalation as a whole
1072
. Here, the conflict between judicial and political classes – expressed 
in terms of illegitimate judicial activism (illegitimate because politicised and excessive) – has 
produced legislative changes that impacted upon national penality.  
Interestingly, the 1990s also saw a number of executive decrees meant to bolster 
judicial powers against organised crime
1073
. This emergency legislation has been described in 
terms of  ‘reform and counter-reform’ (Chapter 2)1074. It would be logical to extend this 
description to the varying relations between Italian judiciary and political classes. Politicians 
were, at one, interested in enlisting the judiciary in the fight against organised crime
1075
, yet 
were simultaneously concerned with hampering judicial investigations into political 
misfeasance. They bolstered judicial powers on the one hand, and tried to limit them on the 
other. Assuming that the ‘halo effect’ described in Chapter 2 also applies in this context, it 
would be logical to expect a wider impact for these contradictory relations, producing both a 
punitive potential and a potential for punitiveness to be defused/tempered.  
iv. A summary and some hypotheses. 
These historical developments (1970-200) can be stylized and linked back to Savelsberg’s 
and Lacey’s hypotheses on judicial contributions to national penality: 
 
1. Consideration of how ‘knowledge and domination’ impact on criminal punishment in 
Italy should allow for an institutional setup that incorporates and transmits variance. 
Italy’s institutional structure allows for different judicial attitudes and approaches to 
the judicial role, and for various types of interrelations between judiciary and 
executive.  
2. The notion of ‘judicial legitimacy’ can help explain national penal divergence, where 
similar institutional features have played out differently across contexts. The way 
institutional conflict has played out in Italy is not for judges to be bypassed in order 
to punish more; it is for judges to be bypassed in order to punish less. 
3. Variable relations between Italian judicial and political classes can be explained by 
reference to judicial self-conception (internal legitimacy). The Italian judiciary’s 
weak professional culture – heterogeneous self-conception – stimulated informal 
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contacts with the political class. It is logical to suppose that these informal contacts 
stimulated the co-negotiation of criminal justice policy elsewhere associated with 
penal moderation. Weak professional culture and informal contacts have also allowed 
judicial collusion with political corruption, contributing to Italy’s leniency by limiting 
criminal investigations, or by enhancing Italian citizen’s distrust of Italian law. 
4. During the 1990s, the Italian judiciary acquired greater esprit de corps. This gave rise 
to attempts to curb judicial activism even through legislative means. Within the 
judiciary, it has led to judges setting aside their internal divisions in defence of the 
existing judicial structure
1076
.  
 
These insights can be summarised into an overall theoretical conclusion that links back to 
Lacey’s and Savelsberg’s two dimensions. First, a bureaucratic judiciary that co-operates with 
the civil service of which it is a part will generally enhance the likelihood of penal 
moderation. However, much will depend on how judiciary and political classes interpret their 
respective roles, and how these roles are operationalised. For example, in a co-ordinated 
system co-ordination will only follow if judicial action is considered fundamentally 
(institutionally) legitimate by its political counterparts, and vice-versa. The Italian system, 
where co-operation and conflict alternate, yields variable results – co-operation when 
legitimacy is high, and conflict when legitimacy is low.  
The terms of the judicial-political interaction between judiciary and political classes 
will vary at any given moment in time, and so will its penal effects. A system in which co-
operation is over penal repression may yield greater harshness; the same system may also 
allow for a withdrawal of co-operation and, depending on its terms, harshness may then be 
reduced. In Italy, co-operation over ‘emergencies’ created a punitive potential partly by 
expanding judicial powers. The subsequent conflict with the political class gave rise to 
reforms intended to reduce judicial powers, with a potentially limiting effect on overall penal 
expansion.  
Judges have inhabited Italy’s volatile scenario in various politicised guises and, in 
their various guises, have contributed to Italian penality’s leniency-repression dualism.    
IV. Judges and public: demands, reception and resistance 
So far I have been discussing judicial structure and institutional organisation, and especially 
judicial interaction with the political class. To fully understand judicial actors’ contribution to 
Italian penality, it is also necessary to consider the demands actually made of the judiciary, 
and their responses to such demands. I have looked at political ‘demands’ in the previous 
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section. In this section I will interrogate public demands and their influence on judicial action. 
Lacey and Savelsberg hypothesise that the relationship between judiciary and public will 
impact upon the extent to which public opinion influences judicial action: the greater the 
institutional ‘distance’ between public and judges, the greater the likelihood that judges will 
be able to resist/mediate public demands on to punishment. Bureaucratisation is again a good 
predictor of this ‘distance’.  
I now apply this framework to Italy: what is the relationship between the Italian 
public and Italian judges? What is its impact on punishment?
1077
 ‘Judicial legitimacy’ is still 
relevant to this discussion and here it encompasses the role the public has envisaged for 
judicial actors, and the role judicial actors have crafted for themselves vis-à-vis the public. 
This analysis requires some discussion of the actual ‘content’ of public demands and it is here 
that we find scope for Italian divergence even in the presence of structural similarity with its 
European comparators. Assumptions on the content of public demands are present throughout 
our theories on contemporary punishment. Garland, for example, assumes that the public has 
become ‘punitive’, and evidence from the US and the UK (also see Savelsberg on the US) 
corroborates this interpretation
1078
. Discussions of judicial-public interactions have thus been 
concerned with judges’ resistance/permeability to punitive demands. The Italian public, 
however, has not overwhelmingly generated demands for punitiveness, or ‘law and order’1079. 
Law and order have become a salient public/electoral issue only in the 1990s, and even then 
demands for ‘law and order’ have been selective1080. How, if at all, does this change our 
appraisal of judicial-political relations and their penal effects? 
  
Judicial engagement against terrorism and organised crime had increased judicial legitimacy 
in the public eye across the 1970s and 1980s
1081
. Compared with an immobile political class, 
judges appeared as those most proactive in the defence of Italian democracy. Judicial actors 
were seen as an alternative – though not direct – source of political representation1082. This 
set-up had multiple effects: judges’ open politicisation provided the opportunity for public 
suspicion of excessive deployment of judicial powers or, by contrast, of insufficient 
deployment of judicial powers. It is logical to suppose that suspicion of excessive deployment 
will have accompanied what Pavarini has described as Italian society’s political interpretation 
of crime and punishment. If, in this interpretation, ‘control [is] tantamount to coercion’ and 
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 190 
‘the criminal justice system [is a] paradigm of social order’, the political variability of the 
judiciary and the expansion of judicial powers may have fostered suspicions of the latter’s 
inappropriate deployment
1083
. Admittedly, this attitude will have been more characteristic of 
the Italian left-wing, and we need to be aware of variation both amongst the Italian public and 
Italian judges
1084
.  
Unsurprisingly, a polarisation of the relationship between judges and the Italian 
public emerged in the 1990s. In the early-1990s, public support for the judges increased: if 
previous decades had seen judicial surrogacy in the face of an absentee political class, these 
years saw the judiciary substitute for the ‘tainted’ political class, in the public imagination1085. 
For a time, judges came to be the primary representatives of the Italian state, representing 
rectitude in an era of corruption. Their investigations into Tangentopoli were seen, in 
Nelken’s words, as the ‘judges' campaign to remoralize Italian public life’1086. As Della Porta 
also notes, at the time the public image of the judiciary, adopted and amplified by the 
media
1087, was centred on the figure of the ‘judge-hero’ pitched ‘against the politician 
villain’1088. ‘Public opinion’ went as far as ‘[expressing] its support for judges with protest 
demonstrations’, when it seemed that the political class was trying to hamper judicial 
investigations
1089
.  
This is symptom and cause of what Pavarini has described as a shift in the ‘collective 
perception’ of crime and punishment, which has shifted from ‘the paradigm of “political 
danger” […] to [that of] “social danger”’1090. When this new paradigm is applied to political 
corruption it ‘gives way to moralism. The magistrates conducting investigations into political 
corruption […] become the latest public idols, great “moralisers” because […] great 
“judges”’1091. The implication is that the ‘judge-hero’ was given the public’s complete 
confidence in her pursuit of law and order
1092
.  
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However, widespread public support for the judges began to wane towards the late-
1990s
1093
 as hostility grew between (some) citizens and part of the judiciary. Della Porta 
explains the judges’ fall from grace as part of the natural progression of Italy’s political 
transition
1094
. Tangentopoli had marked the First Republic’s demise and the Second 
Republic’s birth, in which judicial actors had played a crucial role. Now they could no longer 
hope to occupy the same pivotal, political role they had come to occupy during the crisis. 
They had to ‘leave the stage’ to the seemingly renewed political class: any judicial resistance 
to this passage of power could be taken as an illegitimate surfeit of judicial activism
1095
. 
Political attacks against the magistracy certainly argued as much, and may have influenced 
public attitudes to the judiciary. In Melossi’s analysis, Italy’s ‘widespread illegality’ also 
contributed to judges’ waning legitimacy: in a nation characterised by such ‘widespread 
illegality’ and informality, it was easier to accept attacks on judges’ improper political 
motives than to modify one’s own behaviour1096. What is more, during this era, there was a 
burgeoning concern with urban and immigrant crime (Chapters 3, 4 and 6)
1097
. This 
accompanied a shift away from concerns with threats to the State, including the ‘threat’ of 
corrupt politicians. It may be that judges’ continuing focus on political misfeasance, in the 
face of growing attention to street and immigrant crime, was seen as misplaced by certain 
sectors of the public: judges’ persisting interest in ‘macro’ crimes marked a delegitimizing 
neglect of citizens’ preoccupations with worsening ‘micro’ crimes1098. Specifically in this last 
dynamic we find the makings of a growing demand for law and order, but targeted 
selectively.   
 
What are the implications of this judicial-public interaction for Italian penality and for our 
institutional models? I argue the following: 
1. Our analysis of the link between the public and judges should encompass a discussion 
of the content of public opinion on punishment. We cannot presume ‘populist 
punitiveness’ across contexts: in Italy, for example, demands for law and order have 
been relatively limited. Certain sectors of the public have interpreted crime and 
punishment as political issues and have therefore sought solutions in political and 
social, rather than judicial, spheres. This has limited overall public pressure in favour 
of penal expansion. Chapters 3 and 4 had also shown how the Italian context 
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produced incentives towards the informal resolution of conflict. Where these 
incentives exist we would expect them to have reduced the public demands directed 
to the criminal justice system and to judicial actors.   
2. The issue of the public’s influence on judicial decision-making also touches upon 
issues of judicial legitimacy. Considering external ‘legitimacy’ here means asking: 
will the judiciary be considered the public’s interlocutors? If so, on what terms? In 
Italy the public has not always seen judicial actors as suitable/preferred interlocutors. 
Low legitimacy has defused demands for formal penal solutions to social conflicts. In 
the 1990s, however, public support for judicial action peaked – a time of high 
legitimacy. Much has depended on the terms of this support: during the early 1990s, 
support was bolstered over issues of political corruption, but the terms of the judicial-
public relationship have varied after Tangentopoli. As the decade progressed, 
diffidence about judicial activism grew. Once Italy had transitioned into the Second 
Republic, judicial activism was perceived as illegitimate since it threatened 
‘widespread illegality’; it was perceived as misplaced for those more concerned with 
street crime and immigration. My argument has been that this increased targeted 
demands for ‘legal solutions’ to ‘social problems’1099. 
3. An overview of the Italian public’s attitudes to the judicial class also reveals the 
variability associated with Italy’s ‘volatile political equilibrium’. Judges and judicial 
action have been interpreted differently across social groups and across historical 
periods. At the very least this has meant that, between 1970 and 2000, calls for 
judicial solutions to ‘law and order’ issues have not been unequivocal; nor have they 
been overwhelming. It is logical to suppose that this variability translated into the 
variable public ‘penal’ demands, available for absorption or filtration by political and 
judicial institutions.  
 
 
As point 3 reveals, public demands are only one side to the ‘judges-public’ relation, which 
also encompasses judges’ ‘receptivity’ to public demands. As Lacey and Savelsberg argue 
(albeit in slightly different terms) ‘receptivity’ – the willingness to consider and be guided by 
public opinion on punishment – varies according to judicial structure. It will differ depending 
on how direct the link is between public opinion and judicial decisions. For example, in the 
United States, some judges are elected and hence directly accountable to the public. 
It is not structure alone, however, that mandates the relationship between judges and 
public opinion (and public influence on penally-relevant decisions). Much depends on how 
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judges interpret their role within this structure. Italy is a particularly apt case study in this 
respect, illustrating the importance of judicial self-conception on processes of knowledge 
production and domination. Self-conception – internal legitimacy – is relevant insofar as it 
affects judges’ autonomy in interpreting public demands for ‘punishment’.  Given the 
relatively late development of a judicial esprit de corps, I will focus mainly on the Italian 
judiciary in the 1990s
1100
. Partly because of the judicial-political conflict, judges have begun 
to see themselves as the last bastions of legality in Italy
1101
. This idea is also linked to the 
Italian Constitution, and judges’ perception of their role as its guardians1102.  The Republican 
judge understands herself to be ‘not just a servant of the law […] but a servant of the 
Constitution, which belongs to all citizens’1103. This means that it is the judiciary’s role is to 
listen and, in some sense, ‘represent’ all citizens (not just the majority)1104, even where this 
implies independent interpretation of legality, and even where it requires judges to uphold the 
Constitution against the political majority
1105
.  
This symbolic link between Italian judges and the public should not be seen as a 
necessary conduit for public opinion into judicial decision-making. It is likely that the 
judiciary will be sensitive to public opinion, particularly where they see themselves as 
representatives of the Constitution (and hence the people). But ‘sensitive to public opinion’ 
does not mean dependent on, or indeed contiguous with, public opinion. In this the Italian 
judiciary is still closer to the German, bureaucratic judiciary, than it is to the US and UK 
professional judiciaries. Thus, even when – as in the 1990s – the connection between public 
and judiciary seemed most direct, the judiciary still possessed the structural features necessary 
for an autonomous evaluation of crime and punishment. Judges’ institutional independence 
and professional culture allowed them to ‘take into account in their professional choices their 
own moral convictions as well as the collective consequences of the decisions they [took]’, 
potentially balancing them against public ‘penal’ pressures1106. This is exemplified in 
Nelken’s analysis, whereby the Italian judiciary possesses ‘priorities […] often different both 
from those of the politicians and of the general public’1107. 
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The implication of this setup is that judicial decision-making in Italy is still greatly 
determined by judicial priorities rather than by ‘populist’ demands. Montana and Nelken 
observe that Italian magistrates have been able to resist ‘moral panics’ about street crime and 
immigration, and have diluted the impact of these panics upon the criminal justice process
1108
. 
Judicial resistance follows from a combination of judicial independence, diffidence if not 
open hostility to the political class, and a self-conception centred on an autonomous 
interpretation of ‘legality’. Admittedly, ‘the external influences [on the judiciary] do not 
disappear’ and ‘there is a limit to [judicial] resistance’1109. Moreover, the judicial structure as 
described also allows for judicial receptivity, and not just resistance, to ‘external influences’. 
Judges’ autonomous interpretation of crime and punishment may thus also support penal 
expansion and, as I had analysed in relation to judges and politicians, moderation is not a 
foregone conclusion of judicial action in Italy
1110
. As the Italian case confirms, judicial 
contributions should be part of our analyses of punishment, which must, however, allow for 
systems that produce more or less coherent patterns of contribution or that point to more 
variable contribution. Variability, for example, is built into the Italian system, such that 
variation may occur, on the basis of judges’ penal philosophy, their moral convictions, the 
locality in which they operate
1111
. Similar dynamics should be sought across contexts. 
 
 
This discussion of judicial receptivity to public demands allows me to draw one further 
conclusion: 
 
4. In considering the ‘interlocution’ between the judiciary and public, it is necessary to 
consider judicial self-conception. The way in which judges understand their role, and 
legitimise their action, will influence their willingness to respond to or reject public 
demands for more or less punishment. For example, where judges see themselves as 
the legitimate arbiters of what legality requires, they may ultimately follow their own 
priorities in judicial decision-making, despite public and political demands. How this 
plays out in the penal realm will depend on the content of the demands and on the 
values informing judicial decision-making. For example, in response to ‘moral 
panics’ on street crime and immigration, the judiciary’s professional evaluation of 
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these threats has limited the potentially expansive effects of public punitive 
demands
1112
. However, under the right conditions, the same combination of judicial 
autonomy and self-conception will produce the opposite effects, namely penal 
expansion. This is the case for example where judicial evaluation of ‘moral panics’ 
coincides with that of a ‘punitive’ public (for example, where judges evaluate public 
concerns with micro-crime as justified). Variability again emerges as a key feature of 
the Italian institutional setup, ensconced in judicial structure, self-conception and 
institutional interactions. 
 
 
These insights can be summarised in an overall hypothesis: a judiciary that is electorally 
linked to public opinion, or incorporates public opinion through lay participation, will 
generally be influenced by public opinion in its decision-making. A judiciary that, 
structurally, is distanced from public opinion in its decision-making, will have greater 
chances of mediating the impact of public opinion on judicial action. Whichever the structural 
setup, it still necessary to consider the general content of public attitudes to crime and 
punishment. If the public are not punitive then we need not expect punitiveness to translate 
into criminal justice decisions even in the presence of direct judge-public links. In Italy public 
approaches to punishment have been relatively moderate though not necessarily stable. 
Demands for law and order have not been overwhelming, and have been different to the 
demands recounted by Garland for the US and UK, relating to ‘ordinary crime’ and matched 
by an increased demand for punishment
1113
. Even when they have entered public discourse, 
such demands may have been targeted primarily at political outsiders. This has limited the 
extent to which judges have had to absorb or resist calls for ‘law and order’. 
Judicial contributions to penal trends will also vary with judicial receptivity or 
accountability to public demands. This is partly a function of judicial structure and partly a 
function of judicial self-conception (internal legitimacy) and the extent to which it enhances 
or limits autonomous judicial interpretation of crime and punishment. Bureaucratisation is 
again a good predictor of judges’ power to resist/mediate public demands. For example, the 
internal legitimacy of bureaucratic judiciaries does not depend on judicial decisions 
replicating public attitudes. In Italy, judges have begun to see themselves as guardians of the 
Constitution. This allows them to interpret external influences on judicial decision-making, 
including public opinion. Given that Italian judges (bureaucratic and independent) are 
influenced, but not bound by, public opinion, they have been free to reject or accept pressures 
coming from it. Their internal legitimacy is influenced by public attitudes, but does not 
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depend upon replicating them. The Italian institutional structure has thus further incorporated 
penal variability. 
 
The relationship between judges’ and public is not independent of the interaction between 
judicial and political actors. In fact none of the dimensions analysed in this chapter can be 
taken singly. Judicial ‘selection, training and tenure’; the level of their bureaucratisation; their 
interrelations with the executive/civil service; their interrelation with the public, their self-
conception; all constitute different facets of the way in which judicial actors contribute to 
penal trends. My understanding of judicial contributions to Italian penality is summarised in 
Figure 1. Table 1 also provides an overview of the relationship between judges and political 
class, the relationship between judges and public, and changes in judicial self-conception 
between 1970 and 2000. The final column provides a (simplified) evaluation of judicial 
contribution to Italian penal trends. 
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Table 1. The Italian Judiciary, interrelations, self-conception and penal results
1114
 
Decade  Relationship 
between Judiciary 
and Political 
Actors 
Relationship 
between Judiciary 
and Public 
Judicial Self-
Conception 
Contribution to 
penal trends 
1970s Judicial surrogacy. 
 
Surrogacy over 
terrorism and 
emergencies. 
 
Growing judicial 
legitimacy. 
 
 
Judicial collusion. 
Growing judicial 
legitimacy over 
emergencies. 
 
Judge as political 
actor: suspicion over 
political motives. 
Independent 
judiciary. 
 
Internal variability 
after 1960s reforms: 
multifaceted 
judiciary. 
 
Institutional 
politicisation 
through political 
currents. 
 
External reference 
groups. 
Judge as political 
actor: crime as 
politics and low 
demands for 
punishment. 
 
Emergency powers 
and punitive 
potential. 
 
Collusion: law with 
no purchase: 
diversion. 
1980s Organised crime: 
judicial surrogacy. 
 
Political corruption: 
judicial collusion. 
 
Variable 
legitimacy. 
 
Political corruption: 
beginnings of 
conflict. 
 
  
Reserve of judicial 
legitimacy over 
emergencies. 
 
Judicial collusion and 
‘atavistic distrust’ for 
judges/law. 
 
Growing public 
attention to judicial 
accountability and 
responsibility: 1987 
referendum. 
 
Independent 
judiciary. 
 
Internal variability. 
Lack of a common 
professional 
culture. 
 
External reference 
groups. 
 
Collusion: law with 
no purchase: 
diversion. 
 
Emergency powers 
and punitive 
potential. 
 
Legislation: 
procedural delays 
and limits to penal 
expansion.  
1990s Tangentopoli.  
 
Out and out conflict 
with part of the 
political sphere. 
  
Political attempts to 
limit judicial 
activism. 
 
Continuing sectors 
of judicial 
collusion. 
 
Judges as moral hero: 
apogee of legitimacy. 
 
Judges’ fall from 
favour: 
too active given 
widespread illegality. 
Too little concern 
with micro crimes.  
Growth of a more 
unified self-
conception 
following political 
attack. 
 
Judges as guardians 
of the Law and the 
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Judges as 
interlocutors for the 
‘citizens’. 
Judicial priorities: 
resistance to calls 
for law and order. 
 
Judicial priorities: 
receptivity to calls 
for law and order.  
 
Legislation: 
procedural delays 
and limits on penal 
expansion.  
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 The table simplifies all the dynamics shown and cannot show their continuity across the 
decades. 
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Figure 1: Judicial Contribution to Penal Trends – structure and legitimacy 
 
 
V. Conclusions 
The Italian judiciary has played a central role in Italian public life. Judges and prosecutors 
have partaken of the nation’s ‘volatile political equilibrium’, with its various conflicts and 
tensions. At the penal level, judicial actors have also contributed to Italy’s differential 
punitiveness. The combination of judicial structure, institutional situation and variable 
legitimacy has, when set in context, produced pressures in favour of penal expansion and in 
favour penal moderation at different times depending on the shifting balance of factors that I 
have outlined. In terms of the comparative models set forth by Lacey and by Savelsberg, this 
has meant that the nation has diverged both from the German and the Anglo-American 
models where judges in context have, respectively, enhanced penal stability and contributed 
to penal volatility. However, the Italian case can still be understood in terms of (a modified 
version of) these models, just as an analysis of Italy helps us to refine those models. Judicial 
contributions to Italian penal trends can be reconnected to judicial structure, and to the 
position of judicial actors within institutional set-ups. The axes of bureaucracy/independence 
and co-operation/conflict, have been modified in order to apply them to Italy. My account has 
had to explain a judiciary that is both bureaucratic and highly independent, capable of 
resisting popular sentiment in decision-making but also sufficiently independent to respond to 
such sentiments where judges thought it appropriate to do so. That this has not led to full 
blown penal expansion is testament to the variable pressures produced by the Italian context, 
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in which the penal law is not necessarily the preferred method of conflict resolution. It is also 
a testament to the diverse composition of the judiciary, capable of displaying various penal 
and political outlooks.  
 My mapping of judicial interaction with the political class has also had to be 
modified, relative to the comparative models, insofar as it encompasses judicial collaboration, 
collusion and conflict with the political class. These various interrelations have affected, and 
been affected by, changing judicial legitimacy. The latter has emerged as a crucial, additional, 
variable for our understanding of judicial contribution to Italian penal trends. Volatile 
legitimacy has impacted upon the role of judges in Italy, vis-à-vis the public, vis-à-vis the 
political class, and within judicial ranks (Table 1). The latter – judicial self-conception– has 
become more defined following conflict with the political class. It has bolstered the 
judiciary’s role as independent political player within the Italian scenario, often set in 
opposition to politicians. Given the importance of legitimacy and self-conception within the 
Italian context, it may be worth questioning what role these factors play in other contexts. It 
would be interesting to ask what we can evince about judicial legitimacy and self-conception 
within Lacey’s and Savelsberg’s accounts of Germany, Britain and the United States. How is 
legitimacy constituted in and across these contexts? How do judges think of themselves in 
different polities? How this has impacted upon their contribution to penal stability or 
dynamism? 
The Italian judiciary itself has not produced unitary penal pressures; they have 
contributed to both volatility and containment. This is because in the Italian institutional 
context judges are a genre of political actor whose incentives and opportunity structures shape 
a varying position on punitiveness. This leads me back to the notion of Italy’s political 
conflicts and equilibrium: where judges are an integral part of this equilibrium, their impact 
upon penality will vary according to the factors I have discussed. It also leads me back to 
Italy’s multiple incentives for reintegration, and informal resolution of conflict: to those 
‘protective structures’ that divert from the penal law. To understand the evolution of Italian 
penality, it is therefore necessary to ask, not ‘what happens when defendants encounter Italian 
penal law?’, but ‘who reaches Italian penal law, and why?’. If we seek to identify consistent 
patterns in Italian penality, we are thus best advised to look at penal subjects rather than 
looking at judicial action.
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Chapter 6 - The Legal Vice: Punishing Migrants in Italy 1990-2000 
I. Introduction 
This chapter investigates the punishment of non-EU immigrants in Italy, between 1990 and 
2000, a decade that saw a marked prominence of migrant incarceration in Italian prison rates 
and its contribution to the 1990s’ penal expansion. This chapter is written against the 
backdrop of a fertile theoretical context, where literature has attempted to explain rates of 
migrant imprisonment across Western Europe. In relation to my broader arguments on Italy, 
an investigation of migrant incarceration also functions as a case study, illustrating the 
significance of political dynamics to Italian penality. The chapter illustrates one particular 
example of Italy’s differential punitiveness and follows on from the insights I have developed 
on the importance of political conflicts and dualisms to penal trends, and on the importance of 
political belonging to penal reintegration or exclusion in Italy. The penal fate of non-EU 
migrants in 1990s Italy provides us with an extreme instance of the conditions of inclusion 
and exclusion within the Italian polity and their respective penal effects. In this it mirrors the 
arguments advanced in The Prisoners’ Dilemma, namely that individuals’ exposure to 
penality depends both on the institutional/political-economic context they inhabit and their 
structural position within this context
1115
.  
 
In this chapter, I will argue that the punishment of non-EU migrants in Italy during the 1990s 
should be interpreted as the punishment of political outsiders. ‘Political outsiders’ should be 
understood as defined in Chapters 3 and 4: individuals falling outside those politico-
institutional structures that catalyse penal diversion and reintegration in Italy. The 
outsiderness is political because it is rooted in political relations and identification, a 
dimension that emerged as a crucial complement to economic integration in Italy. As far as 
migrants are concerned, the outsiderness is also political in a more formal sense: as exclusion 
from citizenship and relegation to a ‘legal residence’ in need of constant reaffirmation. 
My investigations span the decade 1990 – 2000. 1990 was chosen because this is the 
date at which migration to Italy began to increase substantially. It is also during the 1990s that 
immigration became ‘a major political issue’ – both in party politics and in public 
awareness
1116
. This starting point also allows us to capture the increasing incidence of 
immigration from Eastern Europe, immediately following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
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The first comprehensive legal text on immigration was passed in 1990:  Legge Martelli 
39/1990"L. 28 febbraio 1990, n. 39" 1990) 
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dismantling of the Soviet Union. The end point is in part justified by the scope of my thesis, 
halting my analysis before the 2001 victory of Berlusconi’s coalition, and the beginning of a 
more obviously contradictory attitude to punishment (Chapter 1). This consideration remains 
valid for immigration legislation not least because, with the xenophobic Northern League as 
part of the governing coalition, immigrants were the targets of increasing ‘law and order’ 
rhetoric. Admittedly the cut-off point limits the scope of my claims to the decade at hand
1117
. 
There is no a priori reason why my claims should not extend past the year 2000 but the reader 
should be aware that this chapter deals only with the punishment of migrants in Italy during 
the 1990s. It may be that in the successive decades the punishment of immigrants followed 
different dynamics to the ones highlighted here: again, there is no a priori reason why this 
should not be so. Of course, I believe that there are insights in this chapter that will help us 
view immigrant punishment in Italy even after 2000, if nothing else at least in terms of 
change. However, I must emphasise that these beliefs have not been tested in this chapter 
whose insights must be taken as temporally bounded. 
 
In this chapter, I propose a theoretical hypothesis that follows logically from both my analysis 
of Italian punishment and from the nature of migration to Italy during the 1990s. I argue that 
the punishment of non-EU immigrants in Italy should be understood as a two stage process, a 
‘legal vice’ resting first on migrants’ dependence on Italian law, and then on the law’s 
definition relegating immigrants to economic marginality. The chapter is structured as 
follows. It first engages with the theoretical literature that has explained immigrants’ 
punishment as an articulation of broader contemporary penal trends. As in the rest of the 
thesis, I take the literature as a starting point for my own critical analysis, examining how 
Italy compares to existing theories, and what we can glean from the similarities and 
differences emerging from this comparison. Here comparison has meant verifying whether 
the punishment of non-EU immigrants in Italy fit the arguments advanced by Alessandro De 
Giorgi and those advanced by Nicola Lacey
1118
. The chapter engages with De Giorgi’s work 
by testing some of his key assumptions against data on immigration to Italy. I have collected 
these data from Italian Caritas publications
1119
, and they include data on the presence of 
migrants, their insertion into the labour market, the demographic make-up of immigration 
during the 1990s. Collated, the data have provided closer contextual support for De Giorgi’s 
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 It halts before the 2002 law that imposed harsher conditions on immigration, shortening 
the duration of immigrant residence permits, limiting family reunification and increasing the 
maximum period of administrative detention: Einaudi (2007, p. 417).  
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but is not part of my analysis. 
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analyses of migrants’ economic position in contemporary Western polities. The data is 
followed by further theorisation on the mechanisms of migrant incarceration in Italy that 
teases out the political dimension already present within De Giorgi’s account and relates it 
directly to the Italian context. 
 
Before embarking upon this investigation a few caveats on the statistical data are in order. As 
I had noted in my introduction, data on immigration is often beset by the problem of 
irregularity: thus, unless specifically stated, the statistics I include in the following pages 
measure the characteristics of the regular immigrant population. This is unsurprising, given 
that the data rely on offical residence permits, but it means that the data are necessarily 
partial
1120
. Note also that data on immigrants in Italy are often absent or incomplete, 
particularly where used to capture features of immigration at the local, rather than national, 
level
1121
. Any data pitched at the national level necessarily gloss over variations in experience 
by immigrant communities and the localities they come to inhabit. This suggests that 
statistical data should be used only as an aide in any discussions of immigration and 
immigrant incarceration, but that not everything is verifiable through statistics. This is the 
point made by Strozza and Golini when discussing ways of measuring immigrant integration 
in Italy: ‘not all the measures proposed could in fact be constructed: this was due in part to the 
absence of necessary data, and in part to the data’s failure to correspond to the reality that we 
wished to represent’1122. This highlights the need to elaborate thorough theoretical analyses of 
immigrant punishment in Italy. The following chapter builds upon existing theories – first and 
foremost De Giorgi’s – and sets forth a series of interpretive hypotheses sensitive to the 
theoretical and Italian context. As with the rest of this thesis, the aim is for this analysis to 
provide a framework for future research that will generate richer primary material where data 
is absent and that can capture the variation in experiences of immigration to Italy
1123
.  
II. Setting the context - punishing migrants in Europe and the Italian legal vice 
Chapter 2 confirmed the over penalisation of migrants in 1990s’ Italy. High levels of migrant 
incarceration are apparent in prison data and secondary literature alike (see Figure 1 and 
Table 1)
1124
. Between the years 1990 and 2000, for example, foreign detainees in Italian 
prisons increased by 288 percent. By the year 2000, 28.6 percent of detainees were foreign 
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Giorgi (2010); Melossi (2003, 2012); Melossi, De Giorgi, and Massa (2009) 
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compared to only 2.5 percent of foreigners resident in Italy
1125
. According to Melossi, Italy 
possessed one of the highest migrant overrepresentation ratios within Europe, incarcerating 
more foreigners relative to foreign residents than either the United Kingdom or Germany
1126
. 
Admittedly, a comparison with the UK may be unfair, given its history of immigration and 
Italy’s conversion to host country only after 19801127. Nonetheless, it remains true to say that 
Italy presents us with very high levels of migrant incarceration. Moreover, in a nation where 
prison rates have tended to fluctuate (Chapter 2), the detention of foreigners shows a 
remarkably consistent upward trend.  
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 Figures calculated from my elaboration of data from the Italian Department of 
Penitentiary Administration (DAP), the Italian National Statistics Association (ISTAT 1990-
2001) and Caritas Statistical Dossiers on Immigration (Caritas 1993-2003). 
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 Melossi (2005, p. 17); Solivetti (2012, p. 14) 
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 Caritas (1993-2003); Melossi (2003, p. 378) 
This late conversion suggests that accounts of migrant punishment in Italy cannot simply be 
subsumed in accounts of migrant punishment in European ‘postcolonial’ nations such as 
France, or compared to the overrepresentation of ethnic minorities in US prisons. Direct 
analogies with either context gloss over important differences between Italy and the 
US/France. Italy does not share the US’s history of slavery, with its impact on race relations 
and punishment. In Italy ‘migrants […] are for a good percentage perceived as “white”’: 
(Melossi, 2012, p. 416). Italy also displays significant differences with France: sharing neither 
the latter’s history as immigrant host country, nor its colonial past. Thus Melossi claims that 
‘the kind of ghettoization that one can find [in America] or […] in the French banlieu’ was 
‘unknown in Italian cities’ - ‘a serious and urgent’ but yet unrealised danger: (2003, p. 386)  
For France and the US see: Wacquant (1999, 2009) For contrasts between Italy and the US on 
issues of migration flows and territorial segregation see: Melossi (2013); Mingione (2009, p. 
225)  
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Figure 1 – Total and foreign detainees in Italy 1990-2000 (thousands) 
 
 
 
Source: My elaboration on data from the Institute for National Statistics ISTAT. (1990-2001) 
and ISTAT (1990-2001); Melossi (2003); Trigilia (1997); Penitentiary Administration 
Data
1128
  
                                                     
1128
DAP (1990-2001); ISTAT (1990-2001)  
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Italy -total and foreign detainees 1990-2000 (thousands) 
Total
population
detained
Foreigners
detained
 205 
Table 1: Comparative Foreigner Overrepresentation Ratios – year 2000 
 
 Number
1
 %
2
 %
3
 Ratio
4
 
France 10553 21.6 5.6/3.6 6 
Germany 26839 34.1 8.9/6.6 5.2 
Greece 3892 48.4 6.4/n.a. 7.6
5
 
Italy 15582 29.6 2.4/2.1 14.1 
Portugal 1540 12.1 2/1.5 8.1 
Spain 8470 18.8 2.2/1.5 12.5 
United 
Kingdom 
5716 8.3 4.1/2.6 3.2 
Source: Adapted from Melossi, D. ‘Security, Social Control, Democracy and Migration’1129 
 
1
 Number of foreign prisoners at 1.9.2000
1130
. 
 
2
 Percentage of foreign prisoners on the total number of prisoners at 1.9.2000
1131
 
 
3
 Percentage of foreigners/foreigners from outside the EU on the resident population at 
31.12.2000 (elaboration of data from Caritas
1132
). 
 
4
 Ratio of % foreign inmates to % foreigners from outside the EU. 
5 
Underestimated because EU population was not subtracted, as data were not available.  
 
Explanations of immigrant punishment in Western Europe can be sought in materialist 
accounts of Western penality, which seek to explain varying punitiveness through 
developments in political economy. Of particular interest in this chapter are De Giorgi’s 
insights on the punishment of migrants in the context of post-Fordism
1133
. The chapter also 
builds upon The Prisoners’ Dilemma which points to immigrants as the ‘outsiders’ of co-
ordinated market economies: individuals whose punishment marks the boundaries of an 
otherwise reintegrative penality
1134
. In these two strands of literature, non-EU migrants stand 
out as recipients of harsh punishment across Western European polities
1135
. The two analytical 
positions, however, do not accord the same significance to migrants’ punishment. In 
Alessandro De Giorgi’s thesis, migrants are archetypal penal subjects, whose punishment is 
distinguished from nationals’ by its relative intensity1136. The mechanism by which they are 
punished remains a function of macroscopic political economic dynamics whose weight falls 
on migrants insofar as it falls on labour’s lower echelons. De Giorgi thus refers to non-EU 
migrants as a ‘paradigmatic case-study’ for penality, controlled by ‘immigration policies 
[that] should be seen as a “laboratory”[for] new strategies […] for the authoritarian control of 
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[contemporary] “advanced marginality”’ as a whole1137. Kitty Calavita also uses this idea of 
migrants as archetypes when describing migrants’ impoverishment in Italy1138. This could be 
taken to imply that there is a fundamental continuity between migrants and nationals, (insofar 
as nationals’ fate is reflected in migrants’ fate). The mechanism through which migrants are 
punished, therefore, would not be exclusive to them as migrants, but falls upon them as 
economically marginal.
1139
  
 By contrast, I argue that the connection between economic marginality and 
punishment should not lead us to conclude that foreigners in Italy are necessarily ‘mirrors’1140 
for nationals
1141
, though both nationals and immigrants may experience economic 
marginality. Immigrants are not penal prototypes, at least where, as in De Giorgi’s adaptation 
of Rusche and Kirchheimer, punishment is linked to economic marginality. In this chapter I 
suggest that the punishment of migrants follows a particular trajectory that results from their 
dependence on law, symbolically and practically. The punishment of non-EU migrants can be 
seen as an example of Italy’s ‘differential punitiveness’ differentiated, in this case, by 
political belonging.  
 
De Giorgi’s approach is further premised on the idea that contemporary penality is anchored 
to broad macroscopic changes, namely the onset of post-Fordism
1142
. This presumes 
substantial continuity across national contexts, including Italy
1143. In Lacey’s account, 
however, the significance of migrants’ punishment is thought to vary according to the type of 
capitalism they inhabit. Thus, in LMEs, migrants’ political-economic position exposes them 
to punishment and this is a fate that, all other things being equal, they may share with 
nationals in similar economic positions. CMEs possess a more inclusive penal system. In such 
polities, where comparative advantage stimulates the reintegration of deviants, migrants’ 
punishment is not ‘more of the same’ but is categorically different to the punishment of 
nationals. Migrants in CMEs are ‘outsiders’1144, generally excluded from structures, such as 
education and training, that catalyse the reintegration of deviants.  
How can this schema be applied to Italy? The Italian political economy is 
characterised as hybrid. I have also argued that Italian penality is heavily susceptible to 
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political dynamics and conflicts, as discussed. In Chapters 3 and 4, I have shown how 
political belonging emerges as a crucial factor in catalysing the reintegration of deviance, or 
the reliance on informal social control vis-à-vis deviance. Thus in Italy’s industrial districts, 
integration and reintegration follow from inclusion in the district’s economic activities and 
from inclusion in the trust networks that regulate the activities. As I have argued in Chapter 3, 
these networks provide incentives for informal resolution of conflict. Alternatively, where 
formal labour regulation is stronger, reintegration into the body politic may follow from 
insertion into the economy complemented by union representation. Representation acts as an 
additional barrier to economic exclusion and its (potential) penal consequences, creating de 
facto long-term investments in the workforce on whose behalf they act, and some protection 
from changes in the political economy. ‘Protection’ from changes in the political economy 
may also follow from clientelistic relations, which are clearly political in their distribution of 
economic resources (job, welfare entitlements) and stimulate political loyalties parallel to the 
state. 
 
Combining the insights of Chapters 3 and 4 with the framework derived from Lacey – 
whereby in certain contexts immigrants will fall outside structures of integration – we can 
then derive an account of immigrant punishment in Italy. I argue that my analysis reveals how 
Italy punished migrants as outsiders between 1990 and 2000. By contrast to migrants within 
CMEs, however, non-EU immigrants in Italy were political rather than economic outsiders. 
Indeed, although they were subordinated economically, they were nevertheless fundamentally 
integrated within the Italian economy. It is De Giorgi who captures this paradox in the phrase 
‘economic inclusion through legal exclusion’1145. The formula indicates both that migrants 
were included as subordinates in the Italian economy, and that this subordination was the 
function of their exclusion from stable legal residence. The economic marginality that 
followed from this subordinate inclusion exposed immigrants to high levels of penalisation. I 
argue that, supplementing De Giorgi’s account, what precipitated their exposure to formal 
punishment, in addition to their economic marginality, was migrants’ ulterior political non-
integration (political outsiderness). This non-integration occurred at the formal level, as 
exclusion from political citizenship; but it also occurred at a broader level, with migrants’ 
exclusion from political structures such as families or established immigrant communities. 
This broader exclusion had numerous implications: it meant that in the 1990s, migrants were 
primarily defined, by and for the Italian state, in terms of their legal status. This legal status 
was mainly dictated by immigration law. As I will illustrate, this simply increased non-EU 
migrants’ economic marginality. It also marked migrants as exclusively legal subjects – a 
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notion (explored below) that highlights how and why migrants have experienced intense 
exposure to the criminal justice system. Since political belonging is a particularly important 
complement to both legal and economic integration in Italy, this heightened migrants’ 
exposure to punishment. Political belonging helps both to stave off economic hardship and its 
penal consequences, and to catalyse informal resolution of conflicts where deviance occurs. It 
also allows individuals to bridge the gap between the letter of the law and the application of 
the law in a context often marked by the ‘negotiability’ of norms (Chapter 4). Political 
belonging has, moreover, influenced personal experiences of the economy: where the ability 
to call upon formal and informal political resources has been crucial in tempering the changes 
associated with contemporary capitalist developments. A study of the punishment of migrants 
therefore also reinforces the notion that Italian penality is heavily influenced by political 
dynamics; those that, in this instance, create an insider-outsider dualism with consequent 
penal effects.  
 
A useful tool for understanding migrant punishment is my concept of the ‘legal vice’. The 
vice is a two-stage process (with each stage as a jaw of the vice) leading not just to the 
incarceration of migrants, but to their over-incarceration. Over-incarceration indicates high 
levels of migrant imprisonment relative to their presence within the resident population. It 
also raises the question of whether different levels of political integration of nationals and 
immigrants are also reflected in different punishment levels. This question implicitly suggests 
that we locate the source of migrant punishment not just in their economic marginality, but in 
their economic marginality combined with their political marginality. I hypothesise that the 
latter is a sine qua non for the ‘legal exclusion’ of De Giorgi’s formula: were migrants not 
formal outsiders (but Italian or EU citizens) they would not need the recognition of 
immigration law; were migrants not political outsiders they would not be so harshly affected 
by the conditions on which this recognition is premised
1146
. Note that my argument here 
supplements De Giorgi’s argument, because it adds a layer of analysis to his theory, adapting 
it to Italy. My approach uses De Giorgi’s analysis of economic inclusion through legal 
exclusion, however it asks how this mechanism has played out in a nation where political 
dynamics have visibly influenced both the application of the law and the evolution of the 
economy.  
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 This particular hypothesis – which follows from the character of punishment, politics and 
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In this chapter I will explore both ‘jaws’ of the legal vice: I will first examine the jaw that 
accounts for migrant incarceration in Italy. I use Caritas data to see whether it is possible to 
say that migrants suffered from ‘economic inclusion through legal exclusion’ in 1990s’ 
Italy
1147. The succeeding section then details the remaining ‘jaw’ of the vice, explaining 
immigrants’ over-incarceration. Using the same Caritas data to build a demographic ‘profile’ 
for migrants and asking how an individual with such a ‘profile’ would fare in Italy, I 
subsequently illustrate why immigrants were outsiders, how this constituted them as primarily 
legal subjects and what the penal effects were of being primarily legal subjects in the Italian 
context.   
 
III. The incarceration jaw: economic inclusion through legal exclusion and the 
punishment of economic marginality 
i. Economic inclusion through legal exclusion. 
The process described by De Giorgi as ‘economic inclusion through legal exclusion’1148 can 
be seen as one jaw of the legal vice.  In Italy, migrants’ ‘economic inclusion’ derives from the 
fact that the labour market relies on immigrant labour. The ‘legal exclusion’ derives from the 
immigration regime, which excludes migrants from stable and regular residence, and thus 
sustains their subordinate economic integration. The important part played by immigration 
law in this ‘exclusion’ is apparent: legislation passed in the 1990s subordinates mid and long-
term residence to formal and stable employment
1149
. These conditions are, as Kitty Calavita 
states, a near impossibility in the Italian context, where the labour available to immigrants is 
typically short-term and scarcely regulated or informal
1150
. Immigration law, in fact, mandates 
that foreigners should be called into Italy primarily to offset existing labour shortages
1151
. 
This already presumes that they will be employed in the type of jobs that will not ensure legal 
residence: the insecure, low-status jobs that nationals reject. This means that non-EU 
immigrants’ legal residence can be at best temporary – subject to constant reappraisal on the 
basis of employment status – and at worst unachieved1152. Regularity and irregularity become 
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two points on a spectrum of possibilities always present within each migrant’s biography1153. 
We can ask whether the Italian legislation does not, in fact, indirectly acknowledge this, given 
the repeat ‘regularisations’ (sanatorie) of the irregular migrants already present on Italian 
territory. As Table 2 shows, regularisations have been a feature of Italian immigration policy 
since the late-1980s, with the number of foreigners formally ‘regularized’ increasing over the 
years. The sanatorie, however, are limited in scope by ‘low [turn-outs] and administrative 
delays’. Moreover, they do not ensure long-term regularity: ‘immigrants who manage to 
legalize are often returned to illegality after one or two years [and only] about half of those 
who were legalized [in] 1990 retained their legal status a decade later’1154. 
 
Table 2: Migrants regularized in Italy between 1986 and 1998 
 
Law 
943/86 
Law 
39/90 
Decree 
489/95 
Decree (Decreto Presidente Consiglio 
dei Ministri) 16/10/98 
Total 
number of 
individuals 
regularized 105000 217626 244492 217124 
Source: Caritas
1155
 
 
The precariousness inherent in migrants’ ir/regularity, is made worse by the threat of 
expulsion and detention with which irregularity is punished (Table 3)
1156. Migrants’ 
consequent vulnerability, combined with individuals’ commitment to their migratory projects, 
contributes to immigrants’ economic marginality. It forces migrants to ‘accept virtually any 
degree of exploitation in the flexible labour markets of advanced […] economies’1157. This 
precariousness further contributes to migrants’ economic marginality, by acting as a 
disincentive for employers to improve migrants’ conditions1158, and by leaving immigrants 
with few legal means to challenge their situation.  
                                                     
1153
 Calavita (2005a, p. 50) 
1154
 Ibid., p. 39 
1155
 Caritas (1993-2003) 
1156
 Explusion rests on knowing where to expel the foreigner: her own nation of origin, or the 
nation she came from when she entered Italy. However information on immigrants’ 
provenance may not be forthcoming, and the third country may not agree to receive the 
expelled individual. Perhaps to obviate these obstacles, the 1998 law establishes ‘Temporary 
Residence Centres’ where ‘irregular’ non-EU immigrants are detained if they cannot be 
expelled.  
1157
 De Giorgi (2010, p. 160) See also Reyneri (2004a) 
1158
 Calavita (2005a, p. 43) 
 211 
Table 3: Migrants in administrative detention, in Italy (1998 – 2000) 
Year Number of individuals in 
administrative detention 
Percentage of individuals 
repatriated from 
administrative detention 
1998 5007 57.1 
1999 8847 44.1 
2000 9768 16.8 
Sources: for years 1998-1999 Caritas; for year 2000 Barbagli Immigrazione e Sicurezza in 
Italia
1159
. 
Note: Administrative detention centres were first introduced by the 1998 Turco-Napolitano 
law: the data thus cover only the three years shown above.  
 
ii. Economic inclusion in the data  
Both data and literature confirm this subordinate economic inclusion of migrants. They show 
that foreigners were fundamentally integrated into the Italian labour market: the economy 
exercised a notable pull on immigration, as work was available. This is reflected in the 
overwhelming majority of residence permits granted for ‘work reasons’ across the 1990s 
(Figure 2)
1160.
. Note that the data missing in both Figure 3 and Figure 2 is due to the absence 
of statistics on immigrant residence by type of labour/reason for residence also layered by 
non-EU status.    
                                                     
1159
 Maurizio Barbagli (2008, p. 119); Caritas (1993-2003) 
1160
 These figures should be taken with caution: they are linked to residence permits and 
reflect the policy behind their distribution as much as the ‘objective reality’ of immigration. 
All analysis of Caritas data is based on my elaboration of statistics extracted from Caritas 
publications. 
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Figure 2 – Non-EU migrants’ reasons for residence in Italy 1990-2000 
 
Source: My elaboration on Caritas data
1161
  
Note: Permits for ‘elective residence’ are granted to those foreigners who can support 
themselves economically without needing to work. Alternatively, they can be granted to 
foreigners previously residing on a work or family permit, where they can benefit from old 
age, disability pension (or other similar pensions)
1162
.  
 
 
 
By accompanying Caritas data with data derived from the Italian social security institute 
(INPS) we see that the number of immigrant workers increased during the 1990s, ‘[tripling] in 
eight years’1163. This confirms that if immigrants were economically marginal in Italy, it is not 
because of economic exclusion as such. Furthermore, immigrants tended to complement, and 
not compete, with local labour (though their insertion into the official labour market varied 
across regions)
1164
. The demographic makeup of migrant communities also accounted for 
their complementary role in the Italian economy
1165
, with a primarily young and willing 
                                                     
1161
 Caritas (1993-2003) 
1162
 Olivetti (2009) At: http://www.asgi.it/home_asgi.php?n=documenti&id=770&l=it 
1163
 Reyneri (2004b, p. 73) 
1164
 Maurizio  Barbagli (2007, p. 188); Quassoli (1999, p. 220); Reyneri (2004b); Venturini 
and Villoso (2008)  
Seasonal workers in Southern agriculture are an exception; even in this sector, however, 
Italians occupy the higher ranks. 
1165
 On approximate measures, calculated on residence permits, immigrants’ unemployment 
rate was lower than Italian nationals’ (1991 – 2001): Maurizio  Barbagli (2007, p. 188); 
Strozza and Cibella (2006, p. 139). 
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migrant population pitched against an ageing Italian population, whose youth were unwilling 
to occupy the harsher roles of the labour market
1166
.  
 
Caritas data show a majority of permits were granted to individuals working in dependent 
labour, working under a contract of services with an employer, rather than self-employed
1167
. 
This in part reflects the ‘tendency of immigrant workers to concentrate in areas where local 
labour is insufficient to satisfy demands’1168. The main sectors of immigrant employment 
included construction, services, domestic labour and agriculture
1169
.   
  
                                                     
1166
 Calavita (2005a, p. 42)  
1167
 Reyneri (2003) Note the increasing incidence of self-employed immigrants, over time, 
and in certain regions/sectors: Mingione (2009) 
1168
 Reyneri (2004b, p. 75) 
1169
 Macioti and Pugliese (2003, pp. 58-86) 
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Figure 3: Residence permits for work purposes, by type of labour 1990- 2000 
 
 
 
Source: my elaboration on my elaboration on Caritas data
1170
.  
Note: Dependent labour refers to labour carried out by employees i.e. individuals employed 
(by an employer) under a contract of services. 
Self-employed refers to individuals working independently or under a contract for services.  
                                                     
1170
 Caritas (1993-2003) 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Residence permits for work purposes by labour type, as a percentage 
of total residence permits (1990-2000) 
Dependent labour
(employed)
Dependent labour
(unemployed)
Total dependent
labour
Self-employed
(employed)
Total self-
employed
 215 
Figure 4 – Foreigners employed and unemployed in Italy 1991-1999 
 
 
 
Source: My elaboration on Caritas data.
1171
 
  
The one common denominator that emerges from this picture seems to be the precarious and 
unstable nature of labour across sectors and across migrant nationalities. Thus Macioti and 
Pugliese talk of employment in the tertiary sector as ‘temporary and precarious’ with the 
dominant characteristic being ‘the irregularity of the employment relation’1172. They talk also 
of agricultural labour as being ‘precarious and marginal’ with a ‘systematic violation of any 
union agreement’1173, of construction work being ‘destructured’ and outside trade union 
protection
1174
 and of migrants being hired in industrial labour in ‘absolute informality’1175. 
This instability is also reflected in data on foreign employment and unemployment (Figure 4). 
Employment can be gauged by analysing the number of immigrants hired each year
1176
, and 
Caritas data show that an increasing number of foreigners were hired across the 1990s. 
Interestingly, as of 1993, the number of jobseekers also increases
1177
. This was occurring at a 
                                                     
1171
 Caritas (1993-2003)  
According to Reyneri the drop in 1993 is due to  the economic crisis (2004b, p. 74) 
1172
 Macioti and Pugliese (2003, p. 78 My translation.) 
1173
 Ibid., pp. 78-79 
1174
 Ibid., p. 80 
1175
 Ibid., p. 82 
1176
 Migrants are otherwise excluded from labour force surveys. 
1177
 The two values are not mirror-images – availability of labour may increase even as 
demand increases: where demand surpasses availability this yields both increasing hires and 
increasing job-seekers. 
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time when immigration was growing (see Figures 6 and 7) during a general economic 
depression
1178
.   
 Note that our interpretation of data on migrant hires and jobseekers must be based on 
what they show but also on what they conceal: where employment levels are concerned, we 
should ask not just whether immigrants are employed, but also for how long they remain on 
the market. The number of hired employees could indicate that individuals were employed in 
a succession of short-term contracts, as occurred for a large proportion of immigrant 
workers
1179
. Data on hires are unable to capture this passage from job to job, and over-
represent the stability of immigrant employment. The data thus reveal increasing 
employment, but of a kind more precarious than we might first assume. Similarly, as Macioti 
and Pugliese state, the high number of immigrants registered as jobseekers was both an 
expression of migrants’ frequent transition between jobs, and of the temporary nature of the 
jobs offered to them
1180
. Moreover even where migrants were formally unemployed, some 
were in fact employed in Italy’s informal economy1181. Registration as jobseekers would thus 
be the necessary tribute to legislation that premises residence on regular labour (actual or 
sought): ‘overall, it is safe to assume that those registered as unemployed [were] in fact part-
time, in transit from one short-term contract to the next, or irregularly employed’1182. Irregular 
forms of labour are disproportionately diffuse in Italy
1183
 and can be found in sectors such as 
construction, manufacturing and agriculture. Similarly, where there is informality, there are 
likely to be harsher working conditions and scarce legal safeguards – again the type of jobs 
migrants, but not nationals, are likely to take on. Moreover, it seems plausible to assume that, 
given the absence of comprehensive state provision for the unemployed (Chapter 3), 
immigrants could not stay inactive for long and would seek informal work
1184
, especially 
considering that few if any could benefit from the family support that substitutes welfare 
provision in Italy
1185
.   
                                                     
1178
 National unemployment rates grew between 1991 and 1992, fell the following year, grew 
again between 1993 and 1995, stabilising unti a final drop between 1999 and 2000: ISTAT,  
http://seriestoriche.istat.it/index.php?id=7&user_100ind_pi1[id_pagina]=76&cHash=c255f48
159e3c338760577586eaab610 Accessed September 2013 
1179
 Reyneri (2003); 2004b, p. 74) 
1180
 See also Maurizio  Barbagli (2007, p. 209); Macioti and Pugliese (2003) 
1181
 Mingione and Quassoli (2000) See also Table 4. 
1182
 Reyneri (2004b, p. 83) 
1183
 Mingione (1995) 
1184
 Bozzini and Fella (2008, p. 253) 
1185
 Mingione (1995, p. 83); Reyneri (2004b, p. 87) Immigration increasingly constitutes 
welfare for Italian middle class families (with variation by immigrant community and Italian 
region), as immigrants take over the care functions formerly reserved to Italian women: 
Mingione (2009). This adds a layer of complexity to analyses that tie welfare provision to 
incarceration, as migrants are both sources of welfare and preferred subjects of penalisation. 
This is a question for future research. 
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Table 4: Percentage of employees in irregular position among the total of non-EU 
employees (1991-2001)  
 
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Employees 
in 
irregular 
positions 
(%) 
33.1 33.5 48.3 56.7 37.1 31.6 33.8 31.2 38.3 41.3 39.5 
Source: Reyneri ‘Immigrants in a segmented and often undeclared labour market’1186.  
Note: Sicily excluded except for 1993 and 1997. 
 
Table 5: Workers in informal occupations as a percentage of total workers, foreign and 
national 1991-2001. 
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Workers 
in 
irregular 
positions 
(%) 13.4 12.9 12.8 12.4 12.6 12.5 12.4 12.2 11.8 11.7 12.2 
Source: ISTAT (1980-2010)
1187
  
 
 
 
iii. Penalising non-EU migrants 
Data, despite their limits, help illustrate that migrants’ material conditions in Italy coincide 
with those laid out by De Giorgi and Calavita’s critiques. It seems that immigrants suffer 
from mutually-reinforcing legal and economic marginality, as legal residence depends on 
economic stability, but economic stability generally requires legal residence
1188
. In this sense, 
theirs is a legal form of exclusion that sustains subordinate economic inclusion. To the extent 
that economic marginality leads to penalisation, it is then not surprising that a large number of 
migrants are incarcerated in Italy. What I am arguing however is that their over-penalisation 
is not explainable by migrants’ economic subordination alone. 
 
To understand migrant over-incarceration, I argue, it is necessary to look at migrants’ 
economic marginality and their exclusion from political structures that complement economic 
status, and whose absence precipitates exposure to the criminal justice system. Before turning 
to this argument, I will explain how De Giorgi’s ‘economic inclusion through legal exclusion’ 
links to migrant penalisation. Orthodox political-economic analyses of punishment have 
                                                     
1186
 Reyneri (2004b, p. 84) 
1187
 ISTAT, http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/39522 Accessed July 2012. 
1188
 Calavita (2005a, p. 64) 
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emphasised that punishment falls disproportionately on the poor
1189
. In this sense, immigrants 
in Western European polities, relegated to economic marginality, are obvious candidates for 
penalisation. De Giorgi explains that this happens by a process he terms ‘hyper-
criminalisation’1190. Part of this process sees (some) immigrants commit ‘crimes of 
desperation’1191: impelled by their economic marginality (and potential irregularity), they 
typically engage in crimes against property and drug-related crimes, or prostitution. 1990s 
criminal justice data bears this out, with substantial numbers of foreigners sentenced for 
property offences or ‘offences against the economy’ (including drug offences). In addition to 
these ‘desperate’ and highly-visible crimes1192, immigrants may also be implicated in crimes 
of immigration, those offences that attach to, or are aggravated by, their migrant status
1193
.  
                                                     
1189
 See for example De Giorgi (2010); Wacquant (2009) 
1190
 De Giorgi (2010, p. 152) 
1191
 Ibid., p. 149; Rusche (1933/1978, p. 4) 
1192
 Angel-Ajani (2003, p. 438); De Giorgi (2010, p. 157); Melossi (2003, p. 379) 
1193
 De Giorgi (2010, p. 158) 
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Figure 5a – Sentenced foreigners, in Italy, by offence type 1990 - 1995 
 
 
Figure 5b – Sentenced foreigners, in Italy, by offence type 1996 – 2000 
 
 
Source: My elaboration on ISTAT data
1194
  
Note: The data is separated into two different figures (1990-1995 and 1996-2000), due to 
changes in the categorisation of offences.  
 
The causes of migrant involvement in crime are complex. For example, Caritas data show that 
Italy’s immigrants have tended to be young, urban and male, and it is difficult to know the 
extent to which these socio-demographic characteristics, rather than their immigrant status, 
have contributed to their involvement in crime
1195
. I contend that in the Italian context, certain 
                                                     
1194
 ISTAT (1990-2001) 
1195
 Holmberg and Kyvsgaard (2003); Lacey (2008, pp. 155-156); Melossi et al. (2009) 
Arguably this caveat does not apply to immigration offences, such as overstaying. 
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structural characteristics – precarious regularity, low political integration, low political 
representation – make migrants ‘penal outsiders’ regardless of their demographic make-up1196. 
In any case, and whatever the factors contributing to their deviance, migrants’ interaction with 
the criminal justice system is marked by systematic disadvantage where ‘legal, economic and 
social vulnerability’1197 collide with procedural requirements for diversion from prison. This 
increases migrants’ exposure to formal punishment: in Italy, for example, house arrest 
(roughly equivalent to remand on bail) requires appropriate housing, and lack of appropriate 
housing (a problem often faced by immigrants) leads to incarceration on remand
1198
. As 
Melossi argues, ‘there is […] a tendency to bifurcation, where Italian offenders tend to get 
more and more non-detentive custody and punishment terms, whereas foreigners are […] 
locked in prison more often, before and after trial’1199. 
Combined, crimes of desperation, immigration crimes, and procedural disadvantages, 
precipitate immigrants’ criminalisation and subsequent detention. The stigmatic involvement 
with the criminal justice system further relegates immigrants to economic vulnerability. 
Economic marginality may then take on a racial and cultural dimension when it becomes 
conceptually welded to migrants’ presumed racial and cultural differences1200. Calavita and 
Angel-Ajani note, through notions of cultural essentialism, that immigrants are perceived as 
being ‘culturally’ disinclined to respect Italy’s legal tenets1201. We then have a series of 
mutually reinforcing vicious cycles at work in Italian society: crime and otherness are equated 
and connected to migration, economic marginality is perceived as being limited to immigrants 
and immigration, crime and economic subordination become synonymous. These cycles blur 
the boundaries between myth and realities of migrant existence, contributing to plunge 
foreigners deeper into economic subordination.  
 
This link between marginality and penalisation partly explains why non-EU migrants were 
‘hyper-incarcerated’1202 in 1990s’ Italy. However, I suggest that to fully understand the 
mechanism of migrant punishment in Italy, we need to look at the other jaw of the legal vice. 
 
                                                     
1196
 Solivetti (2012, pp. 143-144) 
1197
 Lacey (2008, p. 156) 
1198
 De Giorgi (2010, p. 156);  In general see:Van Kalmthout A, F, and F (2007) 
1199
 Melossi (2003, p. 381) See also: Solivetti (2012, p. 135); Strozza and Cibella (2006, p. 
153) 
1200
 Calavita (2005b, p. 414) 
1201
 Angel-Ajani (2000, p. 343); Calavita (2005a, pp. 148-154) See also Balibar (1991) 
1202
 De Giorgi (2010, p. 148) 
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IV. The over-incarceration jaw: migrants as outsiders and dependence on Italian law 
i. Migrants’ dependence on law: law as a primary definer 
During the 1990s, non-EU migrants depended upon immigration law insofar as they needed it 
to obtain some formal recognition within the Italian polity. I argue that this dependence was a 
necessary condition for the exclusion-inclusion dynamics described by De Giorgi: 
immigration law was capable of sustaining these dynamics precisely because migrants needed 
its legal recognition and suffered when the recognition granted only temporary legal 
inclusion. Non-EU migrants’ dependence thus had a formal side, their lack of political 
citizenship, which was entrenched by both immigration and citizenship law, as they laid down 
the conditions for the acquisition of Italian citizenship or permanent residence
1203
. The 
citizenship law passed in 1992 allowed for the acquisition of citizenship by non-EU migrants 
only after ten years’ legal residence1204. Alternatively, under the 1998 immigration law, it 
became possible to acquire permanent leave to remain where non-EU migrants had legally 
resided in Italy for at least 5 years
1205
. In both cases, legal residence was required to have been 
uninterrupted for the relevant period, which meant that the same type of labour as ensured 
regular residence to working migrants was also necessary to ensure citizenship or permanent 
leave to remain. Given what we know of the nature of migrant occupation, and the ease with 
which migrants slipped into irregularity, ‘patching together years of uninterrupted legal 
residence’ to acquire citizenship, was ‘almost impossible’1206. Where citizenship was virtually 
impossible, then, the only legal status available to non-EU immigrants was as the subjects of 
immigration law: in this sense legal status became non-EU migrants’ primary status.  
 
Migrants’ dependence on law also had broader articulations specific to the Italian context. 
Chapter 3 has illustrated how in Italy, citizens’ formal legal identity is often complemented by 
a political identity. ‘Political’ here may indicate some ideological belonging or, in the 1990s 
when the ideologies began to wane, anchorage to broad political structures that also catalyses 
informal resolution of conflict. In Chapter 3, I had shown how these structures included the 
family or family-like political-economic structures, or even political ‘clienteles’. In a context 
marked by a state that claimed to be the central provider of welfare and support, but failed to 
be such a provider
1207
, this additional political identity was crucial. It was important for access 
                                                     
1203
 L. 5 febbraio 1992, n. 91, in materia di "Nuove norme sulla cittadinanza"; see also 
Solivetti (2004 Especially at 186) 
1204
 L. 5 febbraio 1992, n. 91, in materia di "Nuove norme sulla cittadinanza" 
1205
 On a permit granted for a reason that allows an indeterminate number of renewals: art 7, 
Legge Turco-Napolitano: L. 6 marzo 1998, n. 40 
1206
 Calavita (2005b) See also Solivetti (2004, p. 144) 
1207
 Ferrera (1996) 
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to welfare and to employment
1208
, and it was important for diversion from formal penal 
censure into informal social control. Looking at the nature of immigration during the 1990s, it 
appears, however, that in most cases no such complementary political identity was available 
to migrants. 
This is partly the result of the nature of migration to Italy. In its contemporary history 
the nation has not traditionally been a receiving country but, up to the 1970s, was mainly a 
country of emigration. It began to receive a small number of immigrants during the 1970s and 
then, more solidly, during the late-1980s and early-1990s
1209
. It has since continued to receive 
incoming migrants, to the extent that ‘at the end of 2000, the incidence of foreigners on the 
total population [made] Italy the fourth European country in terms of immigration’, after 
Germany, France and the United Kingdom’1210. This influx consisted of immigrants from 
economically ‘developing’ nations into ‘Fortress Europe’ with a significant number from the 
former Soviet bloc
1211
. Data (Caritas and ISTAT, Figure 7) confirm a steadily growing 
presence of immigrants in Italy since the late-1980s. Where ISTAT data is narrowed to 
include only ‘high pressure migration nations’, the percentage increase is markedly higher: 
134 percent across the decade
1212
. 
                                                     
1208
 See Chapter 3; see also Mingione (1994) 
1209
 Bozzini and Fella (2008, p. 246); Melossi (2003, p. 378) 
1210
 Ammendola, Forti, Pittau, and Ricci (2004) 
1211
 Calavita (2005b, p. 413) 
1212
  High-pressure migration nations include Eastern European countries and ‘developing 
countries’: Caritas (1998). Unless specified, where data refer to ‘foreigners’ we cannot 
assume that they refer only to individuals from high-pressure nations. They may include 
foreigners from non-EU, highly-developed nations, not systematically involved in the 
processes under consideration.  
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Figure 6: Italy – Net Migration rate 1956 - 2006 
 
Source: OECD
1213
 
                                                     
1213
 OECD, http://www.oecd.org/statsportal Accessed October 2008. 
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Figure 7:  Foreigners resident in Italy, by type of nation (1983-2000) 
 
Source: my elaboration on ISTAT and Caritas data
1214
. 
Note: all data are originally calculated on the basis of Interior Ministry data. 
 
More than half of the migrants entering Italy during this period were men, and were 
overwhelmingly young – with 68 percent between 19 and 40 years of age1215. There were few 
minors, suggesting that the migrant population was mainly unaccompanied, rather than 
consisting of families with children. Support for this can be sought in data on reasons for 
residence, with permits granted for ‘family reasons’ (including reunification) never exceeding 
26 percent of all permits
1216
, though the number of family reunifications did increase across 
the decade
1217
. Immigration to Italy was also characterised by its heterogeneity
1218
: the biggest 
resident national group (Morocco) made up an average of ten percent of all foreign residents 
across the 1990s; the four next-largest groups varied between just over 4 and just over 5 
percent of all foreign residents
1219
. This heterogeneity is partly a reflection of the lack of 
former colonies for which Italy would have been an obvious migratory destination
1220
, and 
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 As quoted in Caritas (1993-2003) 
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 Ibid. 
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 See also Solivetti (2012, p. 144) 
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 Levels of reunification will vary by migrant communities: see Strozza and Cibella (2006, 
p. 118). 
The increase is to be expected, as immigration gains stronger foothold over the decade. I am 
not arguing that immigrants were always or totally ‘lone individuals’ in Italy. I claim that they 
experienced greater isolation from family/kinship than the national population and migrants 
with settled communities in nations with longer histories of immigration. 
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has tended to imply that, once in Italy, migrants have not found large settled communities 
from their country of origin on which to rely for support
1221
.  
 
This is not to say that immigrants have not found any support when arriving to Italy. Bozzini 
and Fella point to the existence of an ‘advocacy coalition within [Italian] civil society’ 
composed of ‘social movement organisations […] and public interest groups that [defended] 
the rights of immigrants and [promoted] their welfare’1222. This ‘coalition’ included 
immigrant associations – both of and for migrants – as well as trade unions and non-
governmental organisations
1223
. Notable amongst the organisations of denominational origin 
is the Italian Caritas, linked to the Catholic Church
1224
. The 1998 Turco-Napolitano law also 
contained numerous provisions favouring immigrant integration, including the creation of a 
‘Comission for Integration policies […] charged with the task of drafting an annual report on 
the state of implementation of policies for the integration of immigrants’1225. ‘Territorial 
councils’ have also been founded – composed of local politicians, local organisations, 
workers and employers’ organisations – with the aim of ‘involving pro-immigrant civil 
society actors’ to inform ‘policy affecting immigrants’1226. 
However, when discussing the ‘political outsiderness’ of immigrants in 1990s’ Italy 
and their consequent dependence on the law, it is essential to question not just the existence, 
but also the effectiveness of such associations and initiatives. Effectiveness means their 
capacity to grant migrants political representation and integration, in particular with a view to 
participation in Italian political life. This participation would ideally provide migrants with 
power to influence their living conditions by contributing (directly or indirectly) to policy-
making, including immigration and citizenship policy. Looking at the 1998 Turco-Napolitano 
law, however, it appears that migrants groups’ influence on its formulation was limited. Thus 
the legislation provided for administrative detention for migrants despite the fact that it was 
‘much contested by pro-immigrant associations’1227. This episode may express a wider 
phenomenon: the relative lack of influence exerted generally by associations on immigration 
policy and its application: ‘[I]mmigrants often complained that, in the forums for dialogue set 
up by the Turco-Napolitano law ‘there [were] no real links between the deliberative process 
                                                     
1221
 Quassoli (1999, p. 219) 
1222
 Bozzini and Fella (2008, p. 247) 
1223
 Calavita (2005a, p. 117) 
1224
 Bozzini and Fella (2008) 
1225
 Ibid., p. 248; Calavita (2005a, pp. 31-33) 
1226
 Basili (2006, p. 40); Bozzini and Fella (2008, p. 247); Calavita (2005a, p. 79) 
1227
 Bozzini and Fella (2008, p. 246) This testifies to the legislations’ ‘twin souls’: committed 
to integration but establishing a precarious form of regular residence: Calavita (2005a, pp. 43-
47)  
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and the decision making process’1228. Claudia Mantovan provides an even starker judgement 
in her study of ‘participation and self-organisation of immigrants in the Veneto’. She claims 
that initiatives such as consultations and inter-ethnic organisations, set up in the ‘late 1980s 
and early 1990s’ to foster migrant participation, ‘largely failed’ in Veneto1229, a region 
identified by Calavita as one of the most active in terms of integration policies
1230
.  
This is not to say that legislative efforts at integration were in bad faith, or simply 
political posturing
1231
. Rather, I point to the gap existing between legislation and its 
implementation, which may be seen as a broader feature of Italian law (Chapter 3). The gap 
has been described specifically in relation to the Turco-Napolitano law as the result of 
‘implementation deficits’, ‘deficiencies in the effective application of [integration policies] – 
the contrast between [the legislative] objectives declared and [the] results obtained’. It also 
encompasses deficiencies ‘in the institutional tools’ available to effectively implement policy 
objectives
1232
. Macioti and Pugliese note how these deficits result partly from the division of 
labour inherent in the legislation: general decisions and policy outlooks are determined at the 
national level, funds and applicatory legislation are laid down at the regional level, and actual 
application occurs at the local level
1233
. These deficits may also have resulted from the limited 
popular support commanded by immigration integration policy during the 1990s such that, 
after 2001 and a change in political guard, any initiatives ‘could be abandoned without 
political fallout’1234. Lack of public support also made ‘the option of ignoring the demands of 
[pro-immigrant] advocacy groups […] an easier one for decision makers’ to take1235. In fact, 
as the 1990s unfolded, it was the contrast to – and control of –immigration that gained 
increasing political clout, with politicians very reluctant to support integration initiatives for 
fear of losing votes
1236
.  
Looking specifically at associations of migrants for migrants, the question remains as 
to what their level of influence was in Italian politics and whether it could make them 
effective surrogates for migrants’ formal political dis-integration and thus a source of 
substantive political integration.  By 2001, there were an estimated 750 immigrant 
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associations in Italy, sided by 150 associations of Italians acting on migrants’ behalf1237.  
Bozzini and Fella have described the immigrant associations as ‘weak, fragmented [and] 
small-scale’, with greater focus on ‘cultural initiatives […] than [on] political 
mobilisation’1238. This suggests two things: firstly, that the associations were not directly 
concerned with providing political representation (a harder task than service provision). 
Secondly, that even in their socio-cultural support functions they may have been too ‘weak’ 
and ‘fragmented’ to transform immigrants into a ‘critical mass’ within Italian society. This 
further suggests that the associations and initiatives were not firmly rooted in the Italian 
political context, nor were they capable of providing migrants with a political representation 
that lasted over time
1239
.  Rather, immigrant and pro-immigrant associations were better 
placed to provide ‘frontline services’ – welfare and social assistance, particularly on migrants’ 
arrival to Italy, mutual aid rather than political participation
1240
. 
Mantovan has noted an additional obstacle to migrant participation through third-
sector initiatives: the marginality of immigrants’ influence relative to the influence of Italian 
nationals within integration initiatives. From her research it appears that ‘Italians […] 
monopolised all the central positions within the local immigration field’1241. This also meant 
that, in the absence of migrants’ right to vote in administrative elections, ‘the forms of 
“representation” that resulted, addressed a need on the part of the host society’ rather than of 
the immigrants themselves
1242
. A similar point is made by the Caritas itself, noting that 
migrants’ associations ‘have often felt that Italian associations […] were competitors rather 
than allies’ and that ‘they benefitted from greater access to resources1243.  
 
It is again the Caritas that provides us with a summative statement of migrants’ political 
‘outsiderness’ in Italy despite the presence of third-sector associations and integration 
initiatives: 
 
‘Currently immigrants are not legitimately recognised actors, but represented only by 
trade unions and non-profit organisations. [This means] that the processes of 
[immigrant] inclusion [into the Italian polity] are managed without [migrants’] 
participation as principal actors […] [Immigrants in Italy] participate in civil society 
without being able to access [the political sphere] and this lack of participation 
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increases already existing difficulties […] [It places migrants] in a position of 
subordination, given the continued denial of their right to vote in administrative 
elections, and the […] difficulties [they face] in acquiring citizenship’1244. 
 
This evaluation – provided by one of the associations most influential in the immigration field 
– is an apt synthesis of immigrants’ political subordination. It clearly identifies immigrants as 
political outsiders, though with an emphasis on its formal aspects – the exclusion from 
citizenship and from political participation. Immigrants’ right to vote in local elections was 
indeed canvassed and repeatedly rejected over the years
1245
. Mantovan further adds that the 
‘polycentric fragmentation’ of immigrant communities (Table 5) and the ‘recent nature of 
immigration to Italy’ were further obstacles to migrants’ successful political participation, 
substantive as well as formal
1246
. Tellingly, she claims that within the immigrant 
communities, it is those who have acquired Italian citizenship or have been resident in Italy 
for many years – those ‘who are a bit less immigrant’ – who manage to command the greatest 
relative power within the immigration policy field
1247
. In the language of my argument, these 
are individuals who have become political insiders – either formally or substantively. 
Whether through citizenship or long-term residence they have acquired an identity that is 
additional to the (legal) identity laid down in immigration law, and their residence no longer 
needs to be constantly re-legitimised. 
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Table 6: First ten non-EU nationalities present in Italy 1990-2000 (excluding USA)   
Country 
Average percentage 1990 to 2000 (as a 
percentage of total immigrant 
residents)  
Average number of 
immigrants 1990 to 1998 
(number of residents)
1248
 
Morocco 10.40 105,159 
Former 
Yugoslavia 5.16 
49,716 
Philippines 4.73 48,543 
Tunisia 4.54 45,120 
Albania 4.25 43,760 
Senegal 2.87 28,605 
People’s 
Republic of 
China 2.59 
25,567 
Egypt 2.37 23,490 
Romania 2.34 23,209 
Poland 2.26 22,939 
 Source: my elaboration on Caritas data
1249
  
 
Public and policy acknowledgement that people were systematically immigrating into Italy, 
and that their immigration might be different in nature to the industrial migration of the 1950s 
and 1960s, came late
1250. Moreover, immigration policy was unable to acquire a ‘deep-seated 
[…] framework’ and was susceptible to changing short-term political moods1251. Even when 
the reality of migration was acknowledged, the character of the phenomenon continued to be 
unclear. Italy still lacks accurate and official numbers for its immigrant population: the best 
sources of information are provided by the ISTAT and the Caritas (elaborating upon Interior 
Ministry figures). However, given that the institutions use different methodologies, they too 
provide substantially different measures of immigrants’ presence. Moreover, official data fail 
to capture the incidence of irregular migrants, or to track shifts between regularity and 
irregularity. This raises the issue of migrants’ ‘unknowability’, an expression that I use to 
indicate the factual but also symbolic purgatory occupied by immigrants in Italian society
1252
.  
Symbolically, immigrants are abstracted and feared and, at the level of public 
discourse and centralised legislation, the precise shape and impact of immigration (who, how 
many, with what effect for the Italian polity) seems to have been estimated more than 
established
1253
. At the same time, immigration is made knowable by the imposition of 
categories and presumptions that eventually influence migrants’ experience; the presumption, 
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for example, widespread during the 1990s that Italy was being ‘invaded’ by immigrants, in 
particular by migrants from the Maghreb and Eastern Europe
1254
. Or, as Angel-Ajani notes, 
the ‘[d]iscourses of criminality and “job stealing” that [were…] increasingly projected onto 
[immigrant] communities’1255.  These discourses may have practical, negative, effects for 
foreigners: where they contribute to a racialised perception of criminal activity they may, for 
example, skew policing of crime against migrants
1256
. It has also been suggested that these 
myths affect popular perception of non-EU migrants as inherently deviant and that this is 
reflected in the mismatch between the number of immigrants reported and the number 
actually arrested
1257
. 
The lack of knowledge on migrants has a number of implications beyond difficulties 
in estimating immigrant presence. Their contribution to the Italian economy may also go 
unrecognised, given the informality of much migrant labour and the relative ‘invisibility’ of 
their labour activity. Moreover, since migrants lack large communities with a representative 
voice, we are again left with myths and assumptions that consolidate over time, and become 
more difficult to cast off. Mantovan notes how migrants lament the ‘lack of access to the 
mediating and political “foundry” which shapes their social image’1258. The myths on 
immigrants may be the product of media discourse or instrumental political rhetoric, and of 
some academic work on migration as it tries to grapple with erratic information or where it 
too is politically-driven. Yet there is no reason why we should be relying on such assumptions 
in analysing immigration, particularly if this reinforces the stereotypes that stigmatise 
migrants
1259
.   
In the face of this ‘unknowability’, the law – as an emanation of the state, and as a 
force less arbitrary than myth, assumption or popular common sense – becomes the primary 
tool for making migrants ‘knowable’. In Melossi’s words, ‘the law literally runs after 
[migrants] trying to pin them down, to […] define them’1260. The law thus acts as migrants’ 
‘primary definer’ at a symbolic level1261. Significantly, I have argued that immigration law 
also acts as their ‘primary definer’ at a practical level, by laying down conditions for 
migrants’ ‘regularity’ and ‘irregularity’. The law – and immigration law in particular – thus 
wields considerable power over immigrants’ fate. Immigrants’ fate will consequently vary on 
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the basis of the law’s definition of migrants. Even where penalisation has occurred, and 
involvement in the criminal justice system has put the penal law in charge of migrants’ 
‘biographies’1262, this second level of definition rests upon immigrants’ initial dependence 
upon migration law. Migrants are, initially, legal subjects alone, and only after are they 
recognised as economic subjects through the law’s definition. From there, the structural 
mechanisms that follow from economic marginality make them easy penal subjects. 
 
ii. Outsiders and insiders: migrant profiles in the Italian context 
This exclusively legal identity makes migrants political outsiders because immigration law 
grants non-EU migrants only very precarious regularity. In part, however, it is also because 
migrants’ legal identity lacks the broad political anchorage that, in Italy, catalyses informal 
resolution of conflict. This lack is apparent if an (ideal-type) profile for migrants in 1990s 
Italy is contrasted with a similar profile for ‘successful’ Italian nationals. The immigrant 
profile can be drawn up by combining socio-demographic information and information on 
migrants’ economic position.  The ‘successful national’ profile derives from an analysis of 
Italy’s political economy. 
 
Beginning with the migrant profile, the picture emerging from Caritas data points to non-EU 
immigration from a multiplicity of nations, made up mainly of young, unaccompanied 
individuals, a (slight) majority of whom are males
1263
. Kinship ties seem to be weak for 
immigrants – as evidenced by the ‘polycentric fragmentation’ of migrant communities – at 
least during the 1990s and especially for some groups
1264
. We also know that migrants in Italy 
work mainly in dependent labour, and informal (irregular or insufficiently-regulated) 
labour
1265.  Immigrants were ‘well established as employees on all the lower rungs of the 
labour market’1266. From Macioti and Pugliese’s elaboration of social security data, it emerges 
that, between 1994 and 1997, the majority of immigrants registered as employees were 
employed in metallurgy and mechanics. Immigrants were also employed in commerce and 
construction; employment in textiles and chemical industries increased by the end of the 
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decade
1267
. They were also employed in the informal economy, with the highest incidence in 
catering and tourism, cleaning services, domestic work, artisan work and small commerce
1268
. 
Immigrants also face substantial difficulties finding adequate housing in Italy
1269
, and lack of 
housing is a substantial obstacle preventing family reunification, which requires that the 
migrant possess provably adequate living facilities in Italy. Lack of housing also contributes 
to migrants’ over-incarceration where they are incapable of providing the fixed address 
necessary for both house arrest and access to alternative sentences
1270
.   
 
How would a migrant fare in Italy, if s/he were to correspond to this profile? As seen in 
Chapter 3, the Italian political economy is state-driven, with a welfare state both corporatist 
and fragmented
1271
. Welfare rests heavily on supplementary sources of welfare assistance, 
most often the family
1272, leading Enzo Mingione to talk of the ‘familial physiognomy’ of the 
Italian working class
1273
. This creates a tension between public and private forms of welfare 
support that mirrors a more general dualism between public and private realms in Italy; with 
the public seemingly carved up along private lines. The Italian political economy is 
territorially segmented, divided into ‘three Italies’1274: the industrialised northwest; the 
northeast and centre typified by small and medium sized enterprises; and the South, whose 
primarily agricultural economy has been replaced with tertiary occupations distributed along 
clientelistic lines
1275
. 
 
Briefly looking at this context, we can consider the viability of non-EU migrants in Italy 
finding economic stability in a number possible of situations. On the basis of my 
understanding of theory and data, I hypothesise that economic stability would follow from 
integration into ‘First Italy’-type employment, and acquisition of the ‘adult male 
breadwinner’ role that carries with it stable work and social security. Alternatively, and given 
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the shortage of such labour
1276
, migrants could work in the small and medium sized concerns 
diffuse across northern and central Italy, as has indeed tended to occur
1277
. Given that such 
firms usually entail lower levels of regulation (covering security and wages), employment 
would have to be supplemented by kinship ties within the workplace, or by the family as 
welfare provider, in order to avert economic difficulties. Enzo Mingione and Kitty Calavita 
both suggest that this additional socio-political integration has not been forthcoming for 
migrants, despite their economic inclusion. Mingione hypothesises that, though industrial 
districts have become increasingly open to immigrant labour, ‘immigrants are [nonetheless] 
excluded from local trust-based networks’1278. This may also account for Calavita’s 
observation that, in regions such as Emilia Romagna (part of the ‘Third Italy’): ‘[the] intense 
demand for immigrant workers does not […] seem to translate into their increased bargaining 
power or improved working condition’1279. 
 
The family’s centrality arguably extends to all sectors of Italian society, few being the 
breadwinners in stable and protected employment (Chapter 3)
1280
. Mingione points to the 
crucial role of ‘householding and family strategies’ as ‘non-monetary and informal resources’ 
complementary to the ‘monetary and officially recorded resources’ (e.g. state welfare) that 
promote ‘individual welfare and social mobility’1281. The ‘particularistic/reciprocity based’ 
strategies enacted by families range from income pooling and investment, to access to 
political patrons via a family member. They make up for the ‘persistent deficiencies of the 
public welfare system and [for] serious housing problems’1282. By analogy, this would suggest 
that immigration and integration would be easier for groups where there was already a 
presence in Italy. Such groups would be able to replicate the ‘collective solidaristic’ strategies 
necessary to navigate the public/private divide in Italy. This condition was, however, difficult 
to achieve given the fragmentation of immigrant communities in Italy (Table 5) and the 
absence of a ‘critical mass’ or kinship network to join: recall the discussion of the obstacles 
created by migrants’ ‘polycentric fragmentation’ to their social and political integration. 
Obstacles to family reunification also impair migrant collective strategies
1283
. Moreover, 
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family reunification itself may not be enough to overcome scarce political integration
1284
. 
Mingione’s frequent reference to ‘long-term […] intergenerational […] strategies’ of Italian 
families
1285
 implies a rootedness of Italian families. Hence, for the family to function as a 
politico-economic resource, it is not enough for it to be a family nucleus present on Italian 
territory, it is important for the family to be extended (possibly) and (certainly) capable of 
tapping into resources otherwise not available through universalistic, formal means (e.g. 
housing benefits and unemployment benefits)
1286
. This presumes a relatively long-term 
presence combined with social and political integration complementary to inclusion in 
economic activities
1287
. Finally, and particularly in the South, political patronage could ensure 
a certain economic stability, especially in the face of economic stagnation and 
unemployment
1288
. Note that where the clientelistic relationship is premised on the exchange 
of decisions for votes,
1289
 it will only be possible where the client is a voter, and migrants are 
not
1290
. Formulated in terms of Italian dualisms, this means that economic stability in Italy 
requires anchorage to political structures that allow individuals to bridge the gap between 
public and private realms and public and private welfare.   
 
Comparing migrant profiles with these conditions for integration, we are again faced with a 
picture of immigrants’ relegation to economic marginality. They have neither the working nor 
the social conditions for success; they are excluded both from long-term, protected labour and 
from the social structures that shield nationals facing similar exclusion in all three political-
economic regions. Hence, where penalisation ensues from economic marginality, the penal 
effects are not the results of economic subordination alone. Significantly, they are the result 
of migrants’ exclusion from those ulterior (political) structures that complement nationals’ 
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economic status: the family ties that tend to accompany informal labour and allow for some 
protection in the absence of state regulation; the kinship ties that accompany employment in 
small and medium industries, promoting mutual trust and, importantly, informal resolution of 
conflict; and the political clienteles that act as welfare supplements. Immigrants in 1990s’ 
Italy, often alone (because single but often also without a family present) and with weak 
community/kinship ties, could rarely rely on such bonds and integrative structures. They are 
not voters; they are visibly other within Italian communities; they are early newcomers bereft 
of their own community or family networks; and they are thrown back on surrogate forms of 
political representation that help but do not compensate for the lack of in/formal political 
integration.  
 
What this discussion further suggests – and what my discussion of third sector assistance to 
migrants implied – is the need to relate our analyses of migrant punishment more closely to 
the context in which it occurs. Here ‘context’ means the national political system, its 
institutions and its attitudes to the law, including those that require political integration to 
bridge the public/private gap. Luigi Solivetti makes a similar point, emphasising the 
importance of host country characteristics in explaining over-incarceration
1291
. Solivetti 
undertakes linear regression analysis that tests the relationship between over-representation 
ratio of non-nationals (‘relative index of non-national imprisonment’) and a series of 
contextual variables across 18 Western European countries
1292. These include their ‘socio-
economic and cultural characteristics’, level of socio-economic wellbeing, equity and social 
cohesion, education and knowledge, and transparency
1293
. They also include measures of 
‘non-national integration’ in their host country, and measures of immigrant origin1294. Italy is 
included in Solivetti’s study, which covers the period 1990-2000. Solivetti uses his analysis to 
explain the ‘dissimilar non-national shares’ of the prison population in different European 
nations
1295
. Crucially, for my purposes, he tests a set of variables that he collectively terms 
‘institutional social capital’ that measure the vertical links between state and immigrants in 
their host country
1296
. Amongst these variables we find transparency – a measure of 
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corruption and ‘[…] solidarity […] and […] particularism’, i.e., ‘the prevalence of private 
over collective, interests’1297, but also ‘rule of law’ – the reliability of the justice system – and 
the hidden economy
1298. I suggest that this ‘institutional social capital’ can be used to gauge 
the accessibility of political and legal institutions for citizens, as well as the institutions’ 
compliance with formal, transparent rules (‘fairness and universalism’)1299. Solivetti also tests 
over-incarceration against a number of other variables, including those that measure 
economic inequality and relative deprivation.  
 
From his quantitative analysis, Solivetti concludes: 
 
‘the non-national imprisonment index is higher in countries where [there are] 
particularly low incomes for the poor, unfair income distribution, little social 
protection, high corruption level, scarce rule of law […] widespread hidden economy 
[…]’1300 
 
Given the literature I have been dealing with thus far, it is not surprising that economic 
inequality and low social protection should be associated with high levels of migrant 
incarceration. It is perhaps more interesting to note that Solivetti’s analysis points to higher 
overrepresentation where ‘non-nationals have rapidly grown over the last few years […] their 
children are fewer (that is, families are less numerous and roots limited) […] illegal 
immigration is common; and […] non-nationals from non-European and [less developed 
countries] are numerous and growing’1301. This description seems to sum up the state of 
immigration to Italy, particularly during the decade I am considering. Even more interesting is 
Solivetti’s additional observation that ‘indicators of legality (corruption, rule of law, hidden 
economy and illegal immigration) show coefficients higher than those shown by indicators 
of economic well-being, equity and relative deprivation’1302. This suggests that there is greater 
association between the indicators of legality and incarceration index (controlling for other 
explanatory variables) than between indicators of economic wellbeing and incarceration, 
(controlling for other explanatory variables)
1303
.  
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Since Solivetti’s research includes Italy, it can be used to provide some indirect support for 
my theoretical claims. Importantly, it points to the significance of political and legal variables 
for immigrant incarceration, emphasising the role of ‘legality’ in processes of criminalisation 
and punishment (see section below). In Solivetti’s claims on ‘transparency’, ‘rule of law’, and 
‘institutional social capital’, we can read a hypothesis on the link between punishment and the 
availability/distribution of collective goods within different polities
1304
. We can use his work 
in a discussion of law and punishment in Italy, a nation in which collective goods have been 
relatively scarce, as has their distribution by means of clear and unequivocal norms 
(‘transparency’ and ‘rule of law’). I have argued that in such a context the low level of 
collective goods (‘institutional social capital’) makes it necessary for individuals to belong to 
intermediate political structures that can compensate for the lack of collective goods. This 
‘belonging’ is the additional political identity  – acquired over time and once established 
within the local context – required to supplement citizens’ (bare) legal identity. It is the 
substantive political belonging that is complementary to formal political belonging  – 
citizenship. As Solivetti’s analysis suggests, this type of additional political integration may 
be more relevant to immigrant incarceration than economic deprivation, though the two will 
clearly act in concert. The conclusion to draw from this would be that, at an equivalent level 
of economic marginality, immigrants might be more exposed to the criminal justice system 
than Italian nationals, the latter being more politically integrated. This is a claim that remains 
to be tested empirically but it is, as I have shown, a well-supported hypothesis worth 
investigating (on a par with De Giorgi’s political-economic analysis of migrant hyper-
incarceration). This finding would also bolster the notion that punishment in Italy, as a whole, 
reflects patterns of political ‘insiderness’ and ‘outsiderness’. 
 Kitty Calavita seems to imply a similar political distinction between immigrants and 
Italians. She describes the economic difficulties faced by ‘the locally dispossessed’ such as 
Italian youth employed in the underground economy, emphasising their inability to find 
independent housing, and thus their tendency to live with their parents ‘well into their 
twenties and thirties […]’1305. However, the very characteristics she is using as ‘markers’ of 
nationals’ poverty would also insulate ‘young Italian workers’ from penalisation, by allowing 
for alternatives to imprisonment, or because of the informal social control the family 
exerts
1306
. By contrast, migrants are very often excluded from such protective structures, 
precipitating their dependence on law, which remains their primary resource in Italy. This is 
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particularly so for irregular migrants for whom the penal system may come to ‘[constitute] the 
only system of welfare available, lato sensu’ 1307.  
  As in co-ordinated market economies and their institutional structures, where non-EU 
immigrants are not already integrated in Italy’s cultural-political structures, the reintegration 
of deviant migrants becomes more difficult. Note also that the relative lack of political sway 
for migrants’ demands may well reduce the chances of this situation changing over time 
(whether through migrant associations or via Italian ‘surrogates’)1308. The fragmentation of 
migrant communities and associations, the absence of effective political interlocutors
1309
 and 
the absence of public support for a further political integration of immigrants all limit 
migrants’ access to policy making including policy that affects their legal status and socio-
political integration. This lack of formal political influence will precipitate migrants’ need to 
belong to those intermediate political subjects that bridge the gap between ‘legal Italy’ and 
‘real Italy’1310 (and the ‘implementation deficits’ for immigrant integration). This form of 
substantive ‘political belonging’ is what tends to follow from being a client, a voter, a 
member of a family rooted in Italy: in short from being Italian in Italy
1311
. It would logically 
follow that those migrants capable of replicating such conditions are those best protected 
against over-incarceration. Given how unlikely this ‘replication’ was – certainly during the 
first decade of large-scale migration into Italy – it is unsurprising that immigrants were 
overrepresented in Italian prisons. 
 
By effecting a comparison between immigrants and ‘successful Italians’, I am not implying 
that all Italians are successful and all non-EU immigrants necessarily marginal. There are 
Italians who are economically marginal and whose marginality might well warn us against 
assuming that formal citizenship automatically leads to substantive inclusion
1312
. Though 
imprisonment data does not exist that would allow us to test the claim (see introduction), I 
nonetheless hypothesise that, when we pass from economic marginality to penalisation and 
incarceration, the distinction between nationals and foreigners is likely to subsist. Whatever 
the limits of formal citizenship we should not underestimate how disempowering it is to lack 
such citizenship
1313
. As Dal Lago argues, we should not be too eager to conflate the 
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punishment of immigrants with the punishment of national ‘outsiders’1314, but ought to 
distinguish immigrants from ‘all those subjects that experience radical social exclusion [such 
as] the homeless, drug addicts, the poor’. Though the latter may share social hardship with 
migrants at the margins of Italian society, they are nonetheless ‘legitimate subjects’, i.e., 
individuals with formal civil rights, whose residence in Italy needs no legal affirmation
1315
. 
Non-EU migrants, by contrast, are ab initio excluded from making demands of the Italian 
state
1316
. In making any political claims, they are dependent upon the mediation of 
associations that may not always be representative, and whose influence may in any case be 
limited. Moreover, as I will now show, because of the particular nature of Italian law, 
migrants may find that as primarily legal subjects they are also exposed to a greater risk of 
penalisation.  
iii. Depending upon Italian law 
The law (all law) in Italy is a capricious creature, operated on a discretionary basis
1317
. It also 
displays a dualism between principle and pragmatism that is essential to Italian legal/political 
culture, but that can act to confound migrants not aware of its exigencies. Furthermore, the 
dualism can catch migrants without the resources necessary to inhabit this contradiction, 
primarily, I have been arguing, complementary legal and political identities
1318
. 
We can find echoes of this account in Melossi’s analysis of Italian society and its 
criminogenic consequences’ vis-à-vis migrants1319. Melossi characterises Italy as beset by 
‘widespread illegality’1320 (Chapter 4) an illegality that is fostered by (some) citizens’ 
instrumental attitude to the state
1321. He talks also of the ‘hypocritical tolerance’1322 of Italian 
society, whereby acceptance of deviance stops mainly where ‘suitable enemies’1323 are 
concerned. This was particularly true after the 1990s corruption scandal, which engendered 
the need for visible punishment
1324
. Economic marginality and criminalisation of migrants 
made migrants just such ‘suitable enemies’1325. Hypocritical censure of deviance thus 
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crystallised into demands for strict legal compliance by immigrants, who were faced with 
intransigent demands for legality, even as the ‘apparent lack of law […] [made] learning […] 
by example almost impossible’1326.  
In a context marked by dual attitudes to law, immigrants lacked the structural, 
political and cultural co-ordinates to navigate Italian law
1327
. Foreigners were almost always 
excluded from its web of informal social control and social provision; an exclusion that both 
expressed and followed from their existence as legal subjects alone. As primarily legal 
subjects, migrants were also the preferred recipients of Italy’s formal control and penal 
harshness. Commentators have described the development of a ‘dual’ penal system, reflected 
in the divergent national and foreign incarceration of the 1990s
1328
. Again we have, not just 
migrants incarceration, but their over-incarceration; following not from their economic 
marginality alone, but from their economic marginality combined with their political 
exclusion. The over-incarceration is then an expression of the insider-outsider dualism of 
1990s Italian penality. 
V. Conclusions 
In the 1990s, Italy received (and began to acknowledge) immigrants from non-EU countries, a 
process that increased and quickened over the decade. Migrants who arrived in Italy found a 
country ambivalent to migration, in dire need of foreign labour but unprepared to accept 
migrants as anything other than labour. Once past the increasingly policed Italian borders, 
migrants – employed in the least protected, least remunerated sectors and bereft of the family 
ties so crucial for stability in Italy – found themselves socially and economically 
marginalised. They were not excluded from the Italian political economy: they were 
integrated, but only as subordinate ‘others’, in a position that did not assure stable legal 
residence, premised on an economic stability that migrants could not achieve. 
 Their marginalisation was not only a consequence of market conditions but was 
legally constructed, reproduced by a constant threat of expulsion or detention, precipitated by 
migrants’ reliance on law for intelligibility in Italy. This process also lent itself to 
criminalisation: because it marked irregularity, and irregularity itself was assumed to imply 
deviance; because it pushed some migrants towards some offences; because poverty and 
crime have often been conflated, and in Italy this link has been racialised, transforming crime 
into the ‘other’s’ cultural attribute. Marginalisation transformed into penalisation where its 
practical effects barred access to legal benefits that divert from prison and where manifest 
irregularity (such as the refusal to show one’s papers) translated into arrest. 
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Migration law’s definition of immigrants as economic individuals then locked them 
into a subordinate position that facilitated penalisation. It could do this because, in Italy, 
immigrants were excluded from the structures and loci of belonging that nationals inhabit. 
Non-EU migrants depended upon immigration law for their primary definition and for 
protection. This dependence on legal definition, and a legal definition that relegated migrants 
to economic marginality, constituted a legal vice. It is this legal vice, and the marginality as 
part of the vice, that contributed to migrants’ over-representation in the Italian criminal justice 
system. Theirs was the penalisation of ‘outsiders’ and not just of economic ‘subordinates’. In 
this chapter, I have argued that non-EU migrants were outsiders because they were excluded 
from political belonging, possessing no bargaining power vis-à-vis their host state, and could 
fall outside its remit. They were bereft of those characteristics that would have allowed them 
to inhabit the contradictions of Italian politics – the welfare dualisms, the tension between 
legal pragmatism and legal principle – without falling foul of its penal dictates. In this 
context, migrants’ otherness was primarily a political reality, and it was as political ‘others’ 
that they were punished. 
This study of the punishment of immigrants thus reinforces the notion that politics are 
a crucial penal determinant in contemporary Italy. It also emphasises that, within the Italian 
context, marked by a differential punitiveness in which repression and leniency alternate, 
leniency is often conditional upon possessing both a legal and a political identity. A nation 
with a highly politicised institutional structure is, unsurprisingly, better inhabited by 
individuals with a well-rooted political identity. Crucially, this is also true in relation to 
national penality. Where individuals, such as migrants, possess a primarily legal identity, 
Italian criminal law reveals itself as particularly strict. It becomes the purveyor of a penal 
severity that is distributed selectively, varying across an outsider-insider dualism. 
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Chapter 7 – Conclusions 
In this thesis I argue that Italian penality is a ‘volatile penal equilibrium’, oscillating between 
repression and leniency, whose variance is determined by short-term political dynamics. The 
politicisation of state institutions in Italy anchors its structural-institutional features to 
political dynamics – conflict between ideologies, or the competition between state and 
intermediate political orders. Italian institutions tend to amplify, rather than restrain, the 
effects of political conflict on penality. This setup is sustained by the tensions of Italian 
political dualisms, by the contradictory structural dynamics and opposing interests that, 
alongside widespread political conflicts, express and reinforce Italy’s institutional instability. 
Italy remains a contested state, torn between centralisation and fragmentation, with 
institutions pervaded by political competition. In this conflictual and politicised environment, 
belonging to political groupings becomes the key to overcome the state’s shortcomings – the 
key to accessing welfare entitlements and the pre-condition for diversion from formal penal 
censure. This is a context which ‘outsiders’, political outsiders – such as migrants – find 
difficult to navigate and in which ‘outsiders’ may find themselves over-penalised, particularly 
where outsiderness combines with economic marginality. 
 
I. The Italian challenge 
Italian penality challenges existing models of contemporary western penality, including the 
theoretical models from which I began, as Italy displays penal trends that escape unitary 
categorisation. Its prison rates fluctuated significantly between 1970 and 2000, a feature that 
stands in the way of characterising the nation in terms of unequivocal ‘penal escalation’. 
However, if we cannot talk of Italy in terms of increasing punitiveness, neither can we talk of 
it in terms of penal moderation: prison rates in Italy did increase, albeit erratically, over the 
three decades and cannot be described as symptoms of penal stability. Rather, Italy exhibits a 
differential punitiveness. Its penality is a volatile equilibrium, whose prison trends oscillate 
over the years, with full-scale penal expansion staved off by safety valves such as amnesties 
and selectively targeting of punitiveness (Chapters 2 and 6). 
 
Italy challenges existing theories of penality in terms of their observed penal trends, the social 
phenomenon that Garland, De Giorgi, and Lacey endeavour to explain
1329
. Italy also 
challenges the authors’ explanatory frameworks, as often it does not comfortably fit the 
political, economic and institutional variables operationalized in existing analyses of western 
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penality. Thus Italy does not, and did not, possess a welfare state similar to Britain’s 
immediate post-war welfare state whose demise Garland decries. This suggests that analyses 
of Italian penality cannot rely on the shrinking of the welfare state and its penal corollaries as 
causes of penal change. Similarly, given the highly fragmented nature of the Italian political 
economy it is not possible to presume, à-la De Giorgi, that Italy has transitioned from 
Fordism into post-Fordism and from Fordist to post-Fordist penality
1330
. Even seen through 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma’s comparative and institutional framework, Italy poses 
challenges
1331. It is a ‘mixed’ political economy1332 that falls outside the varieties of 
capitalism (VoC) poles – liberal and co-ordinated market economies – on which Lacey builds. 
However, Lacey’s analysis remains the most fruitful: my work shares its emphasis on specific 
institutional dynamics, rather than general meta-theories of cultural or economic changes, and 
it is by undertaking an institutional analysis of Italy that I have elaborated a systematic 
explanation of Italian prison trends.  
 
II. Italian penality – the penality of politics. 
When applied to Italy, an institutional analysis points to the importance of political variables, 
which have only recently started to be addressed as primary determinants in contemporary 
theories of western penality. The nature of the Italian state and its institutional setup lead 
short-term political dynamics to be reflected in Italian penality. The political volatility 
experienced in Italy between 1970 and 2000 feeds into the penal volatility of the same period. 
To argue that the Italian institutional setup conveys political dynamics into penality invites 
the question of how and why Italian institutions produce this effect. This is a particularly 
interesting question in light of Lacey’s argument according to which certain institutional 
configurations contribute to penal stability (for example in CMEs)
1333
.  In Italy, however, we 
witness a politicisation of state institutions, such that its state is not ‘neutral’ (Chapters 3 and 
4). Italy is ‘proportionalistic and conflictual’, inhabited by conflicting political interests, each 
of which finds a space to influence decision-making
1334
. In my research I have analysed 
conflict between judicial and political classes, within judicial factions and between different 
judicial penal philosophies, between political parties and party factions, and between different 
political interests. I have shown that the Italian political system does not have a coherently 
institutionalised way of dealing with such conflicts (by contrast, for example, to Germany). 
The warring of various political groupings produces political volatility, which favours penal 
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volatility as each level of political conflict is left to produce, directly or indirectly, pressure 
towards penal repression or penal leniency. In Chapter 2, I showed how the changing 
incidence of these pressures is visible in Italian prison rates and their oscillation.  
 
Italian penality is influenced by politics not just through the institutionalisation of conflict. Its 
penal volatility is also influenced by Italy’s dualisms: one dualism sees a split between centre 
and periphery, with the Italian state at once centralised and fragmented
1335
; a tension also 
exists between principle and pragmatism, between formal and pragmatic policy tools such as 
amnesties or regularisations of non-EU migrants; there is a dualism between public and 
private networks, a tug of war between the state’s formal claims to complete allegiance, and 
the reality of an allegiance due, primarily or in parallel, to other sub-state groupings. A 
similar public-private dualism is visible in welfare provision, where the Italian state makes 
claims to comprehensive provision of welfare but needs private forms of welfare to 
supplement its deficiencies. This division partially explains the divided allegiances mentioned 
above, and helps explain another penally-relevant dualism – insiders and outsiders. Insiders 
are those who can rely on legal and political identities. They are citizens, with stable legal 
belonging, but are also part of additional political groups. This double belonging buffers 
insiders from economic hardship and, crucially, allows them to be subject to informal social 
control rather than formal penal censure. Admittedly, the extent of this reliance will vary for 
insiders (some are more ‘inside’ than others). However, it remains true to say that for 
outsiders – such as (but not only) non-EU immigrants – the absence of complementary legal 
and political identities results in greater exposure to the penal law. There are both fewer 
incentives for informal resolution of conflict and more structural opportunities for penal 
exclusion in relation to outsiders. Conditions of inclusion and their institutional anchorage are 
a key feature of punishment in Italy. The outsider/insider dualism illustrates another political, 
and penal, duality – between formal and informal social control. 
 
How do these dualisms explain Italian penality? I argue that each dualism, like every conflict, 
can be understood in terms of pressures towards penal repression or leniency. In some cases 
the differing pressures result from the varying purchase and role of penal law, and the 
dualisms can be articulated in terms of this purchase and role. Looking again at the tension 
between formal and informal social control, for example, it appears that in some cases the 
penal law has had a minimal role and, as an expression of state authority, has had varying 
purchase (Chapters 3 and 4). The issue of how conflicts and dualisms dictate penal effects 
cannot be resolved simply. Some political conflicts produce opportunities either for penal 
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repression or leniency, and the dualisms influence when these opportunities materialise in 
penal terms. Thus, the relation between judiciary and political class produces both expansive 
judicial powers and a judiciary convinced of its role as representative of legality. This creates 
some opportunity to deploy, and incentives towards deploying, the penal law. Where this 
opportunity structure meets outsiders – such as migrants – it may lead to their penal 
exclusion. In this case, the existence of the insider/outsider dualism provides penal subjects 
against which penal repression can materialise.  
 
The following sections summarise the sources of Italian penal trends by reference to some of 
the political conflicts and dualisms incorporated into Italian state institutions. Before moving 
to this explanation it is worth pointing to another key feature of the Italian polity: considering 
its history, we can observe that Italy’s institutions do not ‘work together’ to produce a 
relatively ‘coherent’ state setup1336. Conflict is incorporated into Italian institutional structures 
and is not just part of its political life. So if, in other national contexts, institutions seem to 
tame political conflict in some way – such that from a bird’s eye view they present a more 
coherent scenario – in Italy this has not been the case. Though the state has developed to work 
despite constant conflict, it has not developed in such a way as to temper the conflict. This has 
led to a divorce between the post-war political ‘project’, and the present, more fragmented 
Italian reality. Conflicts and dualisms are an expression of this evolutionary path and partly 
cause, because they reinforce, Italy’s institutional instability. These conflicts find expression 
in the divided allegiances to the Italian state and its penal law.  
The additional conceptual implications of Italy’s evolution, which takes us back to 
the ‘Italian challenge’, is that the Italian state escapes unitary definition. Italy cannot be 
characterised using models that presume high levels of institutional coherence. There is, for 
example, a marked contrast between Italy and the more centralised political institutions of the 
British ‘liberal market economy’1337. This is why Italy always appears as a particular scenario 
incapable of being systematised, implying that its penality likewise escapes systemisation. 
Contrary to this implication, I have argued that Italian penality can be systematised by 
factoring in certain contextual features like political dynamics. The Italian case study suggests 
that analyses of contemporary western penality should look more closely at the politics that 
influence penality, and how they do so in different contexts. I also argue that Italy points to 
one aspect of ‘politics’ of particular relevance to accounts of contemporary penality in other 
national contexts: the legitimacy and function of the penal law. In order to understand Italian 
penal trends, I have had to ask why and when the state will rely on its penal arm; and who, 
and when, will make use of the penal law. I claim that similar questions can be asked about 
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other polities. In accounts of British penal evolution we might ask, for example, why recent 
calls for ‘law and order’ have been made, and why they have found popular (‘populist’) 
purchase. We then have to understand how such demands find institutional anchorage, 
interrogating both the political viability of penal trends, and the structures that support them. 
It is essential for analyses of punishment to ‘build a systematic account of how political 
institutions shape penality’,1338 interrogating the extent to which ‘the distribution of political 
interests’ as well as ‘political mentalities and climates of […] opinion’ affect contemporary 
penality
1339
. 
 
In the following sections I analyse Italian penality by reference to political conflicts and 
dualisms. After reviewing how Garland, De Giorgi and Lacey’s accounts do not satisfactorily 
explain Italian penal trends, I suggest how my thesis contributes by modifying existing 
accounts of contemporary western penality. 
 
III. Political conflicts and penal effects 
Political conflict is incorporated in Italy’s politicised institutions, which transmit rather than 
limit the incidence and influence of conflict. Political conflicts, interacting with Italy’s 
dualisms, produce tensions towards penal exclusion or penal diversion/reintegration. The 
alternation between these tensions is the penal mark of a contested state, in which the criminal 
law functions as a statement of state authority, but where it is unevenly applied and appealed 
to. How do the various levels of conflict analysed in this thesis shed light on these dynamics? 
I deal with each conflict in turn, detailing how they interact with Italy’s various dualisms to 
influence penality. 
i. Conflicts between political interests: clientelism  
Like all nations, Italy can be analysed in terms of competing political interests. Historically, 
these interests have been components and competitors within the state (Chapters 3 and 4). 
This particular level of conflict explicitly points to the contested nature of post-war Italy and 
explains the existence of many of its dualisms. 
The warring of political interests, for example, plays a part in constituting the dualism 
between public and private networks, with its implications for reliance on in/formal social 
control. Political clientelism is an illustrative case: as seen in Chapter 3, the relationship 
between patron and clients mimics the relationship between state – as provider – and citizens  
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– as entitled recipients of provision such as ‘work income’1340. In so doing, the clientelistic 
network enters into conflict with the state, for the client-patron relation competes with the 
state-citizen relationship. It thus creates two tiers of allegiance, one of which (patron-client) 
often occurs in the interstices of the law.  
By creating a relationship of servilism between the client and the patron
1341
, 
clientelism weakens citizens’ sense of entitlements vis-à-vis what should be theirs by law. In 
this relationship, ‘rights are perceived as […] mere entitlements, satisfied by virtue of a 
favour’1342. I have argued that this increases reliance on informal social control in Italy: where 
rights are not conceived of as such, they will not be pursued as rights, with a subsequent 
restrictive effect on formal legal demands
1343
. This attitude may well extend to the penal law, 
keeping demands for formal resolution of conflicts relatively low. Clientelism also stimulates 
reliance on informal social control because of its own illicit nature. The relationship it 
establishes is one that happens in the interstices of the law (if entitlements are sold off as 
favours) or as a form of political corruption. In this context, the resolution of conflicts that 
occur within the clientelistic network will also happen outside the law
1344
: the clientelistic 
relationship produces incentives for a ‘parsimonious’ appeal to the criminal law (Chapter 3).  
 
Here we have a conflict of political interests that both expresses and reinforces the political 
dualism between public and private networks. It impacts upon penality by creating an 
opportunity structure for informal social control, enhancing the divergence between public-
state criminal law, and social control within private networks
1345
. It may, however, also create 
incentives for the deployment of the criminal law, by provoking the state’s reaction in the face 
of competing interests. The criminal law then becomes a tool for the imposition of an 
authority that remains highly contested (Chapter 2). This may also shed light on Italian 
legalism, the utopian reliance on the power of law as a tool for the resolution of conflicts and 
the creation of social cohesion. Legalism embodies notions of the appropriate role of the 
criminal law in a politically conflictual scenario. This has further implications for the actual 
purchase of law in different contexts.  
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ii. Conflicts between political interests: parties and policy constraints, the state and the 
family. 
This analysis does not exhaust the interrelations that exist within the conflict between political 
interests and the public/private duality. More links can be traced, for example, in its impact on 
dimensions of welfare provision. The previous section merely serves as an example of the 
interplay between the various dimensions of Italian politics and their impact on the nations’ 
penal trends. The same is true of the following explanation of conflict between parties. 
 
As we have seen in Chapter 3, during the First Republic, the principal conflict was between 
the Christian Democratic Party (DC) and the Communist Party (PCI).  Of particular interest in 
this section is how this conflict impacted on the evolution of the welfare state. We recall that 
conflict between the two parties, as well as divisions within the political Left, occurred within 
the context of Italy’s consensus-oriented system1346. Within a system with many veto-
points
1347
, capillary political tension enhanced legislative immobility: reform required 
consensus, but consensus was not forthcoming. This led to the situation whereby Italy had 
neither the impetus to develop as a fully corporatist nation, nor the impetus to develop as a 
fully liberal nation,
1348
 and the Italian welfare state developed as ‘corporatist’ yet 
‘fragmented’1349. The meant that the Italian state’s claims to comprehensive provision of 
welfare and labour were never fully realised, a discrepancy enhanced by stark regional 
differences, for example across the ‘three Italies’. The welfare state therefore had to be 
supplemented by a series of parallel, private, structures. Here we find Italy’s private/public 
welfare dualism. 
 I have focused on two particular ‘supplementary’ structures that illustrate this tension: 
clientelism and the family (Chapters 3 and 4). The family can function as a welfare 
supplement through the presence of an adult male breadwinner, who typically shares his state-
provided entitlements (such as salary, or pension) with the rest of the family. Like the 
clientelistic network, it also illustrates the dualism between private and public networks in 
Italy – intermediate normative orders in competition with the state. This conflict between 
political interests bolsters both the use of the criminal law as a tool to strengthen the state in 
the face of internal divisions, producing pressures towards penal expansion. Yet it also 
entrenches the existence of private networks that catalyse reliance on conflict-resolution 
outside of the penal sphere. Occasionally, the diversionary role of the family has been explicit 
– for example where it acts as a procedural advantage for youth offenders. In this instance the 
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state relies on the family and the ‘variety of soft sanctions’ it exercises1350, as a corrective 
structure. 
iii. Conflict between parties: particularising the state. 
Conflict between parties is important not just because of its constraining effect on Italy’s 
political economy. It is also important because post-war Italy can be classed as a partycracy 
(Chapter 3), meaning that parties have been the primary political players, dominating the state 
and its institutions
1351
. State and institutions, permeated by parties, have absorbed and 
reflected the competition between them, and the state has thereby functioned along 
particularistic lines. 
 
This phenomenon has interesting penal implications. Partycracy and clientelism, fragment the 
state
1352
, which appears carved up along particular interest lines, blurring the line between 
private and public. I argue that the ensuing fragmentation, and the dualism it reinforces, re-
casts the relationship between state and citizen as one of ‘mutual’ lack of trust. The state sees 
its relationship with civil society primarily as the imposition of ‘a sovereign state over its 
subjects’1353 – of authority by penal means. Citizens will also see the state in the light of its 
penal reaction, perhaps one to elude precisely because of its repressive character
1354
. 
However, the imposition may not only fail to command authority, but also fail to curb the 
illicit practices against which it is directed, particularly if they are embedded within state 
practices, for example in judicial collusion with corrupt politicians, or particularistic 
practices. The state then becomes purveyor of severity and of illegality. 
Illegality is then so ‘widespread’1355 that we witness an ex post facto acceptance of illicit 
behaviour
1356
 which may account for Italy’s tension between principled statement of political 
intent, and pragmatic political measures responding to a reality that does not match its ideal. 
We can see amnesties precisely in this light, as pragmatic and short-term solutions to 
unresolved structural problems (Chapter 2). This ex post acquiescence enhances the 
perception of the state as relatively unreliable: it reinforces citizens’ distrust, increasing 
reliance on private networks and their potential informal social controls.   
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iv. Conflicts within the state: judges and judges; judges and politicians. 
The purchase and role of the penal law are also relevant to a discussion of judicial 
contributions to penal trends, as both are influenced by judicial action. In Chapter 5, I used 
the notion of judicial legitimacy to explore the interaction between judges and the political 
class, judges and the public, and judges and other judges. All three sets of interactions have 
expressed different levels of judicial legitimacy over the decades, and the varying legitimacy 
of judicial action is highly consequential for judges’ influence on penality at different times. 
The Italian case confirms the importance of understanding the conditions under which judges 
are susceptible to political and public influence on punishment.   
 The relationship between judges and politicians has been, at various times, one of co-
operation, collusion and conflict. It has affected judicial legitimacy, and produced varying 
penal pressures. The collusion that is thought to have existed between portions of the 
judiciary and political classes, for example during the 1980s, produced incentives not to rely 
on the formal penal law (low public legitimacy). By contrast, the co-operation that occurred 
between the judiciary and political classes, for example during the 1970s, (high political 
legitimacy) produced variable incentives. By stimulating contact between the two state 
branches, it ensured that any judicial advice against penal expansion could find appropriate 
institutional interlocutors. However, given that co-operation partly occurred over the 
‘management’ of Italy’s emergencies and resulted in the creation of significant judicial 
powers
1357
, it also produced the potential for penal expansion by the use of such powers. 
Judicial action against terrorism/organised crime points to Italy as a contested state, forced to 
react to frequent attacks against its authority. It also leads us to look at judicial actors as 
representatives of the Italian state (in periods of high public legitimacy), raising the issue of 
judicial self-conception (changing internal legitimacy).  
In Chapter 5, I concluded that, given the structure of the Italian judiciary – 
composition, institutional position and independence – which has sustained the existence of 
different attitudes within the judiciary and different interactions with public and political 
class, judicial action has produced variable penal effects. A heterogeneous judiciary set in a 
context that offers diverse incentives means that judicial action cannot easily be correlated 
with penal trends. It is not possible, when considering the judiciary, to predict whether they 
are incentivised to contain or convey punitiveness. At the end of Chapter 5, I had thus 
suggested that we look to the subjects of penality in order to better understand patterns of 
punishment. The other conflicts summarised in this conclusion, which intersect with the 
dualism between public and private networks articulations of welfare (Chapter 3, 4 and 6), 
highlight Italy’s insider/outsider dualism, and articulate it in terms of political belonging.  
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IV. Insiders and outsiders. 
I argue that political belonging – for example belonging to a political clientele or working in 
an SME in the ‘Third Italy’ – mitigates formal penal censure where this belonging creates 
parallel networks of allegiance and conflict resolution. This avoidance should not necessarily 
be taken to imply illegality: it may mean simply that the penal law is not seen as the 
appropriate tool to resolve conflicts created by deviance.
1358
 The importance of political 
belonging, may then explain why it is immigrants who, in the 1990s, bear a disproportionate 
brunt of Italian penal expansion. The deficit in political belonging is particularly true for 
migrants, though not confined to them. I have argued that migrants’ ‘outsiderness’ should be 
seen in political terms, rather than only in terms of economic marginality
1359
. It is true that 
immigrants generally do occupy conditions of economic marginality due to the interaction of 
immigration law and labour market demands,
1360
 and that this economic marginality 
precipitates both migrants’ involvement in crime and their criminalisation. However, I argue 
that economic marginality is insufficient to explain non-EU migrants’ overrepresentation in 
Italian prisons; this requires the additional consideration of their political outsiderness. 
In the heavily politicised Italian context, where the informal extra-legal realm is 
particularly important, ‘political’ belonging is a necessary complement to formal legal 
identity, allowing people to tap into resources otherwise not available to them. Crucially, 
political belonging allows citizens to tap into informal resolution of conflicts and hence avoid 
formal penal censure where such conflicts develop. The incentives to resolve conflicts with-
out the penal law are not just expressions of cultural tendencies, but have institutional 
anchoring. They find support and amplification in political and political-economic 
institutions, for example partycracy and clientelistic networks, but also the small and medium 
enterprises of northern and central Italy – relatively small units that foster mutual investment 
between members
1361
. The existence of such structurally-grounded buffers to penal expansion 
has, I argue, tempered tendencies towards expansion even after the political transition of 
1990s and the consequent change in dominant political ideologies. The outcome of these 
buffers in a new ideological context is a selective deployment of the criminal law that has 
fallen on migrants as a ready example of political outsiders (Chapter 6). Though in this thesis 
I have only investigated non-EU migrants, my discussion of political belonging and 
punishment opens up the agenda for future research, geared at investigating changing 
conditions of political inclusion and their impact on punishment. 
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V. Italy in theoretical perspective and penal theory from an Italian vantage point. 
In sum, the Italian scenario cannot be readily accounted for by Garland, De Giorgi and Lacey. 
None of the theories explicitly consider comparable political dynamics, which I have argued 
are crucial to understanding Italian punishment. Short- and mid-term political dynamics of the 
kind that I have elucidated in the Italian case are relevant political dynamics in all contexts, 
and we should recalibrate our analyses of contemporary Western penality to include their 
more direct consideration as a penal determinant, even where political dynamics are not as 
visibly interlinked with penality as they are in Italy
1362
. 
More than this, I claim that political dynamics do, in fact, form an implicit part of 
Garland and Lacey’s theoretical frameworks. In The Prisoner’s Dilemma, for example, the 
dimension of politics is one of the multiple layers on which Lacey’s analysis rests1363. Italy 
does not fit the VoC models which Lacey’ works with, but it does show that the dimension of 
politics can, under certain institutional conditions, operate as a primary factor influencing 
penal trends. This occurs very clearly in Italy, where the state has not developed the same 
institutional integration as ideal-type liberal or coordinated market economies, and has 
consequently experienced political volatility. 
Garland’s analysis, unlike Lacey’s, is not articulated in clearly institutional terms. Yet 
political dynamics play a part at several stages of The Culture of Control. The dynamics are 
relevant to Garland’s discussion of the transformation of the state in late modernity. Garland’s 
account can be seen as a story of penality in political transition, during the course of which 
law and order has been politicised, and during which political discourse has been hijacked by 
law and order issues.
1364
 In this transition, the type of authority commanded by the state has 
been reconfigured, and the expansion of the penal law, and of punitiveness, speak of a decline 
in political authority in favour of penal reaction. 
We witness a similar but not identical development in Italy during the 1990s, as the 
penal expansion of the decade can be seen as the penality of a political transition. Admittedly, 
it would be difficult to talk of the reconfiguration of the myth of the sovereign state in 
Italy,
1365
 given the conflicts and dualisms of the Italian state. However, the 1990s do stand out 
as a decade of significant change, characterised particularly by the disappearance of 
longstanding political parties, the primary actors of the Italian polity, and the mediating link 
between central state and civil society. The disappearance of those parties was also 
accompanied by the end of the (Red/White) ideological cleavage so crucial to life in the First 
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Republic. With the aggregative and socialising effects of parties and ideologies gone, what 
remained was a partycracy in which interests were ever more particularised. Many of the First 
Republic’s structures remained, but without the impetus to look outside existing in-groups 
and into the public realm.
1366
  
At the same time, the political sphere – new parties, restructured parties and Italian 
politicians – was interested both in ‘re-qualifying’ itself in the public’s eyes after the 
corruption scandals and, paradoxically, in limiting prosecutorial action to prevent further 
investigation into political misfeasance. The penal law then became a tool to be embraced – a 
sign of state strength and political catharsis – but selectively. Here we find the impetus to 
penal expansion, but also to its differentiation. In this changed political context, political 
belonging remained important but more difficult to acquire, with the passing away of parties 
and ideologies that might have acted as routes to ‘insidereness’. Those who belonged did so 
as a part of already existing, and relatively closed, structures, and not because of the outward-
looking and inclusionary effect of political ideologies/parties. Those who arrived from 
outside, such as non-EU migrants, found that they did not belong, at a time when belonging 
was a primary means to temper the harshness of a (relatively) re-invigorated Italian penality.  
 
What we must understand about this process, over and above its ‘Italian’ features, is that it 
points to the political nature of contemporary penality, a feature that can also be seen in 
Garland, De Giorgi and Lacey. Recent penal developments express political arrangements 
within contemporary Western polities; these political arrangements have interacted with 
institutional structures to produce specific national penal trends.
1367
 In certain contexts they 
have allowed moderation even in the face of putative ‘global’ pressures towards penal 
expansion; in others, they have allowed penal expansion and the entry of ‘law and order’ 
rhetoric into political discourse. In Italy, they have produced differential punitiveness. The 
politics that influence penality are important in all of these contexts, though they are more 
apparent in some than in others. Their visibility in Italy is due to the nation’s 
institutionalisation of a politics both conflictual and replete with dualisms. However, insofar 
as it has implications that go beyond the Italian context, this study of Italian penality hopes to 
have restored an explicit consideration of political dynamics to the analysis of contemporary 
penality in other Western states. 
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Appendix to Chapter 1 
A brief history of contemporary Italy 
This appendix provides a brief, schematic outline of Italy – its political institutions and its 
history. The account is meant as a complement to the discussions that occur throughout the 
thesis, in particular where they touch upon political events experienced between 1970 and 
2000. The reader should thus bear in mind that what follows is my selection of relevant 
historical events/institutional features. The latter have been chosen on the sole ground that 
they help to my analysis of Italian penality more intelligible to readers, and in particular those 
unfamiliar with the Italian context
1368
. This summary has no pretentions of being an 
exhaustive account of a highly controversial and contested political experience.  
 
After sketching a basic overview of Italian institutions, my focus in this outline is on the main 
political events, and the main political players, of the Italian Republic (up until 2000). Events 
and players function as a crucial backdrop to the processes I analyse in the main chapters. 
a. The Constitution; central government; local government. 
The Italian Republic was established in 1946 and its Constitution was passed in 1948. The 
Constitution was drawn up by a Constitutional Assembly, elected by proportional 
representation, and composed of Italy’s various anti-fascist forces1369. It established that the 
Republic was a parliamentary democracy, with the President of the Republic at its head. 
Italy’s parliament was designed as composed of two chambers – Senato (Senate) and Camera 
dei Deputati (Chamber of Deputies): both chambers must approve legislative acts for the 
latter to pass
1370
. The head of the Italian government is the president of the Council of 
ministers, and is appointed by the President of the Republic. According to John Foot ‘this 
[structure] has left most of the real power with Parliament itself, and hence with political 
parties’1371.  
 
The Constitution also established the relationship between Italy’s central and local 
government. It set up an ‘asymmetric’ form of regionalism1372 – a system neither fully federal 
nor fully centralised – based on a three-tier system of ‘responsible sub-national governments: 
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the municipalities (comuni), the provinces and the regions’1373. Note, however, the delayed 
implementation of this system, with regions established in 1970
1374
. During the course of the 
1990s greater steps have been taken to satisfy Italy’s ‘growing but disorderly demand for 
federalism’1375. These range from the direct election of mayors and province presidents 
(1993); to increasing devolution of ‘resources and operational responsibility to local 
authorities’ during the second half of the 1990s1376. Looking just beyond my reference period 
(for greater contextual clarity) note that in 2001 the Constitutions’ chapter on local 
government was also reformed. The reform consolidated the changes previously made to the 
distribution of legislative powers between state and local authorities. It has also widened 
regional competences to include economic policy and planning
1377
. At the end of this process, 
regions and local governments have ‘enhanced their role in the […] political system’1378. 
However, given its persisting weaknesses, (lack of uniformity, complexity, stop and start 
motion of changes
1379) the system must still be defined as ‘transitional’1380. 
 
b. Buffers against centralisation: the electoral system, checks and balances, the judiciary 
Crucial to both the ideation and functioning of Italian political life, was the balance of powers 
within the Republican set up. This feature, with its sometimes-unexpected consequences, 
came to play an important role in the evolution of Italian political life and thence penality. 
Similarly, and unsurprisingly, the Italian legal system influenced its penal trends both through 
its rules (legislation and procedure) and through its actors.   
Beginning with the Italian electoral system we see that, from its outset and until 1993 
the system was a very pure form of proportional representation. After 1993 (and up to 
2005
1381) the nation shifted to a ‘mixed’ system, with both PR and first-past-the-post 
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components
1382
. The initial choice of PR points to one of the primary concerns that informed 
the construction of the Italian Republic. It speaks of a desire to build checks and balances into 
the national framework
1383
, with the aim of creating buffers against the excess centralisation 
of powers (an extreme form of which Italy had experienced under Fascism). Arguably, it is in 
the interest of establishing such checks and balances that Italy has a Constitutional Court, 
with the power to declare laws unconstitutional: ‘the civil and penal codes are now full of 
minor and major amendments to laws and norms, imposed over time by Constitutional Court 
decisions’1384. The structure of the judiciary as a whole could also be seen as an example of 
the balance of powers established in Italy. The judiciary’s independence is notable in this 
respect (see chapter 5), as the judiciary benefits from total independence from the executive 
and the legislature. Note also that Italy is a civil law, rather than common law, country. At its 
most basic ‘Italian law has been shaped around two broad legal codes: the penal code, and the 
civil code’1385. Its penal code is still the 1930 Rocco code, i.e., the code passed under Fascist 
rule; it has never undergone wholesale reform, but has been subject to modifications during 
the course of Italy’s republican history (for which see chapter 2). In terms of penal procedure 
Italy was, up until 1989, a ‘mixed inquisitory process [with] an inquisitory pre-trial phase and 
an accusatory trial phase’1386. In 1989 penal procedure was reformed, with a view to aligning 
it with the American adversarial system
1387
. Commentators agree that the reform has in fact 
produced a ‘mixed’ system, with a layering of accusatorial and adversarial features1388 (see 
chapter 5). 
 
c. The cold war at home and abroad: international divisions and mass parties. 
Leaving Italy’s institutions to look at its history, we should note first that Italian post-war 
history was strongly influenced by cold-war dynamics, affecting the shape and influence of 
Italian political parties. Up until the early 1990s Italy was a country of mass parties – ‘with 
political sub-cultures that spread their tentacles deep into civil society, the economy and 
cultural spheres’1389 – such as the Christian Democrats (DC 1942-1994) and the Communist 
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Party (PCI 1921-1991). The two were primary contenders in the Italian political struggle
1390
. 
This was so at an electoral level but also in terms of the influence each ‘bloc’ had within 
Italian society. The PCI in particular had a ‘[highly] developed membership organization’1391 
as well as multiple associations across social sectors: culture, sports, leisure organizations and 
so on
1392
. The DC was initially weaker in this respect, but could count on the support of 
religious organizations and, after 1948, on its effective control of the state and state 
bureaucracy
1393
. 
The DC/PCI rivalry clearly mirrored the international division between communism and 
anti-communism
1394
. This produced a situation whereby the PCI was forever excluded from 
central – though not local – government because of its ideological affiliations, and its links to 
the Soviet Union
1395
. By contrast the DC had as its primary credential that of being anti-
communist: reason enough for it to maintain power, and a shield against criticism of the DC’s 
political attributes
1396. Giovanni Sartori has described this system as one of ‘polarized 
multipartitism’  – with a multiplicity of parties, set in between two ‘anti-system parties’1397. In 
this system only ‘peripheral alternation’ was possible, i.e., alternation at the level of the 
‘small centrist parties’1398 allied with the DC1399. 
As of 1947, and until its demise in the early 1990s, the DC remained the dominant party 
in government. This led to ‘an extraordinary [identification] between the Christian 
Democratic party and the republican state’1400. However, this should not be taken to imply a 
necessary coherence of aims in the party’s mode of governing1401. According to Ginsborg, the 
DC was in fact beset by numerous tensions over ideology, representation of interests and 
party organization
1402. At the level of ideology, the tension was between ‘traditional Catholic 
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social theory’ and ‘liberal individualism’1403. At the level of representation, tensions were 
engendered by the DC’s desire to be ‘inter-classist’: not of the right, nor of the bourgeoisie, 
but a party of the centre, capable of representing capital; as much as the middle classes (urban 
and rural); as much as Catholic workers
1404
. Organizationally, tensions were embodied and 
entrenched by the DC’s notable factionalism. This was caused, in part, by its failure to 
develop strong central leadership
1405
. Each faction ‘rotated around one or more leaders of 
national importance, was soundly based in at least one region of the country, and demanded 
its share of governmental power’1406; DC factions also controlled important ministries. 
Unsurprisingly, this fragmented the party and its mode of governance. Likewise so did the 
coalition governments into which the DC was forced during its time in power
1407
. Indeed, in 
exchange for their support and thus for parliamentary majority, its allies too demanded some 
influence over government policy
1408
. This situation weakened both the collegiate role of the 
Italian cabinet (Consiglio dei Ministri); and left Parliament with a subservient role to both 
‘minor sectional or even individual interests’1409. State resources were fragmented and 
particularised in order to satisfy the DC’s factions and coalition partners. This strategy was 
made possible by the DC’s increasing financial strength and autonomy, achieved through the 
creation of new government agencies and by increasing state control over the banking 
sector
1410
.  
 
Over time, and despite Italy’s ‘polarization’, the Communist Party and the Christian 
Democrats did grow closer together. In fact, between 1976 and 1979 the PCI provided 
‘common parliamentary support for a DC Cabinet’1411. This was the time of the so-called 
‘national solidarity’ governments. These governments were possible in part because the PCI 
had gradually loosened its links with the Soviet Union and ‘moderated’ its position1412. They 
also fulfilled a number of diverse functions. On the DC’s side, they served to defuse the PCI’s 
electoral strength (in 1976 the party had polled 34.4% of votes for the chamber of deputies 
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compared to 38.7% polled by the DC). The then leader of the DC – Aldo Moro – aimed to 
‘see the full legitimation of a reduced Communist Party at last capable of competing with a 
reformed Christian Democratic Party, though never able to defeat it’1413. The leader of the 
PCI – Enrico Berlinguer – was pursuing his vision of a ‘historic compromise’: an alliance 
between Communist, Christian Democrats and the Socialist Party (Partito Socialista Italiano 
– PSI) that would prevent Italy from splitting into two blocks, and would ‘[insulate] the DC 
and the [middle classes] from authoritarian temptations’1414. Finally, it was in the interest of 
both parties that they should be involved together in braving the economic crisis, and the 
terrorist threat that Italy was then facing
1415
. 
It was, in the end, the assassination of Aldo Moro by the left-wing terrorist Red-Brigades, 
that put an end to the ‘historic compromise’. The period of ‘national solidarity’, however, had 
been enough to weaken the PCI
1416
: by the 1980s, the party had returned to its erstwhile role 
of permanent opposition, but with declining electoral support
1417
.  
 
d. The 1960s and 1970s: economic crisis, social movements and political terrorism 
Of all the events that occurred between 1960 and 1970, I focus here on economic crisis, social 
mobilisation and the rise of terrorism. I look at the economic crisis because it provides some 
initial insight into Italian responses to the events thought to mark the beginning of post-
Fordism. Social mobilisation, because it helps us understand the reforms effected to Italian 
welfare during my research period (see chapter 3); terrorism because it features throughout 
the thesis as a form of crime that sheds light on the challenges faced by the Italian state and 
their various penal effects.  
Beginning with mobilisation: the late 1960s and the 1970s were marked by fervent social 
and political mobilisation among ‘students, workers, women, [and] youth’ in Italy1418. In part 
the mobilisation followed similar ‘student revolts’ in other European nations and in the 
United States. However, Italy’s ‘1968’ (as it is commonly known) was uncommon in its 
breadth and duration: a decade as opposed to the few months of the French ‘May 1968’1419. 
The years 1968 to 1978 also saw ‘a level of collective action and conflicts […] not matched 
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elsewhere’ in Europe1420. Consequently Italy experienced profound social changes, some of 
which were expressed and entrenched in legislative enactments. Thus in 1970 the Workers’ 
Statute was passed, entitling many (though not all) Italian workers to greater rights and better 
working conditions. Family law was reformed in 1975, establishing ‘parity between the two 
partners in marriage’1421. In 1977 voluntary abortion was decriminalised: a change that 
benefitted from the input of the Italian women’s movement. The welfare state was also 
expanded in this period with, for example, the 1978 establishment of the National Health 
Service.  
These events were occurring against the backdrop caused by economic crisis, experienced 
in Italy as in other advanced capitalist economies
1422
. According to Ginsborg, Italy was one of 
the European economies most vulnerable to the crisis: a state of affairs that reflected the 
nation’s over-reliance on oil; a capitalist class that ‘had […] responded to industrial unrest 
with investment strikes and the flight of capital’; weak governments; and a strong labour 
movement, unwilling to have the crisis absorbed by decreasing wages
1423
. The Italian 
economy experienced alternating periods of recession and recovery, as did many other 
advanced capitalist countries during the crisis
1424
. Italy suffered from stagnating production 
and (slowly) increasing unemployment
1425
. But the nation also responded to the crisis in ways 
particular to Italian conditions, i.e., with ‘a very high and lasting rate of inflation, the growth 
of the “black” economy, a limited decline in production and [a] spiralling public-sector 
deficit’1426. During this period Italian employers increasingly de-centralized their production 
to small firms, where trade union activism was difficult, and tax avoidance easier. Informal 
labour, with low labour costs but high profits, also held up the Italian economy despite the 
recession
1427
. Thus, the nation managed to maintain a more vital economy than captured in 
labour statistics suggested
1428
; though the cost was borne by public sector spending and public 
deficit
1429
, both of which increased across the crisis years. 
 
During the 1960s and 1970s Italy also experienced political conflict in a particularly violent 
form: terrorism. Terrorism was ‘Red’ (left-wing) and ‘Black’ (right-wing). ‘Red’ terrorism 
was the extreme expression of dissatisfaction with the Italian institutions, as ‘the most 
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militant sectors of the working class and of the student movements came to the conclusion 
that […] official and institutional politics’ would not bring ‘fundamental change’1430. As 
Percy Allum claims, some left-wing groups were thus ‘willing to countenance […] terrorism’ 
with the aim of ‘mobilising the working class for revolution’1431. Red terrorist groups – of 
which the Red Brigades (Brigate Rosse or BR) are a primary example – waged an attack 
against the central state by ‘kidnapping and assassinating state personnel’: from judges, to 
public sector workers, to police officers and to party officials
1432
. Notable is the 1978 
kidnapping and assassination of the leader of the Christian Democrats, and erstwhile Prime 
Minister, Aldo Moro.  
Black terrorism, by contrast, aimed to ‘block the leftward shift’ of Italian society as 
expressed, for example, in the industrial mobilisation of 1969 (the ‘Hot Autumn’). It did so 
through a ‘strategy of tension’ (that predates the explosion of red terrorism), i.e., the planned 
creation of disorder to be ‘blamed on the Left, in order to create the conditions for a military 
coup’1433. ‘Black terrorists’ were, in Foot’s analysis, ‘right-wing elements within the security 
forces, working with NATO agents and Italian neo-fascists’1434; groups that, as Allum claims, 
‘could count on the protection and connivance of the State authorities’1435. A crucial event in 
the strategy of tension was the 1969 bomb placed in Milan’s Piazza Fontana; one of numerous 
bomb strikes between the years 1969 and 1980
1436
.  
Judicial action was eventually undertaken both against those engaged in the strategy of 
tension, and against left-wing terrorism, though the connivance of state authority has arguably 
prevented full knowledge of black terrorism. By the mid 1980s ‘terrorism of the right and 
left’ had been defeated; thanks to the action of ‘some courageous judges and loyal state 
functionaries’; and with the contribution of former terrorists turned state witnesses (pentiti – 
‘the penitent’)1437. 
 
e. Organized crime 
The state faced also a second challenge from organised crime during much of its Republican 
history. Initially concentrated in Western Sicily, Italian organised crime – the Mafia – 
expressed the central state’s failure to ‘impose authority and establish consent’ in the 
                                                     
1430
 Pasquino (2000, p. 75) 
1431
 Allum (2000, pp. 28-29) 
1432
 Ibid., p. 30 
1433
 Foot (2003, p. 57) 
1434
 Ibid. 
1435
 Allum (2000, p. 29) 
1436
 Foot (2003, p. 57) For a more detailed reconstruction of terrorism and the strategy of 
tension in Italy see: Della Porta (1995); Ginsborg (1990, pp. 333-335; 361-366; 379-387) 
1437
 Pasquino (2000, p. 75) 
 262 
region
1438. Its primary activities have been drug trafficking and the ‘politico-military control’ 
of given territories
1439
. Mafiosi are, in one influential analysis, entrepreneurs whose service is 
protection against violence, the same violence whose control the state has failed to 
monopolise
1440. Threats against individuals’ personal or economic integrity, inflicted at the 
hands of organised criminals, also contribute to keeping demands for private protection 
high
1441
. 
The 1970s saw the Mafia ‘[flourish] as never before’ in Italy, as a consequence of an 
expansion in the international drugs trade
1442
. Involvement in the drugs trade increased the 
power wielded by organised criminals; it also destabilised the Mafia
1443
. Between 1981 and 
1983 this gave rise to fierce intercine warfare between competing internal groups within the 
Sicilian Mafia. Conflict with the State also increased during this period, with a number of 
state servants – judges, local politicians, members of the armed forces – assassinated by 
organised crime
1444
.  
During the 1970s and early 1980 organized crime expanded in Italy. The 
phenomenon was not just limited to Sicily and by the 1980s ‘it was possible for the first time 
to talk of an interlinked even if constantly conflictual southern Italian criminal class, with 
increasing activities and contacts in the centre and north of the country’1445. This expansion 
‘benefited’ from the collusion of ‘significant sectors’ of the political class1446. An exchange 
mechanism was established whereby organised criminality could ensure votes to politicians, 
from the areas it controlled; and politicians could ensure protection for organised 
criminals
1447
. This type of relationship was established first with the Christian Democracy and 
then, from 1970 onwards, with other government parties 
1448
. Crucial to this relationship were 
the resources available to the Italian political class, often distributed with a view to 
reinforcing personal clienteles, in whose distribution organized crime sought to participate
1449
. 
Despite the collusion between sectors of the political class and organised crime, there 
did exist state servants engaged in opposing the Mafia. Their operations intensified during the 
1980s and the decade saw, inter alia, the creation of a group of anti-mafia magistrates  
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including, notably, Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino
1450
. With the watershed decision 
by a senior mafia boss, to cooperate with this group, a ‘maxi-trial’ (maxi-processo) was held 
in 1986-7: 
 
‘Four hundred and fifty-six persons were accused of various crimes, among them 
legendary [Mafia] leaders […] At the end of the trial in […] 1987 the court found 344 
defendants guilty and inflicted nineteen life sentences on Mafia leaders’1451  
 
The Italian Cassation Court confirmed the verdicts in 1992
1452
; the Mafia soon exacted its 
revenge: first through the assassination of politicians, and erstwhile ‘partners’ of the Mafia, 
who had failed to protect them
1453
; then with the assassination of judges Falcone and 
Borsellino (in May and July 1992 respectively). Moreover, in 1993 bombs exploded in some 
of Italy’s major cities including Florence and Milan (i.e. cities outside the regions where 
organised crime ‘traditionally’ operated), as a further warning against the state’s anti-mafia 
activities
1454
. 
f. From 1980 to 1990: a blocked democracy 
Thus, during the 1980s Italy witnessed the rise, and partial fall, of organised crime. At the 
level of politics, the 1980s are also the period of what Pasquino terms a ‘blocked 
democracy’1455. This is the era of the pentapartito (1980-1992) and came after the centrist 
coalitions of 1947 to 1962; the centre-left coalitions of 1963 to 1976 and the national 
solidarity governments of 1976 to 1979
1456
.  
As its name indicates, the pentapartito was a five party coalition government composed 
of the Christian Democrat and Socialist Parties, as well as the Liberals, Republicans and 
Social Democrats
1457
. The PSI (1892-1994) was originally a Marxist workers’ party, and was 
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an important player to the left of the Republican political spectrum
1458
. It represented workers 
but also sectors of the middle class; and until 1956 acted in concert with the PCI. As of 1956, 
however, the PSI distanced itself from the PCI, and from the early 1960s the Socialists were 
part of the centre-left ruling coalitions. In 1976 Bettino Craxi became its leader and under 
Craxi the party joined the ‘pentapartito’. Craxi himself was prime minister between 1983 and 
1987: under his leadership the PSI increased its electoral support. John Foot describes the PSI 
under Craxi as ‘a post-labourist body, breaking […] with the symbols of socialism […] and 
its traditional [working class base]’1459. Pasquino claims that Craxi ‘inaugurated a new style 
of politics’: one of confrontation with Italy’s ‘politically relevant organizations’, that stood in 
contrast to the DCs tendency to constant negotiation with the same
1460
.  
The PSI embraced ‘[modern] trends of entrepreneurship, of consumption and individual 
liberty […] without […] any reflexive filters’1461. This itself stood in stark contrast with the 
austerity that the PCI was then advocating. The two parties consequently drew apart; Craxi in 
fact aimed to marginalise the PCI
1462
 and, ultimately, the alliance between PSI and DC 
achieved just this. This marginalisation contributed to halt any political turnover within the 
Italian political system, that would have followed had the PCI been formally recognised as a 
plausible political partner. Given their stable and unquestioned presence in power, the 
government parties grew more powerful and, if Pasquino is correct, they came to benefit from 
substantial impunity. In this environment – characterised by a mentality of ‘enrichissez vous’ 
– political corruption flourished1463. The state budget bore the burden of corruption; 
unsurprisingly, then, under the pentapartito the Italian public debt finally surpassed national 
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GNP
1464
. However, impunity did not last, and in the late 1980s/early 1990s a series of national 
and international transformations combined
1465
, that ended the pentapartito, and the political 
system it inhabited. 
 
g. The 1990s: crisis and transition. From First Republic to Second Republic. 
As a whole, the 1990s were a time of time of crisis and transition in Italy. Given the 
importance of this transition in my thesis, it is worth dealing with it in some detail. Note that 
the peak of the crisis occurred between 1992 and 1994; though the political transition lasted 
across the 1990s
1466
.  
 Within the space of ten years Italy saw the collapse of its erstwhile party system and 
the end of its mass parties. Partly this was the result of investigations into political corruption 
(see below) that left none of the nation’s elites untouched: from political elites, through 
administrative elites, to economic elites
1467
. The Christian Democrats and the Socialist Party, 
and their coalition parties within the pentapartito, all disbanded during these years, following 
their involvement in the corruption scandal. The Communist Party had itself been re-defined 
in 1991, following the fall of the Berlin Wall, and had consequently split. Its heirs were the 
Democratic Party of the Left  (Partito Democratico della sinistra – PDS) and the smaller 
Communist Refoundation (Rifondazione Comunista - RC )
1468
.  
 As the mass parties were unravelling, a series of popular referenda were promoted, 
including referenda in favour of electoral reform. In 1993, for example, the electorate was 
called to vote on whether proportional representation, for elections to the Senate, should be 
repealed 
1469
. The overwhelming majority of voters agreed that it should
1470
; an event that 
forced the political class to promote reform, though it was ultimately under a technical 
government that the latter was passed.  By 1993 Italy had shifted away from proportional 
representation to a ‘mixed’ system (25 percent PR, 75 percent majoritarian – see chapter 3) 
that moved the nation closer to bipolar political competition, though it did not reduce party 
fragmentation. The new electoral system was a further nail in the coffin of the Italian party 
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system, as its parties were now bereft of the electoral mechanism that had allowed them, by 
granting them a share of political influence, to partake of Italy’s partitocrazia1471.  
Parties’ growing arrogance and corruption1472 were particularly noticeable at this time, 
given the economic crisis that Italy was traversing. In Italy as in Europe the ‘great post-
Maastricht depression’ had struck1473. In Italy it took the shape of high budget deficits that the 
then government attempted to tackle by means of a budgetary reform and cuts in fields such 
as health and social insurance. The government also increased taxation and took some steps 
towards privatizing public sector companies, including the energy companies ENI and ENEL 
(for an evaluation of these measures in comparative perspective see chapter 3)
1474
. It is 
important to note that at least some of the reforms passed during the period benefited from the 
agreement (if not support) of the trade unions. During this era ‘consensual compromise 
between government, employers and trade unions became the very basis of governance’1475. 
The technical government appointed in 1993, under Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, further reformed 
industrial relations
1476
: following the changes implemented by the technical government, trade 
unions and employers’ association and governments, were drawn into ‘regular tripartite 
discussion’ in the formulation of labour policy1477. 
 
The first elections to be held under Italy’s new electoral system saw a panoply of new 
parties compete (see below). These elections are thought to mark the entry into the Second 
Italian Republic
1478
. Amongst the new parties, Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia (FI) and its 
allies, the National Allegiance (Alleanza Nazionale  – AN) and the Northern League (Lega 
Nord), were victorious. Berlusconi was a ‘media baron’ and an entrepreneur turned politician; 
he filled the political void left by the demise of the First Republic’s parties1479. He promised 
‘liberty from the state, from the Communists (real and imaginary) and from excessive 
taxation’1480. His allies were two unlikely bedfellows: on the one hand AN, ‘nationalist, with a 
Fascist past, convinced of the need for a strong centralized and interventionist state’, 
supported mainly in Rome and in the South
1481
. On the other hand we find the Lega: 
‘neolocalist and separatist, racist but not Fascist, anxious for the industrious North to be left in 
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peace […],wedded to the free market but not to the State’1482. The Lega garnered the vote of 
erstwhile DC supporters freed, by the end of the Cold War, of the need to vote the Christian 
Democrats against the ‘Communist threat’. The Lega’s success in particular, can also be 
ascribed to its anti-immigrant rhetoric, all the more powerful as Italy suddenly discovered 
itself a nation of immigration: slowly in the late 1980s and then with greater force in the 
1990s (chapter 6). 
In later years the coalition created by Berlusconi was to prove victorious; in its early 
years it was marked by instability. Thus, when in 1994 Berlusconi too was involved in 
ongoing corruption investigations, the Lega strategically withdrew its support and the 
Berlusconi government fell. After another ‘technical’ parenthesis, the rest of the decade saw a 
succession of centre-left coalition governments
1483
. The coalition was fragmented, and beset 
by instabilities which came to a head with a government crisis in 1998. Its main party – the 
PDS ‘lacked vision’ and had been unable to forge a new identity out of its Communist 
past
1484
. However, the centre-left was not without its successes. Crucially in 1996 – following 
a series of ‘drastic economic measures1485 – it managed to negotiate Italy’s re-entry into the 
European Monetary System, four years after the nation’s exit due to devaluation of the 
national currency
1486
. These and other achievements were nonetheless not sufficient, or not 
sufficiently publicised, for the centre-left to garner electoral success
1487
. In the absence of a 
strong leadership, the centre-left could not counter Berlusconi, whose revived coalition won 
the 2001 elections. 
h. Tangentopoli 
Crucial to the political crisis of the 1990s, and instrumental in the shift from ‘first’ to ‘second’ 
Italian Republics, are the events collectively described as Tangentopoli. During the early 
1990s (precisely in 1992) a group of Milan prosecutors (magistrati) began a ‘campaign for 
legality in public life’1488; or, as Nelken describes it, ‘the judges’ campaign to remoralize 
Italian public life’1489. This came in the form of investigations into political corruption, whose 
primary focus were politicians belonging to the then ruling partiers – the Socialist Party and 
the Christian Democracy
1490
. The investigation also exposed the connivance of businessmen 
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in the corrupt exchanges
1491
. As a result of the investigations, Milan was renamed 
Tangentopoli or ‘Kickback city’; but magistrates all over Italy took their cue from the Milan 
pool of magistrates, and the investigations extended across the nation. The term Tangentopoli 
then acquired a broader meaning, and has since been used to indicate the ‘highways and 
byways of corruption’1492 of Italian public life that emerged during this period. Tangentopoli 
was concerned specifically with the illegal financing of political parties, and the exchange of 
money between politicians, businessmen and managers of state holding companies. This 
exchange had, by the early 1990s, become highly systematised
1493. The ‘kickback 
mechanism’ was widespread: so much so that ‘at one time as many as a third of 
[parlamentarians] were under investigation’1494. Ministers, party leaders, administrators, civil 
servants, members of the secret services, all were involved
1495
. Those involved were accused 
of crimes ‘such as bribery, corruption, abuse of public office […] fraud, […] false accounting 
and illicit political funding’1496. Nelken has analysed Tangentopoli as the product of a 
confluence of disparate factors that, together, permitted a political ‘revolution’ at the hands of 
the judiciary. This ‘revolution’ did not aim to overthrow the existing political system ‘ in the 
cause of a new […] class or […] a new ideal’1497. Rather, it was conducted from within the 
law, and within the boundaries of constitutional propriety:  
 
‘Tangentopoli was the result of the determined exertion of their powers by some 
judges, using existing criminal laws approved by politicians themselves, which led to 
the condemnation not of individuals or factions but of a whole political class.’1498 
 
Tangentopoli was possible, Nelken explains, because of the particular structure of the Italian 
magistracy: judges’ and prosecutors’ independence, of executive and legislative control, was 
crucial in this respect. Similarly, the fact that judges and prosecutors belong to the same 
profession in Italy, meant that ‘each prosecutor [could benefit] from the same guarantee of 
independence as the judges’, and that each prosecutorial office could enjoy a high degree of 
autonomy in its decisions
1499
. These structural factors combined, during Tangentopoli, to 
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remove the investigations from political attempts to hinder their progress; they also allowed 
the ‘judges’ revolution’ to gain momentum (see chapter 5). 
 
The timing of Tangentopoli must also be linked to the particular politico-historical 
conjuncture that we have been describing in this section: ‘the ferment of political activity’ 
which saw the rise of the Northern League, and the referendum votes on the electoral system 
and ‘on the direct election of local mayors’1500. The end of the Cold War and the consequent 
drying up of foreign funds for the party system; the economic crisis and business’s reduced 
willingness ‘to keep paying bribes in the face of decreasing returns’ from the political class: 
all these events combined to weaken the political system and its parties. They also contributed 
to rupture the ‘silent collusion […] between the bribe givers and takers’, creating fertile 
ground for the Tangentopoli investigations to succeed where previous investigations had 
failed
1501
. 
 
As Tangentopoli progressed ‘[both] magistrates and politicians, as well as much of public 
opinion called for a solution’ but could not agree on what this solution could be1502. The 
magistrates wished to see the various Tangentopoli trials reach a verdict, and swiftly
1503
. They 
also urged for laws against corruption in order to prevent a repetition of the events that 
brought to Tangentopoli
1504. Politicians were ‘naturally enough […] more concerned with 
clemency’1505. The two positions could not be reconciled. By 1998, ‘of the 2970 cases 
connected’ with Tangentopoli only 566 had reached first level verdict; 106 of which not 
guilty, 61 by reason of the statute of limitations. Though the investigations had contributed to 
the collapse of the First Republic’s parties, as time progressed Tangentopoli was left to ‘fizzle 
out’1506. In Ginsborg’s evaluation of events: 
 
‘The prosecuting magistrates were too isolated to succeed. After initial enthusiasm 
for their actions, public opinion became more tepid, alarmed that the enquiries would 
delve too deeply into all aspects of Italian life. “Accommodations” and illegalities 
were too much a part of daily transactions for Italians to feel comfortable with an 
overzealous judiciary’1507. 
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Note that the ‘overzealous’ portion of the judiciary, was in any case a minority (see chapter 
5): other magistrati were ‘hostile, suspicious or with guilty consciences’1508. The left-wing 
parties, though mostly untouched by the investigations, were themselves not willing to 
support the magistrates and were quite happy to see their efforts wane
1509
. However, 
Tangentopoli remains significant in one important, and lasting, respect. The investigations 
into political corruption had ‘severely disturbed’ the balance of power in Italy, but had not 
replaced it with a new equilibrium between legislative, executive and judiciary
1510
. What is 
more, they had pitched the judiciary and political classes (or at least portions of each) one 
against the other. In coming years this conflict was to be amplified and dragged centre-stage. 
 
 
To sum up: by the end of the 1990s Italy had experienced the collapse of its political system; 
the decline of its traditional ideologies; the birth of new parties; two technical governments; 
electoral reform; exit and re-entry from the EMS; and the onset of immigration. This 
transition into the Second Republic had interesting and noticeable penal repercussions. 
Although continuities certainly existed between First and Second Republics, it is also true that 
‘[at] almost every level of Italy’s political institutions, questions had been asked which, if 
answered in a determined fashion, promised to alter significantly the nature of Italian public 
life’1511. 
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Table 1: Italian political parties from First to Second Republic 
 
Elections to 
Chamber of 
Deputies 
(date) 
1987 1992  From 1st 
to 2
nd
 
Republic  
1994 1996 
 Christian 
Democrats 
(DC) 
DC  
 
– – 
 – – Italian 
People’s 
Party (PPI) 
PPI 
 – – – Christian 
Democratic 
Centre & 
United 
Christian 
Democrats 
(CCD/CDU) 
   Forza 
Italia (FI) 
FI 
 Northern 
League (LN) 
LN LN LN 
 Communist 
Party (PCI) 
– – – 
  Communist 
Refoundation 
(PRC) 
PRC PRC 
  Democratic 
Party of the 
Left (PDS) 
PDS PDS 
 Socialist Party 
(PSI) 
PSI PSI – 
 Social 
democratic 
Party (PSDI) 
PSDI _ _ 
 Liberal Party 
(PLI) 
PLI – – 
 Italian 
Republican 
Party (PRI) 
PRI – – 
 Italian Social 
Movement 
(MSI) 
MSI _ _ 
 – – National 
Alliance 
(AN) 
AN 
 
Source: my elaboration on Ginsborg
1512
 
Note: this is only a selection of the main parties that received valid votes at the general 
elections of 1987, 1992 and 1994.  
Where one or more Second Republic parties succeeded a First Republic party, the former 
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have been placed underneath the latter. For example, the PCI was replaced by both RC and 
PDS; the Fascist MSI was replaced by AN. Clearly this is just a rough depiction of the 
evolution of Italian parties and cannot account for the nuances of political re-alignment in 
Italy between First and Second Republic. 
TIMELINE: A Brief History of Italy 1967-2000
1513
 
1967-68: Student rebellion – universities and secondary schools 
 
1969 - ‘Hot Autumn’: almost 1.5 million workers called upon to strike. Trade Unions active 
participants/organiser of workers’ movement.  
 
1969 – Disturbances in prison; demands are for reforms of system bearing a strong Fascist 
Legacy (1930 Rocco Code). 
 
1969 – Piazza Fontana massacre. Part of ‘strategy of tension’ 
 
1970 - Legislation:  
1) Workers’ Statute approved (safeguard of worker’s rights) 
2) Divorce made legal 
 
1970 – Attempt Coup d’Etat: ‘Golpe Borghese’ 
 
1970 – Communist Terrorist group -Red Brigades- instituted 
 
1971 – Economic Crisis: deflation 
 
1973- General elections 
Shift to the right: 
MSI – growth; especially in Southern Italy 
Centre-right coalition government (DC and co.).  
 
1973 Economic crisis: stagnation, inflation, unemployment 
Growth of submerged economy. CENSIS estimates for 1979: 15-20% of Italian economy 
 
1973 – Birth of movement for prisoners’ rights.  
Revolt within prisons. Creation of short lived Proletariat Armed Nucleus (NAP). Some of its 
members subsequently joined the Red Brigades 
 
1974 – Referendum on law allowing divorce: 1970 law on divorce kept by majority vote.  
 
May 1974  – Bomb explodes in anti-fascist demonstration in Piazza della Loggia, Brescia  
 
October 1974 – Bomb on train between Bologna and Florence 
 
1974 - Italian Communist Party (PCI) Secretary Berlinguer suggests ‘Historic compromise’: 
co-operation with Christian Democrats (DC), combining catholic solidarity and communist 
tradition of collective action. Historic compromise was to serve as bulwark against splitting 
the nation into two warring faction and in countering the tension strategy and consequent 
threat to democracy. 
 
1975 – Women’s movement acquired national importance 
1975 – Penal reform  
                                                     
1513
 Compiled from Ginsborg (1990, 2001) 
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 2 souls of reform: 
o Innovatory – alternatives to custody, stimulating contact between detainees 
and the ‘outside’ 
o Conservative – Art 90 allowing, in case of an emergency, suspension of 
changes wrought by the reform, lasting until normality re-established. 
 
1976 – First disturbance in female prison. Led by political detainees and complaining about 
prison conditions 
 
1977-78 – Red Brigades commence policy of indiscriminate action against professionals and 
State servants, aiming to  hamper the regular workings of the State. 
 
March – May 1978 – Red Brigades kidnap and kill Secretary of DC Aldo Moro. 
Law approved reducing punishment for terrorists who cooperated with police 
 
 
1978 – National Health System established 
1979  - General elections. 
 
1980 – Terrorist bombing at Bologna station 
 
1981 – ‘Pentaparty’ 
Alliance of DC, PSI, Republicans, Liberals, Social democrats – a coalition lasting a decade 
 
1981 – Prison reform. 
 
1981 – Referendum attempting to repeal legalised abortion: failed, law remained 
 
1981 – Milan magistrates uncover P2 – Masonic lodge, anti-communist, anti-TU. Defined by 
parliamentary commission as having polluted nation’s existence. P2 advocated system of 
diffuse corruption allowing to buy off ‘enemies’. Case transferred to more accommodating 
Rome magistrates. Verdict given 13 years later: according to the Cassation Court the P2 was 
primarily a ‘business association’ 
 
1981 – 1983 – Cosa Nostra: clan rivalry and drug trade disputes led to violent war between 
two factions. Mafia related murders of statesmen who opposed organised crime. 
 
1983 – Passage of Rognoni-LaTorre law establishing crime of Mafia association 
 
1983 – Craxi –PSI secretary- becomes Prime Minister 
Thatcherite values imported under Craxi: entrepreneurship, consumption, individual liberty. 
Personalised and simplified politics.  
 
Economic boom  - Maintained by high public debt and annual deficit 
 
1984 – Berlinguer dies; exacerbates decline of Italian communism. 
 
1986 – Gozzini Law –  
 following on from 1975 reform 
 extends possibility of non-custodial alternatives 
 reaffirms concept of differentiated punishment – a gradation of punishment on the 
basis of behaviour within prison 
 benefit-regime established 
 rehabilitative rhetoric: punishment as an opportunity to identify the prisoner’s needs 
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 still contains an (albeit diluted) opportunity to suspend benefits in cases of emergency 
 
1986/87 – Palermo ‘Maxi-trial’ against Mafiosi 
1987 General Elections – emergence Northern League in political spectrum 
 
1989 – Italy enters European Monetary System 
 
Recession 
 
1991 – Referendum: electoral reform. 
Reduced PR in elections to the Senate 
Abolished PR in local elections 
End of multi-choice preference voting in Chamber of Deputies 
 
1991-92: legislation against organised crime, identified specific cases of offenders who could 
not be rehabilitated except in extraordinary circumstances. Also: 
- more powers to police in cases of kidnapping 
- protection of collaborators 
- more transparent subcontracting 
- improvement coordination of police’s anti-mafia activity 
 
1991 – PCI dismantled. Split into PDS (Left Democrats) and, to its left, RC (Communist 
Refoundation) 
 
Feb 1992 – Beginning of Tangentopoli with arrest of Mario Chiesa:  
 
1992 – General elections: vote at lowest level. Collapse DC and PSI. Rise of Northern 
League. 
 
May 1992  - Magistrate Falcone killed by Mafia. 
Popular protest among critical middle class in Palermo. 
 
July 1992 – Magistrate Borsellino killed by Mafia. 
Protest gives way to exhaustion. 
7000 troops sent to Sicily – psychological measure. 
 
1992 TANGENTOPOLI 
 
1992 Lira plummets, Italy is forced to exit the EMS 
 
1993 – Reform of electoral system: move towards majoritarian, bipolar system 
 
1993 – Mafia bombs explode in major cities: reprisal for State’s anti-Mafia activism. 
 
1994 – Craxi (under investigation for Tangentopoli) flees to Tunisia 
Demise of DC, PSI and others. 
 
1993 – Birth of Forza Italia 
 
 
1994 – General elections: 
 Coalition headed by Berlusconi wins: includes inter alia Forza Italia, Alleanza Nazionale 
(former MSI) and Northern League 
Instability in governing coalition caused by Northern League 
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1994 Government collapses. 
 
1996 – Centre-Left government 
 
1996 – European crisis of confidence in Italy. 
High public debt and fast approaching deadlines for monetary union.  
Drastic economic reforms: increased cuts and taxation. 
Italy re-enters EMS 
 
1996 Government collapses due to withdrawal of support by RC. Replaced by other centre-
left government (succession of C-L governments lasts until 2001)  
 
2001 – end of Centre-Left mandate.  
Berlusconi’s campaign: 
- individual choice and liberty 
- limitation of State’s power 
- personal autonomy in the context of public security 
- action against politicized judiciary 
- safer Italian cities 
- action against illegal immigration and attendant crime1514 
 
 
2001 – Right-wing coalition headed by Berlusconi, wins election. 
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Figure 1 – Italian Prison Rates and Italian history (1970-2000) 
 
Source – My elaboration from: Campelli, Faccioli, Giordano, and Pitch (1992); Ginsborg 
(1990, 2001) 
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Appendix to Chapter 5 
The following appendix accompanies chapter 5: it is a (brief) ‘reader’s guide’ to those aspects 
of the Italian criminal trial mentioned throughout the chapter. It also contains a description of 
referenda in Italy, with particular focus on the 1987 referendum. 
 
I. Article 112 of the Italian Constitution – the legality principle 
Art 112 of the Constitution reads: ‘Il pubblico ministero ha l'obbligo di esercitare l'azione 
penale’: ‘the public prosecutor is under an obligation to initiate penal action’ where evidence 
is available. The principle ‘cannot be compromised even for supposed reasons of public 
interest’1515. A similar precept operates in Germany, but in Germany it is discontinued for 
offences that do not carry a mandatory minimum sentence
1516
.   
 
II. The Italian criminal trial and the 1989 reform 
Until 1989 Italian criminal trial did not differ significantly from other European inquisitorial 
systems
1517. Guarnieri and Pederzoli describe the latters’ general framework and note: 
 
- The existence of an inquiry stage at the end of which a decision to prosecute/dismiss 
charges is made. If the decision to prosecute is taken, the case proceeds to trial. This 
stage is important insofar as information gathered at the inquiry stage ‘forms and 
integral part of the file that the trial judge will receive’1518.  
- The role of an examining judge or public prosecutor in directing the investigation 
during the inquiry stage: ‘it is up to the examining judge to conduct investigations, to 
take decisions affecting personal freedoms, and to decide whether to withdraw the 
case or refer it to trial’1519. As a consequence, the examining judge is expected to 
conduct an impartial search for evidence that will either confirm or disprove 
charges
1520
. 
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 Art. 112 Cost.; Montana and Nelken (2011, p. 288) 
1516
 Guarnieri and Pederzoli (2002, p. 114) Nelken (2004, p. 22) 
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- The ‘limited weight given to […] adversarial principles’ at both inquiry stage and 
during trial
1521
. 
- The role of the trial judge in the inquisitorial system: ‘in continental systems evidence 
is not given through the confrontation of parties before an impartial judge with no 
prior knowledge of the case’. Rather ‘continental judges are allowed to exclude 
evidence they believe irrelevant and to search for elements considered pertinent to 
reach a decision’. As such they may question witnesses and defendants1522. 
 
Before 1989, the Italian criminal trial too possessed an inquiry stage. This investigative phase 
of the trial could be carried out ‘either by a public prosecutor’ or ‘by an examining judge’1523, 
both of whom were committed to a ‘non-partisan investigation’1524. The 1989 reform changed 
Italian penal procedure by: 
- Abolishing the examining judge 
- Entrusting prosecutors with investigation 
- Instituting a judge in charge of ‘preliminary investigations’, and responsible for ‘all 
decisions affecting personal freedom’. The judge for preliminary investigations also 
decides whether or not a case will proceed to trial
1525
.  
- Restructuring the trial as a ‘face to face confrontation of parties before a judge who is 
supplied with a far more limited file than before’1526. 
 
Figure 1 provides a summary of the Italian penal trial after 1989.  
                                                     
1521
 Ibid., p. 132 
1522
 Ibid., pp. 132-133 
1523
 Grande (2000, p. 229) 
1524
 This system was criticised for making the trial ‘little more than a repetition and 
confirmation of […] the earlier [investigative] phase’ with the judge simply reviewing the 
prosecutorial file: ibid., p. 229 
1525
 Guarnieri and Pederzoli (2002, p. 133) 
1526
 Ibid. 
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Figure 1: The Italian Penal Trial
1527
 
 
               
                                                     
1527
 Adapted from: Chiavario (2009); Grande (2000); Manna and Infante (2000); Mirabella 
(2012); Pizzi and Marafioti (1992) 
I. Preliminary investigation 
Carried out by public prosecutor. 
Reviewed by judge for preliminary investigations. 
Judge supervises the investigative activities e.g. wiretapping. 
Necessity for pre-trial detention decided at this stage.  
Prosecutor can ask for dismissal if she considers the case is too weak to lead to a 
conviction. 
Where there is enough evidence prosecutor makes formal request for committal to 
trial. 
 
II. Preliminary Hearing 
Determines whether the case proceeds to trial. 
Based on documents contained in prosecutor’s investigative file.  
Debate between parties occurs at the hearing. 
The judge for the preliminary hearing decides whether to continue to trial, or drop 
charges. 
Alternatives to trial can be allowed at this stage e.g. giudizio abbreviato: fast-track 
proceedings in which the judge is asked for a decision on the merits of the case. 
Alternatives also include plea-bargaining 
III. Trial Phase  
For criminal law cases the trial phase can be heard by: 
- Justices of the peace: for minor crimes 
- Tribunals: cover the majority of crimes.  
o The more serious cases are heard by 3 judges; the remaining by 
1 judge. 
- Court of Assizes: for more serious crimes including homicide. 
Court decides on guilt and sentence.  
IV. Appeal 
From Justices of the peace to Tribunal 
From Tribunal to Court of Appeal 
From Court of Assizes to Court of Appeal of Assizes. 
 
 
The appellate court may reform any aspect of the decision. This includes the 
sentence (in part or completely) and factual and legal conclusions.  
 
As a consequence of the appeal the first instance decision may be confirmed, 
modified or annulled. The appeal includes the possibility of retrial on the facts. 
 
Points of law are reviewed by the Court of Cassation. 
Appeal to the Court of Cassation are possible against unappealable sentences and 
against decisions made by the Appeals Court 
 
 
 
 
 280 
III. Lay participation to the criminal justice process – Italian collaborative courts 
Lay participation to the Italian criminal justice process occurs through collaborative courts: 
the Court of Assizes (Corte d’Assise) and the Court of Appeal of Assizes (Corte d’Assise 
d’Appello), with appeals from the Corte d’Assise being heard in the Corte d’Assise d’Appello. 
Similar collaborative courts are found in Germany, but unlike their German counterparts, the 
Italian collaborative courts have a significant number of lay judges relative to professional 
judges. There are 6 lay and 2 professional in Italy, compared to 2 and 1, 2 and 2, or 3 and 2 in 
Germany (depending on the type of court). In Italy, these courts try the most serious criminal 
offences i.e. those carrying a sentence of 24 years or over, or a life sentence. Appeal is still 
possible from the Corte d’Assise d’Appello, and goes to the Court of Cassation (Corte di 
Cassazione), which is composed entirely of professional judges.  
There is little research on the impact the lay component has on the Court’s sentencing 
practices. I would suggest that structural characteristics of the Italian judiciary are likely to 
produce results similar to those observed in Germany, whereby the actual influence of lay 
judges in mixed tribunals is limited, with the professional judge essentially directing the 
trial
1528. In Italy the effects of the ‘lay’ component may also be limited by the fact that 
offences serious enough to be tried by the Courts of Assizes are only a small percentage of all 
tried offences. 
 
IV. Referenda in Italy 
Referenda are provided for by article 75 of the Italian Constitution and they are abrogative 
because the electorate is asked to approve the repeal of one or more legislative provisions.  
Constitutional laws, tributary and budget laws, penal amnesties, or laws relating to Italy’s 
international obligations cannot be subjects of referenda.  
The Court of Cassation and the Constitutional Court must validate referenda; for the 
vote itself to be valid it must cross a threshold – a quorum – of 50% plus one of those entitled 
to vote. Any referendum is called for at the behest of five hundred thousand voters, or five 
regional councils
1529
. If it is successful, i.e., if the provision is repealed, the consequent 
legislative vacuum should be filled by the legislature, in keeping with popular will. This 
arrangement is not beyond criticism, and authors such as Bruti Liberati and Pepino
1530
 have 
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 281 
critiqued the use of referenda as a means to shift existing political equilibria, and to ‘influence 
the legislator’ over and above the specific issues addressed by the referenda1531.   
Bruti Liberati and Pepino argue that the 1987 referendum is a good example of this 
mechanism. The referendum asked a number of questions including whether the electorate 
was in favour of repealing provisions that excluded judges from incurring civil liability in the 
exercise of their functions. The electorate voted in favour of their repeal, and the ensuing 
legislative vacuum was filled with a law establishing civil liability for judges
1532
. According 
to the new legislation, citizens may proceed in damages against the State, if and when they 
have suffered unjust harm due to judicial misconduct (malice, gross negligence), or due to 
denial of justice, 
1533
. The State can then recoup part of the monies from the liable judge. 
 The referendum also asked questions relating to nuclear plants in Italy which, once 
answered in the affirmative, prevented the development of nuclear plants/reliance on nuclear 
power in Italy. The referendum also asked whether the parliamentary commission, entrusted 
with judging ministerial malfeasance, should be abolished and ministers be subject to 
ordinary prosecution. The electorate voted in favour of its abolition. 
In its concern with judicial liability, the 1987 referendum was integral to party 
political tactics of the time, and in particular to the power struggle that was occurring between 
the Socialist Party (PSI) and Christian Democracy
1534
 (DC). Thus, though initially 
campaigned for by other parties (Radical and Liberal), it was eventually ‘adopted’ by the 
Socialist Party as its own. The referendum also provided the PSI with means to advance its 
growing intolerance of judicial investigations into political misfeasance
1535
. Fortuitously for 
the Socialist party, and other parties interested in the referendum’s success, 1987 marked a 
time during which the issue of judicial liability enjoyed particular popular attention
1536
. Legal 
attrition also made its appearance on the scene, the blame for the length of legal proceedings 
increasingly being laid (by politicians and to a certain extent by the public) at the judiciary’s 
doorstep
1537
.  The tenor of the debate raging around the referendum is well summarised in the 
slogan used by its supporters -‘for a just justice’- which itself implied that unreformed, the 
existing system was in fact unjust
1538. As Chimenti recounts, ‘the two major parties, DC and 
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 Bruti Liberati and Pepino (2000, p. 10 My translation.) 
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1533
 For details see: Chimenti (1993, pp. 87-88, note 83) 
1534
 Ibid., p. 77 
1535
 Ibid., p. 84 
1536
 The interest had been sparked by a number of intersecting factors, including the 
spectacular sentencing and successive acquittal of television host Enzo Tortora. Tortora was 
initially sentenced for drug trafficking and ‘criminal association’ with the Neapolitan 
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PCI’ also backed the referendum once it became clear that the latter was (in part at least) ‘a 
referendum on the judiciary’ and that it was likely to succeed. Christian Democracy and the 
Communist Party urged their electorate to vote ‘yes’ to the questions posed by the 
referendum.  
As stated in chapter 5, the 1987 referendum result does not lend itself to 
straightforward interpretation. Roberto Cartocci, writing in 1988, suggests that what in fact 
swayed the vote was not the substance of the issues being debated, but the appeal of the two 
main parties – the DC and PCI – though they had given only lukewarm support to the 
referendum. He argues that the substantive question of judicial liability was in fact too 
complex, and the electorate insufficiently informed, for the majority of voters to have 
developed a well-defined opinion on the issue
1539
.  Unsurprisingly it was party allegiances 
that still commanded authority in the 1987 vote. Nonetheless the referendum can be seen as 
expressing some, politically mediated, public fear of unaccountable judicial activism
1540
. 
It is interesting to note that the 1987 referendum was not the only referendum that 
addressed issues of judicial roles and judicial structure. In 2000, for example, the electorate 
was called to vote upon the separation of judicial careers, separating magistrati in their 
adjudicative functions, from magistrati in their prosecutorial role
1541
. However the necessary 
quorum was not obtained 
1542
. 
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 Cartocci (1988, p. 72) 
1540According to Chimenti, the referendum’s promoters made it clear that the consultation was 
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Appendix to Chapter 6  
I. Italian immigration legislation 1968 – 20021543  
1986 Foschi Law (943/30, December 1986) 
First law on working immigration. Established equal treatment and equal rights for immigrant 
and Italian workers. It authorised family reunification and regulated entry for work reasons 
with monthly censuses. Non-EU immigrants were to be employed only after having 
established that there were no EU workers available.  
The law included a regularization. 
 
1990 Martelli Law 
Established workers quota system. Established residence permit for self-employed. Residence 
permits were valid for 2 years and renewable for 4 upon proof of continued employment.  
Immigrants working in the underground economy could make an ‘auto-certification’ of 
income, but only where they revealed the name of their employer The law included measures 
for refusal of entry at the frontiers (respingimento); measures for expulsions with 
accompaniment to the frontier (measures considered exceptional). The law provided for 
appeal against both measures. It created a fund for immigration policy.  
The law included a regularization. 
 
1992 Law on Citizenship 
Favoured the preservation of Italian nationality by descendants of Italian immigrants abroad. 
Increased to 10 years the period of uninterrupted residence needed for the naturalization of 
non-EU citizens. It also increased the obstacles to acquisition of citizenship for children born 
in Italy, but to foreign parents. 
 
1998 Turco-Napolitano Law 
First organic law on immigration. Reorganized the planning of immigrant flows, leaving it to 
the executive, to be reviewed every 3 years. Set up mechanism to determine the annual 
                                                     
1543
 This brief chronology has been constructed from the chronology included by Luca 
Einaudi in his book Le Politiche dell’Immigrazione in Italia dall’Unita’ a Oggi, and from 
Kitty Calavita’s analysis of immigration policy in Immigrants at the Margins: Calavita (2005, 
pp. 31-35); Einaudi (2007, pp. 416-417 All the material excerpted from Einaudi has been 
translated by the author). 
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worker quota: the quotas were to be established considering the number of foreign workers 
already on government lists, labour needs and unemployment rates  
Facilitated entry for work reasons – including job seeking. Residence permits were usually 
granted for two years, and were renewable if the original conditions (such as formal 
employment) persisted. Foreigners who lost their job could remain in Italy, for up to one year 
after redundancy, to seek new employment.   
 
The law established a sponsor system, whereby public entities – such as trade unions, 
employers’ associations, NGOs – could sponsor immigrants to come to Italy as job seekers. 
This was conditional on the sponsor guaranteeing the immigrant’s livelihood, and on the 
immigrant falling within established quotas. The TN law introduced permanent residency 
card (carta di soggiorno) for long-term residents. It also established a number of integration 
programmes.  
 
The carta di soggiorno required 5 years of uninterrupted legal residence; a legitimate 
occupation; enough income for the applicant to support herself and family (spouses and minor 
children were eligible for the carta). Once the carta di soggiorno was granted, legal residence 
was open-ended. 
 
The TN facilitated irregular immigrants’ access to urgent medical care  
However it also increased frontier controls, and instances of expulsion by accompaniment to 
the frontier. The law created centres for administrative detention of immigrants (Centri di 
Permanenza Temporanea - CPT).  
The law included a regularization. 
 
2002 Bossi-Fini Law 
Created the contract of residence for entry and work, closely tying legal residence to work 
contracts. Only with a work contract in hand could foreigners immigrate to Italy, and only 
within the quota system.  
 
The sponsor system was abolished. Where an immigrant was made redundant they had 6 
months (rather than 1 year under the TN) to seek new employment. 
The BF law shortened the duration of residence permits: permits were valid for a maximum of 
2 years and renewals had to be requested 3 months before expiry. It also limited family 
reunification to spouses and minors (excluding extended family) and increased the period of 
legal residence required for a carta di soggiorno to 6 years.  
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The law generalized deportation with accompaniment to the frontier, so that an official order 
to leave Italian territory, became the exceptional way of expelling immigrants. The BF also 
increased the maximum detention period in CPTs from 30 to 60 days. It further increased the 
custodial penalty for illegal re-entry and for trafficking. It introduced fingerprinting for all 
non-EU foreigners applying to renew their residence permit.  
The law included a regularization.
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